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BY

RICHARD BURN, LL.D.

CHANCELLOR OF THE DIOCESE OF CARLISLE,
AND VICAR OF ORTON IN THE COUNTY
OF WESTMORLAND.

“ The Temporal Law and the Ecclesiastical Law are so
“ coupled together, that the one cannot subsist without
“ the other.” *Lord COKE in Moore's Rep.*

THE SIXTH EDITION;

WITH NOTES AND REFERENCES

By **SIMON FRASER, Esq.**

BARRISTER AT LAW.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

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Vacation.

1. **B**Y the common law of the church, the profits of the vacation were to be laid out for the benefit of the church, or reserved for the successor; but by special privilege or custom, the bishop or archdeacon might have the same, or some part thereof: so also, it is said, the king might take the profits of a free chapel, and the patron of a donative the profits of such donative, during the time of vacation. *Lind. 137. Gibs. 749.*

Who shall have the profits during the vacancy of a benefice.

But by the statute of the 28 H. 8. c. 11. it is enacted as followeth: viz. *Forasmuch as in the statute for the payment of first fruits, it is not declared who shall have the fruits tithes and other profits of spiritual promotions, offices, benefices and dignities, during the time of vacation thereof; divers of the archbishops and bishops of this realm have not only when the time of the taking of tithes hath approached deferred the collation of such benefices as have been of their own patronage, but also have upon presentations of clerks made unto them by the just patrons deferred to institute induct and admit the same clerks, to the intent that they might receive to their own use the same tithes growing and arising during the vacation: so that thro' such delays (over and above the first fruits) they have been constrained to lose all or the most part of one year's profits, to their great loss and hindrance: it is therefore enacted, that the tithes, fruits, oblations, obventions, emoluments, commodities, advantages, rents, and all other whatsoever revenues, casualties, and profits, certain and uncertain, belonging to any archdeaconry, deanry, prebend, parsonage, vicarage, hospital, wardenship, provostship, or other spiritual promotion, benefice, dignity or office, growing or coming during the time of vacation, shall belong to such person as shall be thereunto next presented, promoted, instituted, inducted, or admitted, towards the payment of his first fruits.*

And if any archbishop, bishop, archdeacon, ordinary, or any other person or persons to their uses and behoof, shall receive or take the same, and shall not upon reasonable request render the same to the next incumbent lawfully instituted, inducted or admitted, or shall let or interrupt the said incumbent to have the same; he shall forfeit treble value, half to the king and half to the incumbent, to be recovered in any of the king's courts.

Vacation.

To such person as shall be thereunto next presented, promoted, instituted, inducted, or admitted] In order to receive the benefit of this clause, it is not absolutely necessary, that the clerk be presented by the lawful patron; but if he get institution and induction, tho' he is afterwards removed by *quare impedit*, he, and not the clerk who comes in upon such removal, shall have the profits of the vacation. And the reason is, because till he is removed, he is incumbent *de facto*, and as such is liable to all burdens and duties, and is therefore in reason and equity intitled to all the profits. 1 *Rol. Rep.* 62. *Gibf.* 749.

But in cases where the institution and induction are declared by law to be ipso facto void (as in case of simony, or the like), there the church having been really never full since the death of the foregoing incumbent, and by consequence the vacancy still continuing, there the profits of course shall pass to him who shall be next presented, instituted, and inducted. *Gibf.* 749.

But tho' the church doth become void by the omission of some subsequent duty to be performed, yet having been full by institution and induction, and the person thereby liable to the payment of first fruits, he shall not lose the profits of the vacation; only the profits from the time of such avoidance ipso facto will go to the next incumbent, as profits of the vacation, which commenceth from thence. *Gibf.* 749.

Inducted or admitted] This cannot be understood disjunctively, as if presentation or admission (without institution and induction) intitled the successor to the profits of the vacation; but admission here (coming after induction) was plainly added, to include those preferments which are not taken by institution and induction. And altho' in preferments which are so taken, institution gives a right to enter upon and take the profits as well of the vacation as others; yet that which alone can give a right to sue for them, is induction. *Gibf.* 749.

Sequestration is-
sued, on a bene-
fice becoming
void.

2. Anciently upon the death of an incumbent, without any formal sequestration, the rural dean was to take the vacant benefice into his safe custody, and to provide for the necessary cure of souls; and to take care that the glebe land was seasonably tilled and sowed, to the best advantage of the successor, to whom they were to give up the intermediate profits, and be allowed their necessary charges, which upon dispute were to be moderated by the bishop or his official. But the canon lawyers in process of time deprived the country deans of this, as well as of all

all other parts of jurisdiction; and the chancellors of bishops, or their archdeacons, laid claim to the custody of vacant churches, and by forms of sequestration assigned them over to the oeconomi or lay guardians of the church. *Ant. Par. Ant. 647.*

For now, the ordinary way of managing the profits of vacation is by sequestration granted to the churchwardens. Upon consideration of which, Dr. Watson and Dr. Gibson take occasion to wish, that some of the neighbouring clergymen might be appointed, and would take upon them the trouble of that office, in inspecting and managing the profits, and of supplying or providing for the cure; and that the ordinary, in granting patents, would not convey to chancellors, commissaries, or officials, the right of granting these sequestrations, in times of vacation, but would reserve it to their own immediate cognisance; since it is a point in which the interest of the church and clergy, and also the immediate care of souls for the time, are so nearly concerned. *Gibbs. 749.*

3. The churchwardens, having taken out a sequestration under the seal of the office, are to manage all the profits and expences of the benefice for the successor; to plough and sow the glebe, gather in tithes, thresh out and sell corn, repair houses, make up his fences, pay his tenths, synodals, and procurations; and what other things are necessary during the vacation. Management of the profits.

But the sequestrators cannot maintain an action for tithes in their own name, at common law, nor in any of the king's temporal courts; but only in the spiritual court, or before the justices of the peace in such cases as the law impowers them to hear and determine. *Johns. 122.*

Thus in the case of *Berwick and Swanton, T. 1692*; it was resolved, that a sequestrator cannot bring a bill alone for tithes; because he is but as a bailiff, and accountable to the bishop, and has no interest. *Eund. 192.*

4. By the statute of 28 H. 8. c. 11. *It shall be lawful to every archbishop, bishop, archdeacon, and ordinary, their officers and ministers, to retain in their custody so much of the profits of the vacation, as shall be sufficient to pay unto such person as shall serve the cure his reasonable stipend or salary.* Supply of the cure.

5. *And if the fruits of the vacation be not sufficient to pay the curate's stipend and wages for serving the cure the vacation time; the same shall be borne, and paid by the next incumbents, within fourteen days next after he hath the possession of his living.* *l. 10.*

Vacation.

And it may be safest for the churchwardens, to get it stated by the ordinary, when they take out the sequestration, what they are to pay to the curate weekly for the serving of the cure; and then there can be no contention about it when they make up their accounts. *Par. L. c. 29.*

And Dr. Gibson says, such curate ought to be duly licensed by the ordinary, for serving of the cure; otherwise if he proceeds without such licence, he can have no title to any stipend or salary; nor can any be legally reserved and deducted for him. *Gibbs. 750.*

Successor when
to enter.

5. The successor's right to enter commenceth immediately upon his induction, but his right to the profits commenceth from the avoidance of the benefice. But *where the benefice is in lease, and there is a year or more to come in the term; the lessee may hold and enjoy the lease to the end of the year wherein he is entered at the time of the death of the last incumbent; paying to the successor all such rent and services as for the remnant of the said year shall upon such lease be due, and the successor may recover the same in like manner as his predecessor might have done. Provided, that the successor, in such case, may have, upon one month's warning after his induction, the mansion-house, with the glebe belonging to the same (not being sown at the time of his predecessor's death), for maintenance of his household; deducting for the same in his rent as heretofore hath been paid for the same, or as it is reasonably worth.* 28 H. 8. c. 11. s. 8, 9.

Sequestrators to
account.

6. As soon as a new incumbent is instituted and inducted, the sequestrators are to account to him for all the profits of the benefice, which they have received during the vacancy. *Watf. c. 30.*

In which account they may deduct their reasonable expences, for the collecting and levying the tithes, fruits, emoluments, rents, and other profits rising and growing during the vacation. 28 H. 8. c. 11. s. 5.

If he be dissatisfied with the account, he may bring them to account before the ordinary, by whom all things relating hereunto are properly examinable and to be determined. *Watf. c. 30.*

In the case of *Jones and Barret, H. 1724*; on a bill by the vicar of West Dean in the county of Sussex against the defendant who was sequestrator, for an account of the profits received during the vacation; it was objected for the defendant, that the bishop ought to have been made a party, since the sequestrator is accountable to him for what he receives, by the statute of 28 H. 8. And the court seemed to think the bishop should have been a party;

party; but by consent the cause was referred to the bishop of the diocese. *Bunb. 192.*

7 By the 28 H. 8. c. 11. *If an incumbent before his death hath caused any of his glebe lands to be manured and sown at his proper costs and charges with any corn or grain; he may make his testament of all the profits of the corn growing upon the said glebe lands so manured and sown. s. 6.*

Proportioning the profits with the predecessor's executors.

But if his successor is inducted before the severance thereof from the ground, the successor shall have the tithe thereof; for although the executor represent the person of the testator, yet he cannot represent him as parson, inasmuch as another is inducted. *1 Roll's Abr. 655.*

Otherwise, if the parson dieth after severance from the ground, and before the corn is carried off; in this case, the successor shall have no tithe: because, tho' it was not let out, yet a right to it was vested in the deceased parson by the severance from the ground. The same is true in case of deprivation, or resignation, after glebe sown: the successor shall have the tithe, if the corn was not severed at the time of his coming in; otherwise if severed. *Gibbs. 662.*

In the case where lands are let to farm, it is enacted by the 11 G. 2. c. 19. as follows: *Whereas, where a lessor or landlord, having only an estate for life in the lands tenements or hereditaments demised, happens to die before or on the day on which any rent is reserved or made payable, such rent or any part thereof is not by law recoverable by the executors or administrators of such lessor or landlord; nor is the person in reversion entitled thereto, any other than for the use and occupation of such lands tenements or hereditaments from the death of the tenant for life; of which advantage hath been often taken by the under-tenants, who thereby avoid paying any thing for the same: for remedy thereof, it is enacted, that where any tenant for life shall die before or on the day on which any rent was reserved or made payable, upon any demise or lease of any lands tenements or hereditaments which determined on the death of such tenant for life, the executors or administrators of such tenant for life, may in an action upon the case recover of the under-tenant, if such tenant for life die on the day on which the same was made payable, the whole, or if before said day, then a proportion of such rent according to the time such tenant for life lived, of the last year, or quarter of a year, or other time in which the said rent was growing due; making all just allowances, or a proportionable part thereof. s. 15.*

Under which words lands, tenements, or hereditaments, it hath been holden, that not only glebe lands are included, but also tithes, for tithes are hereditaments. A lease

for a year, if the incumbent shall so long live or continue incumbent, is construed to enure for a year, and this statute, it hath been argued, divides the rent, be it for lands or tithes, between the executor and successor, making proportionable allowances for taxes and other outgoings.

Sir William Blackstone says, the courts of law have of late years leaned as much as possible against construing leases, where no certain term is mentioned, to be tenancies at will, but have rather held them to be tenancies from year to year so long as both parties please, especially where an annual rent is reserved: in which case, they will not suffer either party to determine the tenancy even at the end of the year, without reasonable notice to the other. 2. *Black.* 147.

And in the case of *Timmins and Rowlinson*, H. 5 G. 3. it is said by the court, that even a lease at will is a tenancy for a year certain; and it is not material in such case, whether the lease be in writing or not in writing. *Burr. Mansf.* 1609.

On the other hand, it is contended, that this act between landlord and tenant had not the case of tithes in contemplation. Unto which purpose is applicable the opinion of a very great man, the late bishop *Hoadly*, who, in a letter to his son upon this subject, expresseth himself thus: "The clause in the act of 11 G. 2. can only extend to such leases, as tenants for life had power by law to make before the said act; the act creating no new power, but remedying an inconvenience arising in the exercise of an old power. This proves, that it cannot affect those leases, which common incumbents of parishes often make to their tithe-holders, fixing days of payment generally half-yearly. Such leases, tho' expiring with their makers, yet are not touched by this act, nor can they deprive a successor of any of the tithes which fall after the death of the predecessor, by virtue of this clause, which gives the lessor's executors a right to the proportion of rent to the day of his death; because these leases are not (properly speaking) leases, nor of force against the successor, and do not give the under-tenant any such advantage, as this clause was meant to prevent. For the clause was designed to prevent the cunning of dishonest under-tenants, who took a handle from such leases to pay neither the executors of the lessor nor his successor; which cannot affect the case of a successor in a living, who has a right to all the tithes

“ tithes from the death of his predecessor without this
 “ act, as the executors of the predecessor have to all in his
 “ time. And as to the under-tenant, if he has paid the
 “ predecessor any of those which belong to the successor,
 “ it is to his own loss; which ought to be made up by
 “ the predecessor’s executors, and may by law be re-
 “ quired. This clause therefore had no relation to the
 “ common leases of incumbents of parishes at all.”——
 His lordship adds, “ These observations convinced no
 “ less a lawyer than Mr. Baron Clerke, who mistaking
 “ the act had given his opinion to the archbishop of York
 “ to the contrary.”

In an anonymous case, about three years after making
 this act, reported by Bunbury, *M.* 1730. In the ex-
 chequer: A rector agreed with his parishioners for tithes,
 for a certain sum payable yearly at Michaelmas. The
 rector died about a month before Michaelmas. The
 agreement determining by the death of the parson, the
 successor shall be entitled to tithes in kind only from the
 death, and the executor of the last incumbent to a pro-
 portion according to the agreement till the time of the
 testator’s death. And this is by an equitable construc-
 tion. *Bunb.* 294.

With respect to those tithes which are not in lease there
 can be no doubt, but that the executor shall be intitled to
 those that became due before the incumbent’s death, and
 that the successor shall be intitled to those that became
 due after the incumbent’s death.

And here a case frequently happeneth, with respect to
 modus’s in lieu of tithes; which tithes, if taken in kind,
 would have been due before the death of the incumbent,
 and the modus for the same is not due till after the death
 of the incumbent. Which case not coming in any sense
 within the purview of the said statute, it seemeth that the
 executors are not intitled to the said modus or to any part
 thereof; but that the whole shall go to the successor.

There is another case, wherein it may be disputed, at
 what time the modus itself shall be said to be due. As
 for instance, it is usual in many places to ascertain the
 modus at Martinmas, by then taking an account of the
 stock for the year preceding; and not to receive the
 modus till Easter following. In which case if it shall
 appear from the evidence, as from payments thereof some-
 times made at the time when ascertained, or in the inter-
 mediate space betwixt that time and the more usual and
 ordinary days of payment, or from receipts given and ac-
 cepted

cepted for the same as due at the time when ascertained, or the like, and that the payment thereof was only deferred for convenience, when the incumbent should receive his other dues, or for other like cause; in such case it will be due to the executor: But if it shall appear, that the same hath been understood as not due until such future day, and only advanced sometimes before such day to answer the incumbent's necessities or other convenience, then it seemeth that it will go to the successor. So that this is a matter not of law, but of fact; and depends upon the evidence.

As to disputes concerning things fixed to the freehold, as hangings, tapestry, grates, glasses, furnaces, and such like; these, falling in with the general doctrine about what shall belong to heirs or successors, on the one hand, and executors or administrators on the other, are treated of under the title *Wills*.

Vacation of bishopricks. See *Bishops*.

Vestry.

Vestry what.

1. A Vestry properly speaking, is the assembly of the whole parish met together in some convenient place, for the dispatch of the affairs and business of the parish; and this meeting being commonly held in the vestry adjoining to, or belonging to the church, it thence takes the name of vestry, as the place itself doth, from the priest's vestments, which are usually deposited and kept there. *Par. L. c. 17.*

Notice of the meeting.

2. On the Sunday before a vestry is to meet, publick notice ought to be given, either in the church after divine service is ended, or else at the church door as the parishioners come out; both of the calling of the said meeting and also the time and place of the assembling of it; and it will be fairest then also to declare for what business the said meeting is to be held, that none may be surprised, but that all may have full time before to consider of what is to be proposed at the said meeting. *Wats. c. 39. Par. L. c. 17.*

And

And it is usual that for half an hour before it begins, one of the church bells be tolled, to give the parishioners notice of their assembling together. *Par. L. c. 17.*

3. Anciently, at the common law, every parishioner who paid to the church rates, or scot and lot, and no other person, had a right to come to these meetings: But this must not be understood of the minister; who hath a special duty incumbent on him in this matter, and must be responsible to the bishop for his care herein: and therefore in every parish meeting, he presides for the regulating and directing this affair; and this equally holds, whether he be rector or vicar. *Par. L. c. 17.*

Who may vote.

Also out-dwellers, occupying land in the parish, have a vote in the vestry, as well as the inhabitants. *Johns. 19.*

4. *E. 11 G. Phillybrown and Ryland.* The plaintiff brought a special action upon the case, for excluding him from the vestry room; and upon demurrer, the court made no difficulty, but that such an action was maintainable: however, in this case, they gave judgment for the defendant, it not being averred that the parish had any property in this room, or right to meet there; so that for ought appears it might be the defendant's own house, and then he might let in whom he pleased, and refuse the rest. *Str. 624.*

Hindring persons from the meeting.

5. And when they are met, the major part present will bind the whole parish. *Watf. c. 39.*

Majority conclusive.

6. *T. 9 G. 2. Stoughton and Reynolds.* Adjudged, that the right of adjourning the vestry, is not in the minister or any other person as chairman, nor in the churchwardens, but in the whole assembly, where all are upon an equal footing; and the same must be decided (as other matters there) by a majority of votes. *Str. 1045.*

Power of adjourning.

7. And to prevent disputes, it may be convenient, that every vestry act be entred in the parish book of accounts; and that every man's hand consenting to it, be set thereon. *Par. L. 54.*

Entry of acts made.

8. The vestry clerk is chosen by the vestry; and he acts as register or secretary thereto, but hath no vote: and his business is, to attend at all parish meetings, and to draw up and copy all orders and other acts of the vestry, and to give out copies thereof when necessary: and therefore he hath the custody of all books and papers relating thereto. *Par. L. c. 18. (a)*

Clerk.

9. The

(a) But his office is not such for which *mandamus* will lie, though perhaps the vestry clerk may have that writ to compel those

Beadle.

9. The beadle (in the saxon *bydel*, from *beodan*, to bid) is chosen also by the vestry; and his business is to attend the vestry, to give notice to the parishioners when and where it is to meet, and to execute its orders as their messenger or servant. *Par. L. c. 17.*

Select vestry.

10. Select vestries seem to have grown from the practice of chusing a certain number of persons yearly, to manage the concerns of the parish for that year; which by degrees came to be a fixed method, and the parishioners lost not only their right to concur in the publick management as oft as they would attend, but also (in most places, if not in all) the right of electing the managers. And such a custom, of the government of parishes by a select number, hath been adjudged a good custom; in that the churchwardens accounting to them was adjudged a good account. *Gibbs. 219.*

In some parishes, these select vestries having been thought oppressive and injurious; great struggles have been made, to set aside and demolish them. *Par. L. c. 17.*

And no wonder that it hath been so, in such parishes where by custom they have obtained the power to chuse one another; for it is not to be supposed, but that if they are guilty of evil practices, they will chuse such persons as they think will connive at or concur with them therein.

M. 2 W. Batt and others against *Watkinson*. In a prohibition prayed to the spiritual court at York, the suggestion set forth, that the parish of *Masbarn* in *Yorkshire* was an ancient parish, and that time out of mind there were twenty-four of the chief parishioners, who all along had been called the four and twenty; and that during time immemorial, as often as any one of the said four and twenty parishioners happened to die, the rest surviving of the four and twenty did chuse, and during all the same time used to chuse, one other fit and able parishioner of the same parish, to be one of the four and twenty in the room of him so deceased; and that within the said parish there is, and during time immemorial there always hath been a custom, that the said four and twenty for the time being have been used and accustomed as often as there was occasion, to make rates, and to assess reasonable sums of money, upon the parishioners and inhabitants in the said parish for the time being for the repairs of the church; and that the churchwardens of the said

those who have the custody of the parish books, to deliver them to him. *The King v. the Churchwardens of Croyden. 5 Term Rep. 713.*

parish,

parish, during all the time aforesaid, have used to receive all duties and dues for burials in the body or iles of the said church; and if any of the inhabitants refused to pay the said rates or dues for burials as aforesaid, then the churchwardens by warrant from the twenty four for the time being, were used to distrain the goods and chattels of the said parishioners in the said parish; and that the said twenty four with the consent of the vicar or curate, have used to repair the body and iles of the said church; and that the churchwardens for the time being, during all the time aforesaid, have always used to give up their accounts to the said four and twenty, who allowed or disallowed the said accounts as they saw expedient; and that on the allowance of such account, the churchwardens have always been discharged from giving any other account in any other place; that the plaintiffs were churchwardens for the year 1680; and after this year was ended, they gave in their accounts to the four and twenty; and that tho' all pleas concerning prescriptions and customs ought to be determined by the common law, yet the defendant hath drawn and cited them into the spiritual court to give in and pass their said accounts there; and altho' the said plaintiffs have pleaded all the matters aforesaid in the said spiritual court, yet the said defendant hath refused to admit or to receive the said plea. Upon great debate of this case at several times, the court was of opinion, that the custom was good and reasonable, and a prohibition was granted. *Lutw.* 1027.

So that prescription and constant immemorial usage seems to be the basis and only support of this select vestry. And pursuant hereunto, upon the same foundation, and for the same reasons, was the select vestry of the parish of St. Mary At-Hill in London confirmed and established in the king's bench, not many years ago. And since that time, the select vestries of St. Saviour's and St. Olave's in Southwark, for want of proof of such prescription and immemorial usage, have been set aside and demolished. *Par. L.* 6. 17.

In the act of the 10 *An. c.* 11. for building fifty new churches; the commissioners shall appoint a convenient number of sufficient inhabitants to be vestrymen; and from time to time, upon the death removal or other voidance of any such vestryman, the rest or majority of them may chuse another. *s.* 20.

In the several private acts for building particular churches; sometimes the minister, churchwardens, overseers

seers of the poor, and others who have served, or paid fines for being excused from serving those offices ; sometimes, the minister, churchwardens, overseers of the poor, and all who pay to the poor rate ; sometimes, only all who pay such a sum to the poor rate ; sometimes, all who rent houses of so much a year ;—are appointed to be vestrymen within such parishes, and no other persons.

Vicar.

A Vicar, *vicarius*, is one that hath a spiritual promotion or living under the parson ; and is so denominated, as officiating *vice ejus*, in his place or stead. And such a promotion or living is called a *vicarage* ; which is a part or portion of the parsonage, allotted to the vicar for his maintenance and support.

This part or portion is in some places an annual sum of money certain ; but in most places it is a part of the tithes in kind, which most commonly is the small tithes ; and in some places he hath a part of the great tithes, and also of the glebe : and such a one is called a vicar endowed.

Thus he that hath the right to the possession of the lesser part, is called a vicar ; and he that hath the other and greater part of tithes, is called the parson, who in some parishes is a clergyman, and sometimes the minister or incumbent of the same church ; but in other places he is a mere layman, and cannot supply the church but by a spiritual vicar : and this so possessed by a layman, is called an *impropriation*, and himself the *impropriator*.

An *appropriation* is properly, when such a parsonage (or vicarage or other church preferment) is in the hands or possession of some ecclesiastical person and his successors, and can be made only to a body politic or corporation spiritual, that hath succession, whereby such body becomes perpetual incumbent of the benefice appropriated, and shall for ever enjoy the tithes and other profits, and the cure of souls belonging thereto.

But the words *impropriation* and *appropriation* are generally confounded in the books : and the law concerning the whole is treated of under the title *Appropriation*.

Vicar general.

VICAR general is an officer whose office is usually annexed to that of *Chancellor*; and is therefore treated of under that title.

Vigil. See *Holidays*.

Vi laica removenda.

Vi laica removenda is a writ which (upon the bishop's certificate in chancery of a force and resistance touching a church) lieth where a debate or controversy is between two parsons for a church, the one whereof doth enter into the church with strong hand and great power of the laity, holding the other out, and keeping possession thereof with force and arms. Whereupon he that is so held out of possession may have the said writ directed to the sheriff of the county, to remove the force within that church, and (if need be) to raise the power of the county to his assistance, and to arrest and imprison the persons that make resistance, so as to have their bodies before the king at a certain day to answer the contempt. Which writ is sometimes grantable without the bishop's certificate as aforesaid: for it may, as it seemeth, be had upon a surmise made thereof by the incumbent himself without such certificate; there being a distinct and several form thereof in each of the said cases. So that this writ properly lieth for the removal of any forcible possession of a church kept by laymen. *God. 645. F. N. B. 124.*

By this writ the sheriff ought not to remove the incumbent who is in possession of the church, whether the possession be of right or wrong; but only to remove the force. *F. N. B. 125.*

The writ is made returnable into the king's bench, in which court the offenders shall be fined and punished for the force: and restitution also shall be awarded out of the same court (as it seemeth). *Watf. c. 30.*

Visitation.

NO T E, free chapels and donatives (unless such donative hath received the augmentation of queen Anne's bounty) are exempt from the visitation of the ordinary;

inary; the first being visitable only by commission from the king, and the second by commission from the donor: And there are also other churches and chapels exempted, which did belong to the monasteries; having heretofore obtained exemptions from ordinary visitation, and being visitable only by the pope; which by the statute of 25 *H. 8. c. 21.* were made visitable by the king, or by commission under the great seal. These, and other exempted churches or chapels, so far forth as they are exempted are not treated of under this title; the purport whereof extendeth only to places visitable by the bishop or his subordinate officers.

Origin.

1. For the government of the church, and the correction of offences, visitations of parishes and dioceses were instituted in the ancient church; that so all possible care might be taken to have good order kept in all places. *God. Append. 7.*

Who shall visit.

2. For the first six hundred years after Christ, the bishops in their own persons visited all the parishes within their respective dioceses every year; and they had several deacons in every diocese to assist them. After that, they had authority in case of sickness, or other publick concerns, to delegate priests or deacons to assist them; and hereupon, as should seem, they cantoned their great dioceses into archdeaconries, and gave the archdeacons commissions to visit and inquire, and to give them an account of all at the end of their visitations; and the bishops reserved the third year to themselves, to inform themselves (amongst other things) how the archdeacons their substitutes performed their duties. *Leg. p. 2. c. 15. Johns. 151.*

How often, and in what order.

3. By a constitution of *Otho*: Archbishops and bishops shall go about their dioceses at fit seasons, correcting and reforming the churches, and consecrating and sowing the word of life in the Lord's field. *Atb. 56.*

And, regularly, the order to be observed therein is this: In a diocesan visitation, the bishop is first to visit his cathedral church; afterwards the diocese: In a metropolitical visitation, the archbishop is first to visit his own church and diocese; then in every diocese to begin with the cathedral church, and proceed thence as he pleaseth to the other parts of the diocese. Which appears from abundance of instances in the ecclesiastical records, as well of papal dispensations for the archbishop to visit without observing the said order, as of episcopal licences for the

visitor to begin in other parts of the diocese than in the cathedral church. *Gibf.* 957.

And this sprang from the precept of the canon law, which requires, that the archbishop willing to visit his province, shall first visit the chapter of his own church, and city, and his own diocese: and after he hath once visited all the dioceses of his province, it shall be lawful for him (having first required the advice of his suffragans, and the same being settled before them, which shall be put in writing that all may know thereof) to visit again; according to the order aforesaid, altho' his suffragans shall not assent thereunto. And the like form of visiting observed by the archbishops, shall be observed also by the bishops in their ordinary visitations. *Id.*

By *Can.* 60. for the office of confirmation, it is enjoined, that the bishop shall perform that office in his visitation every third year; and if in that year, by reason of some infirmity, he be not able personally to visit, then he shall not omit the same the next year after, as he may conveniently.

Upon which Dr. Gibson observeth, that by the ancient canon law, visitations were to be once a year: but it is to be noted, that those canons were intended of parochial visitations, or a personal repairing to every church; as appears not only from the assignment of procurations (originally in provisions and afterwards in money) for the reception of the bishop; but also by the indulgence which the law grants in special cases, where every church cannot be conveniently repaired to, of calling together the clergy and laity from several parts unto one convenient place that the visitation of them may not be postponed. From this indulgence, and the great extent of the dioceses, grew the custom of citing clergy and people to attend visitations at particular places; the times of which visitations, as they are now usually fixed about Easter and Michaelmas, have evidently sprung from the two yearly synods of the clergy, which the canons of the church required to be held by every bishop about those two seasons, to consider of the state of the church and religion within the respective dioceses: an end, that is also answered by the presentments that are there made concerning the manners of the people; as they used to be made to the bishop at his visitation of every particular church. But as to parochial visitation, or the inspection into the fabricks mansions utensils and ornaments of the church,

church, that care hath been long devolved upon the archdeacons; who at their first institution in the ancient church were only to attend the bishops at their ordinations, and other publick services in the cathedral; but being afterwards occasionally employed by them in the exercise of jurisdiction, not only the work of parochial visitation, but also the holding of general synods or visitations when the bishop did not visit, came by degrees to be known and established branches of the archidiaconal office as such; which by this means attained to the dignity of ordinary, instead of delegated jurisdiction. And by these degrees came on the present law and practice of triennial visitations by bishops; so as the bishop is not only not obliged by law to visit annually, but (what is more) is restrained from it. *Gibf. 958.*

Lindwood says, the archdeacon, altho' there be not a cause, may visit once a year: but if there be cause he may visit oftener. Nor doth it hinder, where it is said in the canon law, that he ought to visit from three years to three years; for this is to be understood so that he shall visit from three years to three years of necessity, but he may visit every year if he will. *Lind. 49.*

Inhibition during the time of visitation.

4. In the bishop's triennial, as also in visitations regal and metropolitical, all inferior jurisdictions, respectively are inhibited from exercising jurisdiction, during such visitation. And we find in the time of archbishop Winchelsey, a bishop prosecuted, for exercising jurisdiction, before the relaxation of the inhibition; and in archbishop Tillotson's time, a bishop suspended, for acting after the inhibition. And even matters begun in the court of the inferior ordinary (whether contentious or voluntary) before the visitation of the superior, are to be carried on by the authority of such superior. *Gibf. 958.*

However, it hath not been unusual, especially in metropolitical visitations, to indulge the bishops and inferior courts, in whole or in part, in the exercise of jurisdiction, pending the visitation. Thus, we find relaxations granted, pending the visitation, by archbishop Abbot; and by others, an unlimited leave or commission, to exercise jurisdiction, or proceed in cases, notwithstanding the visitation; and elsewhere, a leave to confer orders, confirm, grant fiats for institution, institute, or correct, whilst the inhibition continued in other respects. *Id.*

After the relaxation of the inhibition, and especially in metropolitical visitations, we find not only reservations of

of power to rectify and punish the *comperta et detecta*, but also special commissions issued for that end. *Id.*

5. *Can. 125.* All chancellors, commissaries, archdeacons, officials, and all others exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction, shall appoint such meet places for the keeping of their courts, by the assignment or approbation of the bishop of the diocese, as shall be convenient for entertainment of those that are to make their appearance there and most indifferent for their travel: And likewise they shall keep and end their courts in such convenient time, as every man may return homewards in as due season as may be. Where.

6. *Langton.* The archdeacons in their visitation shall see that the offices of the church be duly administered; and shall take an account in writing of all the ornaments and utensils of the churches, and also of the vestments and books; which they shall cause to be presented before them every year for their inspection, that they may see what have been added, or what have been lost. *Lind. 50.* General power of the visitor.

Account in writing] And it would be well to have the same indented: one part to remain with the archdeacon, and the other with the parishioners. *Lind. 50.*

Utensils] That is, which are fit or necessary for use: and by these are understood all the vessels of the church of every kind. *Lind. 50.*

Every year] That is, every year in which they shall visit. *Id.*

That they may see] Therefore the archdeacon ought to go to the place in person to visit, and not to send any other; which if he do, he shall not have the procurations (due upon the account of visiting) in money: but otherwise, he whom he shall send shall receive procurations for himself and his attendants in victuals. *Lind. 50.*

Other. Concerning archdeacons we do ordain, that they visit the churches profitably and faithfully; by inquiring of the sacred vessels, and vestments, and how the service is performed, and generally of temporals and spirituals: and what they shall find to want correction, that they correct diligently. And when they visit, correct or punish crimes, they shall not presume to take any thing of none (save only moderate procurations), nor to give sentence

sentence against any persons unjustly, whereby to extort money from them. For whereas these and such like things do favour of simony, we decree, that they who do such things shall be compelled by the bishop to lay out twice as much for pious uses; saving nevertheless other canonical punishment against them. And they shall endeavour frequently to be present at the chapters in every deanry, and therein instruct the clergy (amongst other things) to live well, and to have a sound knowledge and understanding in performing the divine offices. *Athol.* 52.

Chapters] That is, rural chapters. *Athol.* 54.

Reynolds. We enjoin the archdeacons and their officials, that in the visitation of churches they have a diligent regard to the fabrick of the church, and especially of the chancel, to see if they want repair: and if they find any defects of that kind, they shall limit a certain time under a penalty within which they shall be repaired. Also, they shall inquire by themselves or their officials, in the parishes where they visit, if there be ought in things or persons which wanteth to be corrected: and if they shall find any such, they shall correct the same either then or in the next chapter. *Lind.* 53.

And their officials] Here it seemeth to be intimated, that the archdeacon's official may visit; which yet is not true, at least in his own right; yet he may do this in the right of the archdeacon, when the archdeacon himself is hindered. *Lind.* 53.

Stratford. Forasmuch as archdeacons and other ordinaries in their visitations, finding defects as well in the churches as in the ornaments thereof and the fences of the churchyard and in the houses of the incumbents, do command them to be repaired under pecuniary penalties. and from those that obey not do extort the said penalties by censures, wherewith the said defects ought to be repaired, and thereby enrich their own purses to the damage of the poor people: therefore that there may be no occasion of complaint against the archdeacons and other ordinaries and their ministers by reason of such penal exactions, and that it cometh not ecclesiastical persons to gape after or enrich themselves with dishonest and penal acquisitions, we do ordain, that such penalties, so often as they shall be exacted, shall be converted to the use of
such

such repairs, under pain of suspension ab officio which they shall ipso facto incur until they shall effectually assign what was so received to the reparation of the said defects. *Lind.* 224.

Can. 86. Every dean, dean and chapter, archdeacon, and others which have authority to hold ecclesiastical visitations by composition, law, or prescription, shall survey the churches of his or their jurisdiction, once in every three years, in his own person, or cause the same to be done; and shall from time to time within the said three years certify the high commissioners for causes ecclesiastical, every year, of such defects in any the said churches, as he or they do find to remain unrepaired, and the names and surnames of the parties faulty therein. Upon which certificate we desire the said high commissioners will ex officio mero send for such parties, and compel them to obey the just and lawful decrees of such ecclesiastical ordinaries making such certificates,

Note, since the making of these canons, the high commission court was abolished by act of parliament.

7. In the year 1626, Mr. Huntley, rector of Stourmouth, was required by Dr. Kingsley, archdeacon of Canterbury, to preach a visitation sermon; which he refused. And being cited before the high commissioners, it was urged, that he was bound to the performance of that office in pursuance of the archdeacon's mandate, by virtue of his oath of canonical obedience. He answered, that he was not a licensed preacher, according to the canons of 1603; and especially, that he was not bound thereunto by his said oath, which implieth only an obedience according to the canon law, as it is in force in this realm; and that there is no canon, foreign or domestic, which requireth him to do this; but on the contrary, that the ancient canon law injoineth the visitor himself to preach at his own visitation. But the court admonished him to comply; and on his refusal, fined him 500*l.* and imprisoned him till he should pay the same, and also make submission; and afterwards degraded and deprived him. *J hnsf.* Huntley's case.

But this perhaps may be one instance, amongst others, charged against that court whilst it subsisted, of carrying matters with a pretty high hand.

And Dr. Aycliffe observes from the sixth book of the decretals, that amongst the orders to be observed by abbishops, bishops, and others in their visitations, the

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first is, that they ought to preach the word of God, by giving the congregation a sermon. *Ayl. Par.* 515.

Nevertheless, it is presumed, very few clergymen would refuse to discharge the offices of their function on the like occasion, at the request or intimation of their superior.

Exhibits.

8. *Can.* 137. Forasmuch as a chief and principal cause and use of visitation is, that the bishop archdeacon or other assigned to visit, may get some knowledge of the state sufficiency and ability of the clergy, and other persons whom they are to visit: We think it convenient, that every parson, vicar, curate, schoolmaster, or other person licensed whosoever, do at the bishop's first visitation, or at the next visitation after his admission, shew and exhibit unto him his letters of orders, institution, and induction, and all other his dispensations, licences, or faculties whatsoever, to be by the said bishop either allowed, or (if there be just cause) disallowed and rejected; and being by him approved, to be (as the custom is) signed by the register: and that the whole fees accustomed to be paid in the visitations in respect of the premisses, be paid only once in the whole time of every bishop, and afterwards but half of the said accustomed fees, in every other visitation, during the said bishop's continuance.

To be by the said bishop allowed] None but the bishop, or other person exercising ecclesiastical authority by commission from him, hath right de jure communi to require these exhibits of the clergy; nor doth the enacting part of this canon convey the right to any other; and therefore, if any archdeacons are intitled to require exhibits, in their visitations, it must be upon the foot of custom; the beginning whereof hath probably been an incroachment; since it is not likely, that any bishop should give to the archdeacon and his official a power of allowing or disallowing such instruments as have been granted by himself or his predecessors. *Gibf.* 959.

Whole fees] In the registry of archbishop Islip, there is a sequestration of the benefices of divers clergymen refusing to make due exhibits in a visitation. *Gibf.* 1545.

And afterwards but half of the said accustomed fees] Lindwood speaking of the letters of orders to be exhibited by stipendiary curates going from one diocese to another, saith, that after the archdeacon or his official or other ordinary hath satisfied himself of their orders and of their life and conversation, they may be admitted to officiate,

and their names ought to be entred in the register of such ordinary; whereupon in other visitations or inquiries their letters of orders ought not to be reinspected, nor their names to be entred again, seeing they are sufficiently known already: And so they do ill (he says) who in every of their visitations take something for the inspection and approbation of the said letters of orders; seeing such entry ought not to be made but once, namely, at the first admission. *Lind.* 225. *Gibf.* 959.

9. *Edm.* There shall be in every deanry two or three men, having God before their eyes, who shall at the command of the archbishop or his official, present unto them the publick excesses of prelates and other clerks. *Lind.* 277. Presentments, by whom to be made.

In every deanry] That is, in every rural deanry. *Lind.* 277.

Publick excesses] That is, notorious, whereof there is great and publick infamy; and this, altho' the same be not upon oath: but if such excesses shall not be notorious, then the same shall not be presented, unless there be proof upon oath. *Lind.* 277.

As to the churchwardens duty in this particular, altho' they have for many hundred years been a body corporate, to take care of the goods repairs and ornaments of the church, as appears by the ancient register of Writs; yet this work of presenting hath been devolved on them and their assistants, by canons and constitutions of a more modern date. Anciently, the way was, to select a certain number at the discretion of the ordinary to give information upon oath; which number the rule of the canon law upon this head evidently supposeth to have been selected while the synod was sitting, and the people as well as clergy in attendance there. But in process of time this method was changed; and it was directed in the citation, that four six or eight, according to the proportion of the district, should appear (together with the clergy) to represent the people, and to be the *testes synodales*. *Gibf.* 960. (b)

But all this while we find nothing of churchwardens presenting, but the style of the books is, *The parishioners say, The laymen say*, and the like, until a little before the reformation, when the churchwardens began to present, either by themselves, or else with two or three more

(b) See Churchwardens, 8.

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parishioners of credit joined with them. And this last (by the way) is evidently the original of that office, which our canons do call the office of sidemen or assistants. *Gibf.* 960.

In the beginning of the reign of king James the first, a commissary had cited many persons of several parishes, to appear before him at his visitation; and because they appeared not, they were excommunicated. But a prohibition was granted; because the ordinary hath not power to cite any into that court, except the churchwardens and sidemen. *Noy* 123.

But by *Can.* 113. Because it often cometh to pass, that churchwardens, sidemen, questmen, and such other persons of the laity as are to take care for the suppressing of sin and wickedness, as much as in them lieth, by admonition, reprehension, and denunciation to their ordinaries, do forbear to discharge their duties therein, either thro' fear of their superiors, or thro' negligence, more than were fit, the licentiousness of these times considered; we do ordain, that hereafter every parson and vicar, or in the lawful absence of any parson and vicar, then their curates and substitutes, may join in every presentment with the said churchwardens sidemen and the rest abovementioned, at the times of visitation, if they the said churchwardens and the rest will present such enormities as are apparent in the parish: or if they will not, then every such parson and vicar, or in their absence as aforesaid their curates, may themselves present to their ordinaries at such times, and when else they think it meet, all such crimes as they have in charge or otherwise, as by them (being the persons that should have the chief care for the suppressing of sin and impiety in their parishes) shall be thought to require due reformation. Provided always, that if any man confess his secret and hidden sins to the minister, for the unburdening of his conscience, and to receive spiritual consolation and ease of mind from him, we do not any way bind the said minister by this our constitution, but do straitly charge and admonish him, that he do not at any time reveal and make known to any person whatsoever, any crime or offence so committed to his trust and secrecy (except they be such crimes as by the laws of this realm his own life may be called in question for concealing the same) under pain of irregularity.

And by *Can.* 116. It shall be lawful for any godly disposed person, or for any ecclesiastical judge, upon know-
ledge

ledge or notice given unto him or them, of any enormous crime within his jurisdiction, to move the minister churchwardens or sidemen, as they tender the glory of God and reformation of sin, to present the same, if they shall find sufficient cause to induce them thereunto, that it may be in due time punished and reformed.

Provided, that for these voluntary presentments there be no fee required or taken.

10. *Coniface.* We do decree, that laymen, when inquiry shall be made by the prelates and judges ecclesiastical for correcting the sins and excesses of those that are within their jurisdiction, shall be compelled (if need be) to take an oath to speak the truth. *Lind.* 109. To be made upon oath.

And that ordinaries are impowered by the laws of the church to require an oath of the testes synodales, appears, not only from this constitution, but also from the body of the canon law. And the same practice of administering an oath, appears in the ecclesiastical records of our own church; where it is often entred, that the presenters were charged upon their consciences, to discover whatever they knew to want amendment in things and persons. *Gibbs.* 960.

11. *Can.* 119. For the avoiding of such inconveniences as heretofore have happened, by the hasty making of bills of presentments upon the days of visitation and synods, it is ordered, that always hereafter, every chancellor, archdeacon, commissary and official, and every other person having ecclesiastical jurisdiction at the ordinary time when the churchwardens are sworn, and the archbishop and bishops when he or they do summon their visitation, shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the churchwardens questmen and sidemen of every parish, or to some of them, such books of articles as they or any of them shall require (for the year following) the said churchwardens questmen and sidemen to ground their presentments upon, at such times as they are to exhibit them. In which book shall be contained the form of the oath which must be taken immediately before every such presentment: to the intent that having beforehand time sufficient, not only to peruse and consider what their said oath shall be, but the articles also whereupon they are to ground their presentments, they may frame them at home both advisedly and truly, to the discharge of their own consciences (after they are sworn), as becometh honest and godly men. Articles of inquiry.

Frame them at home] By an entry in one of our records about 200 years ago, the ancient way of making presentments seems to have been, the ordinary's examination of the synodal witnesses, and the taking their directions and presentments by word of mouth, and then immediately entering them in the acts of the visitation. And altho' presentments are now required to be framed at home, there is no doubt but every visitor hath the same right of personal examination that ancient visitors had, as often as he shall find occasion. *Gibf. 963.*

By reason of several disputes which have been made concerning the articles of inquiry, the convocation hath sometimes attempted to frame one general body of articles for visitations; but the same as yet hath not been brought to effect. *Gibf. 962.*

Presentments on
common fame,

12. *Can. 115.* Whereas for the reformation of criminous persons and disorders in every parish, the churchwardens questmen sidemen and such other church officers are sworn, and the minister charged to present as well the crimes and disorders committed by the said criminous persons, as also the common fame which is spread abroad of them, whereby they are often maligned and sometimes troubled by the said delinquents or their friends; we do admonish and exhort all judges both ecclesiastical and temporal, as they regard and reverence the fearful judgment seat of the highest Judge, that they admit not in any of their courts, any complaint plea suit or suits, against any such churchwardens questmen sidemen or other church officers, for making any such presentments, nor against any minister for any presentments that he shall make: all the said presentments tending to the restraint of shameless impiety, and considering that the rules both of charity and government do presume that they did nothing therein of malice, but for the discharge of their consciences.

But there is more danger now, than when these canons were made, of actions being brought against churchwardens for presenting upon common fame; because the person accused in those days was required to answer upon oath to the charge laid against him, and to bring his compurgators: but the oath *ex officio* being now abolished, it seemeth not safe, to present any person upon common fame only, without proof (c).

(c) See *Churchwardens*, 8. and 17.

And even when the oath of purgation was in force, Mr. Clerke gives a caution, that all, both churchwardens and others, take care, how they accuse or present any person for any crime or fame thereof, unless they can prove either the crime, or that the fame thereof arose from just causes and strong presumptions. Therefore, altho' the fame or rumour of any crime hath been spread amongst many and good men, yet if it had its beginning from enemies or evil minded persons, or (as is often the case) from the sole accusation of a woman confessing her own turpitude, the presentment or accusation in such case ought not to be general, but particular, that is, that such a fame or rather rumour was spread by such persons, or by the accusation or confession of such woman in childbirth confessing her own baseness: And then, if the person accused shall proceed against the accuser in a cause of defamation, he shall fail in his suit, if proof shall be made that there was such a fame or rumour as was set forth in the presentment. *1 Ought. 236.*

13. It is not enough to present that such a one hath committed fornication, or the like; but the person ought to be named with whom he committed the offence, and that there is a publick fame thereof: otherwise upon such a general and uncertain presentment, the person accused cannot know how to make his defence, and there may be cause of appeal. *1 Ought. 229.*

Presentment in what manner to be made.

14. *Can. 116.* No churchwardens, questmen, or sidemen of any parish, shall be inforced to exhibit their presentments to any having ecclesiastical jurisdiction, above once in every year where it hath been no oftener used, nor above twice in every diocese whatsoever, except it be at the bishop's visitation: Provided always, that as good occasion shall require, it shall be lawful for every minister churchwardens and sidemen, to present offenders as oft as they shall think meet; and for these voluntary presentments no fee shall be taken.

At what times to be made.

Can. 117. No churchwardens questmen or sidemen shall be called or cited, but only at the said time or times before limited, to appear before any ecclesiastical judge whosoever, for refusing at other times to present any faults committed in their parishes, and punishable by ecclesiastical laws. Neither shall they or any of them, after their presentments exhibited at any of those times, be any further troubled for the same, except upon manifest and evident proof it may appear, that they did then willingly and wittingly omit to present some such publick crime or crimes

crimes as they knew to be committed, or could not be ignorant that there was then a publick fame of them, or unless there be very just cause to call them for the explanation of their former presentments: In which case of wilful omission, their ordinaries shall proceed against them in such sort, as in causes of wilful perjury in a court ecclesiastical it is already provided.

Can. 118. The office of all churchwardens and sidemen shall be reputed to continue, until the new churchwardens that shall succeed them be sworn, which shall be the first week after easter, or some week following, according to the direction of the ordinary; which time so appointed shall always be one of the two times in every year, when the minister and churchwardens and sidemen of every parish shall exhibit to their severall ordinaries, the presentments of such enormities as have happened in their parishes since their last presentments. And this duty they shall perform, before the newly chosen churchwardens and sidemen be sworn, and shall not be suffered to pass over the said presentments to those that are newly come into that office, and are by intendment ignorant of such crimes; under pain of those censures which are appointed for the reformation of such dalliers and dispensers with their own consciences and oaths.

Fee for taking
in presentments.

15. *Can. 116.* For the presentments of every parish church or chapel, the register of any court where they are to be exhibited, shall not receive in one year above 4d.; under pain, for every offence therein, of suspension from the execution of his office for the space of a month toties quoties.

Penalty for not
presenting.

16. Besides being proceeded against by the censures of the church; it is enjoined by *Can. 26.* that no minister shall in any wise admit to the receiving of the holy communion, any churchwardens or sidemen, who having taken their oaths to present to their ordinaries all such publick offences as they are particularly charged to inquire of in their severall parishes, shall (notwithstanding their said oaths, and that their faithful discharge of them is the chief means whereby publick sins and offences may be reformed and punished) wittingly and willingly, desperately and irreligiously, incur the horrible crime of perjury; either in neglecting, or in refusing, to present such of the said enormities and publick offences, as they know themselves to be committed in their said parishes, or are notoriously offensive to the congregation there; altho' they be urged by some of their neighbours, or by their minister,

minister, or by the ordinary himself, to discharge their consciences by presenting of them, and not to incur so desperately the said horrible sin of perjury.

H. 1680. Selby's case. A prohibition was prayed to the archdeacon of Exeter, because he proceeded to excommunicate the plaintiff, for that he, being churchwarden, refused to present a notorious delinquent, being admonished. And a prohibition was granted: for they are not to direct the churchwarden to present at their pleasure: but if one churchwarden doth refuse to present, he may be presented by his successor. *Freem. 298.*

17. Can. 121. In places where the bishop and archdeacon do by prescription or composition visit at several times in one and the same year; lest for one and the self same fault any of his majesty's subjects should be challenged and molested in divers ecclesiastical courts, we do order and appoint, that every archdeacon or his official, within one month after the visitation ended that year, and the presentments received, shall certify under his hand and seal, to the bishop or his chancellor, the names and crimes of all such as are detected and presented in his said visitation, to the end the chancellor shall henceforth forbear to convent any person for any crime or cause so detected or presented to the archdeacon. And the chancellor, within the like time after the bishop's visitation ended and presentments received, shall under his hand and seal signify to the archdeacon or his official, the names and crimes of all such persons, which shall be detected or presented unto him in that visitation, to the same intent as aforesaid. And if these officers shall not certify each other as is here prescribed, or after such certificate shall intermeddle with the crimes or persons detected and presented in each other's visitation; then every of them so offending shall be suspended from all exercise of his jurisdiction, by the bishop of the diocese, until he shall repay the costs and expences which the parties grieved have been at by that vexation.

None to be presented twice for the same offence.

18. Crimes evident and notorious, whether they be immoralities in persons, as lewdness, swearing, drunkenness, and such like; or defects in places, as the want of repairs, or of utensils, in churches, churchyards, and parsonage houses; are not only in their nature merely spiritual and ecclesiastical, but in the chief heads thereof (as fornication, adultery, and the repairing of churches and churchyards) by the statute of *Circumspecte agatis*, 13 *Ed. 1.* not liable to prohibition: And therefore if offenders, being

Churchwardens to support their presentments.

being presented, do escape unpunished, it must be owing either to the want of proof, or the want of prosecution. *Gibf. 966.*

As to legal proof; in case the party presented denies the fact to be true, the making good the truth of the presentment, that is, the furnishing the court with all proper evidences of it, undoubtedly rests upon the person presenting. And as the spiritual court in such case is intitled by law to call upon churchwardens to support their presentments; so are churchwardens obliged not only by law (Dr. Gibson says) but also in conscience, to see the presentment effectually supported; because to deny the court those evidences which induced them to present upon oath, is to desert their presentment, and is little better in point of conscience, than not to present at all; inasmuch as thro' their default the presentment is rendered ineffectual, as to all purposes of removing the scandal, or reforming the offender. And from hence he takes occasion to wish, that the parishioners would think themselves bound (as on many accounts they certainly are bound) to support their churchwardens, in seeing that their presentments are rendered effectual. In any point which concerns the repairs or ornaments of churches, or the providing conveniences of any kind for the service of God, when such defects as these are presented, the spiritual judge, immediately, and of course, enjoins the churchwarden presenting, to see the defect made good, and supports him in repaying himself, by a legal and reasonable rate upon the parish. But what he intends is, the supporting the churchwardens in the prosecution of such immoral and unchristian livers, as they find themselves obliged by their oath to present, as fornicators, adulterers, common swearers, drunkards, and such like: whose example is of pernicious consequence, and likely to bring many evils upon the parish. *Id.*

Procurations.

19. In all visitations of parochial churches made by bishops and archdeacons, the law hath provided, that the charge thereof shall be answered by the procurations then due and payable by the inferior clergy; wherein custom, as to the quantum, shall prevail. *God. Introd. 19.*

Anciently by provisions in kind.

20. These procurations were anciently made, by *procuring* victuals and other provisions in specie; concerning which the following constitutions have been ordained:

Langton.

Langton. We forbid archdeacons, deans, and their officials, to make any exactions upon their clergy. *Lind.* 221.

Langton. That archdeacons may not be burdensome to the churches subject unto them, we strictly injoin, that they do not exceed the number of horses and men prescribed by the general council; and that they do not presume to invite strangers with them to the procuration made for them on account of their visitation. But if the rectors of the churches, in honour of the archdeacon, will invite any, we do not forbid it. But the archdeacons themselves shall invite none, lest they who would not burden the churches by their own coming, should yet burden them by those whom they should invite. And that there may be no occasion to invite any, we do forbid the archdeacons to hold any chapter on the day of visitation at the church which they visit, unless it be in a borough or city. And we injoin the archdeacons, that they do not in any wise receive procuration without reasonable cause, but only on the day when they personally visit the church; and that they do not extort money from the church as a fee or ransom for not visiting. *Lind.* 219.

Prescribed by the general council] That is to say, five or six: but herein a regard ought to be had to the custom of the country or place. *Lind.* 220.

In any wise] That is, neither in victuals, nor money, nor any thing in lieu thereof. *Id.*

Personally visit] But yet, if thro' infirmity or any other lawful cause, the archdeacon be hindred from visiting in person, he may exercise the office by another; and in such case the procurations shall be paid. *Id.* 221.

Othob. The archdeacons shall not burden the churches with superfluous expences, but only require moderate procurations when they visit; and shall not bring strangers with them, but demean themselves modestly both in regard to their attendants and their horses. *Athon,* 53.

Othob. The church visited ought in reason to entertain the visitor: but where no visitation is, there shall be no procuration; and if any person shall take any thing, he shall be suspended from the entrance of the church, until he make restitution. And the bishops and other inferior prelates, when they visit, shall not burden the clergy with a superfluous number of attendants or horses or otherwise

otherwise in expences; and if they do, the clergy shall not obey them in that behalf; and any sentences of excommunication, suspension, or interdict, on occasion thereof shall be void. *Atton*, 114.

Stratford. No procuration shall be due, without actually visiting: And if any shall visit more churches than one in one day, he shall have but one procuration, to be proportioned amongst the said churches. And because sometimes the retinue of a visitor exceedeth the number of men and horses appointed by the canons, so that they who pay their procurations in victuals are excessively burdened beyond the rate which is usually paid in money; it shall be in the choice of the visited, to pay the same in money or in provisions. *Lind*. 223.

Now converted
into money.

21. And this last constitution, by putting it in the choice of the incumbent, whether he would entertain the visitor in provisions, or compound for it by a certain sum of money, was the cause of the custom generally prevailing afterwards, and which now universally obtaineth, of a fixed payment in money, instead of a procuration in meat, drink, provender, and other accommodation. *Gibbs*. Tracts, 13.

Whether due
when no visita-
tion is made.

22. Procuration is due to the person visiting, of common right: and altho' originally due by reason of visitation only, yet the same may be due without actual visitation. The foregoing constitutions limit the payment, whether in provisions or money, to actual visitation, and warrant the denial of them when no visitation is held. Upon which a doubt hath been raised, whether those archdeacons who are not permitted to visit, but are inhibited from doing it in the bishop's triennial visitation, have a right to require procurations for that year. They who have maintained the negative, build their opinion upon the express letter both of the ancient canon law, and of our own provincial constitutions. But others, who undertake to defend the rights of the archdeacons, alledge, that tho' it might be reasonable that they lose their procurations, in case they neglect their office of visiting (which, by the way, was all that the ancient constitutions meant), yet that reason doth not hold when they are restrained and inhibited from it; and that procurations are rated in the valuation of King Henry the eighth, as part of the revenues of every archdeacon, who therefore pays a certain annual tenth for them; and the law could never intend the payment of the tenth part every year, if there had been any year in which he was not to receive

ceive the nine parts. Which two arguments (Dr. Gibson says) are so strong in favour of the archidiaconal rights, the first in reason, and the second in law as well as reason, that no more need to be said upon that head.

Gibf. 975.

23. Procurations are suable only in the spiritual court, and are merely an ecclesiastical duty. *L. Raym.* 450.

To be sued for in the spiritual court.

And may be levied by sequestration, or other ecclesiastical process. *Gibf.* 1546.

24. *E. 7 G. Saunderson and Clagett.* Dr. Clagett, archdeacon of Sudbury, commenced a suit in the consistory court of the bishop of Norwich, against Saunderson as proprietor or curate of the impropriate rectory of Aspal in Suffolk, for the annual sum of 6 s. 8 d. as a procuration or proxy due to the archdeacon for visitations. Saunderson moved the court of king's bench for a prohibition; and suggested that this rectory of Aspal was time out of mind a rectory impropriate, without any vicar endowed; that all the tithes and profits within this rectory time out of mind belonged to the proprietor thereof, who at his own expence used to provide a curate to celebrate divine service at the parish church of Aspal. But it was denied by the whole court, who delivered their opinions seriatim; 1. That this was an ecclesiastical duty, and therefore properly suable for in the spiritual court. 2. That it was claimed both by and from an ecclesiastical person, which made it the stronger. 3. That though there was an impropriation in the case, still there must be a curate, to take care of the souls of the parishioners; and that curates as well as other persons must stand in need of bishops or archdeacons instructions and visitations. Consequently, 4. That the ordinary or archdeacon ought to be allowed for his procuration, what had been usually paid for it, which here appeared to be 6 s. 8 d. 5. That where a thing is claimed by custom in the spiritual court, it must be intended according to their construction of a custom; and by their law, forty years make a custom or prescription. *1 Peere IV. 657. Str. 471.*

To be paid by rectories impropriate where there is no vicar endowed.

25. If there be a parsonage and a vicarage endowed; only one is to pay procurations: but which of them must pay is to be directed by custom, or the endowment if extant. *Deg. p. 2. c. 15.*

Impropriate rectory where there is a vicar endowed.

26. *Stratford.* A chapel of ease shall be included in the procuration of the mother church. *Lind. 223. Deg. p. 2. c. 15.*

Chapel of ease under a parochial church.

27. Churches

Churches newly erected.

27. Churches newly erected shall be rated to procurations, according to the proportion paid by the neighbouring churches. *Gibf.* 976.

Places exempted.

28. Donatives and free chapels, pay no procurations to any ecclesiastical ordinary, because they are not visitable by any. *Dec. p. 2. c. 15.*

Places exempted, as to other matters, are treated of under the title *Perquisites*.

Synodals or *cathedrals*, and *pentecostals*, are treated of under their respective titles.

Visitation of the sick. See *Sick*.

Uniformity. See *Publick worship*.

Union.

Causes of union.

1. **T**HE union or consolidation of churches ought to be founded upon good canonical reasons. And the principal reasons assigned by the canon law are, for hospitality, nearness of the places, want of inhabitants, poverty or smallness of the living. Which circumstances are specially inquired into before the union, and (some, or all of them, as the case is) are recited in the preamble to the act of union. *Gibf.* 920.

Who may unite.

2. And in such case, by the common law of the realm, the ordinaries, patrons, and incumbents may make a consolidation or an union of the two churches into one. *1 Salk.* 165. *Hughes, c. 28.*

And in such case, it is said, that the consent of the king is not at all necessary, albeit he hath an interest in the churches in the case of lapse. For by the ancient canon law, the licence of the pope was not necessary; nor hath the licence of the king been judged necessary since the reformation; inasmuch as unions have been ordinarily made without such licence; however, in some few instances, it may have been desired and obtained for the greater caution. *Cra. Eliz.* 500. *Gibf.* 916. 920. *Watsf. c. 16.*

Restraint of union by statute.

3. By the 37 *H. 8. c. 21.* An union or consolidation of two churches in one, or of a church and chapel in one, the

the one of them not being above the yearly value of 6 l. in the king's books, and not distant from the other above one mile, may be made by the assent of the ordinary and ordinaries of the diocese where such churches and chapels stand, and by the assents of the incumbents of them, and of all such as have a just right title and interest to the patronages of the same churches and chapels, being then of full age; which unions and consolidations so made, shall be good and available in the law, to continue for ever, in such manner and form, as by writing or writings under the seal of such ordinaries, incumbents, and patrons shall be declared and set forth.

Provided, that where the inhabitants of any such poor parish, or the more part of them, within one year next after the union or consolidation of the same parish by their writing sufficient in the law, shall assure the incumbent of the said parish, for the yearly payment of so much money as with the sum that the said parish is rated and valued at in the court of first fruits and tenths, shall amount to the full sum of 8 l. to be levied and paid yearly by the said inhabitants to the said incumbent and his successors; all such unions or consolidations made of any such poor parish as aforesaid, shall be void and of none effect.

4. By the same statute, it is provided, that all unions and consolidations, to be made of any church or chapel within any city or town corporate, without the assent of the mayor sheriffs and commonalty of such city, or without the assent of the body corporate of other towns corporate, by the names of their corporations in writing under their common seal, shall be void. In towns corporate.

And by the 17 C. 2. c. 3. Forasmuch as the settled provision for ministers in most cities and towns corporate is not sufficient for the maintenance of able ministers fit for such places, whereby mean and stipendiary preachers are entertained to serve the cures there; who wholly depending for their maintenance upon the good will and liking of their auditors, have been and are hereby under temptation of too much complying, and suiting their doctrine and teaching to the humour rather than good of their auditors; which hath been a great occasion of faction and schism, and of the contempt of the ministry: it is enacted, that in every city or town corporate and their liberties, which have a mayor and aldermen, and particular justices of the peace by charter or commission, or bailiff or bailiffs, or other chief officer or officers,

officers, and other assistants, by like charter; and where two or more churches or chapels, or a church and a chapel, and the parishes thereunto belonging, do lie within the said corporation or liberties thereof, convenient to be united; in such cases the bishop of the diocese where such parish or parishes are with the consent of the mayor, aldermen, and justices of the peace, bailiff or bailiffs, or other chief officer or officers, or the major part of them, and of the patron or patrons of such churches or chapels, shall or may according to due form of law unite the said churches or chapels, or any of them; and shall appoint at which of them the parishioners and inhabitants shall usually meet for the worship of God, and which of them shall be united and annexed unto the other, which shall be the church presentative, unto which all presentations shall thereafter be only made, and unto which the parishioners shall resort as their proper church; and after such order made, the said churches or chapels shall accordingly for ever stand united. And the parishioners, landholders, and inhabitants shall, as any of them became void, from thenceforward pay all such tithes and other duties, as did belong to the incumbent of any of the churches or chapels so united and annexed, unto the incumbent of the said presentative church or chapel, unto which such other shall be so united and annexed as aforesaid.

But notwithstanding any such union to be made by virtue hereof, each of the parishes so united shall continue distinct as to all rates, taxes, parochial rites, charges, and duties, and all other privileges, liberties, and respects whatsoever, other than what is hereinbefore mentioned and specified; and churchwardens shall be elected and appointed for each parish, as they were before such union made.

And where one or more of the said churches or chapels so united, shall be full at the time of making such union; the said union shall take effect for every such church or chapel, upon the first avoidance after such union made.

And the several patrons shall present by turns to that church only, which shall remain and be presentative from time to time, in such order as the said bishop, with the consent of the said mayor, aldermen, and justices of the peace, bailiff or bailiffs, or other chief officer or officers within such parishes, or the major part of them, and of the patron or patrons of such churches or chapels, shall
determining

determine and decree for the preservation of their respective rights therein, respect being therein had to the differences of the values of the yearly maintenance belonging to such churches or chapels, or any of them.

Saving to the king all the tenths and first fruits of all such churches and chapels so to be united, according to their rates and valuations in the office of first fruits and tenths: and also reserving all procurations and pensions to all persons to whom they are and have been or shall be due and payable.

Provided that no union of parishes or places to be made by virtue of this act, shall commence or be effectual in law, until it be registred in the register book of the bishop of the diocese; which the register is hereby required to do.

Provided, that no union made by virtue hereof, shall be good and effectual, where the settled maintenance belonging to the parsons vicars and incumbents of the church or chapel, or churches or chapels so united, shall exceed the sum of 100 l. a year, clear and above all charges and reprints; unless the respective parishioners, or the major part of them, under their hands desire otherwise.

Provided, that every minister settled as aforesaid incumbent of any church or chapel, or churches and chapels, united according to this act, shall be full and lawful incumbent thereof to all intents and purposes: so as such minister be a graduate in one of the universities of this kingdom.

And by the 4 *W. c.* 12. Where one of the churches united by virtue of the said last-mentioned act, was at the time of such union, or shall afterwards be demolished; in such case, as often as the church which is made the church presentative, and to which the union was made, shall be out of repair, or there shall be need of decent ornaments for the performance of divine service therein, the parishioners of the parish whose church shall then be down or demolished, shall bear and pay towards the charges of such repairs and decent ornaments, such share and proportion as the archbishop or bishop that shall make such union shall by the same union direct and appoint; and for want of such direction and appointment, then one third part of such charges of the repairs and decent ornaments which shall be made or provided; and the same shall be rated taxed and levied, and in default hereof such process and proceedings shall be made, as if

and by consequence not a collation by the bishop ; nor the institution of a clerk who pretending himself to be patron of a church that is void prays the ordinary to admit and institute him, and (without a presentation in form) obtains institution. *Gibf. 782.*

Also it is said that no usurpation in time of war putteth the right patron out of possession, albeit the incumbent come in by institution and induction ; and time of war doth not only give privilege to them that be in war, but to all others within the kingdom ; and altho' the admission and institution be in time of peace, yet if the presentment were in time of war, it putteth not the right patron out of possession. *1 Inst. 249. Watf. c. 20.*

And the reason of this seemeth to have been because anciently in the time of war, the courts were shut up ; so that the true patron might not have an opportunity to bring his quare impedit within the six months.

For to compleat an usurpation, the usurper must be in peaceable possession for six months. At the common law, if a stranger had presented his clerk, and he had been admitted and instituted to a church, whereof any subject had been lawful patron ; the patron had no other remedy to recover his advowson but a writ of right of advowson, wherein the incumbent was not to be removed : And the reason of this was, 1. To the intent that the incumbent might quietly intend and apply himself to his spiritual charge : And, 2. The law intended, that the bishop that had cure of souls within his diocese, would admit and institute an able man for the discharge of the pastoral duty, and that the bishop would do right to every patron within his diocese. But since the statute of the 13 *Ed. 1. §. 1. c. 5.* to enable the usurper to plead plenarty against the true patron, so as to debar him absolutely of that turn, it is not enough that the usurper do present duly, and his presentee be admitted instituted and inducted, but also that the church hath been full by the space of six months, and no writ brought to recover the presentation : for within the six months the patron may bring his writ of quare impedit or darrein presentment (as the case requires), and recover his presentment and possession of the advowson ; but if neither of these writs be brought within the six months (that is, so as to bear teste within that time) the incumbent is in for life, and the usurpation compleat. *1 Inst. 344. Watf. c. 13.*

And heretofore, if an usurper presented, and the clerk was instituted and inducted, and the true patron did not bring

bring his quare impedit within six months ; in some cases he did not only lose his turn for that time, but his presentation was gone for ever. *Wats. c. 7.*

Thus in the case of *Ashby and White, T. 2 An.* it was said by Holt chief justice ; that if the purchaser of an advowson in fee simple, before any presentment, suffer an usurpation, and six months to pass without bringing his quare impedit, he hath lost his right to the advowson, because he hath lost his quare impedit, which was his only remedy ; for he could not maintain a writ of right of advowson : and tho' he afterwards usurp, and die, and the advowson descend to his heir ; yet the heir cannot be remitted, but the advowson is lost for ever without recovery. For where a man hath but one remedy to come at his right, if he loses that, his right is gone. *L. Raym. 954.*

But now by the statute of the 7 An. c. 18. *Forasmuch as the pleading in a quare impedit is found very difficult, whereby many patrons are either defeated of their rights of presentation, or put to great charge and trouble to recover their right ; it is therefore enacted, that no usurpation upon any avoidance in any church, vicarage, or other ecclesiastical promotion, shall displace the estate or interest of any person intitled to the advowson or patronage thereof, or turn it to a right ; but he that would have had a right if no usurpation had been, may present or maintain his quare impedit upon the next or any other avoidance (if disturbed) notwithstanding such usurpation.*

Usury.

USURY in a strict sense seemeth to be, a contract What. upon the loan of money, to give the lender a certain profit for the use of it, upon all events, whether the borrower make any advantage of it, or the lender suffer any prejudice for the want of it, or whether it be repaid on the day appointed or not. *1 Haw. 245.*

And in a larger sense it seemeth, that all undue advantages taken by a lender against a borrower, come under the notion of usury, whether there were any contract in relation thereto or no : as where one in possession of land, made over to him for the security of a certain debt re-

tains his possession after he hath received all that is due from the profits of the land. 1 *Haw.* 245.

By the civil law.

2. Use or interest, by the civil law, is divided into lucrative and compensatory. Lucrative is, when it is paid where there hath been no advantage made by the debtor, and no delay or deceit in him : and this is condemned by the civil law. Compensatory is, when it is given, where the thing lent hath been advantageous to the debtor, and disadvantageous to the creditor that he was not sooner paid : and this is permitted by that law. *Wood. Civ. L.* 213.

And by the civil law (Swinburn tells us), a manifest usurer cannot make a testament ; and tho' he make one, it is void in law concerning goods and chattels, unless he satisfy for the usury, or put in caution for satisfaction to be made. *Swinb.* 101.

And as manifest usurers are forbidden to make testaments themselves, or to dispose of their goods by their last wills ; so are they forbidden to reap any benefit by the testament of others, or to be capable of any legacy of goods. *Swinb.* 376. (d)

By the canon law.

3. By a constitution of Edmund archbishop of Canterbury ; *We forbid any man to detain a pledge, after he hath received the principal out of the profits, after deduction of the expences, for this is usury.* *Lind.* 160.

Out of the profits] The pledge in this case must be supposed to be lands, cattle or such like, out of which a profit ariseth. *Johns.*

And by *Can.* 109. If any offend their brethren by — usury ; the churchwardens or questmen and sidemen, in the next presentments to their ordinaries, shall faithfully present every such offender, to the intent that he may be punished by the severity of the laws, according to his deserts ; and such notorious offenders shall not be admitted to the holy communion, till they be reformed.

And in general, it is said, that by the ecclesiastical laws, if a man be a manifest usurer, not only his testament

(d) These are the anathemas of the popes, and not the rescripts of the emperors. See *Cod.* 5. 5. The punishment by the civil law was once a quadruple penalty. *L. 2. Cod. Theod. de Usuris*, but this seems to have been mitigated by Justinian, who contents himself with declaring that whatever is paid more than the legal interest, shall be accounted part of the principal, *Cod.* 4. 32. 26. *Noordt, de Fagn. et Us. lib. 2. cap. 15.*

ment is void (as hath been said); but his body, after he is dead, is not to be buried amongst the bodies of other christian men, in any church or churchyard, until there be restitution or caution tendred, according to the value of such goods. *Swin.* 102. (c)

4. By the laws of king Alfred, it was ordained, that the chattels of usurers should be forfeited to the king, their lands and inheritances should escheat to the lords of By the common and statute laws.

(c) Most of the early fathers of the church have condemned usury in the strictest sense, *i. e.* any profit made of the loan of money, as contrary to the divine law. Alexander III. in the council of Lateran, prohibited the taking of all interest for money; and it has been observed, that Gregory X. places the chapter of usury after that of theft. But the Mosaic law, though it forbade the Jews to take interest from their brethren, allowed them to take interest from strangers, or to borrow from them on the same terms; and that this law has not condemned the lending of money on interest as *malum in se*, and contrary to the law of nature and of nations which many have thought, but merely prohibited it amongst the Jews; as dangerous in a political view, considering their itinerant and agricultural life, has been ably demonstrated by Noodt in his *Treatise de Fœnore et Ujuris*, c. 10 and 11. Nearly the same regulations obtained amongst the Romans in the infancy of the republic; but when commerce was introduced amongst them, the contract of lending money at a certain profit became frequent. The highest rate of legal interest among the Romans, from the time of Cicero to Justinian, was the *centesima* or twelfth part paid every month, amounting to 12 *per cent. per annum*; but the satirists inform us that some usurers exacted three, four, or even five times that profit. Justinian in his code fixed the legal rate of interest at 4, 6, 8, and 12 *per cent.* according to the station of the lender and the nature of the contract. *Cod.* 4. 32. 26. Various evasions of the laws, however, were practised at Rome, and some of these were not unknown to the canonists; for usurious profit might be secured under the contract of a sale and repurchase, or letting to hire, or might be stipulated for in consideration of the gain of the borrower, or of the loss which the lender suffered by the detention of his money. To these, modern money-lenders have added the purchase of annuities, in which, as the purchaser risks his capital, he is allowed to take a greater share of interest (though this must be within equitable bounds. *Vaughan v. Thomas*, 1 Bro. 556. *Heathcote v. Paignon*, 2 Bro. 167.). But if any of these transactions appear from circumstantial evidence to be merely the covering of an usurious contract, they are held to be within the statute of *Ann.* See *Chesterfield v. Janssen*, 3 Vesey 125.

the

the fee, and they should not be buried in the sanctuary. *Swin.* 102. 1 *Haw.* 245.

Also it seems to have been the opinion of the makers of divers acts of parliament, since the reformation, that all kinds of usury are contrary to good conscience. 1 *Haw.* 245.

By the 5 & 6 *Ed.* 6. c. 20. (now repealed), it was enacted, that no person by any means shall lend or forbear any sum of money for any manner of usury or increase to be received or hoped for, above the sum lent.

In the time of queen Elizabeth, when commerce began to extend its influence, a relaxation of the laws against usury followed of course. Thus by the 13 *Eliz.* c. 8. it is enacted, that no person shall take above 10l. *per cent.* interest; on pain of being punished and corrected according to the ecclesiastical laws heretofore made against usury.

By the 21 *Jas.* c. 17. None shall take above 8l. *per cent.* (with a proviso, that this statute shall not be construed or expounded to allow the practice of usury in point of religion or conscience).

By the 12 *Car.* 2. c. 13. None shall take above 6l. *per cent.* (without any proviso).

And by the 12 *An. st.* 2. c. 16. None shall take above 5l. *per cent.* on pain of treble value of the money lent; and all contracts, to the contrary shall be void (*f*). And every scrivener or solicitor, who shall take for brocage, soliciting, driving, or procuring the loan, or forbearing of any sum of money, above the rate of 5s. for the loan or forbearing of 100l. for a year, or more than 12d. above the stamp duties for making or renewing the bond or bill for loan or forbearing thereof, or for any counter-bond or bill concerning the same; shall forfeit 20l. half to the king, and half to him that will sue, with costs; and be imprisoned for half a year.

And therefore in these days a distinction seemeth to be made, betwixt usury and legal interest: for what exceed-

(*f*) As this act declares all usurious contracts void, the indorsee of a bill of exchange, given upon an usurious consideration cannot recover, altho' he had no notice of the usury, and had given a valuable consideration for the bill. *Low v. Waller*, *Doug.* 736. And if more than the principal and legal interest be paid, an action will lie to recover the surplus: *per* *Ld. Mansfield*, in *Smith v. Bramley*, *Ib.* 696.

eth the legal interest is properly usury; and he who exacteth it seemeth still to be punishable as an usurer. 1 *Dom.* 126.

And, upon the whole, it seemeth now to be generally agreed, that the taking of reasonable interest for the use of money is in itself lawful, and consequently that a covenant or promise to pay it, in consideration of the forbearance of a debt, will maintain an action. For why should not one who hath an estate in money be as well allowed to make a fair profit of it, as another who hath an estate in land? and what reason can there be that the lender of money should not as well make an advantage of it as the borrower? Neither do the passages in the mosaical law, which are generally urged against the lawfulness of all usury, if fully considered, so much prove the unlawfulness, as the lawfulness of it; for if all usury were against the moral law, why should it not be as much so in respect of foreigners, of whom the jews were expressly allowed to take it, as in respect of those of the same nation of whom alone they were forbidden to receive it? From whence it seems clearly to follow, that the prohibition of it to that people was merely political, and consequently doth not extend to any other nation. 1 *Hew.* 245. 2 *Burnet. Reform.* 192. [*Bentham on Usury*, 2d ed.]

Wakes. See Church.

Wales: Distribution of intestates effects there.
See *Wills*.

Waste committed in the glebe lands. See *Glebe lands*.

Way thro' the church-yard. See *Church*.

Way to the church. See *Church*.

Weapon drawn in the church or church-yard. See *Church*.

Welsh tongue; service in it. See *Publick worship*.

Whitsun-farthings. See *Pentecostals*.

Wills.

THE law affecting *Papists* in particular, with regard to wills and administrations, is treated of under the title *Popery*.

- I. Who may make a will.*
- II. Of what things a will may be made. p. 63.*
- III. Form and manner of making a will; and therein of appointing guardians and executors. [And of the revocation of wills.] p. 77. Also of seamen's wills.*
- IV. Of the probate of wills, and administration of intestates effects. p. 229.*
- V. Of the duty of executors and administrators in making an inventory, and getting in the effects of the deceased.*
- VI. Of the payment of debts by executors or administrators.*
- VII. Of the payment of legacies, and distribution of intestates effects.*
- VIII. Account.*

I. Who may make a will.

Difference between wills and testaments.

I. *Testament* and *will*, strictly speaking, are not synonymous. A will is properly limited to land; and a *testament* only to chattels, requiring executors, which a will only for land doth not require. So every testament is a will; but every will is not a testament. *God. Orph. Leg. 4, 5.*

But as authors in treating upon this subject have not adhered to this distinction; so throughout this title the words *will* and *testament* are used indiscriminately.

So also, the word *devise* seemeth properly applicable to lands; *bequest*, *bequeath*, *give*, *dispose*, and such like, to goods; yet, forasmuch as authors do generally confound them, and because that propriety of expression is not so much regarded in wills as in other legal instruments of conveyance, so long as the testator's intention doth sufficiently appear; therefore it hath not been thought necessary in these different ways of expression to observe a scrupulous exactness, but to take the words in the several authors as they stand; and this so much the rather, as it seemeth

seemeth in general to be an unwarrantable liberty, in reciting matters of law from books of acknowledged authority, to presume to vary the expression without necessary or urgent cause,

2. It doth not seem to be clearly settled, what shall be the lowest age, at which a person shall be allowed to make a testament of goods and chattels. Infant.

Dr. Gibson says, when prohibitions have been prayed, on suggestion that the testator was not in one case seventeen, in another case eighteen years of age, which it was said were the lowest ages assigned by the common law for making a testament of goods and chattels; they were denied in both cases for the same reason, namely that it belongs to the ecclesiastical court to judge when a person is of age to make a will; and if an inferior court had given sentence against their own law, there was no remedy but by appeal. *Gibb. 461. 2 Mod. 315. T. Jones 210.*

And one reason of limiting the same to the age of seventeen may be, because (as it is agreed on all hands) that is the proper age at which a person is allowed to take upon himself the office of an executor; administration daring the minority of an infant executor ceasing at that age.

In the case of *Bishop and Sharp, M. 1704*, in the court of chancery, it is said to have been agreed, that a female may make a will at twelve years; and a male at seventeen, or at fifteen if proved to be a person of discretion. *2 Vern. 469.*

Dr. Godolphin says, an infant male at the age of fourteen years, and female at the age of twelve years, may make a testament of goods and chattels. *God. O. L. 23.*

And in the case of *Hyde and Hyde, H. 8 Ann.* it is said to have been agreed, that a male infant of fourteen years of age, and a female of twelve years of age, might make a will of a personal estate; and it was said in this case, that it was so agreed by the lord keeper Wright in the case of *Sbarpe and Sharpe*, wherein they followed the civil law of Justinian for their consent to marry at such ages. *Gilb. Rep. 74.*

And it is true, that Justinian fixes the *testamentary* age and the age of *puberty* alike, to wit, in the male at the age of fourteen; and in the female at the age of twelve. But by the common law of England, the age of *discretion*

both in the male and female is the age of fourteen ; althoth the same common law admits of Justinian's distinction as to the age of *puberty* or consent to marriage.

And by the author of the *Law of Executors*, who is said to have been judge Dodderidge, it seems to be laid down generally, that an infant of the age of discretion, to wit, the age of fourteen years, may make a will of goods and chattels. *Law of Ex.* 10.

And Mr. *Wentworth* saith, he thinks that at the age of fourteen, being in the judgment of law the age of discretion, a person may make a testament. *Wentw.* 214.

Finally, Sir *William Blackstone* says ; Infants, under the age of fourteen if males, and twelve if females, cannot make a testament : which is the rule of the civil law. For though some of our common lawyers have held that an infant of any age (even four years old) might make a testament, and others have denied that under eighteen he is capable ; yet as the ecclesiastical court is the judge of every testator's capacity, this case must be governed by the rules of the ecclesiastical law. 2 *Black.* 497.

Note, It is Mr. *Perkins*, whom all the subsequent authors quote (*Perk.* § 503.) with some degree of wonder, for asserting that an infant of four years of age may make a testament. But surely this must have been an error of the press ; which might possibly enough happen from a similitude of the words, or especially of the figures 4 and 14.

But by the statute of the 34 & 35 H. 8. c. 5. §. 14. *Wills or testaments made of any manors lands tenements or other hereditaments, by any person within the age of twenty-one years, shall not be taken to be good or effectual in law ;* for until that time by the common laws of this realm, they are accounted infants. *Swin.* 74. 6th edit.

But by custom in particular places, they may devise lands before the age of twenty-one. *God. O. L.* 21. *Wentw.* 214.

But no custom of any place can be good, to enable a male infant to make any will before he is fourteen years of age. *Law of Exec.* 153.

3. An idiot is justly excluded from making a testament. *Swin.* 8.

Now an idiot, or natural fool is he, who notwithstanding he be of lawful age, yet he is so witless, that he cannot number to twenty, nor can tell what age he is of, nor knoweth who is his father or mother, nor is able to answer

answer any such easy question ; whereby it may plainly appear, that he hath not reason to discern what is to his profit or damage, nor is apt to be informed or instructed by any other : and such an idiot cannot make any testament, nor may dispose either of his lands or goods. *Swin. 79.*

4. Mad folks and lunatick persons, during the time of Lunatick, their furor or insanity of mind, cannot make a testament, nor dispose any thing by will ; and the reason is most forcible, because they know not what they do : for in making of testaments, the integrity and perfectness of mind, and not health of the body is requisite. *Swin. 76.*

Howbeit, if these mad or lunatick persons have clear or calm intermissions, then during the time of such their quietness and freedom of mind, they may make their testaments. *Swin. 76.*

And it is sufficient for the party which pleadeth the insanity of the testator's mind, to prove that the testator was beside himself before the making of the testament, altho' he do not prove the testator's madness at the very time of making the testament : the reason is, it being proved that the testator was once mad, the law presumeth him to continue still in that case, unless the contrary be proved. For like as the law presumeth every man to be an honest man, unless the contrary be proved, and being proved, then he which is evil to be evil still ; so concerning furor, the law presumeth every man to have the use of reason and understanding, unless the contrary be proved ; which being proved accordingly, then he is presumed in law to continue still void of the use of reason and understanding, unless the testator were besides himself but for a short time, and in some peculiar actions, and not continually for a long space, as for a month or more ; or unless the testator fell into some frenzy upon some accidental cause, which cause is afterwards taken away ; or unless it be a long time since the testator was assaulted with the malady : for in these cases the testator is not presumed to continue in his former furor or frenzy. *Swin. 78.*

Yet it is a hard and difficult point, to prove a man not to have the use of understanding or reason : and therefore it is not sufficient for the witnesses to depose that the testator was mad or besides his wits ; unless they render or yield a sufficient reason, to prove this their deposition ; as that they did see him do such things, or heard him

Speak such words, as a man having reason would not have done or spoken. *Swin.* 78. (g)

. 5. E.

(g) Questions upon the general sanity of testators or the prevalence of a lucid interval at the time of executing their will, occur frequently both in the civil and ecclesiastical courts. They are usually determined on the particular circumstances of each individual case; for according to Lord Thurlow's opinion in *Att. Gen. v. Parnter*, "it seems scarcely possible to extract from any particular case of this kind that which will apply to any other." But, his Lordship adds, "it is of equal importance that the evidence in support of the allegation of a lucid interval, after derangement at any period has been established, should be as strong and as demonstrative of such fact, as where the object of the proof is to establish derangement." Indeed if lunacy be once established, it is a matter of nice investigation to say, what shall be evidence of such a remission or intermission of the disorder, as shall allow the lunatick to dispose of his property by will. The points generally insisted upon in proof and argument, relate to the state of the testator before making the will, the will itself and his subsequent conduct. And if the circumstances of the case, among which may be reckoned the nature of the disorder, afford any reasonable ground to suppose that a lucid interval may have prevailed, it will be difficult to set aside the will, if it be rationally drawn up both with regard to the disposition of the property and the aptness of the expression to effectuate the testator's intention, especially if it be written entirely by himself; for these circumstances seem to establish that sound disposing mind and memory which the law requires. Thus in the case of *Cartwright v. Cartwright*, *Mich.* 1795, before the delegates in appeal from the prerogative court of the Archbishop of Canterbury, it appeared that the testatrix was insane from 1774 to 1794 when she died, and though decent in her appearance always answered to any inquiries about her health *that she was dying, for that all her bones were broken.* She had made a former will and had been heard to lament that she had destroyed it, adding that she had lost her senses. In November 1794 she repeatedly called for pen, ink, and paper, with which she was at last indulged, the doctor who attended her saying that she must be pacified by compliance, but that nothing she could write would be valid. Her hands being loosed from a strait waistcoat she walked about, in a great agitation, wrote on several pieces of paper which she afterwards tore, and at last produced a most perfect and well written will, in which she preferred *nieces the descendants of a sister of the whole blood, to sisters of the half blood;* being asked if a witness was necessary to authenticate the will, she answered no, for that her will was only of personal property; and sealing it, she delivered it to a friend, and was heard afterwards

5. *E. 3 Jac.* in the star chamber, in *Combe's* case it was agreed by the judges, that sane memory for the making of a will is not at all times when the party can speak yea or no, or had life in him, nor when he can answer to any thing with sense ; but he ought to have judgment to discern, and to be of perfect memory, otherwise the will is void. *Mo. 759.*

Persons of a weak understanding.

And in the case of the marquess of *Winchester*, *T. 41 Eliz.* it is said, that by the law it is not sufficient that the testator be of memory when he maketh his will, to answer to familiar and usual questions ; but he ought to have a disposing memory, so that he be able to make disposition of his estate with understanding and reason : and this is such memory, as the law calls sound and perfect memory. *6 Co. 23. (b)*

But every person is presumed to be of perfect mind and memory, unless the contrary be proved : and therefore if any person go about to impugn or overthrow the testament, by reason of insanity of mind, or want of memory ; he must prove that impediment. *Swin. 77.*

But if a man be of a mean understanding, neither of the wise sort nor of the foolish, but indifferent, as it were betwixt a wise man and a fool, yea, though he rather incline to the foolish sort ; such an one is not prohibited to make a testament : unless he be yet more foolish, and so very simple and sottish, that he may easily be made to

wards to express satisfaction at what she had done. She soon after relapsed into her disorder, in which she continued to her death. And the delegates affirmed the judgment of sir W. Wynne the judge of the prerogative court, establishing the will.

But if other circumstances in proof, added to the nature of the bequests, should raise a presumption that the will originated in insanity, an aptness of expression will not alone suffice to establish it. Thus in the case of *Clark v. Lear and Scarwell* in the ecclesiastical courts in March 1791, the testator a middle aged man, being a lunatic, escaped from his keeper, and at a watering place fell in love with a young lady to whom he afterwards sent in very polite terms a present of a lottery ticket, and making a will rational on the face of it, left her a legacy of 1000 l. But though it was argued that all this had the appearance of reason, the will was set aside as being bottomed in insanity.

(b) It is not sufficient that the testator be corporally present when he signs his will, if in truth he be absent as to mental purposes. *Right v. Price, 1 Doug. Rep. 241.*

Wills. Who may make.

believe things incredible or impossible, and hath not so much wit as a child may have of ten or eleven years of age, who is therefore intestable by the law, for want of judgment. *Swin.* 80.

jur. 6. He that is overcome with drink, during the time of his drunkenness, is compared to a madman; and therefore if he make his testament at that time, it is void in law. Which is to be understood, when he is so excessively drunk, that he is utterly deprived of the use of reason and understanding: otherwise, if he be not clean spent, albeit his understanding be obscured, and his memory troubled, yet he may make his testament being in that case. *Swin.* 83.

men. 7. By a constitution of archbishop Stratford: *Whereas divers persons do hinder or endeavour to hinder the free making and execution of the testaments of women, either sole or married; we decree, that none shall henceforth do the same, on pain of the greater excommunication.* *Lind.* 173.

And *Lind.* *loc. cit.*, in his commentary hereupon, contends for the capacity of married women to make a will, in pursuance of this constitution; especially where such woman hath brought a large fortune to her husband, who perhaps had nothing of his own before. *Lind.* 173.

Two years after the making of this constitution, we find a petition of the commons in parliament, that whereas there was a constitution made by the prelates, that women married [*niefs and femes*] might make a will, it might be ordained that the people should remain in the same state, as they had been accustomed to be in the times of the king's progenitors: To which it was answered as to this matter, that the king will that law and reason be done. *Gibbs.* 461. [*Rot. Parl.* 18 *Ed.* 3. 12.].

And by the statute of the 34 & 35 *H.* 8. c. 5. it is enacted, that *wills or testaments made of any manors lands tenements or other hereditaments, by any woman covert, shall not be taken to be good or effectual in the law.* s. 14. (i)

And

(i) But nevertheless a *feme covert* may have a power given her by settlement, so to dispose of land by writing in the nature of a will, as to prevent its going to the heir, namely, 1. by vesting the legal estate in trustees, and giving her a power to appoint the uses: 2. By agreement; which according to some authorities a court of equity will compel the heir to execute by a proper conveyance. *Wright v. Ld. Cadogan*, 6 *Bro. P. C.* 156. cited

And also of goods and chattels, the wife cannot make her testament without the licence or consent of her husband; because by the laws and customs of this realm, so soon as a man and woman are married, all the goods and chattels personal that the wife had at the time of the spousals or celebration of the marriage or after, and also the chattels real if he overlive his wife, belong to the husband, by reason of the said marriage; and therefore with good reason she cannot give that away which was hers, without the sufferance or grant of the owner. *Swin. 88, 89.*

And albeit the testament be made before the marriage, yet she being intestable at the time of her death, by reason her husband is then living, the testament is void; for it is necessary to the validity of such testament, that the testator have ability to make a testament, not only at the time of making thereof, when the testament receiveth its essence and being; but also at the time of the testator's death, when the testament receiveth its strength and confirmation. *Swin. 88.*

And albeit the wife do overlive the husband, yet the testament made during the marriage is not good; because she was intestable at the time of the will making: but if the testament being made during the coverture, she do approve and confirm the same after the death of her husband; in this case the devise is good, by reason of her new consent, or new declaration of her will; for then it is as it were a new will. *Swin. 88.*

And altho' the will be made before marriage, and the wife survive the husband, yet it seemeth that the will shall not revive upon the husband's death. As in the case of *Mrs. Lewis* some years ago, before the delegates: *Mrs. Lewis*, a widow, made a will; soon after, she married again; in some time her second husband died, and she again became a widow, without any children by either husband. The will which she made in her first widowhood remained; and being found after her death, the question was, whether it was a good will or not. The

and agreed by *Ld. Kenyon*, in *Doe v. Staple*, 2 *T. Rep.* Although others seem to doubt whether such an agreement while resting in agreement, though it bind the husband, defeat the right of the heir at law. See *Peacock v. Monk*, 11 *191.* and *Ld. Thurlow's* opinion in *Hodjden v. Lloyd*, 11 *534.*

counsel for the will cited many authorities from the civil law, and shewed, that among the Romans, if a man had made his will, and was afterwards taken captive, such will revived and became again in force, by the testator's repossessing his liberty. But it was observed on the other hand, that marriage is a voluntary act, but captivity is the effect of compulsion. And the will was adjudged not to be good.—And in the case of *Forse* and *Hemblinge*, *M.* 30 & 31 *El.* (4 *Co.* 60, 61.) it was said, that if a man of sane memory make his will, and afterwards becometh of non-sane memory, this is no countermand of the will, because this is done by the act of God : But marriage is the voluntary act of the party, and amounteth in law to a countermand of the will (*k*).

But yet nevertheless, upon the licence or consent of the husband, the wife may make her testament even of his goods. *Swin.* 89.

But albeit the husband do give licence to his wife to make a will of his goods ; yet he may revoke the same, not only at the making of the will, but after her death, at the least (*Swinburne* says) before the will be proved. *Swin.* 89.

Yet such his consent (*Dr. Gibson* says) shall be implied, until the contrary do appear ; and if after her death he doth consent, he can never afterwards dissent ; and if immediately upon the death of the wife, he discourses and deals with the executor whom she hath appointed, as executor, as in recommending to him a painter for escutcheons, a goldsmith for rings, or the like, this is a good assent, and makes it a good will ; and tho' after such assent given, he do upon the sight of the will dislike it, and oppose the probate, or enter a caveat, such disagreement shall not hurt the will : and when there is an express agreement or consent that a wife may make a will, a little proof will be sufficient to make out the continuance of that consent after their death ; but it is necessary to prove a *disagreement* made, in a solemn and formal manner, in express words, and not by implication. *Gibb.* 461, 2.

(*k*) *S. P.* on the will of Catharine Calver, who by marriage articles between her and *Dr. Hibbins*, had a power to dispose of her property by will *after marriage* subsequent to the articles, but a few hours *before the marriage* she made a will, which was held to be revoked by the marriage. *Doe v. Staple*, 2 *T. Rep.* 684. *Hodson v. Lloyd*, 2 *Bro.* 534.

But

But by lord Hardwicke, in the case of *Henley and Philips*, July 17, 1740. Tho' a feme covert has power of disposing of a sum of money or any other thing, by a writing purporting to be a will, yet after the wife's death, the proving it in the spiritual court will not give it the authority of a will, but it will still be considered as an instrument only, or an appointment of such sum or other thing in pursuance of the power; and before it is proved in the spiritual court as a testamentary conveyance, the husband ought to be examined there as to his consent; nor till then will it have the effect and operation of a will. *2 Atk. 49.*

And when such a will was brought to the prerogative court to be proved and a prohibition was prayed for the husband upon this suggestion, that the testatrix was a feme covert, and so, disabled by the law to make a will, it was granted; because tho' the husband may by covenant depart from his right, and suffer his wife to make a will, yet whether he hath done so or not, shall be determined by the common law. *Gibbs. 462. (1)*

If a woman have a lease, an estate by extent, the next avoidance of a church, or other chattel real; these are not divested out of her into her husband by marriage, but in case she overlive him, they continue to her as before, no alienation or alteration having been made by the husband, who had power to dispose of them by gift in his lifetime, tho' not by his will: yet such a woman in her husband's lifetime cannot of or for these things, without her husband's assent, make an executor or will; but she dying before him, they would by the operation of law accrue to him. *Went. 198. Law of Test. 33.*

Another kind of goods, or rather interest, a woman may have, to wit, debts or things in action, which, as the former, are not divested out of her by marriage into her husband, nor yet can she thereof make an executor without her husband's assent, altho' they be one degree farther from the husband than the said chattels real; for that tho' the husband do overlive the wife, he shall not be intitled to them, as to the former. But if the wife makes him executor of these, as she may; or if after her death, he takes out administration of her goods, then he is thereby intitled to them. *Went. 199. Law of Test. 13, 34.*

(1) *Vid. infra, Jenkin v. Whitehouse.*

But it is said, if a woman hath pin-money or a separate maintenance settled on her, and she by management or good housewifry saves money out of it, she may dispose of such money so saved by her, or of any jewels bought with it, by writing in nature of a will, if she die before her husband, and shall have it herself if she survive him, and the same shall not be liable to the husband's debts. *Swin. a. 95. Viner. Baron and Feme. R. a. 16. (m)*

And altho' a feme covert is so entirely under the power of her husband, that she cannot make what in propriety of speech is a will; yet she may make what is called an *appointment*. And the usual way is, for the intended husband to enter into a bond before marriage in a penal sum, conditioned to permit his wife to make a will, and to dispose of money or legacies to such a value, and to pay what she shall appoint, not exceeding such a value; and in such case, if after the marriage, and during the coverture, she makes any writing purporting her will, and disposes legacies to the value agreed, tho' in strictness of law she cannot make a will without her husband; yet this is a good *appointment*, and the husband is bound by his bond to perform what is appointed. *Swin. a. 94. 1 Vern. 244.*

And in *1 Mod. 211.* it is said, that the husband may bind himself by covenant or bond, to permit his wife by will to dispose of legacies, and this will be such an appointment as the husband will be bound to perform (n); yet it doth not operate as a will, neither ought it to be proved in the spiritual court; for the property passeth from him to her legatee, and it is his gift: And therefore if the legatee dieth before the wife, such legacy is not lapsed; for this in strictness is only the execution of a trust, and the executor or administrator of such legatee shall be intitled.

But in the case of *Jenkin v. Whitehouse, M. 31 G. 2.* By lord Mansfield Ch. J. In a cause of *Ross v. Bwer*, in chancery, July 5, 1744; 'There was a power to a feme covert to appoint by will. And the lord chancellor held clearly, tho' such will operates as an appointment, that it

(m) And in *Pettiplace v. Gorges, 1 Vez. jun. 46. Ld. Thurlow C.* held that a wife having personal property secured to her sole and separate use, took it with all the incidents of property, and might therefore dispose of it and its produce by will, without the consent of her husband.

(n) *Gro. Car. 219. Marriot v. Kingsman.*

must be proved in the spiritual court; and he would not proceed, till the will was so proved. He said, it was not material for him in that case to consider of the precise form in which it was to be proved, whether by a strict probate, or by granting administration with the appointment in nature of a will annexed; and therefore that point was not entered into; but the fact, that the paper was her will, in case she had power to make one, must be established by the ecclesiastical court; for such an appointment is in the nature of a will, and attended with all the consequences of a will. And as to the point, that money disposed under the execution of a power, by such a will, should not lapse; this was fully considered, and contradicted, in the cause of the duke of *Marlborough* v. the earl of *Carlisle* and others, Nov. 26, 1750. The cases that have been cited in this cause shew, that administration may be granted, with the appointment annexed; which proves it to be testamentary: For nothing can be annexed to an administration, but a testamentary disposition; which is proved and established by the ecclesiastical court in that form (o). But if the question be, Whether the wife had a power to make an appointment in the nature of a will, and thereby to deprive the husband of any benefit, which by law would devolve upon him in consequence of her death; that is a question proper to be considered at law: and if she had no such power, this court will grant a prohibition. *Burrow*, 431.

If in the case where a feme covert cannot make a testament without the husband's licence, the husband grants a licence to the wife to make a testament of a certain portion of his goods, and the wife so licensed doth make one testament, and afterwards another, and perhaps a third or fourth; the licence shall be understood of the last testament, and not of the first. *Law of Test.* 37.

But if a feme covert is executrix to some other person, and in that right hath divers goods and chattels; these

(o) That the will of a feme covert cannot be given in evidence till it has been proved in the ecclesiastical court, see also *Stans v. Forsyth*, 2 *Doug. Rep.* 707. where Lord Mansfield says, if the ecclesiastical court will not grant probate, the proper course is to appeal to the delegates. Mr. Douglas in note [+ 150] ib. observes that the regular course in cases like this, is for the spiritual court not to give probate of the will, but administration with the will as a testamentary paper annexed,

are not devested out of her, because she hath them not merely to her own use, but as representing the person of another: and therefore in this case (Swinburne says) the wife may, for the continuation of the executorship, make an executor, and consequently a testament, without the consent or assent of her husband. *Swin. 89. Law of Test. 34. (p)*

But this rule, that a feme covert executrix may make her will of those goods whereof she is executrix, is restrained in two cases:

The first is, where she doth not make an executor, but bequeaths the goods whereof she is executrix, by devise or legacy; in this case the will is void, because an executor may not dispose of the goods of the testator otherwise than to the use of the testator, to the payment of his debts and performance of his will, and therefore may not give or devise the same by legacy, for that were to dispose of the testator's goods as if they were the proper goods of the executor, and to convert the same to the private use of the legatee and not the use of the testator. But when an executor doth only make another executor, the second executor doth stand chargeable and accountable for the distribution of the first testator's goods to the use of the same testator as did the former executor, and is not by the laws of the land reputed for the executor of the executor, but of the former testator, and so is not a legatee. *Law of Test. 35, 36. Swin. 90.*

The second is, where she is not only executrix, but legatee also, and hath accepted of the thing bequeathed not as executrix, but as legatee; and in this case the will of the feme covert is also void. For she taking the thing bequeathed not as executrix, but as legatee, doth thereby make it her own proper goods, and consequently her husband's; and therefore cannot be given from him, without his licence or consent. If it doth not appear whether the wife took the thing bequeathed as executrix, or legatee; it shall be presumed, she took it as executrix. *Swin. 90. Law of Test. 36.*

And altho' a feme covert being executrix may make her testament, and appoint an executor of those goods which she hath as executrix, and not as legatee, without her husband's assent; yet the profit and fruit which arise out

(p) See this doctrine agreed by Ld. TiurLOW C. in *Hodges v. Lloyd*, 2 Bro. 543. *et seq.*

of those goods which she hath as executrix during the marriage, as calves, lambs, and such like profit of kine, sheep, and cattle, do belong to the husband, and not to herself as executrix; and therefore she cannot make her testament of such fruits and profit, without her husband's approbation. *Swin. 90. Law of Test. 36.*

H. 4 G. 2. King and Bettefworth. Mandamus to grant administration to *John Cullem*, or *Joan* his wife. Return; that by articles before marriage it was agreed, that the wife should have power to make a will, and dispose of her leasehold estate; that pursuant to this power, she made a will, and her mother executrix, who has duly proved the same. To this return it was objected, that she might have things in action not covered by the deed, and the husband was in all events intitled to an administration to them. On the other hand, it was insisted, that with the consent of the husband she might make a will; and here is his consent by being party to the deed. But by the court; a general consent to make a will doth not seem sufficient, but there should be a consent to that particular will: besides, this is going beyond her power, which did not extend to the making an executor. This is rather an appointment, which in equity will controul the administration as to the leasehold estate, than a will: And as there may be other effects not covered by the deed, the return is ill, and there must be a peremptory mandamus. *Stra. 891.*

8. That testament is to be repelled, which is made upon just fear, that is, such a fear as may move a constant man; as the fear of death, or of bodily hurt, or of imprisonment, or of the loss of all or most part of one's goods, or the like. Whereof no certain rule can be delivered, but it is left to the discretion of the judge, who ought not only to consider the quality of the threatnings, but also the persons as well threatening, as threatned; in the threatening, his power and disposition; in the person threatned, the sex, age, courage, pusillanimity, and the like. But if the testator afterwards, when there is no cause of fear, do ratify and confirm the testament, it seemeth to be good in law. *Swin. 475, 476.*

Person under
fear or restraint

If a man makes a will in his sickness, at the over importunity of his wife, to the end he may be quiet; this shall be said to be a will made by restraint, and shall not be good. *Styl. 427. [8 Vin. Ab. 167.]*

But if the person who makes the motion be not any ways suspected, and it also appears by some conjectures that

that the sick person had a desire to make his will: in this case the testament is good. *Law of Test.* 53. (g)

g. 7.

(g) Civilians, whilst they declare that force and fraud vitiate a will, tolerate those alluring manners, and that engaging address by which infirm testators are too often induced to clobber their immediate heirs. *Dig.* 28. 5. 70. § 23. 6. 3. *Cod.* 6. 34. 3. *Sauze, Lib.* 4. *Tit.* 1. *Def.* 11. but with two exceptions: 1. Unless the testator be induced to make his will by false suggestions and lies, which are in truth a species of fraud; 2. Unless prayers and intreaties be so frequently repeated, that they operate as a sort of force. See *Sauze ubi supra*, and *Swinsburne*, pt. 7. § 4. § 18. with the authorities there cited. With us also, if a will be proved to have been obtained by fraud or force, it will be set aside in the proper court. See 1 *Cha. Rep.* 24. *Herbert v. Lowndes*, 8 *Vin. Abr.* 165. *Goss v. Tracy*, 1 *P. Wms.* 287. And when legacies were procured by fraud, the court of chancery has in many cases decreed them to be trusts. *Treatise on Eq. by Famb. Vol.* 1. p. 64. *Vol.* 2. p. 380. *Herbert v. Lowndes*, 1 *Cha. Rep.* 13. Error may also in some cases affect a will, especially if it appear that the testator was solely actuated by an almost insuperable mistake, which has made him neglect the performance of some urgent duty; for the presumption is, that had he not been led into an error, he could not thus have willed. And this is the case mentioned by Cicero in his treatise *de Oratore*, *Lib.* 1. c. 38. and quoted by Grotius *de J. B. & P.* 2. 9. 6. and by Lord Mansfield in *Brady v. Cubitt*, 2 *Doug. Rep.* 39. "What cause, says Cicero, could be of greater moment than that of the soldier, whose death being announced at home by a false messenger from the army, the father believing the report, altered his will, appointed another person his heir, and died?" The affair was brought before the centumvirs when the soldier returned home and sued for his paternal inheritance, as a son passed over in his father's will, namely the question of civil law in that cause was, "can a son be disinherited of his paternal goods, whom his father has neither appointed heir by his testament nor disinherited by name?" The last reason mentioned by the author would have been sufficient to annul the will as *testamentum inofficiosum*, by the civil law, but the error which induced the father to alter his will, seems also to be relied on by Cicero, and it is in this view of the case that the passage is quoted by the two latter great authorities. It must however be very difficult to establish by evidence, except in a case equally strong with that here put, that any alleged error, false rumour, or misrepresentation operated so irresistibly on the mind of a testator as to be the sole efficient cause that induced him to make or to alter his will in a particular manner. And perhaps such a presumption would not be sustained,

9. T. 1725. *Stephenton and Gardiner*. A bill was brought to set aside a will relating to a personal estate only, and to stay the probate thereof, setting forth that the will was gained by fraud, and by misrepresenting the plaintiffs, who were the half brothers and sisters of the testatrix; and alleging, that the will was falsely read to her; and setting forth divers instances of fraud, on the part of the defendants, in procuring this will. The defendants, as to that part of the bill which sought to set aside the will, and to stay the proceeding, demurred to the jurisdiction of the court; forasmuch as upon the face of the bill it appeared, that the plaintiffs were improper to sue here, in regard the spiritual court had the proper cognizance of wills relating to personal estates, and could determine fraud concerning them. After which, motions were made before the lords commissioners and the lord chancellor King for an injunction. But the court was against it: for the spiritual court hath jurisdiction of fraud relating to a will of a personal estate, and can examine the parties by allegation touching this fraud, and if the will was falsely read to the testatrix, then it is not her will. 2 P. Will. 286.

Person circumvented by fraud.

T. 1686. *Archer and Mosse*. The testator when in perfect health, had made his will, and thereby gave to the plaintiff *Archer* his nephew the greatest part of his personal estate, to the value of 5000l. But one *Bridget Sandyman*, his maid servant, had in his sickness prevailed upon him to make another will, and to marry her a week before his death, when he lay in his sick bed, at six of the clock at night, tho' it was really proved by two ministers, that she was a year before actually married to the defendant *Mosse*, and was then his wife, and that *Mosse* procured the licence for the marriage of the testator to *Bridget*; and this will being set up by *Mosse* (executor to *Bridget*), tho' it appeared that there was as gross a practice as could be in the gaining the will, the testator being non compos mentis both at the time of making the will, and also at the time of the supposed marriage, and that in his health he knew that *Mosse* and *Bridget* were married, and that *Bridget* suppressed the first will; yet that will so

except in a case where the error was equally unavoidable, and the intention of the testator equally apparent, as well as his duty equally urgent, with those of the father abovementioned. See *Batman v. Roberts*, 3 Ch. Ca. 61. and *James v. Greaves*, 2 P. Will. 270.

set

set up, being proved in the prerogative court, and the matter in question relating only to a personal estate, the lord chancellor was of opinion, that whilst the probate stood, the matter was not examinable in chancery; and tho' the fraud was fully proved and opened to him, he would not hear any proofs read, but dismissed the bill. 2 Vern. 8. (r)

But tho' a will gained by fraud, and proved in the spiritual court, is not to be controverted in equity; yet if the party claiming under such a will comes for equity in the court of chancery, he shall not have it. 2 Vern. 76.

M. 1715. *Gosse and Tracy*. It being urged, that a will concerning *land* is only triable at common law, and that the party there may take advantage of any fraud or imposition on the testator, and therefore not proper to be examined into or set aside in equity upon pretence of fraud or surprise; the lord chancellor held, that there might be fraud in obtaining a will that might be relievable in equity, and of which no advantage could be taken at law; as if a man agree to give the testator 2000 l. in bank bills, if he will devise his estate to him, and on the delivery of such bills makes his will, and deviseth his estate unto him, and the bills prove to be forged or counterfeited. 2 Vern. 700.

But in the case of *Bransby and Kerridge*, July 28, 1728; in the house of lords, it was decreed, that a will of a real estate could not be set aside in a court of equity for fraud or imposition, but must be tried at law on *Devisavit vel non*, being a matter proper for a jury to inquire into. *Law of Test.* 60. *Vin. Devise.* Z. 2.

Persons deaf
and dumb.

10. Those who are deaf and dumb by nature, cannot make any kind of testament or last will; unless it do appear by sufficient arguments, that such person understandeth what a testament meaneth, and that he hath a desire to make a testament: for if he have such understanding and desire, then he may by signs and tokens declare his testament. *Swin.* 95.

Blind.

11. Dr. Ayliffe says, generally, that persons who are blind cannot make their wills. *Ayl. Par.* 531.

But Dr. Swinburne says, he that is blind may make a nuncupative testament, by declaring his will before a sufficient number of witnesses. And he may make his testament in writing, provided the same be read before witnesses, and in their presence acknowledged by the testa-

(r) *Vid. infra, Probate, 7. § 23.*

for for his last will. But if a writing were delivered to the testator, and he not hearing the same read, acknowledged the same for his will, this would not be sufficient; for it may be that if he should hear the same read, he would not acknowledge the same for his will. *Swin. 96.*

And it seemeth best, that it be read over to the testator, and approved by him, in the presence of all the subscribing witnesses; and this the civil law did expressly require in the case of a blind man's will: But in England this strictness seemeth not to be precisely requisite, if there shall be otherwise satisfactory proof before the court that the identical will was read over to him, altho' it was not in their presence: And sometimes the single oath of the writer hath been allowed sufficient by the court of delegates, to prove the identity of the will.

And what precautions are necessary for authenticating a blind man's will, seem in like degree requisite in the case of a person who cannot read. For tho' the law in other cases may presume, that the person who executes a will knows and approves of the contents thereof; yet that presumption ceaseth, where by defect of education he cannot read, or by sickness he is incapacitated to read the will at that time.

12. Whosoever is lawfully convicted of high treason, Traytor. by verdict, confession, outlawry, or presentment; besides the loss of his life, shall forfeit to the king all his goods and chattels, and all such lands tenements and hereditaments as he shall have in his own right, use, or possession, of any estate or inheritance, at the time of such treason committed, or at any time after; and so consequently is intestable. Inasmuch that traytors are not only deprived of making any testament, or other kind of last will, from the time of their conviction; but also the testament before made doth by reason of the same conviction become void, both in respect of goods, and also in respect of lands tenements and hereditaments. *Swin. 97.*

But if any person, being attainted of treason, obtain the king's pardon, and be thereby restored to his former estate; then may he make his testament, as if he had not been convicted: or if he make any before his conviction and condemnation, the same by reason of such pardon recovereth its former force and effect. *Swin. 97.*

But if a traytor hath goods as executor to another, the same are not forfeited: whence it follows, that of such goods he may make his will. *Swin. 97.*

13. If

Felon.

13. If any person be condemned of felony, he ought to suffer death, and the king shall have all his goods, where-soever they be found. And if he have any freehold, it shall forthwith be seized into the king's hands, and he shall have the profit thereof by the space of a year and a day, and also waste; and after the king hath had the year, day, and waste, the land shall be restored to the chief lord of the fee. Felons therefore lawfully convicted, cannot make any testaments, or other dispositions, of any goods or lands; because the law hath disposed thereof already. *Swin. 98.*

But a pardon restoreth them to their former estate. *Swin. 98.*

Felo de se.

14. If a man do willingly kill himself, his testament (if he made any) is void, both concerning the appointment of the executor, and also concerning the legacy or bequest of any goods; for they are confiscate. *Swin. 106.*

But if the testament be of lands, it seemeth it is not void; because a felo de se doth not forfeit any lands of inheritance, for no man can forfeit his lands without an attainder by course of law. *3 Inst. 55.*

Outlaw.

15. An outlawed person is not only out of the king's protection, and out of the aid of law, but also all his goods and chattels are forfeited to the king by means of the outlawry, altho' he were outlawed but in an action personal; and altho' the action were not just, nevertheless his goods and chattels are forfeited, by reason of his contempt in not appearing: and therefore he that is outlawed cannot make his testament of his goods so forfeited. *Swin. 107.*

Howbeit it seemeth, that he who is outlawed in an action personal, may make his testament of his lands; for they are not forfeited. *Swin. 107.*

Also a man outlawed in a personal action may in some case make executors; for he may have debts upon contract which are not forfeited to the king: and those executors may have a writ of error to reverse the outlawry. *Gre. El. 851.*

Excommunicate.

16. It seemeth to be the better opinion, that an excommunicate person may make a testament: unless he be excommunicate with that great curse, which is called anathema, which is not to be inflicted but upon great cause, with great deliberation and solemnity. *Swin. 10.*

And in this case (of the greater excommunication, as it seemeth) lord Coke observes, that an excommunication

tion is a greater disability than an outlawry; for if a plaintiff, who is an executor, be outlawed, his outlawry cannot be pleaded to disable him from proceeding in the suit, because it is in the right of another; but if he is excommunicate it is otherwise, because every man that converseth with such a person is excommunicated himself. 1 *Inst.* 134. That is, after he is denounced excommunicate, and they are admonished not to converse with him. *Ayl. Par.* 266.

II. Of what things a will may be made.

1. Lord Coke says, at the common law (by which he Lands. must be understood to signify the common law since the conquest) no lands or tenements were devisable by any last will and testament, nor ought to be transferred from one to another, but by solemn livery of seisin, matter of record, or sufficient writing; but by certain customs in some boroughs they were devisable. 1 *Inst.* 111. (s)

But altho' lands might not be disposed by will, yet a device was found out, and a distinction made between the land and the use and profits of the land, whereby feoffments to uses came in practice; by virtue whereof a person might dispose of the profits, tho' he could not dispose of the land itself. *Wright's Tenures*, 172.

And the way was this: They conveyed their full estates of their lands to friends in trust, properly called feoffees in trust; and then they would by their wills declare, how their friends should dispose of their lands; and if those friends would not perform it, the court of chancery was to compel them by reason of trust; and this trust was called the use of the land, so as the feoffees had the land, and the party himself had the use; which use was in equity to take the profits for himself, and that the feoffees should make such an estate as he should appoint them; and if he appointed none, then the use should go to the heir, as the estate itself of the land should have done; for the use was to the estate, like a shadow following the body. *Lord Bacon's Use of the Law*, 152.

(s) This principle of the common law may perhaps be traced to the manners of the ancient Germans, of whom Tacitus observes: *Heredes successoresque sui cuique liberi. Nullum testamentum; sed liberi non sunt proximus gradus in successione fratres, patrui, avunculi.* *De Morib. Germ.* c. 20.

But by this course of putting lands into use, there were many inconveniences ; as, namely, a man that had cause to sue for his land, knew not against whom to bring his action, nor who was owner of it ; the wife was defrauded of her thirds ; the husband of being tenant by curtesy ; the lord of his wardship, relief, heriot, and escheat ; the creditor of his extent for debt ; the tenant of his lease : for these rights and duties by the law were due from him that was owner of the land and none other, which was now the feoffee of trust ; and so the old owner, which we call the feoffor, should take the profits, and leave the power to dispose of the land at his discretion to the feoffee ; and yet he was not such a tenant as to be seised of the land, so as his wife could have dower, or the lands be extended for his debts, or that he could forfeit it for felony or treason, or that his heir could be ward for it, or any duty of tenure fall to the lord by his death, or that he could make any leases of it. *Bac. 153.*

Which frauds, by degrees of time as they increased, were remedied by divers statutes ; as namely, by a statute of the 1 *H. 6.* and by another of the 4 *H. 8.* it was appointed, that the action may be tried against him which taketh the profits, which was the *cestuy que use* ; by a statute made in the 1 *R. 3.* leases and estates made by *cestuy que use* are made good, and estates by him acknowledged ; by a statute in the 4 *H. 7.* the heir of *cestuy que use* was to be in ward ; and by a statute in the 16 *H. 8.* the lord was to have relief upon the death of any *cestuy que use*. *Bac. 153.*

Which frauds nevertheless multiplying daily, in the end in the 27th year of king *Hen. 8.* the parliament purposing to take away all those uses, and to reduce the law to the ancient form of conveying of lands by publick livery of seisin, fine and recovery, did ordain, that where lands were put in trust or use, there the possession and estate should be presently carried out of the friends in trust, and settled and invested on him that had the uses, for such term and time as he had the use. *Bac. 153, 154.*

And by this statute of the 27 *H. 8.* the power of disposing land by will, is clearly taken away amongst those frauds : whereupon in the 32 *H. 8.* another statute was made, by which it is enacted, that *every person having any manors lands tenements or hereditaments, holden in socage or of the nature of socage tenure, shall have full and free liberty power and authority, to give dispose will and devise, as well*

by

by his last will and testament in writing, as otherwise by any act or acts lawfully executed in his life, all his said manors lands tenements or hereditaments, or any of them, at his free will and pleasure.

And in the same statute there are several restrictions and limitations with regard to the devising of lands holden by knights service; which were further explained by the statute of the 34 & 35 H. 8. c. 5.

And finally, by the statute of the 12 C. 2. c. 25. tenures by knight's service were abolished, and all tenures turned into free and common socage.

So that now a man may by his will dispose of his whole landed property, except his copyhold and other customary lands, which are devisable or not, according to the custom of the respective manors. And generally, a devise of copyhold will not pass, without a surrender to the use of the will.

But in case of a child, or widow, it is otherwise; for a court of equity, in favour of these, will supply the defect of surrender. 2 Vezey, 582.

So also where there is a general devise of real estate to pay debts, and there is no real estate but copyhold; the court will supply the defect of surrender for the benefit of creditors. *Id.*

Also where a copyhold is in the hands of trustees; the person for whom the lands are holden in trust may devise the same without surrender: because, the legal estate being not in him but in the trustees, he cannot surrender. 1 Atk. 38. 1 Vez. 489.

And altho' the court will supply the defect of a surrender for the benefit of children; yet the rule doth not extend to grand children, or to a natural child, and consequently not to any more distant kindred. 2 Vez. 582. 1 Wilson, 161.

And where a man seised of copyhold lands, surrenders the same to the use of his will, and executes a will, altho' it is not attested by any witnesses, yet it shall direct the uses of the surrender; for the clause in the statute which requires the testator's signing in the presence of three witnesses, is confined only to such estates as pass by the statute of wills of the 34 & 35 H. 8. which doth not extend to copyhold. 2 Atkyns, 37.

[Where lands encumbered are devised, *vid. post. Payment of legacies*, 10. in note (t).] 2. By

(r) A man may also devise a mere possibility when coupled with an interest, or executory devise. *Jones v. Roe in Error*, Vol. IV. F 3 T.

Lands to charitable uses.

2. By the 9 G. 2. c. 36. No manors, lands, tenements, rents, advowsons, or other hereditaments, corporeal or incorporeal, whatsoever; nor any sum or sums of money, goods, chattels, stocks in the public funds, securities for money, or any other personal estate whatsoever, to be laid out or disposed of in the purchase of any lands tenements or hereditaments, shall be given or appointed by will, to any person or persons, bodies politick or corporate, or otherwise, for any estate or interest whatsoever, in trust, or for the benefit of, any charitable uses: but the same shall be done by deed indented, twelve months at least before the death of the donor, to be inrolled within six months after the execution in the high court of chancery; and the same to take effect immediately after the execution for the charitable use intended (u).

Estate pur autre vie.

3. By the statute of the 29 C. 2. c. 3. Any estate pur autre vie shall be devisable by a will in writing, signed by the party so devising the same, or by some other person in his presence and by his express directions, attested and subscribed in the presence of the deviser by three or more witnesses; and if no such devise thereof be made, the same shall be chargeable in the hands of the heir, if it shall come to him by reason of a special occupancy, as assets by descent, as in case of lands in fee simple; and in case there be no special occupant thereof, it shall go to the executors or administrators of the party that had the estate thereof by virtue of the grant, and shall be assets in their hands. s. 12.

Pur autre vie] That is, being held by lease during the life of another person (w).

Special

3 T. Rep. 88. for the nature of which, *vid. infra*, 5. and 23. Also lands articed to be bought before possession. *Greenhill v. Greenhill*, 2 Vern. 679. 3 P. Wms. 169. As to what words will pass a fee simple, or an estate for life, *vid. infra*, *Form and manner*, 13.

(u) See *Mortmain*.

(w) These estates are freehold interests, but they are not entailable within the statute *de donis*, and therefore no common recovery can be suffered of them, but the person who would have been tenant in tail, had the estate been an inheritance, is entitled to the absolute ownership, and may defeat the remainders, by some act *inter vivos*, or, as it would seem, by his will alone. See *Doe on the dem. of Blake v. Luxton*, 6 T. Rep. 289. *Grey v. Mannock*, *ib.* and *Blake v. Blake*, 3 P. Wms. 10. *in sup.* These estates are frequently devised for life with remainder over, in which case Ld. Hardwicke has observed, that the intent of the

Special occupant] A special occupant is, where an estate for life is made to a man and his heirs; in such case, the heir shall have the estate, after the decease of his ancestor,

the testator always is that the leases shall be renewed. *Verney v. Verney*, 1 *Vez.* 430. But by *Ld. Thurlow C.* where an estate of limited duration is given to one for life, the intent is to give him whatever it shall produce during his life, and in that case, unless there are strong expressions to shew a (contrary) intention, the court cannot compel him to renew. *Stone v. Theed*, 2 *Bro.* 243. But if he renews, he shall not renew for his own use alone, but shall be a trustee for the remainder-man, who on his part shall contribute towards the expence of the renewal. And the question has been, in what proportion? Where both parties taking were alive, the tenant for life has usually been directed to pay one third, and the remainder-man the other two thirds. But this rule appears to have been disapproved of by *Ld. Macclesfield* and by *Ld. Thurlow*, and seems ill calculated to make the sums contributed, in every instance, proportionable to the benefit acquired. Where the tenant for life has renewed and dies, the time he has actually enjoyed the estate may be considered in settling the proportion between his representatives and the remainder-man. Thus lands in mortgage being devised to *A* for life, remainder to *B* and his heirs, *A* entered and bought up the mortgage, taking an assignment in trustees names and died. *B* the remainder-man preferred his bill against the defendant the representative of *A*, to redeem the mortgage, and his counsel insisted that he ought to pay but two thirds of what was due on the mortgage, and the other third ought to be allowed by the defendant, by reason that the tenant for life enjoyed the profits during his life; but the court said, that if the remainder-man had come to redeem in the lifetime of the tenant for life, then he should have allowed a proportion of the money with respect to the value of the respective estates of the tenant for life and remainder-man; but he being now dead, and having enjoyed the estate but one year only, the defendant must make an allowance only for the time that *A* enjoyed the estate. *Glyat v. Batteson*, 1 *Vern.* 404. Where leases renewable and directed by the will to be renewed, were given together with the rest of the personal estate; as a general fund charged with annuities, &c. to trustees, to pay the rents and profits to *A* for life, remainder to *B*: *Ld. Thurlow C.* held that the expence of renewal was not to be apportioned between the tenant for life and remainder-man, but to be paid out of the profits of the estate in the first instance. *Stone v. Theed*, 2 *Bro.* 243. As to the rule laid down by his Lordship for the renewal of terms; see *infra*, 7. And that estates *pur autre vie* are to be put into the inventory, *vid. infra*, Inventory, 8.

as *special occupant*, or as a person particularly described, to whom the estate shall go after the lessee's death.

Mortgage.

4. One that hath money to be paid to him on a mortgage, may devise this money when it comes. *God. O. L.* 391.

And if the feoffee in mortgage, before the day of payment which should be made to him, maketh his executors and die, and his heir entrench into the land as he ought; it seemeth in this case, that the feoffor ought to pay the money at the day appointed to the executors, and not to the heir of the feoffee: but yet the words of the condition may be such, as the payment shall be made to the heir; as if the condition were, that if the feoffor pay to the feoffee or to his heirs such a sum at such a day, there after the death of the feoffee, if he dieth before the day limited, the payment ought to be made to the heir at the day appointed. *1 Inst.* 209, 210.

And hereby it appeareth, that the executors do more represent the person of the testator, than the heir doth that of the ancestor; for tho' the executor be not named, yet the law appoints him to receive the money, but so doth not the law appoint the heir to receive the money unless he be named. *1 Inst.* 209, 210.

Advowson.

5. A person may devise by his will the right of presenting to the next avoidance, or the inheritance of an advowson. And if such devise be made by the incumbent of the church, the inheritance of the advowson being in him, it is good, tho' he die incumbent; for tho' the testament hath no effect but by the death of the testator yet it hath an inception in his lifetime: and so it is, tho' he appoint by his will who shall be presented by the executors, or that one executor shall present the other, or doth devise that his executors shall grant the advowson to such a man. *Watf. c.* 10. (x)

(x) But where an advowson was devised to the first or other son of B, that should be bred a clergyman and be in holy orders, and if B should have no such son, to C.; both devises were holden by the court of C. P. to be void, as depending on too remote a contingency; for the rule of law is, that the contingency on which such an executory devise hinges, must take effect within some life in being, or 21 years afterwards; but it was uncertain that the son of B if he ever should have any, would take, or be able to take orders within 21 years of the death of his father. *Proctor v. the Bishop of Bath and Wells, and others*, 2 H. Bl. 358. *Vid. infra*, Form and manner, 23.

6. If

6. If upon articles for a purchase, the purchaser die, having devised the land before a conveyance executed, the land will pass in equity; for the testator had an equity to recover the land, and the vendor stood trustee for the testator, and as he should appoint, till a conveyance executed. 1 *Chanc. Cas.* 39. 2 *Vern.* 679.

Lands contracted for, but not conveyed.

For the vendor of the estate is, from the time of his contract, considered as a trustee for the purchaser; and the vendee, as to the money, is considered as a trustee for the vendor. 1 *Atkyns*, 573.

So if a man covenants to lay out a sum of money in the purchase of lands, generally; and deviseth his real estate before he hath made such a purchase: the money to be laid out will pass to the devisee. *Id.*

But if a man, having made his will, afterwards contracts for the purchase of lands; the lands contracted for will not pass by the will, but descend to the heir at law. *Id.*

But if a good title cannot be made of the lands; as the heir in such case cannot have the lands, so he shall not have the money intended to be laid out. *Id.*

7. If a man have a lease for never so many years, determinable upon life or lives, that is, if such or such live so long; this estate may well enough be given and disposed by will, because it is but a chattel. *Went.* 19. (y)
8. Mr.

Lease.

(y) A lease for years may also be devised to A for life, remainder to B: And if the lease be renewable, and A renew, B shall contribute to the fine so partaking of the benefit of the renewal. A was tenant for life of a lease for years, the remainder of which was limited to B. A renewed for 28 years, when 12 years of the old lease was yet to come, and enjoyed 19 of the 28. Per *Ld. Thurlow* C. The Master ought to take the sum paid by her for the renewal of the lease as the value of the term purchased, that is, of the term of 28 years to commence at the expiration of 12 years. He should then consider the value of the term of 9 years after the existing term, and what the term of 19 years after the existing term and nine years was worth, and the latter is the proportion to be paid by the remainder-man. Then as to the kind of interest to be allowed; simple interest will not be a satisfaction, as she laid out her money totally, and the value of the lease was calculated upon the ground of compound interest; compound interest must therefore be computed upon the proportional value of the 19 years term, to the whole expence of renewal. But as in compound interest, you go upon the idea that the interest is paid
F 3 upon

Term for years.

8. Mr. Wentworth says, If one having a lease for many years, as an hundred, five hundred, more or less, doth devise and bequeath the same to *A* and the heirs male of his body, and for want of such issue to *B* and the heirs male of his body; and *A* dieth, having issue a son; the term shall not go to his son, but to his executor or administrator: for it cannot be made a matter of inheritance. So if *A* had died without issue male, the term should not have gone or remained to *B*, but to the executor or administrator of *A*. *Went.* 45.

So if an advowson, or any other hereditament, granted or devised to one and his heirs for a hundred years: or if such a termor grant a rent out of the land to *A* and his heirs, or to the heirs, or heirs male of his body: yet shall the same go to the executor, and not to any heir; for it being derived out of a chattel, cannot be any freehold or inheritance, but is itself a mere chattel. *Went.* 54.

Debts or things in action.

9. Albeit by deed of gift made in the lifetime of any person to another of all his goods and chattels, debts or things in action do not pass; yet if the testator by his last will and testament, do give or bequeath to another any debt due unto him, or a thing in action belonging unto him, the legacy is good and effectual in the law, and may be recovered in this manner, that is to say, if the testator do make the legatary executor of that particular debt or thing in action bequeathed, then the legatary as executor thereof may commence suit in his own name, and recover the same to his own use, against him by whom it was due; but if the testator do not make the legatary executor of the debt or thing in action bequeathed, then his remedy lieth in the ecclesiastical court, where he may convent the executor, and compel him either to sue for that debt in a court competent, and upon recovery and

upon the exact day, and immediately laid out, which is impossible, it will be sufficient to compute compound interest at 4 per cent. And this is only to be paid till her death, for after that, her executors had the demand upon the remainder-man, and it becomes a common debt, and must carry simple interest only; and *A* having renewed a second time before the expiration of the first renewal, from which second renewal she derived no benefit, his Lordship held, that her executors were entitled to the whole of the expences, at the same rate of interest; for as on the one hand the tenant for life cannot renew for his own benefit, so on the other, the remainder-man shall not have the renewal at his expence. *Nightingale v. Lawson*, 1 Bro. 440.

payment

payment thereof to pay it over to the legatary, or else to make a letter of attorney to the legatary for the recovery of the debt or thing in action bequeathed in the name of the executor to the use of the legatary. *Swin.* 187, 188. (x)

10. Albeit the testator have no such thing of his own as is bequeathed, yet nevertheless the legacy is good in law; therefore if the testator do bequeath a horse or a yoke of oxen, the legacy is good in law, tho' the testator have neither horse nor ox of his own (a). But who shall make choice, in this case, of the thing so bequeathed, is a question not to be neglected: and the solution is this; that if the words of the devise be directed to the legatary, as if the testator shall thus say, I will that *A B* shall have a horse, the choice doth belong to the legatary; but if the words be directed to the executor, as if the testator shall thus say, I will that my executor give to *A B* a horse, the election doth belong to the executor. Provided nevertheless, that to whomsoever the election doth belong, whether to the legatary, or to the executor, they must not be unreasonable in their election, but frame themselves according to the meaning of the testator;

Things which
the testator hath
not of his own.

(x) At common law a *chose in action* is neither assignable nor devisable; that is, the assignee must sue as attorney, and in the name of the original creditor and the legatee as his executor: But courts of equity will protect the assignment of a chose in action, as much as the law will that of a chose in possession. 2 *Bl. Com.* 442. And when the executor has received debts owing to the testator, he may be compelled to deliver them to the legatee in court of conscience or in the spiritual court. *Off. of Exec.* 18. *Ab. Eq. Ca.* 175. If a debtor bequeath to his creditors the same or a larger sum than his debt, the rule of law is, that it shall be construed a satisfaction; but otherwise if he order his debts and legacies to be paid, or it appear by the will that he meant to be both just and generous, for the rule is taken strictly. *Richardson v. Greefe*, 3 *Atk.* 65. *Chancey's case*, 1 *P. Wms.* 408. *Vid. infra*, *Form and manners* 6.

(a) This doctrine is borrowed from the civil law, which permits a testator to will away not only his own property but that of his heir or a stranger, so that his heir or representative shall be compelled to purchase the thing willed, whatever its price may be; or if the owner will not part with it, to pay the value of it, ascertained by the judge. *Inst.* 2. 20. 4. For distinctions on this subject, see *Vinnius* and the commentators. *Id.*

otherwise the legatary might make choice of the best horse in the country, and the executor of the worst, contrary to the meaning of the deceased. *Swin.* 188.

Things in joint
tenancy.

11. If there be two jointenants of lands, and one of them devise that which to him belongs, and dieth; this is no good devise, and the devisee takes nothing because the devise doth not take effect until after the death of the devisor, and then the surviving jointenant takes the whole by prior title, to wit, from the first feoffment. *Gilbert on Wills*, 120.

And altho' the jointure is severed before the testator's death, yet if the will be made before the severance, it will have no effect; unless there is a republication of the will after the partition. *Bur. Mansf.* 1496. [*Swift v. Roberts.*]

So also a man cannot give or bequeath by will, any of those goods or chattels which he hath jointly with another: for if he should bequeath his portion thereof to a third person, this bequest is void by the laws of this realm; and the survivor, which had those goods or chattels jointly with another, shall have that portion so bequeathed, notwithstanding the said will. *Swin.* 189. (b)

[Things in com-
mon.]

But otherwise it is with tenants in common, *God. O. L.* 131. [and coparceners. For there is no survivor between coparceners, but the part of each is descendible, and consequently may be devised. *Co. Lit.* 185. b. And a deed of partition is not a revocation of a devise of his moiety by tenant in common. *Luther v. Ridley*, cited in 3 *P. Wms.* 169.]

Corn growing.

12. By the 20 H. 3. c. 2. *Widows may bequeath the crop of their ground, as well of their dowers, as of their lands and tenements; saving to the lords of the fee all such services as be due for their dowers and other tenements.* And this is only in affirmance of the common law. 2 *Inst.* 80. But by the 27 H. 8. c. 10. *A married woman having a jointure made, shall not have any dowry of the residue of her husband's lands.*

By the 28 H. 8. c. 11. *If the incumbent before his death hath caused any of his glebe land to be manured and sown, at his proper costs and charges, with any corn or grain; he may*

(b) It should appear therefore that in this case the legacy is not good, even as *legatum rei alienae*, any more than if an heriot or heir loom be devised. *Vid. infra*, 14.

make and declare his testament of all the profits of the corn growing upon the said glebe land so manured and sown. s. 6.

But if the testator is lessee for years, and trow the land a short time before his lease expires, and then dies, before the corn can possibly be ripe within the term, in this case a devise thereof is void, because he himself could not have reaped it after the expiration of the term, if he had lived. *Swin. 191.*

13. Not only that thing may be devised or bequeathed by the testator, which is truly extant, or hath an apparent being at the time of the making of the will or death of the testator; but that thing also which is not in rerum natura, whilst the testator liveth: therefore it is lawful for the testator to bequeath the corn which will be sown or grow in such soil after his death, or the lambs which shall come of his flock of sheep the next year, depasturing in such a field. But if there be no such corn growing in that soil, nor any lambs arising out of that flock, then the legacy is destitute of effect, because no such thing is extant at all, as was bequeathed. But if the testator devise a certain quantity of grain or number of lambs, as for the purpose, twenty quarters of corn or twenty lambs, and doth will and devise, that the same shall be paid out of the corn which shall grow in such a field, or arise out of his sheep depasturing in such a ground; tho' not so much or no corn at all there grow, or not any or not so many lambs there arise, yet nevertheless the executor is compellable by law to pay the whole legacies intirely; because the mention of the soil and of the flock was rather by way of demonstration than by way of condition, rather shewing how or by what means the said legacy might be paid than whether it should be paid at all year or no. *Swin. 186. (c)*

Things not yet in rerum natura.

14. Those things which after the death of the testator descend to the heir of the deceased, and not to his executor, cannot be devised by testament, except in such cases wherein it is lawful to devise the lands tenements or hereditaments. And therefore if a man seised of land in fee or fee tail, bequeath his trees growing upon the said land at the time of his death; this devise is not good, except as before: but if he devise the corn growing upon the same land at the time of his death, from the heir to some other person, this devise is good, albeit the land

Things belonging to the freehold.

(c) *Vid. Inst. 2. 20. 7. cum Com. Vin.*

where.

whereupon it groweth be not devisable. And the reason of the difference is, because the trees are parcel of the freehold, and descend together with the land to the heir, and not to the executor: but it is not so of corn; for the same shall go to the executor as parcel of the testator's goods. And therefore if a man be seised of lands in the right of his wife, and sow the land, and devise the corn growing upon the same land, and die before the corn be reaped; in this case the legatary shall have the corn, and not the wife: But it is otherwise of grass, and herbs not separated from the ground, at the time of the death of the testator. If a man seised in fee in right of his wife, do let the same lands for years to a stranger, and the lessee soweth the ground, and afterwards the wife dieth, the corn not being ripe; in this case the lessee may devise the same corn, notwithstanding his estate be determined. So also of tenant by curtesy, and tenant in dower. *Swin. 190.*

And forasmuch as those things which after the death of the testator descend to the heir and not to his executor, are not devisable by will, except in such cases where lands tenements and hereditaments be devisable; therefore those things which are affixed unto the freehold, are no more devisable than the freehold itself, as the windows, doors, wainscot, and such like. *Swin. 191. 4 Co. 64.*

So if a man be seised of a house, and possessed of divers *heir-looms*, that by custom have gone with the house from heir to heir, and by his will deviseth away these heir-looms; this devise is void: for the will taketh effect after his death; and by his death, the heir-looms by ancient custom are vested in the heir, and the law prefers the custom before the devise. And so it is, if the lord ought to have a heriot against his tenant, and the tenant deviseth away all his goods; yet the lord shall have his heriot for the reason aforesaid. *1 Inst. 185.*

Things in executorship.

15. The testator may devise all goods and chattels which he hath in his own right, but not those which he hath in the right of another as executor. *Swin. 185.*

Things in administration.

16. An administrator cannot make a testament of those goods which he hath as administrator to any person dying intestate; because he hath not any such goods to his own proper use, but ought therewithal to pay the debts of the dead person, and to distribute the rest according to law. *Swin. 189.*

17. The

17. The husband cannot devise such goods as his wife hath as being executrix to another, nor such things as are in action, as debts due to her before marriage by obligation or contract, unless he and his wife recover the same during marriage, or that he renew the bonds, and take them in his own name; otherwise after his death they remain to her. 1 *Inst.* 351. Wife's goods by the husband.

But the husband may, at any time during the coverture, release a bond given to his wife. And where the husband makes a *settlement*; the bonds to his wife, being part of her fortune, will notwithstanding his death in the lifetime of his wife, before the security be changed, be decreed in equity to his executor; he being considered in that case as a purchaser for a valuable consideration. *Cases in the time of L. Talb.* 168.

18. A man may by his will dispose of his chattels and personal estate that he shall for the future acquire, any time after the making his will, to the time of his death. And this is necessary from the reason of the thing; because the chattels and personal estate are in a continual fluctuation; and if the law were not so, it would create very great confusion, or else would render it necessary for a man to make a new will every day. *Gilb.* 122. Things obtained after the will made.

But it is not so with lands, for they are fixed and permanent: and therefore if a man maketh his will, and deviseth therein all the lands which he shall have at the time of his death; and after that, he purchaseth lands, and dieth without republication or making a new will; in this case, tho' his intent to the contrary is very apparent, yet it is a void devise: for a man cannot devise any lands but what he hath at the time of making his will. And this was adjudged upon great deliberation, by Holt chief justice and the court, in the case of *Bunker and Cook*: and the judgment was affirmed afterwards upon a writ of error in the house of lords, Feb. 24, 1707. *Gilb.* 122. (d)

But, by Holt chief justice: If he republisheth his will, in such manner, and with such circumstances, as are necessary to compleat execution of an original will; then the purchased lands will pass as by an original will. 11 *Mod.* 127. And in truth this seemeth to make it a new

(d) 1 *Bro. P. C.* 199. So copyhold lands purchased after a will do not pass by it tho' surrendered to the use of the will. *Harris v. Cutler*, *B. R. Tr.* 10 G. 3. cited by Ld. Mansfield in *Spring v. Biles*, 1 *T. Rep.* 435.

will, to all intents and purposes ; and not a republication of the old one.

But a codicil, which concerneth only personal legacies, will not amount to a republication of the will, so as to pass lands purchased after the making of the will. 2 *Vern.* 625.

If a man deviseth all his lands *for payment of his debts*, and purchaseth lands afterwards ; the lord keeper said he would decree a sale, tho' there were no precedent articles. 2 *Chb. Ca.* 144.

If a man hath a *lease*, and disposeth of it (specifically) by his will ; and after surrenders it and takes a new lease, and after dies ; the devisee shall not have this last lease, because this was a plain countermand of his will. *Goldf.* 93. (e)

But in the case of *Stirling and Lydiard*, Nov. 21, 1744 ; where a man devised *all and singular his leasehold estate, goods, chattels and personal estate whatsoever*, and afterwards renewed a lease ; it was held by the lord chancellor Hardwicke clearly, that the leasehold estate passed by the will. He said the objection against its passing proceeded upon a mistake, that this is a specific legacy ; but it is nothing like it : for it is only an enumeration of the several particulars of his personal estate, and is a general devise of the whole. It hath no appearance of a revocation. Suppose the testator had purchased a new lease, would not that have passed ? Why then should not a new term in a lease equally pass ? If I were to construe this a revocation, I do not know but if a man were to give all his bank, East India, and South sea stock, and should afterwards turn it into money, it might as well be insisted that this was a revocation. 3 *Atk.* 199.

If a man deviseth a *term for years*, which he hath not at the time of the devise, but purchaseth some time before his death ; Holt chief justice doubted, whether this would be good. But Mr. Peere Williams says, that notwithstanding the doubt which the court of king's bench seems to have been in in that case, it hath been clearly held to pass by such a will. 3 *P. Will.* 169.

¹ (e) *S. P. Abney v. Miller*, 2 *Atk.* 593. *Rudstorp v. Anderson*, 2 *Kez.* 418. *Marwood v. Turner*, 3 *P. Wms.* 163. *Hone v. Midcraft*, 1 *Bro.* 260. *Vid. infra*, *Payment of legacies*, 1. and 102. in note.

III. Form and manner of making a will; and therein of appointing guardians and executors.

[A will may be *contingent*, as, if the testator do not return from a journey, in which case, if he returns, it is void. *Parsons v. Lanoe, Amb. 557.*

Copyholds not being within the statutes of wills and frauds, and passing by the surrender to the uses of the will, and not by the will itself, such uses may be declared by any writing which the ecclesiastical courts will grant probate of. *Tuffnel v. Page, 2 Atk. 37. Att. Gen. v. Sawtell, ib. 497. Same v. Andrews, 1 Vez. 225. Carey v. Askeu, 2 Bro. 59.*

1. By the 29 C. 2. c. 3. intituled, An act for prevention of frauds and perjuries, *All devises and bequests of any lands or tenements, devisable either by force of the statute of wills, or by this statute, or by force of the custom of Kent, or the custom of any borough, or any other particular custom, shall be in writing, and signed by the party so devising the same, or by some other person in his presence and by his express directions, and shall be attested and subscribed in the presence of the said devisor, by three or four credible witnesses; or else they shall be utterly void, and of none effect. s. 5.*

Signet] Signing being only mentioned, therefore *sealing* is not necessary, altho' it be expedient to a testament; which is not properly and legally a deed, to which a seal is essential, though it hath the force and virtue of a deed. *God. O. L. 6. Wentw 29.*

Signed by the party so devising the same] *E. 23 C. 2. Le-main and Stanley.* The testator made his will, and wrote it with his own hand, and began it thus, I John Stanley make this my last will and testament; but did not subscribe his name: yet this was adjudged a good will, and sufficient signing by the testator within the statute, to pass lands; it being subscribed by three witnesses in the presence of the testator; for his name being written in the will, it must be a sufficient signing within the statute, since the statute hath not appropriated any particular place in the will, either top, bottom, or margin, for that purpose; and therefore necessarily the testator is at liberty to put it where he pleases. *3 Lev. 1.*

And it hath been said, that if the devisor only put his seal to the will, without signing it, this is a sufficient signing within the statute; because signing is no more than

than a mark to distinguish a man's act, and sealing is a sufficient mark to know it to be his will. *Gibb. 93.*

And in *Warnesford and Warnesford, E. 13 G.* On an issue directed out of chancery, *Raymond* chief justice ruled, that sealing a will is signing within the statute. *Str. 764.*

But in the case of *Smith and Evans*, in the exchequer Dec. 6, 1751; it was said by the lord chief baron Parker, baron Clive, and baron Smythe (baron Legge being absent), that what is said by North, Windham, and Charleston, in 3 Lev. 1. that putting a seal to a will is sufficient signing within the statute, is very strange doctrine; for that if it were so, it would be very easy for one person to forge any man's will, by only forging the names of any two obscure persons dead; for he would have no occasion to forge the testator's hand. And the barons said, if the same thing should come in question again, they should not hold that sealing a will only was a sufficient signing within the statute. *1 Wilson, 313.*

And in the case of *Grayson and Atkinson*, July 17, 1752; in the chancery: Lord Hardwicke said, that he should have much doubted upon that point: for the statute requiring the will to be signed, undoubtedly meant some evidence to arise from the handwriting; then how can it be said, that putting a seal to it would be a sufficient signing? For any one may put a seal; no particular evidence arises from that seal; common seals are alike, and one man's may be like another's: no certainty or guard therefore arises from thence. And where an act of parliament mentions signing, it means something different from sealing. *2 Vezey, 459.*

H. 1728. Dormer and Thurland. The will was not signed by the testator in the presence of the witnesses; but he acknowledged it to be his hand, and declared it to be his will, in their presence; and they subscribed their names in his presence. Lord chancellor King inclined that the will was good; but ordered the point to be reserved and made a case of for further consideration. *2 P. Will. 506.*

And in the case of *Stonehouse and Evelyn, E. 1734:* A will was held to be good, though all the witnesses did not see the testator sign it, but he owned it before them to be his hand. And the reporter says, that on his mentioning this case to Mr. justice Fortescue Aland, he said, that this was the common practice: and that it is sufficient, if

one of the three subscribing witnesses swears that the testator acknowledged the signing to be his own hand writing: And it is remarkable, that the statute of frauds doth not say the testator shall sign his will in the presence of three witnesses, but requires these three things; first, that the will should be in writing; secondly, that it should be signed by the testator; and thirdly, that it should be subscribed by three witnesses in the presence of the testator. 3 *P. Will.* 254.

And in the said case of *Grayson and Atkinson*, July 17, 1752; by the lord chancellor Hardwicke: At the time of making the act, and ever since, if a bond or deed is executed by the person who signs it, afterwards the witnesses are called in, and before those witnesses he acknowledges that to be his hand; that is always considered as an evidence of signing by the person executing, and is an attestation of it by them. It is true there is some difference between the case of a deed and a will in this respect, because signing is not necessary to a deed, but sealing is; and I do not know that it was ever held, that acknowledging his sealing without witnesses has been sufficient. But notwithstanding, that is the rule of evidence relating to signing. If it was in the case of a note, or declaration of trust, or any other instrument not requiring the solemnities of a deed, but bare signing; if that instrument is attested by witnesses, proving that they were called in, and that he took that instrument, and said, that was his hand, that would be a sufficient attestation of signing by him. That is the rule of evidence; and there is nothing in this act to take it out of the general rule. 2 *Vezey*, 457.

Attested and subscribed in the presence of the said devisor]
It hath been ruled in equity, that a will of lands, attested by three witnesses, who subscribed their names at the request of the testator, tho' at several times, is a good will, though the witnesses were never once present together. *Gibb.* 92. *Vin. Devise.* N. 10. 12.

Feb. 1. 1742. *Jones and Lake.* A special verdict was found upon an ejectment; the case was, the testator signed and executed his will in December 1735, in the presence of two witnesses, who attested the same in his presence; afterwards in the year 1739, he with his pen sent over his name, in the presence of a third witness, who subscribed his name in the testator's presence, and at his request. And the question was, whether this was a due

a due execution within the statute. For the heir at law it was argued, that the statute requiring three witnesses to subscribe in the testator's presence, must intend they should be all present together; otherwise there is not that degree of evidence which the statute requires: for an attestation of three witnesses at different times, has only the weight of one witness. Witnesses to a will not only attest the due execution of the will, but likewise the capacity of the testator at the time of execution. A man may be sane at the time two witnesses attest, and insane when the third attests. It cannot be considered as a will, till the third witness hath signed, for that compleats the act. The will here is dated in 1735; suppose lands purchased after the date, and before the attestation by the third witness, will the lands pass? certainly not. On the other hand it was argued for the devisee, that a will executed before three witnesses, though at three different times, is good; the statute not requiring they should all be present at the same time. The requisites under the statute are, that the testator should sign in the presence of three witnesses at least, and that they should attest in his presence. It would therefore be adding new requisites which the act does not mention, and in effect be making a new law.—— By the lord chief justice Lee: This case depends upon the words of the statute. The requisites in the statute are, that three witnesses should attest his signing, but it doth not direct that the three witnesses should be all present at the same time. Here you have the oath of three attesting witnesses. This is the degree of evidence required by the statute. And the same credit is given to three persons at different times, as at the same time. We cannot carry the requisites farther than the statute directs. The act is silent as to this particular. It would therefore be making a new requisite. The signing is the same act reiterated. The testator went over his name again, and declared it to be his last will.—— And judgment was given against the heir at law. 2 *Atkyns*, 176.

E. 31 G. 2. Carleton on the demise of Griffin v. Griffin. On a special verdict it was stated, that *John Griffin*, on the 2d of May 1752, wrote upon a sheet of paper with his own hand, as follows: “ Know all men by these
“ presents, that I *John Griffin* make the aftermentioned
“ my last will and testament;” and therein he made several dispositions of his real and personal estate; and sub-
scribed

scribed it at the same time when he wrote it ; but there was no seal or witness to it. An on the 5th of January 1754, he wrote on the same sheet of paper, “ Memorandum, whereas I have laid out on a lighter [and so on]—all these, at my death, shall be at my wife’s disposal : And this not to disannul any of the former part made by me the 2d of May 1752. Witness my hand John Griffin.” All this latter writing related only to the personal estate ; and he subscribed it in the presence of three witnesses ; and then he took the said sheet of paper in his hand, and declared it to be his last will and testament, in the presence of the said three witnesses ; and then delivered it to them, and desired they would attest and subscribe it in his presence, and in the presence of each other ; which they accordingly did. Upon this special case, one question reserved for the opinion of the court was, Whether the republication of the said first will (made in 1752) upon the 5th of January 1754, be a publication or republication of his first will within the statute. It was argued, that this was no good will to pass lands, beyond all doubt, till the 5th of January 1754 ; and what happened then, was neither a publication, nor a republication sufficient to make it a good will within the statute. Here are two distinct instruments, at two different times ; the first unattested, relating to the real estate ; the second, signed, published, and attested according to the statute, relating to the personal. But the first was originally bad, and could not be made good by the subsequent transaction.——By lord Mansfield and the court : The case is accurately stated ; for it is not stated to be either a will or a codicil, but a sheet of paper written. It is a will of an illiterate man, drawn by himself. At first, in 1752, the testator did not know that any witnesses were necessary. In 1754, he had found that they were necessary. Then he makes a subsequent disposition : Which is a memorandum to be added to it. But he doth not call this a codicil ; nor doth the case state it to be so. He plainly considers the whole as one intire disposition ; and he expressly declares in the latter, that he doth not thereby mean to disannul any part of his former devise or disposition. There is not a tittle in the latter that relates to the real estate ; therefore the only intent of having the three witnesses, was and must be to authenticate the former. The signing the former does no harm ; it makes it more solemn, but doth not hurt it. Then the publication of it is, as

of a will. He takes up the sheet of paper ; and holding up the said sheet of paper, says, It is my will. And certainly, he did not mean a part of it only, but the whole of it. And he desires them to attest it. All this must relate to the whole that was written on this paper. It must be considered as one intire will, made at different times, and attested agreeable to the statute. And a man is not obliged to make his whole will all at the same time. *Burrow, Mansf. 549.*

In the presence of the said devisor] E. 3 Ja. 2. Sbires and Glascock. The question was, Whether the will was made according to the statute ; for the testator had desired the witnesses to go into another room, seven yards distant, to attest it, in which there was a window broken, through which the testator might see them. By the court ; The statute requireth attesting in his presence, to prevent obtruding another will in the place of the true one : it is enough if the testator might see, it is not necessary that he should actually see them signing ; for at that rate if a man should but turn his back or look off, it would vitiate the will. Here the signing was in the view of the testator, he might have seen it, and that is enough. So if the testator being sick, should be in bed, and the curtain drawn. *2 Salk 688. (f)*

But if the witnesses subscribe their names to the will, in a room adjoining to that where the testator lay, but out of his sight, so as he could not see them subscribe their names ; this is no good will within the statute to pass lands, because the witnesses in that case did not subscribe their names in the testator's presence. *Gilb. 93.*

But it is not necessary *that it appear upon the face of the will* to have been signed in the presence of the devisor. As in the case of *Hands and James, E. 9 G. 2.* In ejectment brought by the plaintiff as heir at law, the question was on a case by consent left to the opinion of the court, Whether it should be left to a jury to determine, whether the witnesses to a will (being all dead) did set their names in the presence of the testator, and this merely upon circumstances without any positive proof. By the court ; This is a matter fit to be left to the jury. The witnesses by the statute ought to set their names as witnesses, in the presence of the testator ; but it is not required by

(f) S. P. Casson v. Dade, 1 Bro. 99.

the statute that this should be taken notice of in the subscription to the will; and whether inserted or not, it must be proved: if inserted, it doth not conclude, but the contrary may be proved. And if not conclusive, when inserted, the omission thereof shall not conclude that it was not so: and therefore it must be proved by the best proof that the nature of the thing will admit of. *Comyn, 531.*

And in the case of *Croft and Pawlet, E. 12 G. 2.* Upon a trial at bar concerning the execution of a will, it did not appear upon the face of it, that the attestation of the witnesses was made in the presence of the testator; which, being objected to, a case was cited, where lord chief justice Eyre held it a matter proper to be left to a jury, whether they believed it to be so done or not. And Mr. justice Chappel cited a case to the same purpose. To which the court assented; and they held it not to be necessary to be inserted in the will, that the attestation was in the presence of the testator, though by the statute it is necessary that it should in fact be so attested. *Vin. Devis. N. 9. (g)*

By three or four credible witnesses] *M. 1 W. Lee and Libb.* The testator made his will in writing, subscribed by two witnesses, and therein devised his lands. Afterwards he made a codicil, in which his will was recited; and this also was attested by two witnesses, one of which witnesses was a witness to the will, but the other was a new witness. The question was, Whether this new witness should make a third to the will. And it was adjudged that he should not: It is true, here are three witnesses to the intent and will of the testator; but there are only two to his will in writing: It is true likewise, that there are two witnesses to the codicil; but those are not wit-

(g) And *per* Lord Mansfield, in *Bond v. Seawell, 3 Bur. 1775.* It is not necessary that the witnesses should attest in the presence of each other, or that the testator should declare the instrument executed "to be his will," or that the witnesses should attest every page, folio, or sheet, or that they should know the contents, or that each folio, page, or sheet should be particularly shewn to them.—But in that case, there being some doubt, whether the first sheet was or was not in the room at the time of executing and attesting the last, a new trial was directed. See further on this head, *infra, 11.*

nesses to the written will ; So that there wants one witness to the will in writing. 3 *Salk.* 395.

In the case of *Tuffnell and Page, E.* 1740, it was held clearly by lord, Hardwicke, that a will of a copyhold tenant, attested by one or two witnesses, or even without any witness at all, is sufficient to declare the uses of a surrender which he has made ; and the reason is, because the party is in by the surrender, and not by the will. *Barnard. Cha. Ca.* 12.

Therefore where there is a general devise of lands, and there is no surrender of the copyhold lands to the use of the will, the construction at law is, that they do not pass by the will ; for copyhold lands are not properly the subject of a devise, as they pass not by the will, but by the surrender. 1 *Atkyns*, 388.

Credible witnesses] *M.* 34 *Cha.* 2. *Hudson's case.* Two witnesses swore, that the testator did not publish it as his will ; but that another guided his hand, and that the testator made his mark, but said nothing, nor was he capable. On the other side, it was proved, how that the testator had made two former wills, and in them had devised his land in the like manner as by this will, and that he died of a consumption, and was sensible to the last ; and how that three days after making his last will, he was sensible and able to discourse, and so continued till within six days of his death ; hereupon it appeared, that the witnesses had been dealt with. To which the counsel on the other side urged, that if the witnesses were not to be believed, then there would not be three witnesses to the will, and so no will within the statute. To which Pemberton chief justice answered, that if there were three witnesses to a will, whereof one was a thief or person not credible ; yet the words of the statute being satisfied, and he having collateral proof to fortify the will, he would direct a jury to find it a good will ; and as to this case, he said it was not probable, that a person in his senses (as they are not able to disprove him to be) would suffer another to guide his hand to a writing and not say any thing ; and that therefore they took it he did publish it : And he remembered *Digger's case*, where the scrivener wrote the will, and two others were witnesses ; the scrivener swore the testator was compos, and the two other swore he was not compos ; the court stopped these two from going away till verdict was brought in, which found the will a good will, and then committed the two witnesses to the Fleet ;

Fleet; for if this was suffered, it would be in any man's power to destroy another's will. So likewise did the court here commit the witnesses, and took security of the plaintiff to prosecute them for perjury. *Skin. 79.*

And in the case of *Alexander and Clayton, E. 8 G. 3.* where a woman had sworn against her own attestation, Mr. justice Yates said, she ought not to have been admitted to give this evidence. And lord Mansfield observed, that it is of terrible consequence that witnesses to wills should be tampered with to deny their own attestation. But, he said, that will not invalidate the will: for there are cases where one witness hath supported a will, by swearing that the other two attested, though those two have denied that they did so. *Bur. Mansf. 2224.*

And in the case of *Lowe and Jolliffe, E. 2 G. 3.* On a trial at bar, on an issue out of chancery concerning lands in Worcestershire, the three subscribing witnesses to the testator's will, and the two surviving witnesses to a codicil made four years subsequent to the will, and a dozen servants of the testator, all unanimously swore him to be utterly incapable of making a will, or transacting any other business, at the time of making the supposed will and codicil, or at any intermediate time. To encounter this evidence, the counsel for the plaintiff examined several of the nobility and principal gentry of the county of Worcester, who frequently and familiarly conversed with Mr. *Jolliffe* the testator, during that whole period, and some on the day whereon the will was made; and also two eminent physicians, who occasionally attended him; and who all strongly deposed to his intire sanity, and more than ordinary intellectual vigour. They also examined to the like purpose the attorney, a person of unblemished reputation, who drew the will; and read the deposition of the attorney who drew and witnessed the codicil, who was dead, but his testimony was perpetuated in chancery, who spoke very circumstantially to the very sound understanding of the testator, and his prudent and cautious conduct, in directing the contents of his codicil. Upon the whole it appeared to be a very black conspiracy to set aside the will, without any foundation whatsoever; the defendant's witnesses being so materially contradicted, and some of them so contradicting themselves, that the jury, at a trial of fifteen hours, brought in a verdict for the plaintiff, to establish the validity of the will and codicil, at an absence of five minutes. Lord *Mansfield* then de-

elared himself fully persuaded, that all the defendant's witnesses, except one, being nineteen in number, were grossly and wilfully perjured; and called for the subscribing witnesses, in order to have committed them in court, but they had withdrawn themselves. However, a prosecution of some of them for perjury was strongly recommended by the court. And the three testamentary witnesses were afterwards convicted, and sentenced, each of them to be imprisoned for six months, to stand twice in the pillory, with a paper on their heads denoting their crime, once at Westminster-hall gate, and once at Charing-cross, and to be transported for seven years. *Black. Rep.* 365. 416.

In *1 L. Raym.* 85. it is said, that if the spiritual court refuse the evidence of the son to prove a will in which the father is a legatee, no prohibition is grantable. And before the delegates; There were three witnesses to prove a nuncupative will, two of them were without exception, and the third was son to the legatee: the statute of frauds requires three competent witnesses; the question therefore was, Whether these three were sufficient, the son not being an evidence by the spiritual law; and adjudged, that they were; because two only were required by the spiritual law, and the third was a good witness within the intent of the act of frauds.

And altho' it was a general rule in the Roman law, that no one should be permitted to bear testimony in his own cause; yet legataries were allowed to give evidence upon this distinction, that they were particular and not universal successors, and that a testament would be valid without legataries. The difficulty also, which must frequently have occurred, in obtaining so great a number of witnesses as seven, might probably induce the Romans to be less strict, as to the persons whom they admitted upon this occasion. But by the practice of the ecclesiastical courts of this kingdom, which have the sole cognizance of the validity of all wills as far as they relate to personal estate, no legatee, who is a subscribing witness to the will, by which he is benefited, can be admitted to give his testimony *in foro contradictorio*, as to the validity of that will, till either the value of his legacy hath been paid to him, or he hath renounced it; and in case of payment, the executor of the supposed will must release all title to any future claim upon such supposed legatee, who might otherwise be obliged to refund, if the will should be set aside; and a release in this case is always made,

made, to the intent that the legatee may have no shadow of interest at the time of making his deposition. The same practice also prevailed at common law, in regard to witnesses who were benefited under wills disposing of real estate. And if a legatee, who was a witness to a will, had refused either to renounce his legacy, or to be paid a sum of money in lieu of it; he could not have been compelled by law to divest himself of his interest; and whilst his interest continued, his testimony was useless. And this was determined in the case of *Anstey and Dowling*, E. 19.G. 2. which was thus: James Thompson esquire made his will, by which he disposed of his real estate, and gave to one John Hailes and his wife 10l. each for mourning, and an annuity of 20l. to Elizabeth Hailes the wife of John. This will of James Thompson was regularly attested, as the statute directs, by three witnesses, of which number the above named John Hailes was one; and he refused to be paid 20l. in lieu of his wife's legacy and his own. The cause was thrice argued at the bar, and the judges of the king's bench were unanimously of opinion, that a right to devise lands is not a common law right, but depends upon powers given by statutes, the particulars of which are, that a will of lands must be in writing, signed and attested by three credible witnesses in the presence of the devisor; that these were checks to prevent men from being imposed upon; and certainly meant, that the witnesses to a will (who are required to be credible) should not be persons who are intitled to any benefit under that will; and that therefore John Hailes was not a good witness. (*Str.* 1254.) But this very singular case, and the unanimous opinion of the judges upon the meaning and intent of the statute of frauds and perjuries, gave rise to the act of parliament here following. *Harr. Justin. B. 2. p. 49, 50.*

Which act is that of the 25 G. 2. c. 6. and runs thus:
Whereas some doubts have arisen on the act for prevention of frauds and perjuries, who shall be deemed legal witnesses within the intent of the said act, it is enacted, that if any person shall attest the execution of any will or codicil which shall be made after June 24, 1752, to whom any beneficial devise legacy estate interest gift or appointment of or affecting any real or personal estate (other than and except charges on lands tenements or hereditaments for payment of any debt or debts) shall be thereby given or made; such devise legacy estate interest gift or appointment shall, so far only as concerns such
G 4
person

person attesting the execution of such will or codicil, or any person claiming under him, be utterly null and void; and such person shall be admitted as a witness to the execution of such will or codicil within the intent of the said act, notwithstanding such devise legacy estate interest gift or appointment mentioned in such will or codicil. §. 1.

And in case by any will or codicil any lands tenements or hereditaments are or shall be charged with any debt or debts; and any creditor, whose debt is so charged hath attested or shall attest the execution of such will or codicil; every such creditor, notwithstanding such charge, shall be admitted as a witness to the execution of such will or codicil, within the intent of the said act. §. 2.

And if any person hath attested the execution of any will or codicil already made or shall attest the execution of any will or codicil which shall be made on or before June 24, 1752. to whom any legacy or bequest is or shall be thereby given, whether charged upon lands tenements or hereditaments, or not; and such person before he shall give his testimony concerning the execution of any such will or codicil, shall have been paid, or have accepted or released, or shall have refused to accept such legacy or bequest, upon tender made thereof; such person shall be admitted as a witness to the execution of such will or codicil, within the intent of the said act, notwithstanding such legacy or bequest. §. 3.

Provided that, in case of such tender and refusal as aforesaid, such person shall be in no wise intitled to such legacy or bequest, but shall be for ever afterwards barred therefrom; and in case of such acceptance as aforesaid, such person shall retain to his own use the legacy or bequest which shall have been so paid satisfied or accepted, notwithstanding such will or codicil shall afterwards be adjudged or determined to be void, for want of due execution, or for any other cause or defect whatsoever. §. 4.

And in case any such legatee as aforesaid, who hath attested the execution of any will or codicil already made, or shall attest the execution of any will or codicil which shall be made on or before the said 24th day of June 1752. shall have died in the lifetime of the testator, or before he shall have received or released the legacy or bequest so given to him as aforesaid, and before he shall have refused to receive such legacy or bequest, on tender made thereof; such legatee shall be deemed a legal witness to the execution of such will or codicil, within the intent of the said act, notwithstanding such legacy or bequest. §. 5.

Provided always, that the credit of every such witness, so attesting the execution of any such will or codicil, in any of the cases

cases in this act before mentioned, and all circumstances relating thereto, shall be subject to the consideration and determination of the court and the jury, before whom any such witness shall be examined, or his testimony or attestation made use of; or of the court of equity, in which the testimony or attestation of any such witness shall be made use of; in like manner to all intents and purposes, as the credit of witnesses in all other cases ought to be considered of and determined. §. 6.

And no person, to whom any beneficial estate interest gift or appointment shall be given or made, which is hereby enacted to be null and void as aforesaid, or who shall have refused to receive any such legacy or bequest, on tender made as aforesaid, and who shall have been examined as a witness concerning the execution of such will or codicil, shall after he shall have been so examined, demand to take possession of, or receive any profits or benefit of or from any such estate interest gift or appointment, so given or made to him, in or by any such will or codicil; or demand receive or accept any such legacy or bequest, or any satisfaction or compensation for the same, in any manner or under any colour or pretence whatsoever. §. 7.

Provided, that nothing herein shall extend to the case of any heir at law, or of any devisee in a prior will or codicil of the same testator executed and attested according to the said recited act, or any person claiming under them respectively, who has been in quiet possession for the space of two years next preceding the sixth day of May 1751, as to such lands tenements and hereditaments, whereof he has been in quiet possession as aforesaid; nor to any will or codicil, the validity or due execution whereof hath been contested in any suit in law or equity commenced by the heir of such deviser, or the devisee in any such prior will or codicil, for recovering the lands tenements or hereditaments mentioned to be devised in any will or codicil so contested, or any part thereof, or for obtaining any other judgment or decree relative thereto, on or before the sixth day of May 1751, and which has been already determined in favour of such heir at law or devisee in such prior will or codicil, or any person claiming under them respectively, or which is still depending, and has been prosecuted with due diligence; but the validity of every such will or codicil, and the competency of the witnesses thereto, shall be adjudged and determined in the same manner, to all intents and purposes, as if this act had never been made. §. 8.

Provided nevertheless, that no possession of any heir at law or devisee in such prior will or codicil as aforesaid, or of any person claiming under them respectively, which is consistent with, or may be warranted by or under any will or codicil attested

tested according to the true intent and meaning of this act, or where the estate descended or might have descended to such heir at law, till a future or executory devise, by virtue of any will or codicil attested according to this act, should or might take effect, shall be deemed to be a possession within the intent and meaning of the clause herein last before contained. s. 9.

Afterwards, this matter came in consideration again, in the case of *Wyndham and Chetwynd*, M. 31 G. 2. Which was on an issue out of chancery, devisavit vel non, to try the validity of the will of one Mr. Chetwynd deceased. The jury found a special verdict, with regard to the attestation of this will; wherein it was stated, that the testator died Mar. 17, 1750, leaving the will in question, which was regularly attested by three subscribing witnesses, Higden, Squire, and Baxter: that the testator was indebted about 18,000l. upon mortgage of his real estate, and left a personal estate to the amount of 13,972l. which was greatly superior to all his specialty and simple contract debts; that he charged his real estate with the payment of his debts and legacies; that at the time of attesting this will, he was indebted to Higden the witness (who was an apothecary) about 11l. and at the time of his death about 18l. which had been paid off by the executor, before the trial of the issue; that he was indebted to Squire and Baxter, the other witnesses, who were two attornies in partnership, about 280l. at the time of attestation, which also (except a small mistake in miscasting) was out-set or discharged before the day of trial. If these were three credible witnesses within the statute of frauds, the jury found the devise to be sufficient; otherwise insufficient.

It was argued by serjeant Prime for the plaintiff; first, That the facts as stated, did not make them interested witnesses; secondly, That supposing them to have been interested, yet the interest was removed before the time of trial. As to the first: They are no legatees, and derive nothing from the gift or bounty of the testator; they were justly intitled to payment of their debts, tho' no will had ever been made; the personal assets were the proper fund for them to resort to, and that is sufficient to pay their demands; so that they are not interested in the charge on the real estate. As to the second point: They were competent witnesses at the time of examination, their debts being then discharged. The word *credible* in the statute is an ambiguous expression, and capable of many senses; but there seems to be a parliamentary exposition

position thereof in the statute of 4 & 5 *An. c.* 16. *f.* 14. whereby three witnesses are required to authenticate a nuncupative will, and it is declared, that such as are good witnesses in trials at common law, shall be deemed good witnesses to establish a nuncupative will. Now allowing the same exposition to take place in the statute of frauds; then, as these witnesses would be unexceptionable on a trial at law in respect of interest, so they are competent (and therefore credible) witnesses to the present devise. And in this, and the former argument, there were cited divers cases to this purpose.

On the other side, Mr. Norton argued for the defendant; that at the time of the *attestation* the witnesses were interested, and therefore incompetent; and that this, and not the time of examination, is the proper time of inspecting their credibility; else it would open greater opportunities of fraud and perjury, than before the act; it would be setting up witnesses to hire; and would put the validity of the will in the power of the witnesses, by releasing or not releasing their interest. If a witness is unexceptionable at the time of attestation, and afterwards becomes infamous or insane; the will is nevertheless a good will: which proves that his condition at the time of attestation is alone to be regarded. And to this purpose were cited also divers cases; and it was observed, that most of the cases cited on the other side were prior to the statute of frauds. He insisted, that the word *credible* means something more than *competent*: the law required competency before; and it is not to be imagined, that the learned compiler of this statute (lord Hale) would put in a word, which at best was superfluous: That in the statute of the 13 *C.* 2. against deer stealing, and in all the game laws, the expression of *credible* witness is used, which hath always been understood to mean more than *competent*, and to give the justices a discretion whether they will convict upon such testimony or not, tho' the witness was in law strictly admissible. And he insisted on two cases, as directly in point; viz. *Hilliard and Jennings*, 1 *L. Raym.* 505. And *Ansty and Dowling*, 19 *G.* 2.

On the argument, lord Mansfield expressed his doubts of that generally received opinion, that Lord Hale drew the statute of frauds, 29 *C.* 2. he having died in 1676, in the 28 *C.* 2. and observed also, that the statute of the 4 & 5 *An.* was enacted to check the extravagant notions of

of some civilians, by which they excluded from being witnesses the children and family of the testator, as well as of the legatees; arising from a fiction in the Roman law, by which testaments are transacted in the form of a sale between the deviser and the devisee, to which none of either family were allowed to be witnesses.

Afterwards in the same term, lord Mansfield delivered the opinion of the court. In this case the real estate is only charged with payment of debts; as an auxiliary fund to the personalty; which stands in need of no assistance, being itself much greater than the debts: and at the time of trial, the three witnesses were not creditors to either the real or personal estate, but were so at the time of attestation. And herein the question is, Whether this be a valid attestation, according to the statute of frauds. This is a doubt which sprang out of the general question in *Ansty* and *Dowling*, whether a benefit to a witness arising from a will shall annul his testimony, tho' at or after the testator's death he becomes totally disinterested. The solution of this question depends upon general principles; not upon the words of the statute. The statute declares no incapacity, lays down no legal conditions for admitting witnesses. The word *credible* is no term of art: it has only one signification, and that universally received: it is never used as synonymous to legal competency: it presupposes evidence to have been already given. The consideration of competent, is previous to that of credible: and in the statutes which have been mentioned at the bar, the expression so frequently used of credible witnesses, is never construed to mean competent. To make the validity of a will depend upon the credibility of the witnesses, would be absurd; since the testator could never foresee what credit might hereafter be given to them. It is true, that in *Butler and Baker's case*, 3 Co. 36. the third caution there given is, to call credible witnesses: But that is only a loose and casual expression; tho' perhaps the penner of this statute might take his hint from thence. I cannot conceive (for the reasons I formerly mentioned) that this statute was drawn by lord Hale, any further than perhaps by leaving some loose notes, which were afterwards unskilfully digested. I therefore think, that the epithet *credible*, in this statute, is used as a word of course, but is unfortunately misapplied: if it signifies competent, that is implied in the word witness alone: if it signifies any thing more than competent, it is (as was before observed) absurd. Perpetual doubts

doubts have arisen upon every clause of this statute, not only among the unlearned, for whom it ought to have been calculated ; but even among the learned also. In a statute so inaccurate, I therefore think the word *credible* might accidentally slip in, and ought not to be attended to as if it carried any special legal meaning. I shall therefore consider the statute, as only requiring the attestation of three subscribing witnesses, that is, legal competent witnesses : and cannot but observe, that the necessity of having subscribing witnesses to any instrument never existed before in this country. The statute determines no point of time for the competence of witnesses ; and as I think that competence is not confined to the time of attestation, so that I think that the incompetence of witnesses at the time of examination could never be intended for a question by the legislature, since however competent at the time of attesting, they may become insane or infamous before the time of examination.

The competence of witnesses to wills, must therefore depend upon the general rules of competence for all other witnesses. I will therefore consider, first, How this matter of competent attestation would have stood upon general principles, supposing no judicial determination had been given : Secondly, How the authority of judicial determinations stands ; for if there are any in point, they are certainly proper to be adhered to : And, thirdly, How these two rules may be applied to the present case.

First, As to general principles : The power of devising ought to be favored. It naturally follows the right of property. It subsisted in this kingdom before the conquest, and till about the reign of king Henry the second, when it ceased in consequence of feudal tenure, not from any express prohibition. The doctrine of uses revived this power ; and the statute of uses again accidentally checked it. This occasioned the statute of wills to be soon after made ; which received a great enlargement by the alteration of tenures in the reign of king Charles the second. And this testamentary power over property is more reasonable in this kingdom, than ever it was among the Greeks and Romans ; since by reason of primogeniture, and other exclusive rules of descent, the succession *ab intestato* among us is not so equal and universal as among those people. The statute of the 29 C. 2. was not meant to check this power, but only to guard against fraud. In theory it seemed a strong guard : In practice it may be some guard : But I believe more fair wills have
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been destroyed for want of observing its restrictions, than fraudulent wills obstructed by its caution. In all my experience at the court of delegates (and I have heard the same from many learned civilians), I never knew a fraudulent will which was not legally attested. Courts of justice ought therefore to lean rather against, than in support of, any too rigid formalities.

Suppose the subscribing witnesses honest, how little need they know? They do not know the contents; they need not be together; they need not see the testator sign; they need not know it to be a will. At the time this act was made, the law rejected no witness to prove a will, unless at the time of his examination his testimony tended to support his own title, and enable himself to hold or recover an interest under it. In the ecclesiastical court, the probate is conclusive to every one as to every part. If a legatee came to prove it, he intitled himself to his legacy. But if the legacy was contingent, and at the testator's death could not take effect; if he had the same or a greater interest, tho' the will should be set aside; he was a witness: a release, payment, or tender, made him a witness. In the courts of common law, where the witness had a charge upon land devised to another, he was just in the case of a personal legatee. If he had as great an interest the other way; if his interest at the testator's death could never take effect; if there was a release, and I will add, as by necessary consequence, if there was payment or tender; he was a witness. Nice objections, of a remote interest, which couldnot be paid or released, though they held in other cases, were not allowed to disqualify a witness in the case of a will: As parishioners might prove a devise to the use of the poor of the parish for ever. 2 *Sid.* 109. Interest in a witness is certainly an objection to his competency: This arises from a presumption of bias: It is no positive disability; as if a particular age was required and wanting in a witness: It is only presumptive; and presumptions only stand until the contrary is made apparent: If the bias be taken off, the objection ceases. There is no presumption of bias in a witness, who at the time of signing probably knew not the contents of the testator's will, and after his death is discharged from, or has renounced all interest arising from thence. Nothing can be more reasonable, than to allow this objection of interest to be purged by matter subsequent to the attestation, and previous to the trial, if it were only for the benefit

nefit of third persons. Shall tokens of kindness to friends, servants, or the like, who may be unwarily called in as witnesses, vitiate a solemn and well-weighed disposition of a man's estate; when by payment or release this interest may be at once removed? This seems the more unreasonable, since there are methods by which legatees may by circuitry be witnesses to a devise in their own favour, without either payment or release: If land be once charged with legacies by a well attested will; legacies may be given by an unattested codicil to the witnesses of that very will.

As to the judicial authorities: In all cases of testimony it hath often been determined, that a release takes off all objection in point of interest. And therefore I give credit to the dictum of judge Powis, in *Viner*, tit. Evidence, F. sect. 53. not on the authority of the reporter, but because it is consonant to the known practice of Westminster-hall in other cases; viz. That it had been solemnly agreed by the judges, that where a person had a legacy given, and did release it, he was a good witness to prove the will. The case of *Hilliard* and *Jennings* (of which, Carthew's is the best report, he having been counsel in the cause) in substance is much the same as that of *Ansty* and *Dowling*. In this last case, the wife of one of the witnesses had an annuity charged on the lands devised; no release was had; no payment, no tender could be made; and as husband and wife are considered as one person, this was a material objection to his testimony; and it was upon the particular circumstances of that case, and not upon any general doctrine, that the judgment in that case was founded, as Mr. justice Denison soon after assured me. It is true, the lord chief justice Lee, in delivering his opinion, went into the general point, and argued as if the credit of a witness could not be purged or varied by an act subsequent to the attestation; which he grounded on a maxim of the Roman law, *conditionem testium inspicere debemus eo tempore cum signarent*: But this was not sufficiently considered; as will appear from a short view of the Roman testaments, which originally could only be made as a legislative act *in procinctu*, or in *comitiis populi*: but after the law of the twelve tables, which gave the power of private testaments, testamentary matters were usually transacted *per es & libram*, under the fiction and in the form of a sale or contract between the testator and the legatees. These symbols were used before the introduction of written instruments; and to this symbolical

bolical sale five, and afterwards to the written instrument seven witnesses were required, who must be citizens, free-men, adults, and attended with other qualifications. This positive capacity was the condition of the witnesses referred to in the Roman law; which was requisite to be in them at the time of their attestation or signing, and not afterwards; in like manner as where a surrender must be made into the hands of two copyhold tenants, it will not be good if made into the hands of a stranger, tho' he should afterwards become a copyholder. The interest of the witnesses was not in the contemplation of the law; for heirs were admitted as subscribing witnesses after the symbolical sale had ceased, as were also *cestui que trusts* and legatees. The consequence of this doctrine of lord chief justice Lee was, that no creditors or legatees, if the estates were charged to pay them, could at any rate be good witnesses. And yet when lord Aylesbury died in February 1746, leaving a new-made will, witnessed by three servants, to all of whom he had left legacies charged on lands, which they released before examination, and it appearing that by a former will dated in 1744, and witnessed by other persons, he had left the same legacies, the lord chancellor in 1748 held them to be good witnesses to the second will, for it was indifferent to them which will should stand good, and besides they had released. And in the case of *Baugh and Holloway*, 1 *P. Will.* 557. Lord Raymond lays down the same general doctrine that I would now establish; and also another point, which agrees with my opinion, that an interested witness may prove a devise to another, tho' not to himself. In all judicial determinations, devises have been considered, not in the nature of wills by the Roman law, but as dispositions and conveyances of real estates; whence it is, that by such disposition of all one's estate, lands that are purchased subsequent thereto will not pass: Therefore the interest of witnesses to devises should be governed by the same rules, as in all other written dispositions of real estates. As to the notion started in the argument of *Ansty* and *Dowling*, of four devisee witnesses dividing an estate among themselves, by reciprocally attesting for each other; this might as well be effected by four distinct devises separately attested by three of them in rotation: But in either case, the very contrivance would appear so fraudulent, as alone to be sufficient to set it aside.

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With respect to the present case on its own particular circumstances:—These witnesses are in the nature of legatees; not several devisees. The presumption of interest at the time of attestation, is taken off at the death, by the principal funds being more than sufficient: It is taken off before the trial, by the debts being paid. But the benefit, at the time of attestation, was nothing. It doth not appear the principal funds then were deficient. The legacy is a bare possibility, upon a contingency, which contingency never happened. But I will go farther; I think a charge to pay debts ought not to incapacitate subscribing witnesses, altho' they wanted and claimed the benefit of it. Every honest man should make that charge in his will. He who omits it, is said to sin in his grave. Fraud cannot be presumed, from inserting a clause which it would be iniquitous not to put in. No man would resort to wicked and fraudulent practices, to get his debt charged upon him by the will of his debtor. If he suspected the debtor's circumstances, he would not stay till his death, or trust to a revocable security. The presumption of fraud in this case would be against justice and truth; and the public inconvenience so great, that hardly a will could stand. This charge ought to be in every will. The persons attending upon a dying testator, and therefore most common witnesses, are generally in some degree creditors: such as servants, parson, attorney, and apothecary: and the disallowing such persons to be witnesses cannot answer any ends of public utility. Upon the whole, we are all of opinion, That this will is duly attested by three witnesses. *Black. Rep. 95. (b)*

Afterwards, in the case of *Hindson and Kersey, E. 5 G. 3.* a special case was reserved from Appleby assizes before Mr. Justice Bathurst in 1760, which was thus: John Knott, being seised of a messuage and other tenements, at Mauls Meburn in the county of West-motland, by his will bearing date August 16, 1734, (which was before the mortmain act of 9 G. 2. and therefore that was out of the question,) devises his messuage and lands in the will particularly mentioned (after the death of his wife) to John White, Christopher Moss, Henry Holme, William Dent, Robert Burra, and William Burra, in trust, that they and their successors for

(b) *S. C. 1 Burr. 414.*

ever dispose of the rents and profits to poor orphans, aged, and impotent people within the township of Mauls Meburn, and put out the children of such poor people apprentices. Other lands and tenements there he devised to his wife for life, remainder to Anne Gibson for life, remainder to Mary Brown for life, remainder to Anne Hebson in fee. Anne Gibson (after the wife's death) entered as devisee on that part devised to her; and the heirs at law brought an ejectment, alleging that the will was not duly attested according to the statute of frauds. The witnesses were two of the said trustees, Henry Holme and Robert Burra, and the third John Mitchell; all of whom, at the time of the attestation, and at the death of the testator, and long after, were respectively seised of messuages and tenements in the said township of Mauls Meburn, and were assessed to and paid the poor tax there. But before the time of trial, the said Henry Holme and Robert Burra released all their interest under the will to the other trustees, and they and also John Mitchell conveyed away their respective messuages and tenements within the said township. The question was, whether under these circumstances, the said writing purporting to be the will of the said John Knott was sufficient and effectual to pass the aforesaid lands and tenements to the said Anne Gibson?—Upon the hearing of this cause in the court of common pleas, the three puisne judges delivered their opinion in favour of the will; and the lord chief justice Pratt (afterwards lord Camden) declared his opinion against it, and argued to the following effect: Two questions arise out of this will; first, Whether it is executed according to the statute of frauds; and, secondly, If not, whether the objection to it is cured by the late act. In handling this subject, I shall be obliged to differ from the opinion of the court of king's bench delivered by lord Mansfield in the case of Wyndham and Chetwynd; or rather (for so I wish to put it) I shall agree with the judgment of the same court delivered by lord chief justice Lee in the case of Ansty and Dowling. For as both the opinions are justified by authorities of equal weight, a man may take either side without hazarding his reputation. The case of Wyndham and Chetwynd supposes that the word *credible* in the act is only a word of course, and ought not to be attended to as conveying any special legal meaning; and that the other word *witness* is to be expounded by common law analogy. From whence this rule was taken,

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that as at common law no man was allowed to be a witness to prove an interest for himself; so since the statute, no man shall by his own subscription take an interest which he could not prove at the time by his own examination: And from the rule thus framed it was concluded, not only that a release or payment will re-establish the witness, if his incompetency really stands in the way; but further, that such a witness may even without a release be competent enough to prove the will for every person except himself.

In opposition to this reasoning I propose to maintain, that this credibility, which I shall prove to be competency, is a necessary and substantial qualification of the witness, at the time of attestation, that if the witness is incompetent at that time, he cannot purge himself afterwards, either by release or payment, so as to set up the will; and that he cannot be a witness in that case to establish any part of the will, but that the whole is void for ever. As my brothers differ with me upon the second question, by holding that the witnesses are competent by the rule of law, I might, if I thought it fitting, leave all the other points undiscussed, as not absolutely necessary to the decision of this case. And I should have been glad for several reasons to have done it, if other reasons more weighty with me had not determined me the other way. One is, that as the whole argument is connected by a chain, those parts whereon I am bound to speak could not be so clearly illustrated, if the others were omitted; for they all throw light upon each other, and the former are proper and material introductions to the latter. Another reason is, that as the same case may again exist, and even this case may yet come before another court; and likewise, as no cases of the like kind, in my opinion, are cured by the late act; but that future wills, as well as those that are past, under such like attestations, must occasion the same questions, when they happen to be contested: I think myself bound in duty to declare my dissent to the last opinion of lord Mansfield, and do my best endeavours to restore that of lord chief justice Lee, which has been so considerably shaken, I may say overturned; because the last opinion, if it is acquiesced under, almost always governs, and becomes the leading case. I am very sensible at the same time, that I am destroying an honest will, upon a nominal objection; for the interest here which I must treat as a serious incapacity, is too slight even to disparage the witness's credit, if he could be sworn;
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and yet I must adjudge him, upon this objection, to be a person so destitute of all credit, that he is not fit even to be examined: But as it is not my business to decide cases by my own rule of justice, but to declare the law as I find it laid down; if the statute of frauds has enjoined this determination, it is not my opinion, but the judgment of the legislature. As I am satisfied, however, that this will was fairly executed, I am very glad my brothers, by differing from me, have enabled me to give judgment in favour of it, against my own opinion. Before I proceed, I desire it may be understood, that I do by no means deny the authority of the judgment in *Wyndham* and *Chetwynd*; for that case was not determined only upon the general principles, which I am obliged in this argument to deny, but upon its own general as well as particular circumstances, none of which can be applied to the case of a mere legatee witness. The first general inquiry then being this, Who are those witnesses which are described in the act by the word *credible*? I answer, in one word, they are *competent* witnesses and no other. And when it is further asked, At what time must the witnesses be endued with this qualification? I say, that they must be clothed with it at the time of attestation. And here I must premise one observation, That there is a great difference between the method of proving a fact in a court of justice, and the attestation of that fact at the time it happens. These two things I suspect have been confounded. Whereas it ought always to be remembered, that the great inquiry upon this question is, how the will ought to be attested, and not how it ought to be proved. The new thing introduced by the statute is the attestation; the method of proving this attestation stands as it did upon the old common law principles. Thus, for instance, one witness is sufficient to prove what all the three have attested; and though that witness must be a subscriber, yet that is owing to the general common law rule, that where a witness hath subscribed an instrument, he must be always produced, because it is the best evidence. This we see in common experience; for after the first witness has been examined, the will is always read. The statute says, the will must be executed before three credible witnesses. If it be asked, whether the quality of credibility is requisite in the witness at the time of attestation? I answer, Nothing can be more clear upon the words, if credibility means any thing; for what is the clause, but a description of those

those solemnities that are to attend the execution? among which the presence of credible witnesses is made necessary. It is admitted, that if any other description had been added to the witnesses, that must have belonged to them at the time; as if three Englishmen, or three full aged persons had been required, these adjuncts would have been necessary at the time; and if so, I see not by what rule of construction one epithet or adjunct can be distinguished from another. Nay, if the word *credible* be expunged; and the word *witness*, as it is admitted, doth of itself alone include *competent*; still, competency must be essential to the witness at the time of execution: And a competent witness in the eye of the law is a witness that is not infamous nor interested. So that, take it which way we will, an interested witness cannot be the witness the law intends to be present at the execution. And that the statute had a main view to the quality of the witnesses, will appear from this consideration: namely, that a will is the only instrument in it required to be attested by subscribing witnesses at the time of execution. It was enough for leases and all other conveyances, marriage agreements, declarations, and assignments of trust, to be in writing: These were all transactions of health, and protected by valuable considerations and antecedent treaties; the power of a court of equity was fully sufficient to meet with every fraud that could be practised in these cases, after the contract was reduced into writing. But a will was a voluntary disposition, executed suddenly in the last sickness, oftentimes almost in the article of death. And the only question that can be asked in this case is, Was the testator in his senses when he made it? and consequently, the time of execution is the critical minute that requires guard and protection. Here you see the reason why witnesses are called in so emphatically. What fraud are they to prevent? Even that fraud so commonly practised upon dying men, whose hands have survived their heads; who have still strength enough to write a name, or make a mark, though the capacity of disposing is dead. What is the condition of such an object in the power of a few who are suffered to stand him, wheedled or teized into submission for the sake of a little ease? Put to the laborious task of recollecting the full state of all his affairs, and to weigh the just merits and demerits of those who belong to him, by remembering all, and forgetting none. Such an act to be done at such a time is so pregnant with suspicion,

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That a formal declaration of the testator's sound and disposing mind and memory, tho' he is weak in body, is grown to be a common introductory clause to almost every testament. Who then shall secure the testator in this important moment from imposition? Who shall protect the heir at law, and give the world a satisfactory evidence that he was sane? The statute says, three credible witnesses. What is their employment? I say, to inspect and judge of the testator's sanity before they attest. If he is not capable, the witnesses ought to remonstrate and refuse their attestation. In all other cases the witnesses are passive, here they are active, and in truth the principal parties to the transaction, the testator is intrusted to their care. Sanity is the great fact the witness has to speak to, when he comes to prove the attestation; and that is the true reason why a will can never be proved as an exhibit *viva voce* in chancery, tho' a deed may; for there must be liberty to cross examine to this fact of sanity. From the same consideration, it is become the invariable practice of that court, never to establish a will unless all the witnesses are examined; because the heir has a right to proof of sanity from every one of them whom the statute has placed about his ancestor. And yet this duty of the witness, this solemn trial of the testator's sanity, hath been called a matter of form, and of no use to prevent frauds. I am of a very contrary opinion. That many fraudulent wills have been made since the statute, and all formally executed, I have no doubt; and I am afraid these frauds will continue to the end of time; for, what law can totally extinguish wickedness, and reform mankind? But if a law is to be slighted, because it doth not entirely eradicate the mischief it was made to prevent, no law whatever can escape censure. Many bad wills have been made; but who can tell me how many have been prevented; The design of the statute was, to prevent wills that ought not to be made, and always operates silently by intestacy. I have no doubt but that a thousand estates have been saved by this excellent provision. It is called a guard in theory only; whereas almost every delirious paralytic, that is suffered to die intestate, is preserved by this law, and gives testimony of its utility. But if you once treat this part of the solemnity as a form, and call the devisees and legatees into the sick man's chamber; the whole ceremony will then, I admit, become a mere form: nay it will be worse, it will be a snare to the testator; and instead of being a prevention, it will be a protection of fraud.

fraud. I will close this reasoning with the words of the court in the case of *Lea* and *Libb*, as reported in *Carth.* 37. "'Tis true, the intent of the statute was to prevent fraud; but tho' no suspicion of fraud appears in this case, yet the statute hath prescribed a certain method, which every one ought to pursue to prevent fraud." And if this is the true language of the statute of frauds, the consequence is undeniable, that the incompetency can never be purged, and that the whole will is void for ever.

This being the criterion of credibility, I proceed to consider, how far the witnesses to this will are affected by it. The case is this. The testator deviseth certain lands to trustees, to be applied to the use of such poor as by reason of infancy, impotence, or old age, are unable to work, and to place out apprentices the children of such poor. The three witnesses who attested the will, are seised of lands in fee within the parish at the time of attestation. The objection is, that these witnesses cannot be admitted to prove the will in court, while they remain so seised, because by the establishment of the will they will derive an interest to themselves in respect of those lands. Their interest is this, that as the poor rate must be reduced in proportion to the value of this benefaction, their estates will become rate-free for so much for ever. And altho' the devise at the time of the testator's death was future, and did not take effect till some years after; yet it was a present benefit to the owner of those lands, and made them immediately more valuable, in consideration of this future easement. It is objected, that the interest claimed under the will is nothing; that it is nothing at present; that it is contingent in future; and that at most it is extremely minute. 'Tis true, it is not given to the parishioners; but it is an interest derived to the parishioners in consequence of the will: which is the common case of penalties given to the poor; they gain if the will is established, they lose if it is set aside. I do admit also, it is no easement in present; but in respect of future easement, it is even now a present and lasting benefit; and in truth, all future interests, whether certain or contingent, whether now or hereafter to be enjoyed, are present benefits, have a price, and are saleable. The court of chancery therefore hath very sensibly pronounced possibilities to be vested interests, and made them transmissible. A fee expectant upon a thousand years term has
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been sold for money.' Let me put the case of an executory devise of an estate of 10,000l. a year, and the life before it in a deep consumption, (I am entitled to put the strongest case I please,) could this devisee be a competent witness to prove the will? The answer must be, he could not. Tell me then what chances are valuable and what not. Till this line is drawn, I must insist that all chances are valuable. As to the objection that the interest is minute, and that a small interest, as in *Townsend's* case, ought not to disqualify witnesses: I do conceive, that however that point might have been litigated formerly, yet now the law is clearly settled, and the witness must be rejected, if he has any interest, be it ever so small. The point was disputed for above twenty years, in the case of toll or custom claimed by the city of London, upon importation, called by the name of water bailage: The question was, whether freemen might be witnesses? Nothing can be more minute than such an interest; and yet after many opinions *pro* and *con.* it was finally settled that they were not witnesses. True it is, that the interest of the witnesses in some cases is drawn so fine, that it is scarce perceptible; and yet that glimmering, that *scintilla*, shall be as powerful to exclude the witness, as the most substantial proof. The true ground whereof is this; that as no positive law is able to define the quantity of interest that shall have no influence upon the minds of men, it is better to leave the rule inflexible than permit it to be bent by the discretion of the judge.—[And therefore to divest a legatee witness of all kind of interest in time to come, the late act hath taken the most effectual method, by making his legacy totally void. In the present case, the parties, to avoid any further litigation, came to an agreement and divided the estate amongst them.]

In the case of *Pendock* and *Mackender*, H. 28 G. 2. On a special case reserved at the assizes, the question was, whether one of the witnesses to the will was a sufficient witness within the statute, who before the time of attestation had been indicted, tried, and convicted for stealing a sheep, and was found guilty to the value of ten pence, and had judgment of whipping. After three arguments at the bar, the whole court of common pleas were clearly of opinion that he was not a competent witness; and laid it down as a rule, that it is the crime that creates the infamy, and takes away a man's competency,

petency, and not the punishment for it; and it is absurd and ridiculous to say it is the punishment that creates the infamy. The pillory has been always looked upon as infamous, and to take away a man's competency as a witness. But to shew the absurdity of this notion; suppose a man is convicted on the statute against deer stealing, there is a penalty of 30l. to be levied by distress, and if he has no distress, he is to be put in the pillory; so that if the pillory be infamous, the person convicted (according to this notion) will be so if he has not 30l. but if he has 30l. he will not be infamous. Petit larceny is felony. And there is no case where a person convicted thereof was ever admitted to be a witness. *2 Wilson. 18.*

2. A written will of goods and chattels is not altered Of goods. as to this matter by the said statute, but continues as it was before.

Concerning which, it is said in *3 Salk. 396.* that by the canon law, and also by the common law, two witnesses are requisite to prove a will of goods.

For one witness by the civil law, unto which the other laws are conformed in this matter, is as no witness at all. *1 P. Will. 13.*

So in the case of *Thwaites and Smith, M. 1696.* Before the delegates. Where there were only three witnesses to the will, and two of them children of the residuary legatee; the will was set aside, children (by reason of the affection and duty which they owe to their parents) not being allowed to be witnesses by the civil law. — But on a commission of review being sued out, the parties agreed, and the executor renounced. And the reporter makes a query, Whether if the will in question appeared to be written or so much as subscribed by the testator's own hand, it would not have been good without any witness at all? *1 P. W. 13.*

And Swinburn says, if it be certain and undoubted, that the testament is written or subscribed with the testator's own hand, in this case the testimony of witnesses is not necessary; but if it be doubtful, whether the testament were written or subscribed by the testator, in this case the testimony of witnesses is necessary, to confirm the same to be the testator's own hand. *Swin. 353.*

And altho' witnesses to prove the will may be necessary yet it doth not seem to be of absolute necessity that the names of these witnesses should be by them subscribed to the will.

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In the case of *Limbery* against *Mason* and *Hyde*, T. 8 G. 2. several cases were cited wherein these strict formalities were determined not to be requisite. As in the case of *Wright* and *Waltbee*, H. 1710. There were three testamentary schedules, whereof one was without date; the second was written *In witness*, but there was no witness; the third concluded abruptly: yet being written by the testator, they were declared to be his will. *Comyn. 452.*

So in the case of *Worlick* and *Pollet*, 1711. Before the delegates. The testatrix sent for a person to make her will; gave him instructions for the same; when he had wrote it, he read it to her; she approved it; declared it to be her last will; sent for three witnesses to see her execute it; *Signed and sealed* was written, but she died before any other execution: yet it was held a good will. For tho' the first sentence for it was reversed upon an appeal, yet it was afterwards affirmed by the delegates. *Comyn. 452.*

And by Gilbert chief baron: If a will be made of goods, and written in the party's own hand, without any witness at all; it is allowed to be good, and the statute doth not require any witnesses to chattels only. *Gilt. Rep. 260.*

In the case of *Brown* and *Heath*, 1721. A will of a real and personal estate was prepared in order to be executed, tho' there were several blanks in it, and the testator died before execution; yet it was held a good will for the personal estate: and tho' more was intended to be done, yet it shall be good for what is done. *Comyn. 453.*

So in the case of *Loveday* and *Claridge*, 1730. The testator intending to make his will, pulled a paper out of his pocket, wrote down some things with ink, some with a pencil, and tho' it had no conclusion, but appeared to be a draught which he intended after to finish, for it was not signed, but had at the end a calculation of his effects, an account of his tea table, and an order to pay a dividend of stocks; yet it was held to be a will. *Comyn. 452.*

So in a case where the testator gave instructions to make his will of his real and personal estate; and when it was brought to him, he made several alterations, and then wrote the whole over as altered with his own hand: this, being found in his study, tho' not signed or sealed, was held a good will (as to the personal estate). It is true, the

the first sentence was, that he died intestate: but that was reversed by the delegates. *Comyn. 453. (i)*

3. By the same statute of the 29 C. 2. c. 3. *All de-* Declarations of
trust.
clarations or creations of trusts or confidences, of any lands tene-
ments or hereditaments, shall be manifested and proved by some
writing signed by the party who is by law enabled to declare such
trust, or by his last will in writing; or else they shall be utterly
void, and of none effect. l. 7.

And all grants and assignments of any trust or confidence,
shall likewise be in writing. signed by the party granting or as-
signing the same by such last will or devise; or else shall be ut-
terly void and of none effect. l. 9.

4. A nuncupative testament is, when the testator Nuncupative
will.
without any writing doth declare his will, before a suffi-
cient number of witnesses. *Swin. 58.*

By the aforesaid statute, 29 C. 2. c. 3. *No nuncupative*
will shall be good, where the estate thereby bequeathed shall ex-
ceed the value of thirty pounds, that is not proved by the oaths
of three witnesses at the least, that were present at the making
thereof; nor unless it be proved, that the testator at the time
of pronouncing the same did bid the persons present or some of
them bear witness that such was his will, or to that effect;
nor unless such nuncupative will were made in the time of the
last sickness of the deceased, and in the house of his habitation or
dwelling, or where he hath been resident for the space of ten days
or more before the making of such will, except where such person
was surprised or taken sick, being from his own home, and died
before he returned to the place of his dwelling. l. 19.

And after six months passed after the speaking of the pretended
testamentary words, no testimony shall be received to prove any
will nuncupative, except the said testimony or the substance there-
of, were committed to writing within six days after the making
of the said will. l. 20.

And no letters testamentary or probate of any nuncupative
will shall pass the seal of any court, till fourteen days at the least
after the decease of the testator be fully expired; nor shall
any nuncupative will be at any time received to be proved, unless
process have first issued to call in the widow or next of kindred
to the deceased, to the end they may contest the same if they
please. l. 21.

Provided that notwithstanding this act, any soldier being in
usual military service, or any mariner or seamen being at sea,

(i) So also a will made under a power, but not duly attested,
to pass real estate, was deemed a good execution of the power
as to the personalty. *Duff. v. Dalzell, 1 Bre. 147.*

may

may dispose of his moveables, wages, and personal estate, as he might have done before the making of this act. l. 23.

And by the 4 An. c. 16. *All such witnesses as are and ought to be allowed to be good witnesses upon trials at law, by the laws and customs of this realm, shall be deemed good witnesses to prove any nuncupative will, or any thing relating therunto.*

By the oaths of three witnesses at the least] T. 1704. Philips and the parish of St. Clement Danes. Dr. Shallmer by will in writing gave 200l. to the parish of St. Clement Danes; and after Prew the reader coming to pray with him, his wife put him in mind to give 200l. more towards the charges of building their church; at which, though Dr. Shallmer was at first disturbed, yet afterwards he said he would give it, and bid Prew take notice of it; and the next day bid Prew remember what he had said to him the day before, and dies that day. Within three or four days after, the doctor's widow put down a memorandum in writing of the said last devise, and so did her maid. Prew died about a month after; and amongst his papers was found a memorandum of his own writing, dated three weeks after the doctor's death, of what the doctor said to him about the 200l. and purporting that he had put it in writing the same day it was spoken; but that writing which was mentioned to be made the same day it was spoken, did not appear; and these memorandums did not expressly agree. About a year after, on application of the parish to the commissioners of charitable uses, and producing these memorandums and proofs by Mrs. Shallmer and her maid, they decreed the 200l. But on exception taken by the executors, the decree was discharged of this 200l.; and the lord chancellor held it not good, because it was not proved by the oath of three witnesses: for though Mrs. Shallmer and her maid had made proof, yet Prew was dead, and the statute in that branch requires not only three to be present, but that the proof shall be by the oath of three witnesses. 1 Abr. Cas. Eq. 404.

Letters testamentary or probate of any nuncupative will] H. 22 & 23 C. 2. Verborn and Brewin. An administrator brought a bill to discover and have an account of the intestate's estate: the defendant pleaded, that the supposed intestate made a nuncupative will, and another person executor, to whom he was accountable, and not to the plaintiff as administrator. But decreed, that though there was such a nuncupative will, yet it was not pleadable against an administrator before it was proved. 1 Chan. Cas. 192.

5. A codicil, by intendment of law, is either to alter, explain, add or subtract something, from the will; and wherever it is added to a testament, and the testator declares that it shall be in force, in such case, if the will happens to be void for want of those solemnities required by law, yet it shall be good as a codicil, and be observed by the administrator: it is true, executors cannot regularly be appointed in a codicil, but yet they may be substituted according to the will of the testator, and the codicil is still good. *Swin. 14.*

M. 31 C. 2. Stonivell's case. The testator made his wife executrix and residuary legatee; but she dying in his lifetime, he by a codicil nuncupative devised to G. R. all which by will he had given to his wife, and died. The question was, whether this nuncupative codicil was good, notwithstanding the statute before mentioned; and adjudged that it was, and as it were a new will for so much as he had given to his wife, and that it did not alter his written will, for there was no such will, the operation of it being determined by the death of the wife, living the testator, who was her husband. *Raym. 334.*

Although no man can die with two testaments, because the latter doth alway infringe the former; yet a man may die with divers codicils, and the latter doth not hinder the former, so long as they be not contrary. *Swin. 15.*

If two testaments be found, and it doth not appear which was the former or latter, both testaments are void: but if two codicils be found, and it cannot be known which was first or last, and one and the same thing is given to one person in one codicil, and to another person in another codicil; the codicils are not void, but the persons therein named ought to divide the thing betwixt them. *Swin. 15.*

If codicils are regularly executed and attested, they may be proved as wills are. So if they are found written by the testator himself, they ought to be taken as part of the will, and to be proved in common form by the oath of the administrator with the will annexed; and in case of opposition, by witnesses to the handwriting and finding: And it hath been usual to exhibit an affidavit of the handwriting and finding, before a probate or administration passes even in common form.

But in case of a real estate, a codicil cannot operate, unless it be executed according to the statute. *1 Atk. 426.*

6. Donatio

donatio causa mortis.

6. *Donatio causa mortis*, or a gift in prospect of death, is where a man moves with the consideration of his mortality, does give and deliver something to another, to be his in case the giver die, but if he lives he is to have it again. *Law of Test. 174. P. & M. Ch. 269. (k)*

In every such gift there must be a delivery made by the party in his last sickness; and nothing can operate as such, without having been delivered in the testator's lifetime, by him or his order. *3 P. Will. 357. Miller v. Miller.*

A man by his will disposed of personal estate; and afterwards by parol gave 100l. bill to one to deliver over to his nephew, if the testator should die of that sickness: And this gift was held good. *Druy and Smith, 1 P. Will. 404.*

So where the husband upon his death bed delivered to his wife a purse of 100 guineas, bidding her apply it to no other use than her own. *Lacey and Lawson, 1 P. Will. 441.*

So where the husband upon his death-bed drew a bill on his goldsmith, to pay his wife 100l. for mourning. *Ibid.*

Mar. 11, 1744; *Baily and Swigrove*. Mrs. Baily going out of town in a bad state of health, gave her maid a bond executed to her by a third person; saying, If I die, it is yours. She died intestate. The administrator brought a bill to have the bond delivered up. But by the lord chancellor Hardwicke: this is a sufficient *donatio causa mortis* to pass the equitable interest of this bond upon the intestate's death (m). The question in this case was, whether

(k) This is the strict and proper definition of a *donatio mortis causa*, given by Justinian in the Institutes. *Lib. 2. Tit. 7. § 1.* Who adds, that the nature of the gift is, that the donor should rather have the thing than the donee; but that the donee should rather have it than the heir. For the difference between an absolute gift and one in contemplation of death, see *Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Vez. jun. 111.*

(i) In *Blount v. Barrett, 2 Vez. jun. 546. Ld. Com. Eyre* was of opinion that it must appear to the court, that the gift was made in the last illness of the deceased; but a *donatio mortis causa* may subsist, altho' the donor afterwards make a testament, without mentioning the gift. *Hill v. Chapman, 2 Bro. 612.*

(m) Ruled *contra* by Sir Joseph Jekyl, M.R. as to a note for 100l. it being a chose in action. *Miller v. Miller, 3 P. Will. 356.* How far a chose in action may be willed, *vid. supra, Of what things, §.*

whether the nature of the property was capable of being so given : His lordship held it might, as well as a specific chattel ; though no legal property passed thereby, nothing but the paper, a bond being evidence of a debt, and the intent being to give the debt, not the paper, he held it a good donation *mortis causa*, comparing it to the property which passes by assignment of a bond, which passes nothing in point of law, and the assignee must make use of the other's name for recovering on it. He put the case, that if a chattel in possession had been bought by the intestate, and a bill of sale made to a trustee for her use ; the property would have been in the trustee, and the equitable interest in the *cestuy que trust*, who if she had given this chattel so circumstanced to the defendant, it would have been good. 3 Atk. 214. 2 Vez. 422.

But in the case of *Ward and Turner*, July 20, 1752 ; It was held by lord Hardwicke, that a delivery of receipts for South Sea annuities was not sufficient (though there was strong evidence of the intent) ; and that it could not be done without a transfer, or something amounting to that ; and all the anxious provisions of the statute of frauds will signify nothing, if donation or stock ; attended only by delivery of the paper, is allowed. It might be supported to the extent of any given value ; and would leave these things under the greatest degree of uncertainty, and amount to a repeal of that useful law as to all this part of the property of the subjects of this kingdom. Therefore notwithstanding the strong evidence of the intent, this gift of annuities is not sufficiently made within the rules of the authorities. And considering how much of the personal estate of this kingdom is now vested in stocks and funds ; his lordship said he was of opinion not to carry it further. 2 Vezij, 431.

In the case of *Smith and Gasen*, 8 Dec. 1718, the master of the rolls, where jewels were given by the testator by way of donatio causa mortis, doubted whether this was good against debts. And it seems not ; they being given in case of the donor's death, and in nature of a legacy, which therefore would be fraudulent as against creditors. 1 P. Will. 106.

T. 13 G. *Thompson and Batty*. An executor libelled in the spiritual court, for taking a tankard without his consent, on pretence that the testator gave it to the defendant if he died of his then sickness. And the court granted a prohibition ; this not being a legacy, but a donation in prospect

prospect of death, the validity whereof may be tried in an action of trover. *Str.* 777.

For this is a matter of which the common law takes notice, and need not be proved in the ecclesiastical court. *1. P. Will.* 441. *Sel. Cas. in Chan.* 14. (n)

Appointing
guardians.

7. Dr. Swinburne says, By general custom observed within the province of York, the father by his last will or testament may for a time commit the tuition of his child and the custody of his portion; which testament and assignation is to be confirmed by the ordinary, who also is to provide for the execution of the same testament. *Swin.* 210.

And if the father die, no tutor being by him assigned, and the mother do in her last will and testament appoint a tutor; the same will is to be proved, and the assignation of the tutor confirmed. *Swin.* 210.

And if no tutor be assigned by either of the parents, then may a stranger, if he make the orphan his executor, and give him his goods, assign a tutor unto him [with respect to such goods]; which tutor is by the ordinary to be confirmed. *Swin.* 210.

And if there be no tutor testamentary at all, then may the ordinary commit the tuition of the child to his next kinsman demanding the same, according as in administrations where any dieth intestate. *Swin.* 211.

And by the said custom a tutor may be assigned to a boy at any time until he hath accomplished the age of fourteen years, and to a girl until she hath accomplished the age of twelve years. But after those years, he or she respectively may chuse their own curators. But if they do not elect any other curator after their several ages, then he that is assigned in the will is to be confirmed curator to either of the said children, albeit he were above fourteen years, and she above twelve, when the will was made. *Swin.* 212. And this is according to the rules of the civil law; but by the common law, the age of chusing guardians both as to the male and female is the age of fourteen. *1 Inst.* 78.

And

(n) If a defendant be examined to charge him with the receipt of property, his evidence is admissible to establish a gift in contemplation of death; but the Court of Chancery, where doubtful, has directed an issue to ascertain the fact, *Blount and Burrow*, 1 *Vez. jun.* 5, 6.

And by the said general custom observed within the province of York, a tutor may be assigned either simply or conditionally, and until a certain time, or from a certain time. But no tutor may intermeddle as tutor, until he be confirmed by the ordinary, albeit he be assigned tutor simply; much less where he is assigned conditionally, or from a certain time, may he intermeddle as tutor, until the condition be extant, or the time limited be expired. But the ordinary may in the mean time commit the tuition; and he that is so appointed by the ordinary, may for that time administer. Swin. 215.

But, more generally, by the statute of the 12. C. 2. [Guardians by Statute.]
c. 24. (which controlleth the aforesaid custom in divers instances), *Where any person shall have any child or children under the age of twenty-one years, and not married, at the time of his death; it shall be lawful for the father of such child or children, whether born at the time of the decease of such father, or at that time in ventre sa mere, or whether such father be within the age of twenty one years or of full age, by his deed executed in his lifetime, or by his last will and testament in writing, in the presence of two or more credible witnesses, in such manner, and from time to time, as he shall think fit, to dispose of the custody and tuition of such child or children during such time as he or they shall respectively remain under the age of twenty one years, or any lesser time, to any person or persons, in possession or remainder, other than popish recusants: and such person to whom the custody of such child shall be so disposed or devised, may maintain an action of ravishment of ward or trespass, against any person who shall wrongfully take away or detain any such child for the recovery of such child, and recover damages for the same in the same action, for the use and benefit of such child. s. 8.*

And such person to whom the custody of such child shall be so disposed or devised, may take into his custody to the use of such child, the profits of all lands tenements and hereditaments of such child, and also the custody tuition and management of the goods chattels and personal estate of such child, till his or her age of twenty one years, or any lesser time, according to such disposition aforesaid; and may bring such actions in relation thereto, as by law a guardian in common socage might do. s. 9. (o)

(o) See the clauses of this statute ranged under six different heads by Mr. Fonblanque in his notes to *Tract. on Eq.* Vol. 2. p. 294.

Provided, that this shall not extend to alter or prejudice the custom of the city of London, nor of any other city or town corporate, or of the town of Berwick upon Tweed, concerning orphans. s. 10.

[Before this the 4 & 5 Ph. & M. enacted as to female children, *That it shall not be lawful to any person or persons to take or convey away, or cause to be taken or conveyed away, any maid or woman child unmarried, being under the age of sixteen years, out of or from the possession custody or governance, and against the will of the father of such maid or woman child, or of such person or persons to whom the father of such maid or woman child by his last will and testament, or by any other act in his lifetime, hath or shall appoint assign bequeath give or grant the order keeping education or governance of such maid or woman child, except such taking and conveying away as shall be had made or done, by or for such person or persons as without fraud or covin be or then shall be the master or mistress of such maid or woman child, &c. under penalty of two years imprisonment or such fine as shall be assessed by the Queen's council in the star chamber; and if he deflower or marry such child, to be imprisoned for five years, or pay such fine as shall be assessed as aforesaid.*]

Of the several species of guardians, the first are guardians *by nature*, namely the father, and (in some cases) the mother of the child. For if an estate be left to an infant, the father is by common law the guardian, and must account to his child for the profits.—There are also guardians *for nurture*; which are, of course, the father or mother, till the infant attains the age of fourteen years: and in default of father or mother, the ordinary usually assigns some discreet person, to take care of the infant's personal estate, and to provide for his maintenance and education.—Next are guardians *in socage*, who are also called guardians *by the common law*. These take place only, when the minor is entitled to some estate in lands; and then, by the common law, the guardianship devolves upon his next of kin, to whom the inheritance cannot descend. These also like guardians for nurture, continue only till the minor is fourteen years of age; for then, in both cases, he is presumed to have discretion; so far as to chuse his own guardian. 1 Black. 461. (p)

Heretofore there was also a guardian *in chivalry*, which was, where the tenant by knight's service died, his heir

(p) For the various sorts of guardians see Mr. Hargrave's notes to Co. Lit. §8. D.

male being under twelve years of age ; in such case, the lord should have the land holden of him, until the heir should attain the age of twenty one, and likewise the marriage of the heir, if he was unmarried at the death of his ancestor ; if there was an heir female, under the age of fourteen, and unmarried, then the lord had the wardship of the land till her age of fourteen, and was to tender to her covenable marriage without disparagement. And this sort of guardianship was a kind of dominion of lords over their tenants, and was introduced among the Gothic nations, to breed them to arms ; but is now fallen with the tenures : for by the 12 C. 2. c. 24. all tenures by knight's service and in capite are taken away, and turned into free and common socage. 1 *Inst.* 74. 87, 88.

Guardians appointed by the spiritual court, are only for the personal estate ; guardians for the real estate were heretofore under the direction of the court of wards and liveries, which court being taken away by this statute, power is given by the same statute to the father by his deed or will to appoint guardians ; which if he shall not do, or if the guardians appointed by him shall die or refuse to act, then the power devolveth upon the high court of chancery, the lord chancellor (under the king) being the supreme guardian of all infants and others not capable to act for themselves.

In the case of *Buck and Draper*, Mar. 26, 1747, a petition was preferred to the lord chancellor Hardwicke by the mother of the infant, to discharge an order of the master of the rolls appointing the plaintiff guardian of her daughter ; upon an allegation of his unfitness, as being disordered in his mind, and that she, the mother, had long before been appointed guardian of her daughter by the ecclesiastical court at York, and had by virtue of that appointment taken possession of the infant's person and estate.—The lord chancellor dismissed the petition with costs, the facts of the lunacy being not at all made out, and said he was surprised upon what pretence the ecclesiastical courts in the country take upon them to appoint guardians *ex officio*, without any suit instituted for that purpose, and by this means break in upon the jurisdiction of this court with respect to the guardianship of infants, and said, he recommended it to the attorney general to consider, whether a *Quo warranto* might not issue to the ecclesiastical court, upon such an extrajudicial appointment of

of guardians to infants, where no suit at all is depending for this purpose. 3 *Atk.* 631.*

It shall be lawful for the father] By the common law, before this act, it was not lawful for the father to appoint a guardian either in chivalry or socage; but the law appointed one for him: and in such case, the guardian appointed by the law could not refuse; but the guardian appointed by the father, under the statute, may refuse, if he pleaseth. *Vaugh.* 182.

For the father] Therefore the act only authorised the father, and not the mother; altho' she hath the same concern for her heir as the father. And as the father only can appoint a guardian, so therefore the guardian appointed by him cannot appoint another guardian: for it is a personal trust, and not assignable, any more than guardianship in socage. *Vaugh.* 179. [*Bedell v. Constable.*]

In the case *Ex parte Edwards*, June 18, 1747; the mother by her will appointed a guardian to her son till his age of 21. An application was now made to the court for maintenance, and in case they should not approve of the guardian appointed by the mother, that a new one may be assigned. By lord Hardwicke: The statute confines the power of appointing a testamentary guardian to the father only; and therefore the appointment by the mother is absolutely void. And the infant being of the age of 14 chose a guardian in court. 3 *Atk.* 519.

But here being no negative words, this altereth not the custom within the province of York (as hath been expressed) for the mother by her will to appoint a guardian; that is, with respect to the personal estate; for unto that only the custom must be understood to extend; for when that custom first took place, the law itself appointed guardians for the real estate, in chivalry or in socage.

In ventre sa mere] In like manner, by the custom within the province of York, a tutor may be assigned

* This is one instance amongst many others, of the perpetual jarring between the two jurisdictions. The ecclesiastical judge probably in answer to such *Quo warranto*, would return the custom within the province of York, as is here above set forth from Swinburne; which custom existed long before there was any court of chancery in this kingdom. *Barn.*

to a child that is not born, as also to an idiot or lunatick.
Swin. 212.

But this statute gives no power to the father to appoint a guardian to his child being an ideot or a lunatick, after he shall be of the age of twenty one years (g).

Whether such father be within the age of twenty one years, or of full age] Therefore, the father, under the age of twenty one, may grant the custody of his heir; but he cannot demise or devise his land in trust for him directly: but he may do it obliquely; for by appointing the custody, the land follows as an incident given by the law to attend it. *Vaugh. 178.*

By his deed executed in his lifetime, or by his last will] In the case of the earl of *Sbastesbury* and *Hannam*, where the father had given the guardianship of the infant to one by deed, and to the mother by will, it was decreed that the will was a revocation of the deed. *Chan. Ca. Finch. 323.*

By his last will] And such will need not to be proved in the spiritual court. *1 Ventr. 207.* That is to say, if the will is merely upon this statute for the appointing a guardian and nothing else; for in such case, the appointment being solely by act of parliament, the temporal courts shall be judges thereof. But in the same will, if there is any disposition of the personalty (as is most commonly the case), it seemeth that the will shall be proved in the spiritual court for the whole: which probate shall be effectual so far as the personalty is concerned, altho' it shall be of no avail with respect to such particular appointment of a guardian by the statute. Also this consideration shall not be extended to take away any power from the spiritual court which it had before; as particularly, within the province of York (as before mentioned) or within any of the places specially excepted by the statute.

In such manner, and from time to time, as he shall think fit] It seemeth not to be material by what words the tutor is appointed, so that the testator's meaning do appear. Wherefore if the testator say, I commit my children to the power of such a one; or, I leave them in his hands; it is in effect as if the testator had said, I make him tutor

(g) The care of lunaticks devolves on the crown, who generally commits it to the lord chancellor. As to the rules by which their property is managed, see *Oxendon v Ld. Compton, 2 Pex. jun, 69;* and *4 Bro. 231.*

to my children. So it is, if he say, I leave them to his government, regimen, administration, or the like. For in all things the will and meaning of the testator is to be observed and preferred before the propriety of the words, whereof perhaps he is ignorant; which meaning is to be collected by that which went before or followeth in the will, and by other circumstances, which the judge ought to inquire. *Swin. 216.*

Under the age of twenty one years, or any lesser time] And if the infant marries in the mean time, this shall not dissolve the guardianship. *3 Atk. 625.*

Or any lesser time] If a man devise the custody of his heir apparent, and no time is mentioned, yet it is a good devise of the custody within the act, if the heir be under fourteen at the death of the father; because by the devise, the guardianship is changed only as to the person, and left the same as to the time. But if the heir be above fourteen, then the devise is void for the uncertainty; for the act did not intend every heir should be in custody till twenty one, but only so long as the father shall appoint, not exceeding that time. *Vaugh 184.*

To any person or persons in possession or remainder, other than popish recusants] Yet there are other exceptions: As, by the 9 & 10 W. c. 32. Persons denying the Trinity, or asserting that there are more Gods than one, or denying the Christian religion to be true, or the holy scriptures to be of divine authority, shall for the second offence be disabled to be guardians.

And by the statutes relating to the qualification for offices, persons executing their respective offices without taking the oaths and performing the other requisites for their qualification, shall be disabled to be guardians.

Also, in general, he that cannot be an executor, cannot be a guardian. *Swin. 211.*

May maintain an action of ravishment of ward] The ecclesiastical court cannot intermeddle with the body, although the parents make no disposition thereof. *3 Keb. 834.*

But by the express words of this act, the guardian by will takes place of all other guardians; and the guardian under this statute may have ravishment of ward, as the guardian by knight's service or in socage at common law might have had. *3 Keb. 528. 2 P. Will. 115.*

May take into his custody, to the use of such child] This guardian being made after the model of a socage guardian, and coming in the place of the father, hath not a bare autho-

authority, but an interest; but it is only an interest joined with his trust (as being necessary in order to the performance of the trust), but not an interest for himself. *Vaugh.* 181. 183. 2 *P. Will.* 122.

The profits of all lands] A guardian by nurture, being so appointed by the testator's will, can only lease at will, and not for any number of years; for the guardian himself (except he be guardian in socage) is only tenant at will. *Cri. Elm.* 678, 734. 8 *Mod.* 312.

In the case of *Roe* on the demise of *Parry* against *Hodgson*, 7. 33 G. 2. Upon a case stated for the opinion of the court of common pleas, the principal question was, whether a lease for 21 years, made by the testamentary guardians of an infant, Mr. Spencer, was absolutely void or only voidable. It appeared, that Mr. Spencer himself has done no one act since he came of age, either towards establishing the lease (supposing it voidable) or to avoid it. Upon the first argument, the court agreed in one point, viz. that a testamentary guardian by statute till an infant was 21 years of age, and a guardian in socage till an infant was 14, were the same; and therefore whatever interest the latter had in lands till the infant was 14, the guardian by statute has the same until he is 21. As to the main question, whether the lease was void or only voidable, they doubted much, and took further time to consider. And at last they resolved unanimously, that a guardian of an infant cannot make a lease of the infant's lands, and that the lease in this case was absolutely void. 2 *Wilson*, 129. 135.

Of all lands, tenements, and hereditaments of such child] It seemeth that this guardian shall have the custody, not only of lands descended, or left by the father, but of all lands and goods any way acquired or purchased by the infant (which the guardian in socage had not); which proves that he derives not his interest from the father, but from the law; for the father could never give him power or interest of or in that which was never his. 2 *P. Will.* 185.

And also the custody, tuition, and management of the goods] Swinburn says, the office of a tutor is, to provide that his pupil be honestly and virtuously brought up; and to provide for him meat, drink, cloaths, lodging, and other necessaries, according to the child's estate, condition, and ability. *Swin* 217.

And the same also doth farther consist, in the good and faithful administering or disposing of the goods and chattels

of the said pupil ; that is to say, the tutor may not commit any thing that may be hurtful, nor omit any thing that may be profitable to his pupil, and in the end must restore unto his pupil all his goods and chattels, by him the said tutor before received. And for that purpose every tutor ought, even at the very entry into his office, to make a true inventory of all the goods and chattels of his pupil, and to make a just and true account of his dealings in behalf of his pupil. And it is generally observed within the said province of York, that every tutor, as well testamentary as other appointed by the ordinary, doth enter into bond with sureties to the effect aforesaid, according to the discretion of the ordinary. *Swin. 217.*

The tutor may sell such goods belonging to the pupil, as cannot be kept until he come to lawful age. But other goods which may conveniently be kept, and especially goods immoveable, the tutor may not sell ; unless otherwise ordered by will. *Swin. 217.*

More particularly ; The guardian ought to apply the estate in his hands, to pay the *debts* of the infant. *1 Cha. Ca. 157.*

He may pay off the *interest* of any real incumbrance, and the *principal* of a *mortgage* ; because it is an immediate charge on the land : but no other real incumbrance, *Pres. Cha. 137.*

In the case of *Waters and Ebral, H. 1707*, where the mother, as guardian, received the rents of the estate, and paid off specialties, but took assignment, and after the death of the infant brought a bill against the heir for a discovery of assets by descent (she claiming the rents received as administratrix) ; it was held by the court, that the guardian is not compellable to apply the profits of the estate of the infant, to pay off the *bond* debts of the ancestor. *2 Vern. 606.*

In the case of the earl of *Winchelsea and Norcliffe, T. 1686*. A guardian, having a considerable sum of money in his hands, laid it out in a *purchase* of lands, for the benefit of the infant, if when he came of age he should agree to it ; the infant dying in his minority, it was decreed that the guardian should account for the money to the administrator of the infant ; for that he could not, without the direction of the court, convert the personal into real estate. *1 Vern. 403. 435.*

M. 35 C. 2. Osborn and Chapman. A guardian at the request of one who was going to marry the ward, gave in an account of the estate to the intended husband, and secured

cured to him the balance by three several bonds; and the intended husband gave a bond to the guardian, to release all accounts to him after the marriage: The marriage was had: The guardian paid the balance: But the husband gave no release, but sued for an account and relief against the bond. And the guardian was ordered to answer the bill: For the account was made when the intended husband had no title; no release was given; and the pursuit is fresh. 2 *Cha. Ca.* 157.

For, by Cowper lord chancellor: Wherever a father, mother, or guardian insists upon private gain, or security for it, and obtains it of the intended husband, it shall be set aside. 1 *Salk.* 158. 2 *Vern.* 652.

For marriage brocage agreements have been often condemned in equity. And a bond to give money if such a marriage could be obtained, is ill. And so is a bond to forgive a sum of money. For such bonds, altho' good at law, yet being introductive of infinite mischief, have upon great consideration been condemned in equity. 3 *P. Will.* 394. [*Ib.* 76. And see *Herrington v. Du Chatel*, 1 *Bro.* 124. (r)]

But a guardian, upon account, shall have allowance of all reasonable costs and expences in all things. *Litt. sect.* 123.

And if he receive the rents and profits, and be robbed without his default or negligence, he shall be discharged thereof. 1 *Inst.* 89.

By the statute of the 4 *An. c.* 16. actions of account may be brought against the executors or administrators of guardians.

By the 6 *An. c.* 18. *f.* 5. Any person who as guardian or trustee for any infant shall hold over after the determination of the particular estate, without consent of the person next entitled, shall be adjudged a trespasser, and shall pay damages to the value of the profits received.

By the 7 *An. c.* 19. Infants seised or possessed of lands in trust, or by way of mortgage, shall and may, on direction of a court of equity, signified by an order made on hearing all parties, on petition of the person for whom

(r) If the consideration of such a bond is void as contrary to general policy, upon the principles laid down by the court of C. B. in *Collins v. Blantern*, 2 *Wils.* 347. it might be pleaded at law.

such infant shall be seized in trust, or the mortgagor, or guardian of such infant, convey and assure the said lands, as such court shall direct.

By the 29 G. 2. c. 31. Guardians on application to a court of equity, may obtain an order for infants to surrender leases, in order to accept new ones.

And by the 26 G. 2. c. 33. Guardians may consent to the marriage of such infants.

And may bring such actions in relation thereto, as by law a guardian in common socage might do. And he may also submit matters to arbitration; for tho' the infant cannot submit to an award, yet the guardian may do it for him, and bind himself that the infant shall perform it. *Comb.*

318. An infant may sue either by his guardian or next friend; but must defend by his guardian. *Cre. J4. 641.*

And if an infant refuseth to name a guardian to appear by; the plaintiff, by order of court, may do it for him. *Sid. 1076.*

And the *prochein amy*, or next friend, need not to be a relation; but he must be a person of substance; because liable to costs. *1 Atk. 570.*

And when an infant brings an action by his guardian, the warrant for him to appear by guardian ought to be entered upon record, because it is the act of the court; for the court takes care of infants, that none shall sue for them, but those that are responsible; for if the infant be prejudiced, he may have this action against him. *2 Rem. 232.*

But the suit is not in the name of the guardian, but of the infant; for at this day a guardian doth not act in any cause, for a minor in his own name, as guardian; but the minor acts in his own name by his guardian. *2 Ought.*

337, 359. [Though, strictly speaking, testamentary guardians cannot be appointed to natural children, yet on the petition of the infant, and the consent of the guardians named by the putative father, the court of chancery will appoint them, without reference to the master. *Ward. v. St. Paul, 2 Bro. 583.* And in *Rex v. Cornsford, 2 Stra. 1162*, the court of king's bench granted an information against the defendant for taking away a natural daughter under 16, from under the care of her putative father, being of opinion this was within the 3 *stat. of 4 & 5 P. & M. c. 8*]

8. By the 9 & 10 W. c. 32. Persons denying the Trinity; or asserting that there are more Gods than one, or denying

[Guardians to natural children.]

Appointing of executors.

denying the Christian religion to be true, or the holy scriptures to be of divine authority, shall for the second offence be disabled to be executors.

By the 5 G. c. 27. Artificers going out of the kingdom, and exercising their trades in foreign parts, shall be incapable of the office of executor.

And by the acts for the qualification for offices, persons not having taken the oaths and performed the other requisites for qualifying, who shall execute their respective offices after the time limited for their qualification shall be expired, shall be disabled to be executors.

An *infant* may be made executor, how young soever he be. *Swin.* 331.

And if the infant executor be so young, that he hath no discretion (for it is not only lawful to make such an one executor, but also the child in the mother's womb and unborn at the death of the testator); in that case the ordinary, or other to whom the approbation of the testament appertaineth, after the birth of the child, doth commit the execution of the will to the tutor of the child for the child's behoof, until he be able to execute the same himself; which tutor hath authority to deal as executor until the child be able to undertake the executorship, that is to say, until he be of the age of seventeen years. During which minority, the administrator to the child's use cannot sell or alienate any of the goods of the deceased, unless it be upon necessity; as for the payment of the deceased's debts, or that the goods would otherwise perish; nor let a lease for a longer term than whilst the executor shall be in minority, because having that office for the good and benefit of the child only, he may not do any thing to his prejudice. *Swin.* 359, 360.

And after his age of seventeen years, before he shall come to the age of twenty one, an act done by such infant as executor, as (for instance) the releasing of a debt due to the testator, or the selling or distributing of the testator's goods, is said to be sufficient in law: Which is to be understood, upon true payment and satisfaction of the due to the deceased, made to the executor in minority; for then he may acquit and discharge the debtor for so much as he doth receive; for therein he doth perform the office and duty of an executor, which he is enabled to do; and so doing, his act shall bind him. But if he shall release without satisfaction, this act is not according to the office and duty of an executor; and therefore being without the compass of his office and duty, shall not bind or bar

bar him from recovery thereof: for if it should, then should it be a *devastavit*, and charge the minor out of his own proper goods; which cannot be by law: for an infant may better his estate, but not make it worse, by contracting with or acquitting of another person. *Swin.* 358, 359. 2 *Bac. Abr.* 377.

M. 1730. *Jones* and the earl of *Strafford*. In the case where an administration is granted during the minority of an infant executrix being under the age of seventeen years, and she marries a husband of age, King lord chancellor and Raymond chief justice strongly inclined against the opinion reported by lord Coke in *Prince's* case, that such administration during the minority of the executrix is determined: the same being extrajudicial in that case, and not taken notice of by other cotemporary reporters; and the author of the book intitled *The office of executors*, mentioning this opinion, a little marvels thereat, considering (as he observes) that these things are managed in the spiritual court, and by the canon law, which intermeddles not with the husband in the wife's case; and that by that law, and not by the common law, comes in this limitation of seventeen years; and he adds, that he hath seen that case otherwise reported in this point. 3 *P. Wil.* 88.

Swinburne says, If a wife during the coverture be named executrix, she alone cannot sue for any debt due to the testator, without her husband. But (he says) she alone may do an act extrajudicial, as the paying of debts or legacies, or the receiving or releasing of any debts due to the testator. *Swin.* 417.

And the husband and wife being but one person in law, she cannot be executrix without his assent; for if she might, then he would be executor against his will: therefore if she is made executrix, she cannot bring an action alone, but her husband must join with her; and if he should refuse, he cannot be compelled, nor can she be compelled to plead without her husband. *Swin.* 417, 418.

But (he says) altho' she cannot sue or be sued without him, yet she may deliver any of the testator's goods to another to keep; and may pay legacies, and receive debts, and give acquittances without her husband; and if any *devastavit* is made by giving acquittances, it shall bind them both, because she could not administer without his assent; and it shall be accounted his folly to suffer such a person to administer. *Swin.* 418.

But it seemeth that this must be understood only according to the spiritual law, which in this case maketh no difference betwixt married and sole : for otherwise it is by the common law.

For by the common law, the assent to a legacy by a feme covert executrix is not good, unless her husband assent to it also ; otherwise it is void : but the assent to such legacy by her husband is good. *Law of Ex.* 264. 2 *Bac. Abr.* 378.

And the release of a feme covert executrix is not good ; for she can do nothing to the prejudice of her husband : but without question the release of the husband is good. *Curson*, 53. 1 *Roll's Abr.* 924.

And this, not only during the marriage, but also after the death of the husband. But if the wife die, the husband cannot convert any of the goods and chattels belonging to the first testator to his own proper use ; for of such goods the wife herself may make a testament (*Swinburne* says) appointing an executor, without the licence of her husband. *Swin.* 417. (s)

And if the husband commits waste, and then she dies ; there is no remedy at common law against her husband, but only in the spiritual court, where he will be compelled to make restitution. 1 *Roll's Abr.* 919.

In the case of *Taylor and Allen*, Oct. 29, 1741. The testator made the defendant Allen, who was a feme covert, his executrix, the husband being then in England, but at the death of the testator the defendant's husband was in the West Indies. It was moved for an injunction to restrain the defendant from getting in the assets of her testator, and for a receiver to be appointed. By lord Hardwicke : There are several instances where this court hath interposed to prevent an executor from getting assets of a testator into his hands upon particular circumstances ; and this is one of those cases, for the husband being in the West Indies, and not amenable to the process of this court, the plaintiff can have no remedy, if the executrix should waste the assets, or refuse to pay, because the husband must be joined in the action. And a receiver was appointed, to collect in the assets, and to bring actions in the name of the executrix for recovery of debts due to the testator ; on giving security to indemnify the execu-

trix and her husband on account of such actions brought: 2 *Atk.* 213.

[Executor bankrupt or non compos.]

9. Altho' an executor becomes a *bankrupt*, yet administration cannot be committed to another; but if an executor become *non compos*, the spiritual court may commit administration. 2 *Bac. Abr.* 376.

And in the court of chancery, forasmuch as an executor is considered only as a trustee; if he be insolvent, that court will oblige him, as they will any other trustee, to give security before he enters upon the trust. 2 *Bac. Abr.* 377. (1)

And by a constitution of archbishop Stratford, the executor at the time of proving the will, shall give security (if need be) to render a just account of his administration, when duly thereunto required by the ordinary. *Lind.* 177.

As to the *form and manner* of making an executor in the will, it is not always necessary to express this word *executor*, neither hath every testator skill so to do; but it is sufficient, if the testator's meaning do appear by other words of like sense or import: as, if the testator say, I commit all my goods to the disposition of *A. B.*; or, I leave all my goods, or the residue of all my goods to *A. B.* or the like; for in these cases, he to whom all the residue is bequeathed, is thereby understood to be made executor. *Swin.* 247.

Supervisors.

10. Overseers of a will have no power to intermeddle, otherwise than by counsel and advice, or by complaining in the spiritual court. *Went.* 9, 10.

Sir Thomas Ridley takes occasion to wish, that they might be made of more use; altho' at present (he says) they be looked upon only as candle holders; having no power to do any thing but hold the candle, while the executors tell the deceased's money. *Ridley, Part 4. Ch. 2.*

Attesting the execution of the will (u).

11. If the testator shew the will unto the witnesses, saying, This is my last will and testament, or, Herein is

(1) If it appear that an executor is insolvent, or the fund in danger, the court will appoint a receiver, or order as much as he admits to have in hand to be paid into the bank. *Ex parte Ellis*, 1 *Atk.* 101. *Strange v. Harris*, 3 *Bro.* 365: Whether the spiritual court can exact security, *vide infra, Probate* 19.

(u) See farther on this head, *supra* I.

2 11

contained

contained my last will; this is sufficient without making the witnesses privy to the contents thereof, provided the witnesses be able to prove the identity of the writing, that is to say, that the writing now shewed is the very same writing which the testator in his lifetime affirmed before them to be his will, or to contain his last will and testament." *Swin. 52. God. O. L. 66.*

Whether it is necessary, that the testator should declare to the witnesses, at the time of the attestation, that the writing which they attest is his will, hath been matter of some doubt. As in the case of *Wallis and Wallis, T. 1762*: Thomas Wallis, esquire, made his will, and therein devised his real estate to his wife for life; the will was of his own hand writing; and the form of attestation was in these words, *signed, sealed, published, and declared for the last will and testament of the said Thomas Wallis, in the presence of us, &c. Isabella Matthews, James Wardell, William Powell.* The heir at law brought an ejectment. The widow pleaded the devise to her for life. The cause came on to be heard at the summer assizes at Lincoln, 1762, by a special jury, before Mr. justice Denison. To prove the execution of the will, the defendant produced William Powell, the testator's coachman, one of the three subscribing witnesses, who deposed, that in the beginning of July 1760, James Wardell, then butler to the said Thomas Wallis, came and told him the said Powell that he was to come to his master; that upon entering the room, he found his master sitting with a table before him, on which were some papers open; and that his master called him, and the said Wardell, and one Isabella Matthews, then his housekeeper, up to the table to him; where they all came. Then the said Thomas Wallis, further addressing himself to them all, desired them to take notice; and then took a pen, and in all their presence signed and sealed each part of his will, and laid both the said parts open and unfolded before them to subscribe their names as witnesses thereto; which they all did, by the direction of the said Thomas Wallis in his presence, and in the presence of each other; he shewing them severally where to write their names. But that the said Thomas Wallis, otherwise than as above, did not declare or publish either part to be his will, or say what it was. The counsel for the plaintiff contended that this was not a sufficient proof by one witness, of a complete execution of the will. And they produced on the other hand, the other two subscribing witnesses; who in divers particulars did not give a clear

a clear and distinct evidence ; and could not recollect whether they had signed one or two papers ; or whether then, or at any time before the said Thomas Wallis's death, they understood what they had so witnessed to be the said Thomas Wallis's will, tho' Wardell seemed to admit he conjectured it so to be. But both Wardell and Matthews swore that they did not see the said Thomas Wallis sign or seal either part of his said will ; that Powell, the other subscribing witness, was not at that time in the room, when (at the said Thomas Wallis's desire) they wrote their names to the two papers as they now appear ; that the said Thomas Wallis did not declare or publish it as his will, nor did they know it to be a will. The defendant's counsel then called Richard Price, the said Thomas Wallis's groom, who swore, that one morning in the beginning of July 1760, James Wardell told him that his master had much wanted him ; and that upon his the said Price's offering to go to his master to receive his orders, the said Wardell told Price that the business was done, and that Powell had supplied his place ; and that he the said William Powell, James Wardell, and Isabella Matthews had that morning been witnessing their master's will. And Sarah Dixon being called, swore, that in the beginning of July 1760, Isabella Matthews came one morning after breakfast into the kitchen, and told her that she the said Matthews, James Wardell, and William Powell, had that morning witnessed their master's the said Thomas Wallis's will, tho' he had not told them it was so. Upon this state of the evidence on both sides, it was insisted for the plaintiff, that as the law stood before the statute of frauds, *publication* of a will was an essential part thereof ; and if so, there is nothing in that statute to take it away : And further it was insisted, that by the said statute there are four requisites to constitute a good and valid devise of lands : 1. That it shall be in writing. 2. That it shall be signed by the party devising, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express directions. 3. That it shall be attested and subscribed in the presence of the deviser by three or four credible witnesses. 4. That the words *attested and subscribed* must import, that it shall be published as a devise or will by the testator in the presence of the said witnesses. On the contrary, for the defendant it was insisted, that neither before nor since the statute publication was necessary ; and that by the statute, only the three first requisites are necessary, which in the present case were all complied with, the devise being in writing,

writing, and signed by the testator in the presence of three credible witnesses, who had subscribed their names as witnesses to the same in the presence of the testator and of each other; and further, supposing any such publication was necessary, that the testator had used words and done acts which amounted to a publication within the meaning of the statute, which had not directed or prescribed any particular form or manner in which such publication should be made; that the testator using these significant words to all the witnesses when he called them up to the table "*take notice*," and then signing both parts of his will, and then delivering both the parts thereof to the witnesses to attest, directing them where to sign their names, and to witness each part under the common and usual form of attestation, which the witnesses did, was a sufficient execution and publication of his will; that the words "*signed, sealed, published, and declared*," being all written in the testator's own handwriting, and the witness Powell swearing that both the parts of the will lay open to the inspection of all the witnesses when they subscribed their names, and it appearing by the evidence of Price and Dixon that both the other witnesses had declared that they had been attesting the said Thomas Wallis's will, this was much stronger than the case of *Peate* and *Ougley*, reported in *Comyns* 197. And Mr. justice Denison was of opinion, if the witnesses for the defendant were credited by the jury, that this was a due execution within the statute, and a sufficient publication; and for this cited the case of *Trimmer* and *Jackson* lately determined in the court of king's bench. And the jury found accordingly a verdict for Mrs. Wallis the defendant. Nevertheless, the plaintiff's counsel insisted, that the point, whether a good publication or not, shou'd be reserved for a case to be argued above.—But the matter was compromised, on the defendant's remitting the costs.

Note; The case of *Peate* and *Ougley* was, where the testator produced to the witnesses a paper folded up; and desired them to set their hands to it as witnesses, which they all did in his presence, but they did not see any of the writing, nor did he tell them it was his will, or say what it was; but it was all written by the testator's own hand. It was objected, that this was not a good execution of the will within the statute; for it is not sufficient that the witnesses write their names in the presence of the testator, without any thing more; but they must attest every thing, to wit, the signing of the testator, or at least the

publication of his will: But here the testator neither signed the will in their presence, nor declared it to be his last will before them. On the other part, it was insisted, that the execution was sufficient within the statute; for there is no necessity that the witnesses see the testator write his name; and if he writes these words, *signed, sealed, and published* as his will, and prays the witnesses to subscribe their names to that, it will be a sufficient publication of his will, tho' the witnesses do not hear him declare it to be his will. And Trevor chief justice inclined, that here was sufficient evidence of the execution, and the jury found it accordingly. But as to the matter of law, he permitted it to be found special. And it doth not appear further what became of it.

The case of *Trimmer and Jackson* was, where the witnesses were deceived by the testator at the time of the execution, and were led to believe from the words used by the testator at the execution of the instrument that it was a deed and not a will. It was delivered as his act and deed; and the words "*sealed and delivered*" were put above the place where the witnesses were to subscribe their names. And it was adjudged by the court, as it is said, for the inconveniences that might arise in families, from having it known that a person had made his will, that this was a sufficient execution (x).

Wills to be confirmed favourably.

12. The intention of the testator is called by lord *Coke* the pole star, to guide the judges in the exposition of wills.

In *Rivers's* case, *M.* 1737. The testator by his will gave certain lands to his two sons James and Charles Rivers. It appeared that they were illegitimate children; and the question was, whether this is such a description of their persons as will intitle them to take under the will. By lord *Hardwicke*: In the case of a devise, any thing that amounts to a *designatio personæ* is sufficient; and tho' in strictness they are not his sons, yet if they have acquired that name by reputation, in common expression they are to be considered as such: It hath been objected also, that the testator hath made a mistake in their names, and that therefore they cannot take; but the law is otherwise; for if a man is mistaken in a devise, yet if a person is clearly made out by averment to be the person meant,

(x) See also Lord Hardwicke's opinion in *Rigden v. Valier*, 2 *Vez.* 252. *et infra* 18.

and there can be no other to whom it may be applied, the devise to him is good. 1 *Atkyns*, 410.

But altho' by the law the intention is more to be considered than the words; yet such intention must be collected out of the words, and it must consist with the law. *Swin.* 10.

Thus, In the lord *Cheiney's* case, *M.* 33 & 34 *El.* Sir Thomas Cheiney, knight, lord warden of the cinque ports, made his will in writing, and thereby devised to Henry his son divers manors and to the heirs of his body, the remainder to Thomas Cheiney of Woodley and to the heirs male of his body, upon condition *that he or they or any of them shall not aliene or discontinue.* And the question was in the court of wards, between Sir Thomas Perot heir general to the lord warden and divers purchasers of Sir Thomas Cheiney, whether the said Sir Thomas Perot shall be received to prove by witnesses, that it was the intent and meaning of the deviser, to include his son and heir within these words of the condition [*he or they*], and not only to restrain to Thomas Cheiney of Woodley and his heirs male of his body. But Wray and Anderson chief justices, upon conference had with the other justices, resolved that he shall not be received to such averment out of the will; for a will concerning lands ought to be in writing, and not by any averment out of it; for it will be full of great inconvenience, if none shall know by the written words of a will what construction to make, or what advice to give, but the same shall be controuled by collateral averments out of the will. But if a man hath two sons, both baptized by the name of John, and thinking that the elder (who hath been long absent) is dead, deviseth his land by will in writing to his son John generally, and in truth the elder is living; in this case the younger John may in pleading or in evidence alledge the devise to him, and if this be denied, he may produce witnesses to prove the intent of his father, that he thought the other to be dead, or that at the time of making the will he named his son John the younger, and the writer omitted the addition of the younger: and in this case no inconvenience can arise; for he who shall see the will by which the land is devised to his son John, cannot be deceived by any secret invisible averment, for when he shall see the devise to his son John, he ought at his peril to inquire what John the testator intended, which may easily be known by him who writ the will, and others who were privy to the intention; and if no direct proof can

be made of the intention, then the devise is void for the uncertainty. 5 Co. 68.

But this rule hath received a distinction of late, which hath greatly prevailed, between evidence offered to a court, and evidence offered to a jury. For in the last case, no parol evidence is to be admitted, lest the jury should be inveigled by it; but in the first case it can do no hurt, being to inform the conscience of the court, who cannot be biassed or prejudiced by it. And accordingly, in divers instances, collateral evidence hath been admitted in the court of chancery, to explain the testator's intention. *Law of Test.* 306. 2 *Bac. Abr.* 309.

And in the case of *Selwin and Brown, M. 1734*, Lord Talbot admitted, that it had sometimes been allowed. *Cas. Talb* 240. (y)

But notwithstanding these cases, the courts have been very unwilling to admit of parol evidence in relation to any thing that appears on the face of a will; and it is certain that too much caution cannot well be used in this particular, especially when it is considered that the statute

(y) In *Fonnereau v. Poyntz*, 1 *Bro.* 472. the testatrix gave several legacies of *stock in long annuities*, viz. 500 l., 500 l., 200 l., and 100 l., and the residue to her nephews; and it being uncertain from the other directions of the will, whether the above-mentioned sums were meant as annuities to those amounts, or as gross sums of money to be laid out in the long annuities, Lord Thorlow, C. at first decreed, that the sums were annuities, and that the legatees must abate proportionably; but on a rehearing, his lordship admitted collateral evidence of the value of the testatrix's estate, which was only 120 l. *per annum* long annuities, and decreed that the legacies were gross sums, because it could not be supposed that the testatrix meant to give away in legacies ten times more than she was worth. Such evidence was also admitted by Lord Hardwicke in *King v. Philips*, 1 *Vez.* 232. In which cause the question being, Whether the plaintiff could take as a creditor under articles, and also as a legatee under a will? his lordship said, "This legacy being so near in value to the personal estate that it will defeat the rest, I will do what lord Jefferies and lord Cowper have done in such a case; direct an account to be taken of the value of the personal estate at the testator's death, and at the making of the will; which fact may give some light as to the intent, and is a fact necessary to be known before I determine it." So parol evidence may be received to shew that the name of one legatee has been inserted for that of another. 8 *Vin. Ab.* 312. 29. 2 *Vez.* 216. 6 *T. Rep.* 671.

of frauds and perjuries, which was made to prevent perjury, contrariety of evidence, and uncertainty, binds the courts of equity as well as the common law courts ; as also that little regard ought in many cases to be had to the expressions of the testator, either before or after the making his will, because possibly these expressions might be used by him, on purpose to conceal or disguise what he was doing, or to keep the family quiet, or for other secret motives and inducements which cannot after his death be found out. 2 *Bac. Abr.* 310.

And in the case of *Lowfield and Stoneham, M. 20 G. 2.* upon plene administravit pleaded, the question was, whether 1000 l. received by the defendant was due to her in her own right, or as executrix of her husband, and consequently assets. And it arose upon the following devise : “ I give to my loving brother John Stoneham “ 1000 l. and in case of his death, to his wife Susanna” (who was the defendant). It appeared that John Stoneham survived the testator. And therefore the plaintiff insisted, this legacy (which the defendant admitted that she had received) vested absolutely in him, and was assets in her hands. On the part of the defendant, it was offered to give in evidence, that the testator in extremis declared, he meant only to give his brother the interest of the 1000 l. and that the defendant should have the principal in case she survived him. The parol evidence was opposed by the plaintiff’s counsel, as being contradictory to the plain words of the will. And Lee chief justice said, it could not be allowed ; and that in the case of *Selwin and Brown* (afore said), the house of lords had refused it, even where it was to support the legal interpretation of the will ; and lord Hardwicke, about two years ago, held it in the same manner in the case of the earl of *Inchiquin and Obrian*, Str. 1261.

And in the case of *Ulrich and Litchfield*, July 23, 1742 ; the testatrix bequeathed her real and personal estate to Elizabeth Travers and James Ulrich, equally between them for life ; and upon the death of Elizabeth Travers, she gave the whole estate to James Ulrich in tail general, and for want of such issue to Richard Ulrich in fee ; with a few pecuniary legacies ; and charged her real estate with payment of these legacies, if her personal estate should not be sufficient ; and by her will declared she gave all the *rest and residue of her personal estate* to her uncle Leonard Colhard’s three daughters ; and particularly gave to Mrs. Susanna Litchfield 10 l. and made her

executrix.—For the residuary legatees, it was insisted, that *rest and residue* of her personal estate must mean the residue after the particular legacies are paid off; and could not refer to the beginning of the will, because there is a fee devised, and consequently the testatrix has disposed of the whole: That parol evidence in this case may be admitted of the attorney who drew the will, that he had express directions to give the personal estate to the three daughters of Leonard Collard: That (to be sure) things which are quite contrary to the will shall not be proved by parol evidence, but that it may be allowed to explain words in a will, especially in this case, where it appears to be a mere blunder in the drawer: That this doth not intrench upon any of the rules with regard to parol evidence, but only clears up who was intended to have the personal estate, where the whole is devised to two different persons; and that it seems clearly to be a blunder in the drawer of the will, because the devise in the first part of it is proper only in the disposing of real estate.—By the lord chancellor Hardwicke: As to the question, Whether I ought to admit parol evidence to explain the intention of the testator, I am of opinion, that this is not a case in which parol evidence can be read, and would be of dangerous consequence; it is true, there are some things here which would make a judge wish to admit it; but I must not follow my inclinations only, for I do not know that upon construction of a will, courts of law and equity admit parol evidence, except in two cases: First, to ascertain the person, where there are two of the same name, or there has been a mistake in a christian or surname, and this upon absolute necessity; where if such evidence were not let in, it would make the will void: The other case is, with regard to resulting trusts relating to personal estate; where a man makes a will, and appoints an executor, with a small legacy, and the next of kin claim the residue; in order to rebut the resulting trust for the next of kin, parol proof hath been admitted to ascertain the person who was to have the residue (z). It is very true, cases may be cited where lord Cowper has admitted such evidence; for he went upon this ground, that it was by way of assisting his judgment, in cases extremely dark and doubtful. I have the greatest deference for his judgment, but must own I

(z) *Vld. Blinkhorn v. Feast*, 2 *Vez.* 27.

was never satisfied with this rule of lord Cowper's of admitting parol evidence in doubtful wills: besides, he went further in the great case of Strode and Russel (2 Vern. 621.) in which there was an appeal to the house of lords; Mr. Justice Tracy who assisted lord Cowper in that cause, was at first of the same opinion with him, but upon considering it more, disavowed his first opinion, and was clear that it could not be admitted, and this alteration in his judgment was mentioned in the house of lords. In the case of Selwin and Brown, I was of opinion that it ought to have been admitted; and even lord Talbot, when he had heard the cause, had a remorse of judgment at the same time that he rejected the parol evidence: But the house of lords refused it as of most mischievous consequence, and affirmed his decree. In the present case, here is in the will undoubtedly a contradiction and repugnancy; for in the first place she has given all her personal estate to the plaintiff, and yet legacies come afterwards, and a devise of the residue. What then must be the construction? As to the general question, where the same thing is described generally, and given to two different persons in the former and latter part of a will, lord Coke was of opinion, the latter words shall revoke the former; but in Plowden it is said they shall take as jointenants. I own the reasoning in Plowden is not convincing to me, I rather incline to lord Coke's, though the latter cases have taken it otherwise. But no certain rule is to be laid down as to construction of devises: So says Swinburne, but that they must depend upon their particular circumstances. Upon the whole of what Swinburne says, the result is this: That if the same thing be given to two persons, they shall take as jointenants, unless there is something to indicate and prove the intention of the testator to revoke and vary the devise. Now try the present case by this rule, and see if it doth not come exactly within it. The testatrix, by giving legacies after the devise of all the personal estate, has varied the will for so much. It is truly said, that a man may give the whole in a former part, and qualify it afterwards, and still the first legatee is intitled in part. But here, in case the whole personal estate should not be sufficient to pay the legacies, she charges the real estate with them, upon a supposition that the other might not be sufficient; and therefore is a plain indication of her intention in one event totally to revoke the devise of the personal estate. And there being an alteration of her in-

tention before she finishes her will, the construction is, she hath altered her intention throughout, and the plaintiff is not intitled to any part of the personal estate, but the residue belongs to the three daughters of Leonard Collard. And decreed accordingly. 2 *Atk.* 372.

And notwithstanding that wills are generally favoured by the law; yet where the testator endeavours to establish a settlement against the reason and policy of the common law, the judges will reject it. *Gilb.* 110. 2 *Bac. Abr.* 79.

Also where the testator by his will maketh no other disposition of his estate than the law itself would have done, had he been silent; there such a will is useless, and shall be rejected: and therefore if a devise be made to a person and his heirs, which person is heir at law to the devisor; this is a void devise, and the heir shall take by descent as his better title; for the descent strengthens his title, by taking away the entry of such as may possibly have right to the estate; whereas if he claims by devise, he is in as by purchase. *Gilb.* 110. 2 *Bac. Abr.* 79.

Also devises are void and rejected, where the words of the will are so general and uncertain, that the testator's meaning cannot be collected from them; and therefore where a man by will gave *all* to his mother, the general words did carry no *lands* to his mother, for since the heir at law hath a plain and uncontroverted title, unless the ancestor disinherits him, it would be severe and unreasonable to set him aside, unless such intention of the testator is evident from the will; for that were to set up and prefer a dark and at best but a doubtful title, to a clear and certain one. *Gilb.* 112 2 *Bac. Abr.* 81. (a)

[Wills referring to deeds.]

[Wills frequently refer to deeds and other written instruments, which are then taken to be part of the will, and explanatory thereof. *Metham v. D. of Devon*, 1 *P. Wms.* 529. 8 *Vin. Ab.* 45. *Ch. Rep.* 265. *Hawtree v. Trollop.*]

Clause of perfect mind and memory.

The clause of *perfect mind and memory* is more usual than necessary in a will; and yet not hurtful. *Swin.* 77.

But in case of a contestation, it is necessary to prove the sanity of the testator. 2 *Atk.* 56.

(a) So where it was uncertain which of two limitations personal property directed to be laid out in land and therefore considered as land, was to follow, it was decreed to the heir at law. *Leslie v. Devonshire*, 3 *Bro.* 188.

13. A devise made *in fee simple*, without express words of heirs, is good in fee simple: But if a devise be made to *A. B.* he shall have the land but for term of life; for these words will carry no greater estate. *Terms of the Law, Tit. Devise. Black. Rep. 1045.*

What words will pass a fee simple, or a life estate only.

If a man devise all his *estate* which he hath in such a place, without mentioning the heirs of the devisee; courts of equity have held, that it shall extend to such heirs, for that the word *estate* implies the whole property and interest therein: especially in the case of children, to whom the parent, unless there is some express limitation, cannot intend a life estate only. By lord Hardwicke, in the case of *Bailis and Gale*, Nov. 6, 1750. *2 Vez. 48. (b)*

If lands be devised to a man, to have to him *for ever*, or to have to him and his *assigns*; in these two cases, the devisee shall have a fee simple: but if it be given by feoffment in such manner, he hath but an estate for term of life. *Terms of the Law, Tit. Devise.*

If a man devise his land to another; to give, sell, or *do therewith at his pleasure* or will; this is fee simple. *Id.*

A devise made to one and to his *heirs male*, doth make an estate tail: but if such words be put in a deed of feoffment, it shall be taken for fee simple: because it doth not appear of what body the heirs male shall be begotten. *Id.*

If lands be given by deed to one, and to the *heirs male of his body*, who hath issue a daughter, who hath issue a son, and dies; there the land shall return to the donor, and the son of the daughter shall not have it, because he cannot convey himself by heirs male, for his mother is a lett thereto: but otherwise it is of such a devise; for there the son of the daughter shall have it rather than the will shall be void. *Id.*

If lands be given by deed to one and *his heirs for ever*, and if he die without heirs then to his brothers or sisters,

(b) The word "*estates*" in a will carries the fee, unless coupled with words which shew a different intention. *Fletcher v. Smiton*, in K. B. 2 T. Rep. 656. *Tilley v. Simpson*, before lord Hardwicke, C. Ib. 659. But the word "*hereditaries*" was not deemed sufficient by the court of K. B. in *Denn v. Mellet*, 5 T. Rep. 558.; which judgment was however reversed in the court of exchequer, *Mich. 1796.* The word *legacy* may be applied to a real estate, if the context of the will shew that such was the testator's intention. *Hardacre v. Nash*, 5 T. Rep. 716.

this

this last is void, because the first gift conveyeth unto him the fee simple; but in a will, such devise over is good, and such limitation shall convey but an estate tail: As in the case of *Tyte and Willis*, *M. 7 G. 2.* The testator devised his lands to his wife *Jane* for life, the remainder to his son *Henry* for life, remainder to his son *George and his heirs for ever*; and if he died *without heirs*, then to his two daughters *Katherine and Jane*. The question was, whether *George* took a fee simple, or only an estate tail. And the case of *Webb and Herring*, *Cro. Ja. 415.* was cited, to prove that where a devise is to one and his heirs, and if he die without heirs, remainder over to another, who is or may be the devisor's heir at law, such limitation shall be good, and the first limitation construed an intail, and not a fee, in order to let in the remainder man; but where the second limitation is to a stranger, it is merely void, and the first limitation is a fee simple. And by the lord chancellor: In this case, *George* took an estate tail. The difference which hath been taken is right; and the reason of it is, that in the latter case there is no intent appearing to make the words carry any other sense than what they import at law; but in the former, it is impossible that the devisee should die without an heir, while the remainder man or his issue continue. And therefore the generality of the word *heirs* shall be restrained to heirs of the body; since the testator could not but know, that the devisee could not die without an heir while the remainder man or any of his issue continued. *Cas. Talb. 1.*

But in the case of *Tilburgh and Barbut*, *Mar. 2, 1748*; where the remainder man, being of the half blood, could never possibly inherit, it was decreed by lord Hardwicke, that this being a fee mounted on a fee, it vested in the first taker, and the remainder over to the half brother was merely void. *3 Atk. 617. 1 Vez. 89. (c).*

(c) If a remainder be given by will after an estate tail, and the first estate never take place, the remainder vests in possession. Thus if one devise to *A.* and the heirs of his body, and for default or want of such issue of *A.* to *B.*, and *A.* die in the lifetime of the devisor leaving issue, the estate shall go to *B.* and not to the issue of *A.* See *Hogdson v. Ambrose*, *Doug. 337.* and *White v. Warner*, cited in *Denje v. Bagshaw*, *6 T. Rep. 512.*

If

If one devise to an *infant in his mother's womb*, it is a good devise ; but otherwise by feoffment, grant, or gift : for in those cases there ought to be one of ability to take presently, or otherwise it is void. *Term: of the Law (d).*

If one devise to a person by his will *all his lands and tenements* ; here not only all those lands that he hath in possession do pass, but all those that he hath in *reversion*, by virtue of the word tenements. *Id.*

If a man hath lands in fee, and lands for years, and deviseth *all his lands and tenements* ; the fee simple lands pass only, and not the lease for years ; but if a man hath a lease for years, and no fee simple, and deviseth all his lands and tenements ; the lease for years passeth, otherwise the will would be merely void. *Cro. Car. 293. [Rose v. Bartlet. Pistol v. Richardson, 2 P. Wms. n. 459. (c).]*

If a man seised of freehold lands, and of the legal estate of *copyhold* lands, makes a general devise of all his manors, messuages, lands, tenements, and hereditaments, but makes *no surrender of the copyhold lands to the use of his will* ; the copyhold lands will not pass. By lord *Hardwicke*, in the case of *Gibson and Styles*, July 18, 1741.

The words (all my lands) in a devise, will pass a house ; but the devise of a house doth not pass lands. *Mo. 359.*

A devise of a *messuage*, will carry with it a garden and curtelage ; otherwise of a *house*, unless it be *with the appurtenances*. 2 Cha. Ca. 27.

The testator devised a house *with the appurtenances*. The question was, whether land in a field passed. And it was adjudged, that the land did pass ; for it was in a will, in which the intent of the devisor should be observed. *Godb 40.*

But in a like case where it appeared upon evidence, that the house was copyhold, and the land freehold ; it was adjudged, that the land could not in that case be said to be appurtenant, although it had been used with it. *Cro. Eliz. 704.*

A devise of the *inheritance*, hath been held to be a devise of the lands. *Sty. 308.*

(d) 8 Vin. Ab. 85.

(e) And in the former case the word *lands* may be explained by other words, so as to pass a leasehold interest, as “ all his lands which he then stood seised or possessed of, or any ways interested in, and which were in the possession of A. B.” *Addis v. Clement, 2 P. Wms. 455.* The word *farm* is sufficient to pass a leasehold estate, if such appear to have been the testator's intention. *Lane v. Earl Stanhope, 6 T. Rep. 346.*

If

If lands are devised to trustees, without the word *heirs*; yet by implication they must have an estate of inheritance sufficient to support the trust: for there is no difference between a devise to a man for ever, and to a man upon trusts which may continue for ever. 1 *Abr. Cas. Eq.* 176.

If lands are devised to a man, paying *several sums* in gross; he hath a fee, though all the sums together do not amount to the annual rent of the land: for the devise shall be intended for his benefit, and if he had only an estate for life, he might die before he received the legacies out of the land, and consequently be a loser. *Id.*

So if lands are devised to a man, in consideration that he *release a sum of money* due to him; he has a fee simple, on his release of the debt: for the devise being intended for his benefit, an estate for life might be determined before he could receive the sum out of the land. *Id.* 177.

But if lands are devised to a man, paying so much out of the *profits* of the lands; he takes but an estate for life; for although he takes the land charged, yet he is to pay no farther than he receives, and so can be no loser. *Id.* (f)

A man devised that his lands should descend to his son, but he willed, that *his wife should take the profits thereof until the full age of his son for his education and bringing up*, and died. The wife married another husband, and died before the full age of the son. And it was the opinion of Wray and Southcote justices, that the second husband should not have the profits of the lands until the full age of the son; for nothing is devised to the wife but a trust, and she is as guardian or bailiff for the benefit of the infant, which by her death is determined; and the same trust cannot be transferred to the husband: but otherwise, if he had devised *the profits of the land unto his wife until the age of the infant, to bring him up and educate him*; for that is a devise of the land itself. 2 *Leon.* 221.

In the case of *Hogan*, lessee of *Henry Wallis* esquire,

(f) See this distinction taken in *Collier's case*, 6 *Rep.* 16. But if the expression "out of the rents and profits" be accompanied with other clauses which shew an intention to give a fee, the intention shall prevail. *Frogmorton v. Holyday*, 3 *Bur.* 1618. And if an estate is devised subject to an annuity, the fee shall pass, because the annuitant may survive the devisee. *Baddely v. Leppingwell*, 3 *Bur.* 1531. *Doe v. Richards*, 3 *T. Rep.* 356. *Goodright v. Stocker*, 5 *T. Rep.* 13.

and others, against *Rowland Jackson* esquire, T. 15 G. 3. On a writ of error from the court of king's bench in *Ireland*, the case was, The reverend *George Jackson* by his will devised as follows: "As to my *worldly substance*, I give and bequeath to my mother *Mary Jackson*, my house and lands of *Glanbegg*, and all their appurtenances, for and during the term of her natural life, and also my lands of *Balygally*, subject only to the rent payable thereout, for the term of her natural life, without liberty of committing waste thereon:" And after several legacies and annuities, he gives all the *remainder and residue* of all his *effects* both *real* and *personal* to his said mother. The question was, Whether under the residuary clause, all the testator's real estates undisposed of by the will passed to his mother *Mary Jackson* so as to enable her to devise the same to the lessors of the plaintiff.— And it was argued that they did. It is apparent that the great and chief object of the testator's bounty was his mother; therefore by way of securing a certain provision to her, he first gives her a life estate in two denominations of his real property: He then proceeds to dispense his bounty amongst his other relations; and perceiving there was still a surplus undisposed of, by one general sweeping clause, he devises to his mother every species of property he should die possessed of. And that he did not mean to die intestate, as to any part of his real or personal property, is manifest not only from the strong language of the residuary clause, but from the introductory words of the will, *As to all my worldly substance*, which have always been understood to include both real and personal estate, and to indicate an intent in the testator who uses them, to dispose of all his property. And the several cases were cited, where words of the like import have always been understood to include all the testator's property. As, *all my worldly estate*, *all my temporal estate*, *all the rest and residue of my estate*.—On the other hand, three rules were laid down for the construction of wills. First, that an heir at law shall not be disinherited but by express words or necessary implication. Secondly, that the whole of the will must be taken together; and nothing is to be rejected which has a determinate and fixed meaning in itself. And thirdly, where words used by a testator are indifferently applicable to real and to personal estate, they shall not be applied to the real in disinherison of the heir at law. As to the first of these, the heir shall not be disinherited but by express words

or necessary implication, here is clearly no express devise of the real estate. The word *effects* is properly applicable only to personal estate. And as to the word *real* annexed to it, this can at most apply only to *chattels* real, which it appears the testator died possessed of. As to the second rule, that the whole will must be taken together; the word *estate* in the introductory part is a technical expression, and improperly applicable to real estates: but the meaning thereof is qualified by the word annexed, my *worldly* estate, which always is understood to signify worldly *substance*, without expressly limiting the extent or quantum of such disposition. Thirdly, the words remainder and residue of my effects *both real and personal*, do not necessarily refer to real estate, but are equally applicable to personal; and if so, they shall not be extended to disinherit the heir at law.—By lord *Mansfield* chief justice: There is one point upon which the whole case turns, which is, to fix the meaning of the word *effects*. If it is equivalent to *worldly substance* used by the testator in the beginning of his will, or if it is synonymous to *property*, there is an end of the question: Because then, all the cases prove, that the sweeping clause passes a fee. On the contrary, if it can be shewn that *effects* mean *chattels or personalty only*, then the residuary clause can include them only. I take *effects* to be synonymous to *worldly substance*, which means whatever can be turned to value; and therefore, that *real and personal effects* mean all a man's property. His lordship added, As this cause has already been nine years depending in *Ireland*, and as the court has no difficulty upon the question, which turns upon the construction of a very few words of the will, I think it is right, that we should give our opinion directly, without adding further delay, by deferring it to a second argument. The question upon the construction of the will is, Whether, by virtue of the sweeping clause, any real property at all passed to *Mary Jackson*, the mother of the testator; and, if any did, whether it can pass for a longer time than during the life of *Mary Jackson*, because there are no words of limitation. In a conveyance of real estate by the common law, it is required, in order to pass a fee, that there be words of limitation in the donation or grant. Without the word *heirs*, general or special, no man can create a fee at common law. Afterwards, when wills were introduced, and devises of real property began to prevail, being considered as a species of conveyance, they were to be governed by the same rule. Therefore

fore by analogy to that rule, in the construction of devises, if there be no words of limitation added, nor words of perpetuity annexed, which have been held tantamount, so as to denote the intention of the testator to convey the inheritance to the devisee, he can only take an estate for life. For instance, if a testator by his will says, I give my lands, or such and such lands to *A.*; if no words of limitation are added, *A.* has only an estate for life generally speaking, no common person has the smallest idea of any difference between giving a personalty and a quantity of land. Common sense alone would never teach a man the difference; but the distinction which is now clearly established, is this: If the words of the testator denote only a description of the specific estate or lands devised; in that case, if no words of limitation are added, the devisee has only an estate for life. But, if the words denote the quantum of interest or property that the testator has in the lands devised; there, the whole extent of such his interest passes by the gift to the devisee. The question therefore is always a question of construction, upon the words and terms used by the testator. It is now clearly settled, that the words *all his estate* will pass every thing a man has: But if the word *all* is coupled with the word *personal* or a *local description*, there, the gift will pass only personalty, or the specific estate particularly described. And having considered the whole of this will, including the introductory part, and the several particular bequests, and the general sweeping clause in the conclusion, his lordship gave his opinion, that the lessors of the plaintiff the residuary legatee are intitled, and therefore that the judgment of the king's bench in Ireland must be reversed. Unto which the other three justices assented. Afterwards, upon a writ of error in the house of lords, the judgment of the king's bench reversing the judgment of the court of king's bench in *Ireland* was affirmed. *Cowper*, 299.

Afterwards, in the case of *Loveacres*, on the demise of *Mudge* against *Blight*, *M.* 16 G. 3. Lord *Mansfield*, in further explanation of the aforesaid rule, says thus: The principles by which this and other like cases must be governed, are settled by analogy to established rules respecting the limitation of estates by deed at common law. If a man by deed of conveyance at common law gives land to another *generally*, without words of *limitation*, the donee has only an estate for life. But I really believe that almost every case determined by this rule, as applied to a devise

devise of lands in a will, has defeated the real intention of the testator. For common people, and even others who have some knowledge of the law, do not distinguish between a bequest of personalty, and a devise of land or real estate. But, as they know when they give a man a horse, they give it him for ever; so they think if they give a house or land, it will continue to be the sole property of the person to whom they have left it. Notwithstanding this, where there are no words of limitation, the court must determine in the case of a devise affecting real estate, that the devisee has only an estate for life: Because the principle is fully settled and established, and no conjecture of a private imagination can shake a rule of law. But as this rule of law has the effect of defeating the intention of the testator, in almost every case that occurs; the court has laid hold of the generality of other expressions in a will, where any such can be found, to take the devise out of this rule. Therefore if a man says, I give *all my estate*, that has been construed to pass a fee: or, if even words of locality are added, as *all my estate in A.*; it hath been held that the whole of the testator's *interest* in such particular lands will pass, though no words of limitation are added. Because the law says, that the word *estate* comprehends not only the land or property which a man has, but also the *interest* he has in it. So in the case from *Ireland*, the court had no difficulty in saying, that the words *all my worldly substance*, in the introductory part of the will, meant every thing the testator had; and that the words *all his real effects*, in the subsequent residuary devise, were equivalent to *worldly substance*, and carried every thing to the residuary devise. In general, wherever there are words and expressions, either general or particular, or clauses in a will which the court can lay hold of, to enlarge the estate of a devisee, they will do so to effectuate the intention. But if the intention of the testator is doubtful, the rule of law must take place. So if the court cannot find words in the will sufficient to carry a fee, though they should themselves be satisfied beyond the possibility of a doubt, as to what the intention of the party was, they must adhere to the rule of law. *Cowper, 352.*

Devise to a female
covert, to her
separate use.

14. *H. 1724. Roilse and Budder.* Devise of a bond by the son to his mother to her sole and separate use: It is her sole property in equity, and her assignment of it is good. *Bunb. 187.*

So

So in the case of *Bennet and Davis, M. 1725.* A person seised of an estate in fee, devised it to the defendant's wife, who was his daughter, for her separate use, without any limitation to trustees: It was adjudged, that the husband was but a trustee for the wife. 2 P. Will. 316.

15. If a devise be made to a man, and to the heirs female of his body begotten, and after, the devisee hath issue a son and daughter, and dieth: here the daughter shall have the land, and not the son, and yet he is the most worthy person, and heir to his father. But because the will of the dead is, that the daughter should have it, law and conscience will so too. *Terms of the Law.* Devise.

Devise to heir female.

16. A man devised his personal estate *for the use of his relations*, without specifying any in particular, or using any other words; and made an executor; and died. His mother and three sisters brought their bill, as nearest relations, for a discovery and account of the personal estate, and to come in according to the statutes for distribution. And it was agreed to be the rule, in construction of such devises to relations, that those who would by the statutes for distribution be entitled to the personal estate, in case the testator had died intestate, should, upon such general devises, be admitted in the same proportion only. And the lord chancellor Cowper said, he thought it the best measure for setting bounds to such general words, and that it had been often ruled accordingly in that court. *Reach and Hammond, E. 1715. Prec. Cha. 401. 2 Abr. Eq. Caf. 438.*

Devise to one's relations.

For if upon such general devise they were not to take in this manner, it would be uncertain; for the relations may be infinite. And in the case of *Carr and Bedford, 30 C. 2.* where the testator devised the residue of his estate *among his kindred according to their most need*; it was determined that this shall be construed according to the statute of distribution. 2 Cha. Rep. 146. 2 Abr. Eq. Caf. 365.

So in the case of *Thomas and Hole, M. 1734.* A man devised 500 l. to the *relations of A. to be divided equally between them.* A. had, at the testator's death, two brothers living, and several nephews and nieces by another brother. It was determined, that no relations should take by this description, that could not take by the statute of distribution. *Caf. Talb. 251.*

Whether the *wife* is a relation in this respect, has been made a question. As in the case of *Davis and Bailey*, Feb. 8, 1747. The testator by his will gave the residue of his personal estate to his wife for life, remainder to such of his relations as would have been entitled by the statute in case he had died intestate. The wife claimed a moiety. By the lord chancellor Hardwicke: Relation here means kindred. The wife is not of kindred, nor a relation within the meaning of the statute.

And more particularly, in the case of *Worsley and Johnson*, M. 27 G. 2. The testator, seised in fee, deviseth his estate to his wife for life, remainder to another in tail, and for want of issue, the reversion in fee to be sold; with these words, *And my mind is, that the money arising from the sale be divided amongst such of my relations, and in such manner, as the statute of distributions directs*: Then he gave other legacies to his wife, and appointed her sole executrix; and died; leaving relations of his own blood, and his said wife, who married a second husband. Then the wife dies; and the second husband dies; and the tenant in tail dies without issue. The plaintiff brings his bill, as executor to the second husband, praying a sale of the estate, and a moiety of the money thence arising, as the representative of the second husband to the wife who is entitled to it by the will, as a relation within the statute of distribution.—Lord chancellor Hardwicke: During the course of this cause, I have altered my opinion. The question arises on the words of the will referring to the statute of distribution, and depends upon the construction, which must be agreeable to the words, and to the intent of the testator to be from thence collected. The question is, what is the sense of the word *relation*, as used in this will. In a proper grammatical sense, it denotes a quality in the abstract; but in common sense, it becomes personal, and signifies the same as *my kindred*. Now *next of kindred* are the words in the statute to which he refers, and takes in only relations by consanguinity or by blood. Now it seems strange to say, that a man's wife is no relation to him: but she certainly is not in this sense, neither by blood nor affinity. The etymologists, when they speak of *consanguinity*, say, that it is, *vinculum personarum ab eodem stipite descendantium*; and of *affinity*, they say, *non est affinis, sed casu affinitatis*. And so the word appears to be used in our statutes: for if the wife was of kin to her husband, she would exclude all the rest, as

being the nearest of kin. So in the 21 H. 8. c. 5. the ordinary shall grant administration to the widow, or next of kin; which distinguishes the wife from the kindred. This perhaps would be too nice a construction of the will, unless the manifest intent of the testator would warrant it; for wills are to be construed according to common understanding, and not by nice grammatical distinctions. Now in this will he has made an ample provision for the wife; and whenever he gives her an interest, he expressly mentions her. It was probable that this remote contingency would not happen in her life; and he could never intend, that her representative, such as the executor of a second husband, should carry so considerable a share from his own blood. Suppose he had said, *my own relations*; he would certainly be construed to mean his relations by blood. Therefore in this strict sense of the words, the wife is not intitled to any share. And I continue in the same opinion I was of, in the case of *Davis and Bailey*; which is expressly to this point. And therefore I dismiss the bill; but without costs. 3 Atk. 758. (g)

(g) *Green v. Howard*, 1 Bro. 31. The testator devised 4000 l. to his wife for her life, and after her decease to his own relations who should be then alive. There were several legacies in the will to both first and second cousins, and the second cousins petitioned to be admitted to shares with the next of kin. And it was said, that to construe the will by the statute of distribution would be to make the testator die intestate. But by lord Thurlow, C.: It would be difficult to draw a line in favour of the second cousins against those who are more remote: If you once go beyond the statute, it must extend to every person who can make any claim. It must be confined to the statute, that is, to one class under it; for the wife cannot claim, the statute providing for her by the name of wife. Therefore such a will is not totally inofficious*, for it shuts out the wife. So where the bequest was to all my relations; *Thomas v. Hole*, Forrester. 251. But where the testator has added other words to explain his intention, they have been allowed to prevail. Thus *Hester Joyce* by a codicil gave the residue to be divided between her relations, that is, the *Greenwoods*, the *Everitts*, and the *Dows*: The *Everitts* were not within the degree of relationship limited by the statute, but were deemed to take jointly with the *Greenwoods* and *Dows* who were. 14 Ap. 1779, 1 Bro. 32. n.

* *Quere* inofficious? no; inofficious

Devise to
younger chil-
dren.

17. If money be devised to younger children, where there are divers daughters and a son, and the son is by birth a younger child, but heir at law to the inheritance, the son shall not be considered as a younger child, so as to take by the devise. 1 *Abr. Eq. Cas.* 202. *Bretton and Bretton*, 12 C. 2.

In the case of *Becke and Becke*, H. 1713. The testator, being tenant in tail, had power by deed or will to charge the lands with 2000 l. for portions *for younger children, living at his death*. He had only two daughters, and the younger was born after his death. He charged the lands by his will for raising this 2000 l. And the question was, whether it should be raised. It was objected, that the *elder* daughter was not entitled to any part of it, because it was only to go to the *younger* children; and the *younger* daughter cannot claim any part of it, because she was not *living at the time of his death*. But by the lord chancellor Harcourt: The eldest daughter, tho' first born, when there is a son, hath been often ruled to be a younger child. Every one but the heir is a younger child in equity; and the provision which such daughter will have is but as a younger child's, in regard the son goes away with the land as heir: so here, the estate goes all to the remainder man, who is *hæres factus*, and neither of the two daughters is heir. And as to the younger daughter, he said, it would be very hard in a court of equity, that a child, because it happened not to be born at such a time, must therefore be unprovided for; but the law so far regards an infant *in ventre sa mere*, as in this respect to look upon it as living at the time of the father's death, 1 *P. Will.* 244.

Estate equally to
be divided.

18. Mar. 2, 1738, *Owen and Owen*. The testatrix devised the residue of her personal estate to her two nieces, *equally to be divided between them*, and appointed them executrixes accordingly. One of the nieces died in the life of the testatrix. The question was, whether a moiety of the residue should go to the next of kin, as undisposed of by the will; or the devise to the two nieces was a jointenancy, and the whole residue should go to the surviving niece. By the lord chancellor Hardwicke: It is clear to me, that if both of the nieces had been living, the words *equally to be divided* would have made a tenancy in common, and not a jointenancy; for tho' these words, in a strict settlement at common law, have never been determined barely of themselves to make a tenancy in com-
mon,

mon, yet in a will it is settled that these words will make a tenancy in common, both with regard to real and personal estate. 1 *Atk.* 494.

In the case of *Rigden and Valier*, Mar. 25, 1751. The question arose on a deed poll, which began in this manner, "To all Christian people, &c. I *George Everinden*, in consideration of natural love and affection, &c. and for the firm settling and assuring of all my real and personal estate on my wife and children after my decease, dispose thereof in the manner following: I give, grant, and confirm to my daughter *Margaret*, &c. [This was not in question.] Also, I give, grant, and confirm to my two daughters *Margaret* and *Hannah* the rents and profits of the land called *W.* during the life of my wife, equally to be divided betwixt my said daughters, paying to my wife ————— per annum; and after her decease to them and their heirs, *equally to be divided betwixt them.* Also I give, grant, and confirm to my five daughters all my personal estate equally to be divided betwixt them, after all my debts and funeral charges paid and satisfied." This deed was signed and sealed by *George Everinden* in the presence of three witnesses. He and his wife died. *Hannah*, one of the daughters, married *Rigden*, by whom she had the plaintiffs, and died. The question was, whether *Margaret* and *Hannah* took as jointenants, or as tenants in common. If the latter; the plaintiffs, who brought their bill for an account of the rents and profits of a moiety of the estate given to *Margaret* and their mother *Hannah*, and claimed as co-heirs of *Hannah*, were right; if the former; the whole survived to the defendant *Margaret*, as the survivor of her sister. — By the lord chancellor *Hardwicke*: This case depends upon a deed or writing, which, though executed as a deed, I am not sure was intended to take effect as such. It begins as a deed poll: but it is a disposition of the whole real and personal estate of *Everinden*, and to take place from his decease, and in consideration of the natural love and affection he bore to his wife and children. If it be not construed as a will, or covenant to stand seised, (and being in consideration of natural love and affection, tho' by a single deed without livery, it may be considered to be a covenant to stand seised,) it will be void, being without livery, and because a freehold cannot pass *in futuro*. But by way of covenant to stand seised, it may be good; for that operates not by transmutation of the possession, but the use remains in

the grantor till ~~the~~ ^{the} time by force of the construction. The present question arises upon a very lig-
 tigated point in the books, not clear enough in one view.
 In a will the words *equally to be divided* certainly create a
 tenancy in common, tho' this at first was doubted; nay,
 the words *equally to have and have alike*, have the same
 effect. But it is said, that there is not sufficient autho-
 rity to show that these words do make a tenancy in com-
 mon in a deed, and that the books take the law to be other-
 wise. This point the books do so generally. And yet
 there is no better determination that I can find, where it
 has been argued against a rule, that the words *equally to
 be divided* will not create a tenancy in common in a deed.
 The only determination that has been, was in the case
 of *Fisher and Wig*, (L. R. 11. 113. 1 P. Will. 14.) which
 has been taken as a judgment of the court of king's
 bench, that these words make tenancy in common in a
 deed. But it is objected, that this is a case of doubtful
 authority, being on the opinion of only two judges, against
 so great a man as lord chief justice Holt; and it is ap-
 prehended too, that this judgment was afterwards reversed.
 I have made inquiry, and cannot find that it was, or that
 even a writ of error was brought: so that this judgment
 yet stands, and is so far an authority, that this construc-
 tion in regard to the words *equally to be divided* making
 a tenancy in common, took place in the case of the sur-
 render of the copyhold lands.—Another case has been
 cited at the bar, which, if rightly reported, is in point,
 2 Vent. 361. But I have caused the register's books to be
 searched, and can find no decree to warrant the report:
 but notwithstanding this, there might have been such a
 case, and it is taken by *Gould* that there was.—Another
 case is mentioned at the end of *Fisher and Wig*, by *Ner-
 they*; but the records have been searched, and there is no
 possibility of finding it.—*Smith and Johnson* too is another
 authority, such as it is.—In regard to the case before me,
 upon the best consideration I can give it, I am inclined
 to be of opinion, that the deed or instrument, call it
 what you will, has created a tenancy in common; and
 that to say otherwise, would be a manifest contradiction
 to the intention of a father providing for his children.
 Tho' none has a greater reverence for the opinion of lord
 chief justice Holt than I have, I think the arguments of
 the other judges are founded more on the reason and
 nature of the thing than his lordship's; and that his pro-
 ceed from the artificial and refined reasoning of the law,
 and

and are deduced from a great deal of fine learning drawn from argument in other cases. The arguments of Mr. justice *Gould* have great weight, and are by no means satisfactorily answered. Indeed that case was on a surrender of copyhold lands in the lords court; and the two judges argued it was not to be considered with great strictness, but as a will: whereas *Holt* contended that it should be construed as a deed; and in one thing he is certainly right, that the surrender of copyhold lands to uses is not to be considered on the foot of uses, being not within the statute of uses; and therefore such a surrender is only a direction of the lord whom to admit; and when admitted, the surrenderee is not in by the grant of the lord, but by the surrender. If the arguments of the judges had any weight in that case, they must have full as much in this, being on a covenant to stand seised. But it is objected, that there is no warrant to construe a deed to uses, as to the limitations and words of it, with greater latitude than a conveyance by way of feoffment, or any other conveyance at common law; and that strange confusion would arise, if the words of a deed on the statute of uses should be taken in a larger sense than they would bear in a conveyance at common law. This is true in general: for the statute joining the estate to the use, it becomes one intire conveyance by force of the statute. But some restriction must be added to this. The words of limitation, to be sure, must be construed in the same sense as at common law. But when there are words of regulation or modification of the estate (as the words *equally to be divided* are), and not words of limitation; I think there is no more harm in giving them a greater latitude in deeds on the statute of uses, which are trusts at common law, than in feoffments, which at all times have been strict conveyances. The case upon that occasion cited by *Gould*, is very material; where the intendment, not the words, of the special verdict influenced the determination. Consider the argument from thence to the present case. The only distinction taken between the construction of words in a special verdict and in other cases, is, that in a special verdict, they may be taken more largely than in pleading; and therefore it is often said, that a description, which would be bad in a count or plea, may be good in a verdict, and taken by the intendment of the jury: but there never was any book that said, that words may be taken more loosely in a special verdict than in a deed. It is admitted, that if the deed had been in this manner,

to hold one moiety to one and her heirs, and the other moiety to the other and her heirs, this had been good, not only in such a deed as this, but likewise in a feoffment. And considering how the sense of the words *equally to be divided* is to be construed, there is no reasonable difference between the two cases. Thus the matter stands on the foot and authority of *Fisher* and *Wig.*—But there are other reasons which greatly strengthen the present case in favour of the plaintiffs. The first is this: Here is a parent making a provision for his children (who were five in number), and for his wife: if the children were to take this estate intended for the support of each of them and their future families, as jointenants, the share of any one, who should happen to die, would not descend for the maintenance of his children and posterity, but survive to the other jointenants; a disposition by no means reasonable, nor likely to be supposed agreeable to the intention of the father. And this court has always used a great latitude in pursuing the intent of the parties, in construing a deed to make a tenancy in common or a jointenancy, though the words *equally to be divided* have been omitted; and have determined therefore, that if two men jointly and equally advance a sum of money on a mortgage in fee, and take a security to them and their heirs, there shall be no survivorship; and so if they foreclose an estate, it shall be divided betwixt them, because their intention is supposed to be so. It has been said indeed, if two men make a purchase, they may be supposed to buy a kind of chance between them, and to intend that the survivor shall be intitled to the whole. But it has been determined, that if two purchase, and one advance more than the other; there shall be no survivorship, though there be no such words as *equally to be divided*, or to hold as tenants in common: which shews, how strongly the courts have leaned against survivorship, and erected a tenancy in common, by construction, or the intention of the parties. Consider how nearly this comes to the case in question. And this court always considers provisions for children, as having an equitable consideration. And therefore, though such voluntary dispositions cannot be preferred to debts for valuable consideration; yet they are always preferred to other voluntary dispositions.——But *George Ferinden* has himself put his own construction on the words, by the disposition of his *personal* estate; which is allowed to make a tenancy in common.—Besides, this appears to be as near a testamentary act as possible; nor do

do I know why it may not be proved as a will, notwithstanding the solemnity of the execution by sealing and delivery: according to the case of *Kibbet and Lee* (*Hob.* 313,) and a late determination in the king's bench in the case of *Trimmer and Jackson* (*b*). And it is admitted, that in a will, these words make a tenancy in common; and I think it ought to be so here. My opinion therefore at present is, that, agreeable to the case of *Fisher and Wig*, strengthened by the farther observations already made, the plaintiffs are intitled to a division of the estate. 2 *Vez.* 252.

So in the case of *Goodtitle and Stoakes*, in the king's bench: *H.* 26 *G.* 2. By indentures of lease and release, dated in the year 1695, and made between *John Gurl* and his wife of the one part, and *William Purefoy* and *Peter Capper* of the other part, the said *John Gurl* granted and releated to the said *Purefoy* and *Capper* and their heirs, the lands in question, to the use of such and so many of the children of the said *Gurl*, on the body of his said wife begotten, in such manner, and in such shares, as the said *John Gurl* should appoint; and in default of such appointment, *to the use of all such children equally to be divided*: with a remainder to the right heirs of the said *John Gurl*.—*John Gurl* died, without making any appointment, leaving his widow, and children, *Richard*, *Jane*, *Peter*, and *Wilmot*.—The question was, whether by the words “*to the use of all such children equally to be divided*” the children took as tenants in common, or as jointtenants, in which case *Wilmot*, who married the defendant, being the only surviving child, would take the whole.—*Lee* Ch. J. delivered the opinion of the court: This case depends upon the clause (abovementioned). The defendants have insisted, they ought to take as joint tenants. Joint tenants must be to the land in one right, and by one joint title, and they must have one joint freehold. Tenants in common take differently, as is laid down, 1 *Inst. sect.* 297. 296, 297; from which it does appear, that no particular words are necessary to create a tenancy in common. The question then comes to this; Whether the children do not take several freeholds, with a several occupation? To make them tenants in common, would be to construe every word in this deed as operative. No words in a devise or a grant shall be con-

(b) *Vide supra*, 11.

turned void, if they can be construed otherwise consistently. (3 *Lev.* 373.) There is no doubt at this time of day, but that the words *equally to be divided*, in a will, make a tenancy in common. In the case *Cro. Eliz.* 443, 695, it was first determined to be so. There is no determination where in a deed to uses they will. It has been objected, they have a joint title in the freehold; and the words *equally to be divided* will not sever it: And tho' the statute of uses executes the use to the possession; yet it leaves the estate subject to the same uses: The intent cannot prevail here: and these words, in a conveyance at common law, would not create a tenancy in common. But the question here is not, whether the joint title is severed; but whether any joint title is conveyed. If land be given to *A.* and *B.* to hold one moiety to *A.* and his heirs, and the other moiety to *B.* and his heirs; they take as tenants in common. And where the grantor, in the same clause, and *uno flatu*, uses the words *equally to be divided*; he intends to convey an equal property in the land, and to the fee, to each. This is the opinion of *Popham*, *Cro. Eliz.* 696. in his argument. I cannot think the clause here is nugatory, or of no effect. The intent of the party operates to pass the whole fee. There is no rule in law, to prevent the court from making a construction, according to the intent of the party, in a deed. The true reason, why the words *equally to be divided* make a tenancy in common, is from the apparent intent that the estate should be divided: And such a construction ought to be made, if there be no rule to the contrary; and no precise words are necessary. The case in 2 *Ventr.* 365. is in point: A covenant to stand seised to the use of *A.* for life; and after, to two equally to be divided, 1 *Inst.* 191. a. If a verdict find that a man hath two parts of a manor, or the like, to be divided into three parts: they are tenants in common, by the intendment of the verdict; and if in a verdict, there is no reason why not in a deed. *Carth.* 343. *Leigh. v. Brace.* A conveyance by way of use shall be construed as a will, with respect to the intention of the parties. The case of *Fisher* and *Wig* cannot now be departed from; it is mentioned in the case of *Philips* and *Stringer*, as if this judgment had been reversed; but it was not. The whole reasoning of *Holt's* argument, in the said case of *Fisher* and *Wig*, is applied to the supposition of a conveyance at common law: but it does not from that appear, what his opinion would have been, upon a direct deed to uses as here. In the case of *Rigden*

Rigden and Valier, lord *Hardwicke* Ch. J. declared upon the best consideration he could give the case, that he was inclined to think, that the words *equally to be divided*, whether in a will or deed, create a tenancy in common.— And judgment was given for the plaintiff by the whole court.

And in the case of *Peat and Chapman*, Aug. 3, 1750: The testator devised all the rest and residue to be divided betwixt two. By Sir John Strange, master of the rolls: This must be understood to be *equally* divided, and is a tenancy in common; and by the death of one in the life of the testator, his moiety shall not survive to the other devisee of the residue, but be considered as undisposed of by the will, and divided among the next of kin, as if no devise thereof had been. 1 *Verz.* 542. (i)

19. A devise of all a man's goods and mortgages to his executors, is a good devise, and will pass all the lands mortgaged; for the equity of redemption passeth to the devisee. *God. O. L.* 477. *Cro. Car.* 37.

Devise of mortgages passeth the lands,

But by a general devise of all lands, tenements and hereditaments, a mortgage in fee shall not pass, unless the equity of redemption be foreclosed; and if after such devise made, a foreclosure is had, yet such estate shall not pass by those general words of lands, tenements, and hereditaments, because a foreclosure is considered as a new purchase of the land. The interest of the land must be somewhere, and cannot be in abeyance; but it is not in the mortgagee, and therefore must remain in the mortgagor. If a man devises his estate, and after makes a mortgage in fee, it is a total revocation in law, yet in equity it is a revocation only *pro tanto*. And the mortgagee with regard to the inheritance, is a trustee for

(i) *Perkins v. Baynton*, 1 *Bro.* 118. Frances Nott gave by her will, "to S. B. and W. B. 1500l. jointly and between them." W. B. survived S. B. and insisted that the joint legacy survived, and that he was intitled to the whole. But by lord *Hardwicke*, C. the one word here is *jointly*, the other *between them*; they must be so put together as to effectuate the intent. In *Hawes v. Hawes*, 3 *Atk.* it is laid down that if words are so inconsistent that they cannot stand or be reconciled together, the court must reject those words which are least consistent with the intention of the testator. The intent here was to give to each an equal interest, as it is a sum of money which resolves between them; and his lordship decreed, that the survivor was not intitled to the whole legacy.

the mortgagor till a foreclosure. 1 *Atk.* 605. 2 *Baq. Abr.* 83.

Advowson,
tithes, fee farm
rents.

20. By the word *lands*, an advowson will not pass; but by *hereditaments* it may. *Portesc.* 351.

But fee farm rents, portions of tithes, or any other right out of lands, will pass by a devise of lands. *Viner, Devise.* K.

Lands to be
sold (k).

21. Where lands are appointed to be sold, and it is not said by whom; the executor ought to sell, because he is the person intrusted with the execution of the will. *Law of Test.* 121. *Law of Ex.* 221. And a court of equity will compel the heir at law, and all other proper parties to join in the sale. 1 *Atk.* 490.

H. 26 El. Vincent and Lec. A special verdict was found, that *A.* was seised of certain lands in fee, and devised the same in tail, and if the donee died without issue, that his said lands should be sold by his sons in law, he in truth having five sons in law; one of his sons in law died in the life of the donee, and after the donee died without issue, and then the four of the sons in law sold the land: and it was adjudged, that the sale was good, because they were named generally, by his sons in law, and the lands could not be sold by them all; and the words of the will, in a benign interpretation, are satisfied in the plural number, albeit they had but a bare authority. But if they had been particularly named, it had been otherwise. 1 *Inst.* 113. -

But if a man deviseth lands to his executors to be sold, and maketh two executors, and the one dieth; yet the survivor may sell the land, because as the estate, so the trust shall survive. And so note a diversity between a bare trust, and trust coupled with an interest. 1 *Inst.* 113.

Yet in neither of those cases, albeit one refuse, can the other make sale to him that refused; because he is party and privy to the last will, and remaineth executor still. 1 *Inst.* 113.

And hereupon lord Coke says, his advice to them that make such devises by will, in order to make it as certain as they can, is, that the sale be made by his executors or the survivors or survivor of them, if his meaning be so, or by such or so many of them as take upon them the probate of his will, or the like. And it is better to give them an authority than an estate, unless his meaning be

(k) *Vid. infra, Payment of debts, 4. and 8.*

should take the profits of his lands in the mean time when it is necessary that he devise, that the mean profits of the sale shall be assets in their hands; for otherwise they shall not be so. *1 Inst. 113.*

Where the testator deviseth that his *executors shall sell his land*, there the land descendeth in the mean time to the heir: and until the sale be made, the heir may enter and take the profits. But when the land is devised *to his executor to be sold*, there the devise taketh away the descent, and vesteth the estate of the land in the executor, and he enters and takes the profits, and makes sale according to the devise. And in such case, the executor is bound to sell so soon as he can; for that the mean profits taken before the sale shall not be assets; and therefore he might otherwise take advantage of his own laches. *1 Inst. 236.*

Where there is a devise of lands to trustees to sell, to pay debts; the heir shall have the surplus. *Law of Test.* [Resulting trust as to the surplus.]

Where whatever interest in, or profits out of a real estate, is disposed of by a testator, the same shall descend to the heir; and he takes them, not by the will, or the intention of the testator, but they are cast upon him by the law for want of some other person to take. *Cas. Talb.*

Where the testator by will devised all his lands to trustees to sell, and dispose of the money as he by writing should appoint; and for want of such appointment, to his four nephews. The testator by writing appoints his trustees to pay several sums to several persons, but not to the value of the land. It was held, that the nephews should not have the residue, but that the heir at law should have it, as an interest resulting, and not disposed of. *City of London and Garway, 2 Vern. 571.*

Where a person devised his real estate to his executors, to be sold for payment of debts; the surplus, if any be, to be paid to his personal estate, and to go to his executors, to whom he gave 20 l. a piece. It was decreed, that the surplus should be a trust for the heir at law: And the same was afterwards affirmed in parliament. *Countess of Bristol v. Hungerford. 2 Vern. 645. (1).*

The

Where a testator directs his real estate to be sold, and the proceeds blended with his personal, and wills the whole away, thereby disregarding his heir and next of kin; if any of the executors die before the testator, such part of their legacy as arose from

The testator devised to his nephew several lands, to hold to him and his heirs for ever, in trust to be sold for payment of all his debts and legacies, within a year after his death, and made him executor, but *gave him no legacy*.

It was held, that there was no resulting trust for the heir at law; for then the executor, who is taken notice of as his nephew, would have nothing for his trouble. *Cunningham and Mellish*, Prec. Ch. 31. 2 Vern. 247.

If lands be devised *for payment of debts*: the executor may sell, tho' authority be not especially given him: but otherwise, if such devise had been for *legacies* only, or for raising portions, or the like; for in such case there had been no remedy but in chancery against the heir. 1 Keb. 14.

If lands be devised on trust, *out of the rents and profits* to pay debts and legacies; if the rents and profits will not raise it in a convenient time, the trustees may sell: for the words [*profits of lands*] especially when to pay debts or portions, imply any profits that the land will yield, either by selling or mortgaging. 1 P. Will. 415.

If lands be devised to be sold for payment of portions, and one of the children dies after the portion is due, and before the lands sold; the administrator of the child is intitled to the money. 1 Vern. 276.

For lands devised to be sold, or in trustees hands, for payment of debts, portions, or the like, are to be deemed as money so far as there are any such to be paid: and so money devised to buy lands, is to be deemed as lands. But with respect to the heir at law or residuary legatee, the lands so given in trust, or devised for payment of debts or legacies, shall be deemed as land; and he may, by paying the debts or legacies pray a conveyance. 9 Mod. 170.

So if money be devised to be laid out in land, and settled on a man and his heirs; he may come into court, and pray to have the money, and that no purchase may be made; for no other has any interest in it. But if he die before it is paid or laid out in land, and the question is between the heir and executor who shall have it; the heir shall have it, and it shall be considered as land; first,

from the realty shall result to the heir at law; and such as arose from the personalty shall go to the next of kin. *Digby v. Legard*, before lord Bathurst, 3 P. Wms. 22 n. *Akroyd v. Smithson*, 1 Bro. 503. *Robinson v. Taylor*, 2 Bro. 589.

because

because the heir in all cases is favoured : and secondly, if the executor should have it, it would be against the words of the will, which gave it to the heir. *Prec. Cha.* 544.

[The purchaser of land is in general not bound to look to the application of the purchase money. *Smith v. Guyon*, 1 B. 10. 186 et n.]

22. Devise of a rent charge to his younger son, *towards the education and bringing him up in learning*; it is not conditional, and he shall have the rent tho' not brought up in learning, and the words (*towards his education*) are only to shew the intent and consideration of the payment of the sum. 2 *Lev.* 154. Devise upon condition.

Devise of lands to his wife for life, remainder to his second son in fee; provided if his third son shall within three months after the wife's death pay 500 l. to the said second son his executors or administrators, then he devised them to the said third son and his heirs. The third son died, leaving the wife: Then the wife died. The heir of the said third son may enter upon the lands, upon payment or tender of the 500 l. It is not a condition, but an executory devise. *M. 5 G. Marks* and *Marks*, 10 *Mod.* 420.

Note, *Executory* is said to be, where an estate in fee, created by deed or fine, is to be afterwards executed by entry, livery, writ, or the like. Estates *executed* are when they pass presently to the person to whom conveyed, without any after act. And an *executory devise* is, where a future interest is devised, that vests not at the death of the testator, but depends on some contingency which must happen before it can vest. If a particular estate is limited, and the inheritance passed out of the donor, this is a *contingent remainder*; but where the fee by a devise is vested in any person, and to be vested in another upon contingency, this is an *executory devise*. And in all cases of executory devises, the estates descend until the contingencies happen (m).

Devise, If my son and my two daughters die without issue of their bodies, then all my lands shall remain and come to my nephew and his heirs. Here no estate is de-

(m) The reader will find much profound learning on this branch of law, conveyed in an elegant and perspicuous manner, in the writings of the late Mr. Fearne on *Contingent Remainders and Executory Devises*.

vifed

vised to the son and daughters by implication ; the words only import a designation or appointment of the time when the land shall come to the nephew, namely, when the son and two daughters shall happen to die without issue, and not before. For no estate being created to the son and daughters, the nephew can take nothing by way of remainder ; for that must descend to the heir at law. A remainder cannot depend upon an absolute fee simple, that being but the residue of an estate. For when all a man has of an estate, or any thing else is given or gone away, nothing remains, and no other or further estate can be given or disposed, and therefore no remainder can be of an absolute fee simple. Yet, in another respect, an estate in fee may be devised to one, and to be in another upon a contingency, as default of paying a sum, or such a one's dying without issue living the other, or such like. *1 Augb. 259. 270.*

A man devised his lands to one, and devised also that the said devisee should pay a rent to *A.* and that *A.* might distrain for it ; and if the devisee fail of the payment of the rent, that the heirs of the devisor might enter. This is a good distress, and a good condition. *1 Lev. 269.*

Devise to his wife ; proviso, and my will is, that she shall keep my house in good repair ; this is a good condition. So a devise of lands to one, paying 10 l. to another, is a good condition. *1 Lev. 174.*

Devise of 100 l. to his wife, for and in discharge of her dower ; is a condition, that she shall not have the 100 l. till she make a discharge of her dower. *Gro. Eliz. 274.*

If a man deviseth land to an executor to be sold ; this amounts to a condition. *1 Inst. 236.*

The mortgagee by will remits part of the mortgage money and all the interest, *if the rest be paid* within three years. If the mortgagor doth not pay within three years, he loses the benefit of the bequest. *1 Cha. Ca. 51.*

If lands are devised in fee, upon condition that the devisee shall not alien ; this condition is void : And so it is of a feoffment, grant, release, confirmation, or any other conveyance whereby a fee simple doth pass. For it is absurd and repugnant to reason, that he who hath no possibility to have the land revert to him, should restrain his feoffee in fee simple, of all his power to alien. And so it is, if a man be possessed of a lease for years, or of a horse, or of any other chattel real or personal, and give or sell his whole interest or property therein upon condition that the donee or vendee shall not alien the same ; this is void :

because his whole interest and property is out of him, so is he hath no possibility of a reverter : and if such condition should be good, it would oust him of all the power which the law gives him, which would be against reason, and therefore such a condition is void. *1 Inst. 223.*

When the devise is to an infant, when he shall be born ; or to a daughter when she shall be married ; it shall descend to the heir in the mean time. *1 Sid. 153.*

The testator, having the reversion of lands of which another was tenant for life, devised the lands to a man when he should marry his daughter. The tenant for life dies. The lands shall descend, until the devisee shall marry the daughter. *1 Keb. 802.*

If executors or others who are put in trust by devise to sell, or the like, will not perform the trust : the heir may enter. *Br. Devise, 46.*

A devise of lands was made, to the eldest daughter, paying 100 l. to the second daughter, and 100 l. to the third daughter ; and if the eldest daughter did not pay the 100 l. to the second daughter by such a day, then the testator devised the land to the second daughter, she paying her sister's portion by a certain day ; and if she did not pay, then he devised the land to the third daughter. It was resolved, this was not in the nature of a mortgage, to be redeemable after the time of payment was over ; but that the eldest daughter not paying at the time appointed, the second daughter should have the land, and the eldest had no relief. *2 Freem. 206.*

The testator devised lands to one, upon condition to pay 30,000 l. to his granddaughter and heir at law, to wit, 1000 l. a year for the first sixteen years, and 2000 l. a year after till the whole should be paid. Of which, 1000 l. being in arrear, the heir enters. It was resolved by Cowper lord chancellor, that the devisee of the lands should be relieved upon paying the 1000 l. with interest ; the court declaring, that they would relieve wherever they could give satisfaction or compensation for the breach of the condition. *1 Salk. 156. 2 Vern. 594.*

Where the devisee, who is to perform the condition, is heir at law, notice of a condition must be given to him ; because he having a title by descent need not take notice of any will, unless it be signified to him : But where the devisee is a stranger, and not heir, he must inform himself of the estate devised to him, and upon what terms, and must take notice of the condition at his peril. *Cart.*

1 Ventr. 200.

Devise tending
to perpetuity.

23. Devises, as well as other settlements, which tend to introduce perpetuity, are void; for wills, tho' favourably expounded, are yet to be construed according to the common rules of the courts at law and equity: Hence it is, that a devise to John and his heirs, the remainder to Thomas and his heirs, is void; for that the law in no case will allow a limitation of a fee simple upon a fee simple; because by a devise to John and his heirs, the devisor hath transferred the whole estate to him, and then the limitation over must be impertinent and void, when the devisor before had given the whole estate. Nor can his devise be good by way of future interest, or a remainder to vest upon a contingency; because no man can say when the heirs of John will fail: and to allow the remainder to Thomas to be good upon such a distant contingency, is to perpetuate the estate in the family of John, to preserve a remainder or interest in Thomas, which probably may never vest. *Gilb. 116. 2 Bac. Abr. 80.*

But tho' the law will not allow a present remainder to be limited upon a fee, yet a future contingent estate may be limited upon a fee, where the contingency upon which it is to vest, is to happen in a short time: And therefore if a devise be made to John and his heirs, and if he die without issue, living Thomas, then to Thomas and his heirs; there nothing vests immediately in Thomas, because the whole estate is transferred to John; yet the limitation is good by way of executory interest or devise; because it is to vest on a contingency which is to happen on a life in being, therefore out of the inconvenience or danger of a perpetuity; because John is only tied up from alienating but for life, and his heirs are at liberty to dispose of it after the death of Thomas. *Gilb. 116.*

The utmost length that has hitherto been allowed for the contingency of an executory devise to happen in, is that of a life or lives in being, and one and twenty years afterwards. As when lands are devised to such unborn son of a feme covert, as shall first attain the age of twenty-one, and his heirs; the utmost length of time that can happen before the estate can vest, is the life of the mother and the subsequent infancy of her son: and this hath been decreed to be a good executory devise. *2 Blackst. 174. (n)*

(n) Vid. *supra*, Of what things, 5.

If a man devise a *personal* chattel to one, the remainder of it to another; the first devisee hath the whole property, and may dispose of it as he pleaseth: for such chattels will bear no limitation over, because being commonly moveable things, they are subject to be broken, worn out, or lost, in the compass of a life: and therefore it were ridiculous to suffer a limitation, which the nature of the thing will not bear. *Gilb. 117.*

But otherwise it is of a *real* chattel, as of an use: It was indeed formerly held, that such limitations of remainders of terms are void: but at length the court of chancery interposed, to rectify the rigour of the common law, and hath settled such remainders of terms to be good, where the settlement doth not tend to introduce perpetuity. *Gilb. 118.*

Therefore if a term be devised to John and the heirs male of his body, provided if John dies without issue in the life of Thomas, then the term to go to another; this last limitation is good, because there is no danger of a perpetuity, for the contingency on which it is to vest is to happen within a life in being. *Gilb. 118.*

But if the limitation had been to John in tail, and the remainder over to another; here the last limitation had been void, because the whole property of the term being in John, the limitation over, which is to vest on the contingency of John's dying without issue, is too distant to expect: whereas in the former case, the limitation after the intail to John is good by way of future interest or executory devise, because it is to vest in the compass of a life, or not at all; and it doth not look like a perpetuity, to oblige John from alienating because the estate will be free from the clog when the life is spent, and whoever is proprietor afterwards may dispose of it at pleasure. *Gib. 119.*

E. 1731. Fereyes and Robertson. A man by his will deviseth his leasehold estate, and other his chattels real, to his son William and to the issue of his body; and if he die without issue, to his son B. and the issue of his body; and if he die without issue, to C. and so on. By the whole court, The whole interest vests in William, and shall go to his executors or administrators, and the limitations over are void. *Burnb. 301.*

But a lease assigned in trust for A. for life, remainder to B. for life, with remainder to twenty other persons all in being at the time, is good; because they are like candles all lighted at a time, and have an

easy common probability of determination. *Law of Test.* 99.

So to *A.* for life, remainder to his first issue for life, is good; because no vast uncertain distance of time. *Law of Test.* 99

In general, it seemeth to be agreed, that where the devise or grantee of a leasehold would be tenant in tail in case of a freehold, he shall have the whole interest in the leasehold, and all limitations over are void; but where he would be only tenant for life in case of a freehold, the limitation of the leasehold over will be good.

Money cannot be devised from one to another; as for instance, the testator had three daughters to whom he devised 540 *l.* equally to be divided; and if any of them died without issue, her part to go to the survivor; one of them married and died without issue; the husband exhibited a bill against the executor and the surviving sisters for his wife's part, being 180 *l.*; and had a decree: because a sum of money cannot be intailed. 2 *Ventr.* 349.

So in the case of *Butterfield* and *Butterfield*, *Oct.* 29, 1748; where money was devised to one for life, and the heirs of his body; and if he died without heirs of his body, then to go over: it was held, that the whole property vested in the first taker, the limitation being too remote. And it was said to be an established rule, that where personal estate is given for life, and then to the indefinite heirs of the body, there being no recovery by which the intail of personal estate can be barred, the first taker may dispose of it as he pleases: and tho' a personal cannot descend as a real estate, yet if it was intended to go in that course of descent, which would be an intail of land, the first taker has the absolute property, and the remainder over cannot take effect. 1 *Vent.* 133.

[Devise of the use of chattels personal.]

But the use of chattels personal may be bequeathed to one for life; and after, the property to another: so that if one will that *A.* shall enjoy the use of his household stuff during his life, and after that it shall remain to *B.*; this is a good devise thereof to *B.* But if the property of the thing be bequeathed to the first of them, then it is otherwise; for the gift of a chattel personal, tho' but for an hour, is a gift thereof for ever; provided that the testator make it absolute, and not conditional. *Swin.* a. 207. 1 *P. Will.* 651.

A devise of goods to *A.* for life, with remainder after the decease of *A.* to *B.* It was said to be now clearly settled, that it is a good devise to *B.* and that *B.* may exhibit

hibit a bill against *A.* to compel him to give security that the goods shall be forthcoming at his decease: and is all one whether the goods or use of the goods be devised for life. 2 *Freem.* 206.

M. 1696. *Hyde and Parrot.* The testator bequeathed all his household goods to his wife for life, and after to his son: It is a good devise over, and the same as if the devise had been only of the use of them for her life. And by Lord Somers: It is a rule, where personal chattels are devised for a limited time, it shall be intended the use of them only, and not the thing itself. 2 *Vern.* 331.

M. 1702. *Hale and Burrodale.* A farmer devised his stock, which consisted of corn, hay, cattle, and the like, to his wife for life, and after her death to the plaintiff. It was objected, that no remainder can be limited over of such chattels as these, because the use of them is to spend and consume them. But the master of the rolls said, the devise over was good: but said, if any of the cattle were worn out in using, the defendant was not to be answerable for them; and if any were sold as useless, the defendant was only to answer the value of them at the time of sale. And an account was decreed to be taken accordingly. 1 *Abr. Cas. Eq.* 361.

T. 1720. *Upwell and Halscy.* The testator, being possessed of a personal estate of the value of 333 l. having a wife and sister, but no issue, devised that such part of his estate as his wife should leave of her subsistence should return to his sister and the heirs of her body, and made his wife executrix. The wife married; and died, living her husband. The master of the rolls said, that it is now established, that personal things or money may be devised for life, and the remainder over; and that tho' it be true, that the wife had a power over the principal sum provided it had been necessary, yet not otherwise. And he directed, that the master should inquire how much had been applied for the wife's subsistence, and the husband to account for the residue. 1 *P. Will.* 651. [*S. P. Hyde v. Parrott, lb.* 1.]

Where a man devises goods to go as heir-looms with such an estate, so far as by law they may; the court, to the end that the testator's intention may take effect, will decree a conveyance from him to whom they may come as personalty. *Bernard. Cha. Ca.* 54. (e)

24. A

(e) Chattels, directed to go as heir-looms with an estate, vest absolutely in the first tenant in tail who comes into esse, and

Devise to children yet unborn.

24. A devise to one's children and grandchildren generally refers only to such children and grandchildren as were living at the time of making the will; but if a devise were to one's children and grandchildren living at the time of the death of the testator, a child *in ventre sa mere* might in such a case be so far regarded as to be looked upon as living. 1 *P. Will.* 342.

For a devise to an infant *in ventre sa mere* is good; and the freehold shall descend in the mean time. 1 *Roll's Abr.* 609. 1 *Lev.* 135.

So if a man devises lands to be sold, for the increase of children's portions; a child born since the will shall have a share. 2 *Cha. Rep.* 211. (p)

So where a man conveyed a term for 500 years, upon trust to raise 1500 l. for such child or children as he should have living at his death; and died, leaving no child, but his wife ensient of a daughter, which was after born: It was decreed, that this daughter was a child living at his death, within the meaning of the trust. And the direction of a trust is not so strictly construed as the limitation of an estate at law; and in *Lutterel's* case, in lord *Bridgman's* time, a bill was brought on behalf of an infant *in ventre sa mere* to stay waste, and an injunction was granted. *Hale and Hale, Prec. Ch.* 50.

And by the 10 & 11 *W. c.* 16. Where any estate shall, by any marriage or other settlement, be limited in remainder to, or to the use of the first or other son or sons of the body of any person lawfully begotten, with remainder over to the use of any other person; or in remainder to, or to the use of a daughter lawfully begotten, with remainder over to any other person: any son or daughter of such person lawfully begotten, that shall be born after the decease of his father, may by virtue of such settlement take such estate so limited, in the same manner as if born in the lifetime of their father; altho' there shall happen no estate to be limited to trustees, after the decease of the father, to preserve the contingent re-

and go to his representative. *Foley v. Burnell*, 1 *Bro.* 274. *Vaughan v. Burslem*, 3 *Bro.* 101.

(p) Devise to trustees to permit T. C. to receive the rents for his life, and after his death to sell the estate and divide the money amongst all and every the child and children of T. C. at the age of twenty-one. *Sir L. Kenyon, M. R.* decreed that a child born after the death of testatrix shall take. *Congreve v. Congreve*, 1 *Bro.* 530.

mainder to such after-born children until they shall come in *esse* (q).

T. 11 G. 2. Jones and Fulham. The testator, being possessed of a term, devised it in these words: "To my wife for her life; and after her decease, to such child as my said wife is now supposed to be with child and enient of, and his heirs for ever: Provided always that if such child, as shall happen to be born as aforesaid, shall die before it has attained the age of 21 years, leaving no issue of its body; then the reversion of one third part to my said wife, and the other two thirds to my sisters." The testator dying within a month after, the wife entred, and enjoyed during her life, but had no child or miscarriage. And upon her death the question was, Whether, as no child had ever been born, the remainders, limited upon his dying under 21 without issue, could take effect. And after several arguments, it was held by the court of king's bench, that they might; that tho' formerly there had been opinions to the contrary, yet according to the law now settled, the devise to the infant in ventre sa mere was well limited, and if any child had been born, would have passed the term accordingly: secondly, that tho' no child was ever born, yet the remainders are notwithstanding good; for there being no devisee, the devise, tho' void only ex post facto, falls to the ground as much as if it had been void in its creation, and this lets in the remainders immediately: that tho' the clause by which the remainders are limited is in words, strictly speaking, conditional, yet they do not make it a condition, but only a limitation. Lastly, that the contingencies must happen within a reasonable time: and therefore it may well operate by way of executory devise. And they said they had seen the decretal order in the court of chancery, by which it appeared, that the same question, arising upon this same will and concerning the same premisses, came before lord Harcourt; and that he

(q) In *Reeve v. Long*, *Salk.* 228. 3 *Lev.* 408, The objection that there were no trustees to preserve contingent remainders, and that therefore the freehold must be in abeyance, prevailed in the opinion of all the judges. The house of peers, perhaps influenced by the hardship of the case, reversed the judgment of the courts below, and soon after procured this statute to be passed, to settle the point. See *Ld. Kenyon's opinion in Lancashire v. Lancashire*, 5 *T. Rep.* 60. See also 1 *T. Rep.* 634. *Har. Co. Lit.* 298. n. *Bul. N. P.* 105.

was of opinion, that the devise over of the reversion in thirds to the wife and two sisters was good, notwithstanding the wife was not ensient with any child. *Vin. Devise, L. 53.*

In what case
maintenance
shall be implied.

25. The father settled a lease, with reference to his will: in which he gave 500 l. to each of his daughters, to be paid at the age of twenty one; and if any or all died before that age, then to others; but devised no maintenance to them till their portions became payable: By the court, a maintenance cannot be decreed, because of the devise over. *1 Chan. Cas. 249. 3 Salk. 127.*

But if there is no devise over, the court will decree a maintenance in the mean time: Thus in the case of *Harvey and Harvey, E. 1722.* The father seised of a real estate, and possessed of a personal estate, and having several children, deviseth all his real and personal estate to his eldest son, charging the same with 1000 l. apiece to all his younger children, payable at their respective ages of twenty-one; but in the will no notice is taken of maintenance for the younger children in the mean time. The younger children bring their bill, in order to recover interest, or some maintenance during their infancy. Upon which the master of the rolls, having taken time to consider of the case, and having been also attended with precedents, decreed, that the younger children should recover maintenance. He observed, that these being vested legacies, and no devise over, it would be extreme hard that the children should starve, when entitled to so considerable legacies, for the sake of their executors or administrators, who in case of their deaths would have the said legacies: That in this case, the court would do, what in common presumption the father, if living, would (nay ought to) have done; which was, to provide necessities for his children. *2 P. Will. 22.*

Household stuff.

26. It is usual in wills to devise all the household stuff; by which words plate about the house, and not for ornament, passeth; but books, cattle, clothes, coaches, corn, carts, ploughs, waggons, and any thing fixed to the freehold, will not pass by that word. *Swin. a. 185.*

Household goods
and furniture.

27. By a devise of household goods, plate will pass. *2 Vern. 628. 3 Atkyns, 370.*

T. 1727. Nichols and Osborn. The testatrix devised all her household goods to J. S. The question was, Whether by the devise of the household goods the plate should pass? Tho' it was reported on a reference to a master, that

that there were manifest intentions and declarations of the testatrix, that she did not intend the plate should pass; yet the master certifying that the plate was commonly used in the house, all the evidence touching the intention of the party was rejected, there being a compleat and plain will in writing, which must not be altered or influenced by parol proof. 2 *P. Will.* 419.

If a man deviseth 1200 l. to J. S. and by general words deviseth all his goods chattels and household goods in and about his house to the said J. S.; money in the house will not pass, he having a particular legacy devised to him. *Swin. a.* 185.

By a devise of jewels, plate, pictures, medals, and furniture; it was decreed by lord Hardwicke, that a *library of books* did not pass under the word furniture. 3 *Atk.* 202. (r)

28. It is usual likewise to devise all the goods moveable and immoveable: Now by the civil law, actions and rights of actions pass by the word moveables, especially when the words of universality are repeated in the will; as, I give to T. S. all my moveable goods and immoveable, of what kind soever, or wheresoever found. *Swin. a.* 185.

All his goods
what it implies.

One deviseth all his goods; and whether a debt by bond passed to the devisee was the question: Decreed by lord chancellor Cowper that it did; that these words seemed at common law to pass a bond, and to extend to all the personal estate; but this being in the case of a will, and a will relating to a personal estate too, it ought to be construed according to the rules of the civil law: now the civil law makes *bona mobilia* and *bona immobilia* the *membra dividenda* of all estates; *bona immobilia* are land, *bona mobilia* are all moveables, which must extend to bonds, and therefore by the devise of all the testator's goods, a bond must pass. 1 *P. Will.* 267. (s)

By

(r) Under a bequest of *household furniture*, plate in the house at the testator's death, whether in common use or not, if suitable to the rank of the testator, pictures hung up, linen, and china, will pass; but books in a library will not. *Sir G. Kelly v. Powell, Amb.* 605. Neither will jewels *occasionally worn* pass by the bequest of "a cabinet of curiosities," although usually shewn with it. *Cavendish v. Cavendish*, 1 *Bro.* 467.

(s) But where the testator gave to "R. M. all his goods and chattels in Suffolk," and died, having goods and chattels there, and also in other counties. Lord Thurlow C. held that a bond found in Suffolk did not pass, because though accounted *inter bona notabilia* of the diocese where it is found, (1 *Re. Ab.* 909.) being a chose

By a devise of all his goods, a lease for years will pass; if there be not some other circumstance to guide the intent of the deviser. *Swin. 2. 200.*

But where a man devised to his niece *all his goods, chattels, household stuff, furniture, and other things which then were, or should be in his house at the time of his death*, and died, leaving about 265 l. in ready money in the house; it was decreed, that this ready money did not pass: for by the words *other things* shall be intended things of like nature and species with those before mentioned. *M. 1729. Trafford and Berridge. 1 Abr. Eq. Cas. 201.*

So where a man devised so much of his *personal estate as should be and remain on such an estate at his death*; and there were, amongst other things, corn, household goods, plate, and 400 l. in money; it was decreed by the lord chancellor Hardwicke, that all stock on the farm, live and dead, and all stores on the lands, did pass; but that the 400 l. did not pass by the devise. *Inledon and Northcote, Mar. 2, 1746. 3 Atk. 437. (1)*

So where a man devised to his wife *all his household goods and other goods, plate, and stock within doors and without*, and bequeathed the *residue* of his personal estate to another; it was decreed, that the testator's ready money and bonds did not pass by the word *goods*: for if the words were to be taken in so large a sense, it would make void the bequest of the residuum; and therefore the words *other goods* should be understood to signify things of the like nature with *household goods*, that the whole will might have its effect. *3 P. Will. 112.*

Chattels.

29. Chattels are of two kinds, real and personal. Real chattels are such as concern or favour of the realty; as terms for years of land, the next presentation to a church, and the like. Chattels personal (which are what are commonly to be understood when goods and chattels are given by will) are properly things moveable, which may be annexed to or attendant on the *person* of the owner, and car-

a chose in action it has not that *locality* which can attach it to a particular place. *Moore v. Moore, 1 Bro. 127.* See also *Chapman v. Hart, 1 Vez. 271.* where lord Hardwicke says, that such a devise relates to the death of the testator, and the goods if removed before, (except contingently, as for fear of fire, or by the owner being ordered from ship to ship,) do not pass. See also *Green v. Symonds, 1 Bro. 129.*

(1) But ready money in a house, (including bank notes,) if not an extraordinary sum, will pass by a devise of all things in the house. *Proc. in Cha. 8. Chapman v. Hart, 1 Vez. 271.*

ne

ried about with him from one part of the world to another. Such are animals, household stuff, money, jewels, corn, garments, and every thing else that can properly be put in motion, and transferred from place to place. 2 *Blackst.* b. 2. c. 24.

By a devise of all his chattels, the devisee shall not have glass of the windows, wainscot, tables dormant, fats in the brewhouse fixed to the freehold, nor furnaces, nor the box or chest where the testator's evidences are; nor doves in the dove house, nor fishes in the pond, nor deer in the park: for these things belong all to the heir. *Curf.* 181.

30. If a man seised of land for life, or in fee, or in tail, in his wife's right or his own, sows it with corn or any manner of grain, and dies before severance; it shall go to the executor of the husband, and not to the wife or heir that shall have the land. *Went.* 59. *Swin.* 214. 2 *Inst.* 81. *Hob.* 132.

Lands, implies the corn growing thereon.

But where a man was seised of land in fee, and sowed the land, and *devised* the same, and died before severance; it was adjudged, that in this case the devisee should have the corn; and not the executors of the devisor; for the devisee, in relation to the chattels belonging to the land, is put in the place of the executors, by the words of the will. *M.* 20 *Ja.* *Spencer's case.* *Winch.* 51. *Swin.* 2. 183.

So if a man seised in fee sows copyhold lands, and surrenders them to the use of his wife, and dies before the severance: it seems that the wife shall have the corn, and not the executors of the husband: for this is a disposition of the corn, it being appurtenant to the land: and since the husband hath disposed of it during his life, it cannot go to his executors. 1 *Roll's Abr.* 727.

And the reason why the corn passeth to the donee as appertaining to the soil when the property of the soil alters, and yet shall not descend to the heir, as appertaining to the soil when the property of the soil remains in the first owner, is this: Because every man's donation shall be taken most strongly against himself; and therefore it shall pass not only the land itself, but the chattels that belong to the land. But no chattels can *descend* to the heir, and therefore they go to the executor. *Gilbert's Law of Evid.* 250.

So if land be *sold*; the corn growing shall go to the purchaser of the land, unless specially excepted. *Went.* 59.

A per-

A person seised in fee sows the land, and after grants it to *A.* for life, remainder to *B.*; *A.* enters, and dies before the corn is severed: His executors or administrators shall not have the crop, because he was not at any charge or industry, but *B.* shall have it. *Hob. 132.*

Generally, the distinction seemeth to be, where the estate is determined by the act of the party himself, and where it is determined by the act of another.

And therefore Littleton saith, if the lessee, being *tenant at will*, sow the land, and the lessor after it is sown, and before the corn is ripe, put him out; yet the lessee shall have the corn, and shall have free entry, egress and regress, to cut and carry away the corn, because he knew not at what time the lessor would enter upon him. Otherwise it is, if *tenant for years*, who knoweth the end of his term, sows the land, and his term ends before the corn is ripe; in this case, the lessor or he in the reversion shall have the corn, because the lessee knew the certainty of his term and when it would end. *Litt. sect. 68.*

And the reason why the tenant at will shall have the corn is, because his estate is uncertain; and therefore lest the ground should be unmanured, which would be hurtful to the publick, he shall reap the crop which he sowed in peace, albeit the lessor doth determine his will before it be ripe. And so it is, if he set roots, or sow hemp, or flax, or any other annual profit; if after the same be planted, the lessor oust the lessee, or if the lessee dieth, yet he or his executors shall have that year's crop. But if he plant young fruit trees, or young oaks, ashes, elms, or the like, or sow the ground with acorns; there the lessor may put him out notwithstanding, because they will yield no present annual profit.—And this is not only proper to a lessee at will, that when the lessor determines his will, the lessee shall have the corn sown; but to every particular tenant that hath an estate uncertain. And therefore if tenant *for life* soweth the ground, and dieth; his executors shall have the corn: for that his estate was uncertain, and determined by the act of God.—And the same law is of the *lessee for years of tenant for life*.—So if a man be seised of land *in the right of his wife*, and soweth the ground, and he dieth; his executors shall have the corn, and if his wife die before him, he shall have the corn. But if husband and wife be jointenants of the land, and the husband soweth the ground, and the land surviveth to the wife; it is said that she shall have the corn.—So if a woman seised in fee or for life sows the

he land, and then takes a husband, and he dies before he severance; the wife shall have the profits, and not the executors of the husband: for the corn committed to the ground is a chattel real, which is annexed and belonging to the freehold; and not a chattel personal, annexed to the freehold and transferred. And therefore if the husband doth not dispose of it during his life, it belongs to the wife and not to the husband.——So if the husband sows the land, and dies before severance; the wife shall have the third part of the land so sown for her ~~husband~~: for she shall be in the best possession of her husband, above the title of the executor; and it would be unreasonable, if her husband had all corn land, that she should stay for her subsistence for a whole year, till the crop should be renewed.—If a man seised of lands in fee with issue a daughter, and dieth, his wife being *ensueit* with a son; the daughter soweth the ground; the son is born; yet the daughter shall have the corn, because her state was lawful, and defeated by the act of God; and it is good for the commonwealth that the ground be sown.—But if the *lessee at will* sow the ground with corn, and after he himself determine his will, and refuseth to occupy the ground; in that case the lessor shall have the corn, because he loseth his rent.—And if a woman that holdeth land *during her widowhood*, soweth the ground, and taketh husband; the lessor shall have the corn, because the determination of her own estate grew by her own act.—But where the estate of the lessee being uncertain is defeasible by a title paramount; or if the lease determine by the act of the lessee, as by forfeiture, condition, or the like: there, he that hath the right paramount, or that entreth ~~for~~ any forfeiture or the like, shall have the corn.——So if a *disseisor* sow the ground, and sever the corn, and he who is disseised re-enter; he shall have the corn, because he entreth by a former title; and severance or re-~~turning~~ of the corn altereth not the case: for the regrest ~~the~~ continuation of the freehold in him in judgment of ~~the~~ from the beginning. 1 *Inst.* 55. 2 *Inst.* 81. 1 *Roll's* *Ar.* 727.

31. Generally, by the ecclesiastical law, all conditions ~~against~~ the liberty of marriage are unlawful, as being a ~~restraint~~ on the natural liberty of mankind, and an ~~hindrance~~ to the propagation of the species.

So if the condition be, that the legatee marry according to the appointment, arbitrament, or consent of some other person, this is rejected as unlawful. *Godolphin's Orphans Legacy*, 45.

Devise in restraint of marriage.

But

But if the conditions are only such as whereby marriage is not absolutely prohibited, but only in part restrained, as in respect of time, place, or person; then such conditions are not absolutely to be rejected. *God. O. L. 45.*

So if the condition be, not to marry before the age of twenty years, this condition is to be performed; otherwise, if it is continued to an unreasonable length.

So if the condition be, not to marry such a particular person, or a widow, or of one particular place, or the like (u).

Generally

(u) The ecclesiastical law has borrowed this doctrine from the Roman law, in which the *Lex Julia de Maritandis Ordinibus*, introduced by Augustus*, made all conditions prohibiting marriage void, and conferred rewards and honours on those who had numerous families of children. The necessity of enacting this law we collect from the historians and satirists to have been a singular love of celibacy which pervaded the rich, who were induced to remain unmarried by the respect which was paid them by all who wished to share their inheritance. Petronius observes, "in this city no one educates children." And in *A. Gelius*, 1. 6. we find Metellus Numidius gravely advising his countrymen to marry; because "though they cannot live comfortably with their wives, it is impossible they should live without them entirely, and they should therefore prefer their lasting welfare to a short gratification." So great a corruption of manners required the interference of the legislature. It is agreed that a condition restraining a person who had never been married, from marriage generally, was by this law rendered void, and the legacy vested absolutely; but a legacy to a widow, on condition *that she should remain a widow*, might be claimed by her if she married within a year, swearing that she did so for the sake of procreating children; but after the lapse of the year she was compelled to give security for the performance of the condition. This Justinian altered in his Code, 6. 38. 2. & 3. permitting widows in such cases to marry, *maritorum suorum interminatione sprete*; though he changed his opinion in the novels, and required them in all such cases to give the *cautio antoniana*, which bound them to restore the legacy if they broke the condition. *Nov. 22. c. 43.* But though by the law of the Digest and Code, conditions prohibiting marriage in general were

* This law was also called *Julia Papia*, *Papia Poppæa*, and in the Code *Julia Miscella*; which various names were probably given to different chapters of it. See Cujac. *Paratit. in Cod. 6. 40.* and *Leges Romanæ*, subjoined to Calvin's *Lexicon*.

Generally in the temporal courts, the distinction seemeth to have been, where the legacy is devised over to another, and where it is not devised over: in the former case it hath been held, that the restraint shall be good, so as the legacy shall not be due, unless the condition be performed; but in the latter case, where there is no devise over, it hath been held, that the proviso or condition is only in terrorem, to make the person careful, but not to defeat the legacy. 1 Cha. Ca. 22. 1 Vern. 20. 2 Vern. 293, 357. (x)

Also

Set aside thus, *Si non nupserit—si in viduitate permanferit,—si nupserit Titio scil. indigno,—si arbitrato Titii nupserit,—Patri si filia quam in potestate habet non nupserit—filio familias si pater ejus uxorem non duxerit; Dig. 35. 1. passim; and this though the legacy were given over, thus, Titio restituat si nubat; Ib. l. 22.; yet the following conditions were allowed, as appears by the same title; Filiae meae cum nupserit,—si cum Titio nupta erit,—si neque Titio neque Seio neque Marcio nupserit,—si Ariciae non nupserit,—Titio, si Seiam uxorem duxerit,—uxori, si a liberis impuberibus me (non) nupserit,—dum cum filio meo erit,—dum cum filio meo Caput erit; Dig. 32. 3. 30. § 5. And the reason is, that the testator in the latter cases seems to regard the care and education of his children rather than to enjoin perpetual widowhood; and though a condition restrictive of marriage generally was void, yet one deferring it to a certain day, or making it to depend on some contingency, if not in fraud of the law, was allowed; Dig. 35. 1. 72. § 5. with the Com. of M. Potbier ad Pand. in Nov. Ord. digestæ, No. 33. If these restraints on marriage were thought reasonable in the civil law, they must appear much more so in ours, which does not provide with equal anxiety against improper and unequal marriages; especially as that excessive love of celibacy has not yet been experienced in this country, and it has become the policy of the law to protect the property of young persons till they arrive at an age of discretion which may enable them to take care of it themselves. Nevertheless, in *Long v. Dennis*, 4 Bur. 2052. Lord Mansfield and the other judges agreed, that conditions in restraint of marriage ought to be construed with the utmost rigour and strictness.*

(x) See however the case of *Scott v. Tyler post.*; and note, it has been decided that where there is an alternative gift, as 10l. a year at all events to a grand-daughter, but if she marries with the good liking of trustees, 150l. in lieu of the annuity, if she marry without such consent, equity will not relieve so as to give her the larger portion. *Gillet v. Wray*, 1 P. Wms. 284. A devise of the residue has also been holden tantamount to a devise over of the specifick legacy. *Scott v. Tyler*, 2 Bro. 431. But where the

Also in the temporal courts a distinction is made where a portion is charged on the personalty, and where it is charged on land. If it is charged on the personalty, they follow the rule of the ecclesiastical court, which hath jurisdiction as to the personalty; but if it is charged on land, of which the ecclesiastical court hath no jurisdiction, they follow the rule of the common law courts, which on non-performance of the condition will not suffer the portion to be raised (y). In the case of *Harvey and Aston*, Apr. 30, 1737; Sir Thomas Aston by settlement after marriage created a term in trust by mortgage or sale to raise 2000l. for each of his daughters portions, “ provided they marry with their mother’s consent, and “ if either die before marriage with such consent, her “ portion to cease, and the premises to be discharged; “ and if raised, then to be paid to the person to whom “ the premises shou’d belong:” and afterwards by will created another trust term to augment their fortunes 2000l. apiece more, but *subject to the condition as in the settlement*, and gave the residue over and above 2000l. apiece to his wife: and by a codicil created another trust term for the better raising of his daughters portions. Sir Thomas died, leaving issue two daughters. One of them married after the age of 21, and the other before the age of 21, and both of them without the consent of their mother. Sir Joseph Jekyl, master of the rolls, decreed the portions to be paid. But on appeal from this decree, the lord chancellor Hardwicke, assisted by the two chief justices Lee and Willes, and the chief baron Comyns, reversed the decree; and argued, first, that it is the right and liberty of the subject, who makes a voluntary disposition of his own property, to dispose of it in what manner, and upon what terms and conditions he pleaseth. Secondly, that it is an established maxim of law, that if an estate in land, or interest out of the land, is limited to commence upon a condition precedent, nothing can vest or take effect, till the condition is performed. And this is so strong and so settled a point, that altho’ the previous

the condition of marrying is annexed, it is necessary that the marriage should take place to vest the legacy, although the consent of particular persons should be dispensed with. *Garbut v. Hilton*, 1 Ark. 381. *Atkins v. Riccocks*, ib. 500.

(y) *Add*, Or if it be raised, and the condition subsequent be broken, will divest the estate. 1 Roll. *ib.* 418. pl. 6. *Fry v. Pottier*, 1 Cha. Ca. 138.

act was at first impossible by the act of God, or other accident, the estate can never vest. Thirdly, that it is most agreeable to the rules of equity, to direct the execution of the trust according to the intent of him who appointed the trust.—It is said, that a trust is to be construed favourably: and it is true, it is to be construed with as much advantage as may be to make good and answer the intent and design of the party, but it is to be construed strictly with regard to the execution of the trust; and therefore it would be a strange thing, when the trust directs the trustees to pay the money at the time of the daughter's marriage with her mother's consent, that the court should direct them to pay the money before that time. Fourthly, that a restraint in the present case is not only lawful, but prudent and reasonable; and no consequence more likely to ensue from it, than the hindrance of an inconsiderate or imprudent marriage. *Comyns 744. Cas. Talb. 212. 1 Atk. 361.*

T. 1743. Pulling and Reddy. By the lord chancellor Hardwicke: If a legacy be given to a woman upon this condition, that she marry with the consent of a third person, and there be no devise over in case she marry without such consent; this is only to be considered *in terram*: but if there be a devise over, then it shall go to whom it is so devised over. This rule is taken from the civil law, as this court hath a concurrent jurisdiction as to legacies. But if a portion be to arise out of land, and there is no devise over, in that case she shall not have it, but it shall go to the heir; for the spiritual court hath no jurisdiction as to lands. There may be some doubt (he said) where money is given to be laid out in lands. *1 Wilson 21.*

May 5, 1746. Reynish and Martin. Elizabeth Philips by her will devised her real estate to her daughter Martha and her heirs for ever; and then says, "If my daughter Mary marry with the consent of the trustees (therein particularly named) or the major part of them, signified in writing before such marriage had, then and not otherwise I give and devise to my said daughter Mary the sum of 800 l.:" And after comes a clause, "And I do hereby charge all my aforesaid real estate with all my debts of all kind, and with all my legacies." The testatrix died, leaving issue the said two daughters Martha and Mary. Mary married Thomas Reynish the plain- without the consent of the trustees. And the bill brought by Thomas Reynish, as representative and

administrator of Mary his wife, for an account of the personal estate, and that the same might be applied in payment of the said legacy of 800 l. ; and in case the personal estate should not be sufficient, that then the real estate, or so much thereof as will make good the deficiency, might be sold, and the money arising therefrom applied for that purpose. This case coming on to be heard at the rolls, the personal estate not being sufficient, Fortescue master of the rolls decreed the real estate to be sold for payment of the legacy. The defendants appealed from the decree, and the cause now standing for judgment, lord Hardwicke delivered his opinion to the following effect : First, I will consider this as if it had been a mere personal legacy, and payable out of the personal estate. Secondly, I will consider it as if it had been charged on the real estate originally. As to the first, I apprehend, that taking this as a mere personal legacy, the plaintiff by the rules of the civil and ecclesiastical law, and which have been constantly adhered to in this court, will be intitled to the legacy ; for it is an established rule in the civil law, and has long been the doctrine of this court, that where a personal legacy is given to a child on condition of marrying with consent, this is not looked on as a condition annexed to the legacy, but as a declaration of the testator *in terrorem* : And indeed the civil law makes such conditions void, notwithstanding the legacy be given over, but that has not been received so in this court ; but whenever the legacy is given over for breach of the condition, the gift over shall take place upon this foundation, because it thereby appears clearly that the person to whom it was given over, was in the mind and contemplation of the testator at the time of making his will ; but in the present case there is no such gift over. The second consideration is, what the consequence will be, taking this legacy as a charge originally laid upon the lands, and not merely personal. In the will it is first of all a personal legacy, issuing out of personal estate ; but then the testatrix afterwards, at the close of her will, charges all her real estate with all her debts and legacies. If it had been originally charged upon the land, and given upon the condition before mentioned, it could not have been contended that the plaintiff could have recovered it after breach of the condition ; and indeed it would be contrary to the rule of the common law (to decree for the plaintiff) which always favours the heir, and contrary to the determination in *Harvey and Ashton*, for the

the difference taken there is, that this court follows the rule of the civil law, because that was the original jurisdiction for the recovery of personal legacies; but whenever land is in question, or to be affected, this court followeth the rule of the common law; and in all cases, whereof this court takes cognizance of suit, where the original jurisdiction arises in another court, the rule of this court is always to follow the law of that other court; for if this court did not pursue that rule, there would be different remedies in different courts, which would create great inconvenience, and the rule of right in different courts would be different. But though this be so in the case of a personal legacy, it is not so in regard to lands affected or charged with legacies, because the property of land must be governed by the law of England; and where it is a legacy charged upon land, it must have the same consideration as a devise of the land itself would have had. And I am of opinion, if this case stood as an original charge upon land, the plaintiff could have no right to demand it. But this being an original personal legacy, the plaintiff is intitled to have an account of the personal estate of the testatrix, but not of her real estate. But as the personal estate may be exhausted by the payment of debts and legacies, the next question will be, whether this court cannot marshal the assets in such a manner, as to give the plaintiff a remedy out of the real estate: And as the real estate is expressly charged with the payment of all debts and legacies, and this legacy, by the event which has happened, falls out to be a charge upon the personalty only; I am of opinion, that the plaintiff ought to stand in the place of such creditors or legatees as have received a satisfaction out of the personal assets: And to order it so, is the constant rule and practice of this court. 3 Atk. 330. 1 Wilson, 130.

In the case of *Needham and Vernon*, 25 C. 2. Lands were devised in trust for raising portions for daughters, payable upon their marriages with consent of the trustees; but if they married without consent, then to remain over to another. The daughters were old, and never intended to marry, but to lay out their portions in a purchase of annuities for their lives. And it was held that they should have their portions immediately, upon giving security to indemnify against the persons to whom the portions were devised over.—And the like hath been decreed, upon giving security to refund, if the condition should be broken. 1 Abr. Eq. Cas. 111.

[In *Scott v. Tyler*, 2 Bro. 431. the testator Richard Kee directed his trustees to purchase 10,000 l. South-Sea annuities, and willed that one moiety of that stock should be transferred to his god-daughter Margaret Christiana Tyler, of whom he was the putative father, at her age of 21 years, if she should then be unmarried, and the other moiety at her age of 25 years, if she should then also be unmarried; but in case she should marry before 21 *with consent of her mother*, he directed certain settlements to be made, and in case she should die before 25 unmarried, he gave the 10,000 l. to the mother, whom he also made residuary legatee. The daughter, who had other property given her by the will, married under 21 against the consent of her mother, who entered into trade and became a bankrupt; and the question was between the daughter and the assignees of the mother. Per lord Thurlow C. after full argument: "An injunction to ask consent is lawful, as not restraining marriage generally; a condition that a widow shall not marry is not unlawful. An annuity during widowhood; a condition to marry or not marry Titius is good (z). A condition prescribing due ceremonies and place of marriage is good; still more is a condition good which only limits the time to 21, or any other reasonable age, provided it be not used evasively as a cover intending to restrain marriage generally. And it is agreed on all hands, that (however restrictive of marriage) when the legacy is given over to other uses, the testator shall be deemed to regard those uses. I am of opinion, that the daughter having married at eighteen, improvidently (as far as appears) and against the anxious consent of the mother, never came under the description to which the gift of the 10,000 l. South-Sea annuities was attached; it is therefore void, and part of the residue, and belongs to the assignees of the mother."]

Condition not
to give trouble
to the executor.

32. If a legacy be given on condition not to dispute the will, and the legatee commenceth a suit whereby he disputes the validity of the will, yet this is no forfeiture of the legacy, if there was probable cause of contesting it. 3 Bac. Abr. 479.

And even altho' there be no probable cause; yet where a legatee, or other person interested, hath a right to see the will proved in solemn form, his making use of that right cannot (as it seemeth) be deemed a disturbance.

(z) *Stone v. Thred*, 2 Bro. 243.

E. 1724. Nutt and Burrel. The testator gives to *B.* a legacy, on pain of forfeiture of it, in case he should give his wife (whom he made executrix) any trouble in relation to his estate. *B.* brings a bill against the wife, for which there was very little colour, and amongst other things demands his legacy. The chancellor was of opinion that the suit was very frivolous, but would not declare the legacy forfeited. *Cha. Ca. King, 1.*

But in the case of *Cleaver and Spurling, T. 1729.* A person by his will gives a legacy to his daughter, provided that if she or her husband refuse to give a release, or put the executor to any trouble, the same *shall go over to her sister's children.* The daughter and her husband (being within the custom of the city of London) sue for her orphanage part. Decreed, that the legacy was forfeited; for however it might have been construed to be intended only *in terrorem*, yet being devised over, and by that means a right to this legacy being vested in a third person, a court of equity could not divest it or call it back again. *2 Peere Will. 528.*

H. 1710. Webb and Webb. The father gave a legacy of 40*l.* to his son, upon condition that he should not disturb the trustees. They applied to the court for an execution of the trust, and that he might either join with them in a sale, or lose the legacy. And it was decreed accordingly, by Harcourt lord chancellor. *1 P. Will. 136.* [But Mr. Coxe, in his note to this case, observes, that such conditions are considered to be merely *in terrorem*, and therefore void, unless the legacy be given over, as in *Cleaver v. Spurling.*]

33. It is said by some, that if land be devised to one, and after in the same will to another, they shall take it as joint tenants. *Gilb. 159.*

Things devised twice.

But by lord Coke, the last devise taketh place; the same being for so much a countermand of the former part of the will. And of this opinion was lord Hardwicke in the case of *Ulrich and Litchfield* above mentioned, tho' (he said) the later opinions have taken it otherwise. *1 Inst. 112. 2 Atk. 372.*

But as to this, it seemeth that no certain rule can be laid down; but the determination will vary according to the particular circumstances in each will, *2 Atk. 374. (a)*

34. A

(a) If a testator give a pecuniary legacy to *A.* by his will, and in a codicil also give the same *A.* a pecuniary legacy, the legatee

Things which a person hath jointly with another.

34. A devise by one joint tenant of land devisable, which he holdeth in fee, at his death, jointly with a stranger, is not good; But if such devisor doth survive all his companions, then such devise is good. *Perk.* 219.

Also a man cannot bequeath by will any of those goods or chattels which he hath jointly with another, tho' by act in his lifetime he might dispose of his part; if he bequeath his portion thereof to a third person, the legacy is void, and the survivor shall have the whole, notwithstanding the will. But joint merchants are to be excepted out of this rule; for the wares, merchandizes, debts, or duties which they have as joint merchants or partners, shall not survive, but shall go to the executor of him that die; and this by the law of merchants. *Law of Test.* 188.

And by the custom of the city of London, he which holdeth tenements in London jointly with others, may devise that which belongeth to him, without any other severance. *Privileg. Lond.* 145.

In what cases a legacy shall be said to lapse.

35. Generally, *If the legatory die before the legacy be due, the legacy is extinguished.* Insomuch that if the testator by his last will do bequeath his lands and tenements to a man and his heirs; yet if such person die before the testator, the devise is merely void, and his heirs cannot recover the land by force of the will; because the devisee was not in being when the will should take effect; and the word heirs in this case is not a designation of the person who shall take, but a limitation of the estate; for if it was a description of the person, then his widow would be endowed. *Plowd.* 345. *Swin.* 35, 560. *Law of Test.* 230.

legatee is entitled to both sums, except a contrary intention can be collected from the will; but if the same specific thing, as a horse or diamond, be twice given to the same person, it cannot from its nature be doubled. *Ridges v. Morrison*, 1 Bro. 389. *Hosley v. Hatton*, ib. 390, with the authorities there cited. If the same sum of money be twice given to the same person in one writing, the presumption is that one legacy only was intended. And where, in different codicils to a will, legacies have been repeated in such a manner as to shew that the codicils were meant as substitutions for one another, the legatee has been decreed to take under the last only. But this being a question of presumed intention, parol evidence has been admitted to prove the contrary. *Duke of St. Alban's v. Miss Beauchamp*, 2 Atk. 636. *Campbell v. Radner*, 1 Bro. 271. *Coote v. Boyd*, 2 Bro. 521.

And

And so it is, if the devisee of a copyhold die before the devisor; notwithstanding the surrender by the devisor of the copyhold to the use of his will. *Str.* 445.

And so also it is, if the legatee lives as long as the testator, but doth not survive him; for they may both die at one instant, as in a storm at sea they may both be drowned together, or by the falling of a house may both be killed at once: but if the legatee overlive the testator, even tho' it be but for a moment, the legacy is due, and may be recovered by the executors or administrators of the legatee. *Law of Test.* 231.

M. 6 An. Snell and Dee. The testator bequeathed by his will in these words; I give 100 l. apiece to the two children of J. S. at the end of ten years after my decease. The children died within the ten years. And by Cowper lord chancellor, This is a lapsed legacy, and shall not go to the executors of the children: For the diversity is, where the bequest is to take effect at a future time, and where the payment is to be made at a future time: Wherever the time is annexed to the legacy itself, and not to the payment of it; if the legatee dies before the time of payment, it is a lapsed legacy in that case. *2 Salk.* 415.

T. 1721. Bagwell and Dry. The testator, amongst other things, bequeathed the surplus of his personal estate unto four persons equally to be divided among them, share and share alike; and made A. B. his executor in trust. One of the four residuary legatees died in the life of the testator. After which, the testator died. And the question being, to whom the fourth part devised to the residuary legatee who died in the life of the testator belonged; the lord chancellor, after time taken to consider of it, delivered his opinion, that the testator having devised his residuum in fourths, and one of the residuary legatees dying in his lifetime, the devise of that fourth part became void, and was as so much of the testator's estate undisposed of by the will; that it could not go to the surviving legatees, because each of them had but a fourth part devised to him in common, and the death of the fourth residuary legatee could not avail them, as it would have done had they been all joint tenants, for then the share of the legatee dying in the lifetime of the testator would have gone to the survivors; but here the residuum being devised in common, it was the same as if the fourth part had been devised to each of the four, which could not be increased by the death of any of them. This share shall not go to

the executor, he being but a bare executor in trust; and consequently it belongs to the testator's next of kin according to the statute of distribution; and as to this, the executor is a trustee for such next of kin. 1 *P. Will.* 700.

M. 2 G. 2. Page and Page. A person deviseth to his six relations, all his lands and all his personal estate, in trust to perform his will, and after all these things discharged, directed that the remainder should be equally divided amongst them, share and share alike, and made his said six relations executors. One of the six legatees died, and then the testator died. The question was, whether the share of that legatee who died in the lifetime of the testator should go to the surviving legatees, as part of the residuum; or whether in this case it should go to the next of kin of the testator, or so much of his estate undisposed of. It was argued, that where there is a lapsed legacy, it falls into the residuum of the personal estate generally; but here a part of the residuum itself is a lapsed legacy, and consequently undisposed of, and ought to go to the next of kin of the testator. For the executors are to take nothing as executors, but as residuary legatees. And one of the legatees dying in the lifetime of the testator, his share must go according to the statute of distributions, as undisposed of. And so it was decreed. *Str.* 820.

M. 1705. Elliot and Davenport. The testator by his will reciting, that *B.* owed him 400 l. gave and bequeathed the same to him, provided that out of it he paid several particular sums in the will mentioned, to his wife and children, and the residue he freely and absolutely gave him, and required his executor, immediately on his death, to deliver up the security, and not to meddle with the debt, but to give such release as *B.* his executors or administrators should require. *B.* died in the lifetime of the testator. It was held, that the money directed to be paid to the wife and children was well devised; but as to the residue devised to the debtor himself, it was a lapsed legacy, he dying in the lifetime of the testator; but it was admitted, that if the testator had said, *I forgive such a debt,* or that my executor shall not demand it, or shall release it, that would have been a good discharge of the debt tho' the debtor had died in the lifetime of the testator, 2 *Vern.* 521. 1 *P. Will.* 83.

T. 1731. Willing and Baine. The testator devised by his will 200 l. apiece to his children, payable at their respective

pective ages of twenty-one; and if any of them died before twenty-one, then the legacy given to the person so dying to go to the surviving children. One of the children, died in the testator's lifetime. And the question was, whether the legacy should go to the surviving children, or should be a lapsed legacy, and sink into the surplus. By the court; The rule is true, that where the legatee dies in the life of the testator, his legacy lapses, that is, it lapses as to the legatee so dying; but in this case the legacy is well devised over to the surviving children. 3 *P. Will.* 114.

Devise of a legacy to a person and his assigns; the legatee died before it was paid: adjudged, that his administrator shall have it as assignee in law. 1 *Roll's Abr.* 915. (b)

Where the legacy is conditional, the legacy is not due, until the condition be performed: And therefore if the legatee die before the condition is performed, the legacy is extinguished; except in some few cases. *Law of Test.* 231.

If a legacy be given to a child, payable at his age of twenty-one years, and the child dies before he attain that age: tho' the administrator of the child is intitled to the legacy, yet he shall not have it till such time as the child, if he had lived, would have attained his age of twenty-one years. 2 *Vern.* 199. 1 *P. Will.* 478.

But if a legacy be devised to a child payable at his age of twenty-one years, and if he dies before that age, then the legacy to go over to another; in this case if the child dies before he attains the age of twenty-one, the second legatee shall have the legacy immediately. 2 *Vern.* 283. 2 *P. Will.* 478. *Viner*, Devise, G. d. 35. (*Laundy v. Williams.*)

(b) In general where a sum of money or residue of personalty is bequeathed to A. for life, and then, or if he die without issue, or marry, in whole or in part to B.; B.'s legacy is considered as a vested remainder and transmissible if he survive the testator, although he die in the lifetime of A. *Pinbury v. Eikin*, 1 *Wms.* 563. *Atkinson v. Paice*, 1 *Bro.* 91. *Barnes v. Allen*, *ib.* 181. *Godwin v. Munday*, *ib.* 191. *Monkhouse v. Holmes*, *ib.* 298. *Ant. Gen. v. Crispin*, *ib.* 386. *Devisme v. Mello*, *ib.* 537. *Dan-son v. Hawes*, *Amb.* 276. *E. of Salisbury v. Lambe*, *ib.* 383. *Ben-jon v. Maddison*, 2 *Bro.* 75. And if such be the construction of the will, the court will secure the fund, and order the produce to be paid accordingly. *Green v. Pigot*, 1 *Bro.* 103. *Billings v. Bandon*, *ib.* 393. *Nowlan v. Nelligan*, *ib.* 489. *Infra*, Payment of legacies, 4.

So

So if a legacy be given to an infant, to be paid at his age of twenty-one years, and the executors to pay interest for it until it becomes payable: if the infant dies before twenty-one, it is due presently to the executor or administrator of the infant: but if no interest was to be paid for it, then it shall not be paid until such time as the infant would have come to twenty-one in case he had lived; because there it is a benefit the testator intended to the executor by keeping it in his hands; but in the other case it would be none, when interest was payable. 2 *Frem.* 64.

So where the testator bequeathed to an infant 1000 l. payable at twenty-one; and in the mean time the infant to have the yearly sum of 20 l., not amounting to the interest of the legacy given him. The infant died before twenty-one. It was held by Raymond chief justice, Jekyl master of the rolls, and Eyre chief justice, that the executors of the infant should wait for their legacy, till such time as the infant, had he lived, would have been twenty-one; it being unreasonable that the executors of the infant, standing in his place, should be in a better case than the infant himself would have been, had he been living; and it was to be presumed, that the testator had made a computation of his estate, and considered when the same would bear and allow of the payment of this legacy; and that no reason could be given, why an uncertain accident should accelerate the payment of this legacy before the time, which was at first intended for that purpose. 2 *P. Will.* 335. [*Chester v. Painter* (c).]

Generally, it is to be considered, whether the time be joined to the *substance* of the legacy, or to the *payment*: If it be joined to the *substance* of the legacy, and the legatee dies before the day, the legacy is gone; as if the testator gives to B. 100 l. when he cometh to the age of twenty-one years, and B. dieth before, the legacy will not go to his executors or administrators: But if the day be joined

(c) *Joseph Smith* gave all his personal estate to his wife upon the following considerations, *inter al.* that at the decease of his said wife, or if she should marry again, 500 l. be paid to his sister *Sarah Smith* out of the aforesaid estate within six months after her decease or marriage. *Sarah Smith* died, living the wife, and the court of exchequer held that the legacy was not given till after the wife's death or second marriage, and therefore lapsed. *Norris v. Husbwaite.* 1 *Bro.* 182.

to the *payment* of the legacy, the executors or administrators of the legatee shall have the legacy, tho' the legatee die before the day; as if the testator bequeath 100 l. to *B.* and wills that it shall be paid to *B.* when he attains the age of twenty-one years, yet his executors or administrators may recover the legacy when the time is expired that *B.* should have attained that age if he had lived. *Law of Test.* 232, 233.

And this is agreeable to the rule of the civil law, which is, that if a legacy be devised to one generally, to be paid or payable at the age of twenty-one, or any other age; yet this is such an interest vested in the legatee, that his executor or administrator may sue for and recover it; for it is *debitum in presenti*, tho' *solvendum in futuro*, the time being annexed to the payment, and not to the legacy itself: So if the legacy is made to carry *interest*; tho' the words *to be paid*, or *payable* be omitted, it shall be an interest vested. But if a legacy be devised to one *at* twenty-one, or *if* or *when* he shall attain the age of twenty-one, and the legatee dies before he attains that age, the legacy is lapsed. But where the legacy is to arise out of a *real* estate; this, by the better authorities, shall not go to the representative of the legatee, but shall sink in the inheritance for the benefit of the heir, as much as if it was a portion provided by a marriage settlement. But when the legacy is to be paid out of a *personal* estate, the above distinction hath been allowed of; and Cowper lord chancellor said, that tho' it was at first introduced upon very slender reasons, and probably upon no other but from a constant willingness in the civil law to stretch in favour of a particular legatee, against the residuary legatee who went away with the whole surplus of the personal estate; yet as the chancery hath now a concurrent jurisdiction with the spiritual court in matters of this nature, he thought it highly reasonable that there should be a conformity in their resolutions, that the subject might have the same measure of justice, in which court soever he sued. *Law of Test.* 242, 243.

So, in the case of *Boycot* and others, against *Cotton* and others, *Nov.* 24, 1738. It was said by the lord chancellor Hardwicke, that it is now settled, whether the portion charged upon land be given with or without interest, by deed or by will, if the person dies before the age at which it becomes payable, it shall sink into the estate. *1 Atk.* 555.

M. 1682. *Smith* and *Smith*. The testator devised 100 l. to his daughter for her portion, chargeable upon a *real* estate

estate, and payable at twenty-one : and the daughter died before twenty-one : the portion shall sink in the land. But it is otherwise, if no time had been limited for the payment of the portion ; for in that case it goes to the executor of the daughter. And there is no difference, whether the portion is secured by settlement or by will, if it be to be raised out of a real estate, and the party dies before it is payable ; for in either case it sinks in the lands. 2 *Vern.* 92.

H. 1690. *Norfolk and Guildford.* The testator by will charged his lands with 6000 l. for the child his wife was then enſient with, if it proved a daughter ; with a clause of entry for non-payment. A daughter is born ; who dies. It was decreed, that the 6000 l. should not be raised for the benefit of her administrator. 2 *Vern.* 208.

M. 1684. *Bartholomew and Meredith.* The testator devised lands to be sold for payment of portions to younger children, and one of the children dies after the portion was payable, tho' before the lands sold. It was held, that it being an interest vested, his administrator should have it. 1 *Vern.* 276.

E. 1701. *Jackson and Farrand.* The testator by will gave 500 l. to his daughter, to be paid by his executor at the age of twenty-one out of his personal estate and the rents of his real ; and if not raised by that time, the executors to stand seised and take the rents till 500 l. is raised, and after payment gives the land to his son. The daughter marries at eighteen, and dies under twenty-one, leaving issue a daughter. The husband takes administration. It was held, that the portion should be raised, and that by a sale, tho' the land would produce little more than the 500 l. 2 *Vern.* 424. [But this, lord Hardwicke said, is an anomalous case, and no stress ought to be laid upon it. 1 *Atk.* 556.]

H. 1740. *Lowther and Condon.* Thomas Condon, esquire, by his will gave unto his daughter Diana Condon the sum of 1000 l., to be raised and paid unto her, immediately after the decease of her mother, out of her mother's jointure lands, with interest of six pounds in the hundred from the death of her mother till the same should be paid. Thomas Condon dies. After which, his daughter Diana intermarries with Sir William Lowther, and dies in the lifetime of her mother. Last of all the mother dies. And Sir William Lowther, as administrator to his wife, brings his bill for the recovery of the 1000 l. It was insisted by the defendant the heir at law, that as the said sum was to be raised and paid out of the lands, and the

the late lady Lowther died before the time when this sum became payable, namely, before the death of her mother the testator's widow, the same ought to sink into the estate for the benefit of the heir, and ought not now to be raised. By Hardwicke lord chancellor: It is clear, if this were to be paid out of a personal estate, it would have been transmissible to an administrator: It is indeed true, that it hath been an established rule in general, as to real estates, that where a legatee dies before the time of payment of the legacy, it shall sink into the estate; but with regard to portions or fortunes for daughters, the circumstance of the legatee is to be considered; as where a portion is given to one immediately, payable when she attaineth the age of twenty-one or marrieth, and such person dieth before either of the contingencies happeneth, it ought to sink, because the legatee wanted no personal provision; but in this case, as Lady Lowther was married, and lived married for some years, there is the less reason that it should sink. And it was decreed, that this was an interest vested, and as such transmissible to the administrator, and the legacy should not sink into the estate for the benefit of the heir at law. [But this determination was upon particular circumstances in the will, manifesting an intention that the portion in this event should not sink into the inheritance, but be transmissible; and particularly because the remoteness of the time of payment did not arise from the circumstances of the persons, but of the estate; the legacy being ordered to be paid as soon as the estate should be disincumbered. And upon the same ground, the like was determined afterwards in the case of *Sherman and Collins*, Feb. 4, 1745. 2 *Atk.* 127. 130. 3 *Atk.* 319.]

But it is said, if a legacy be chargeable *both* upon the real and personal estate; then so much thereof as the personal estate will extend to pay, shall go to the executors or administrators of the child; for in such case, as far as the executor or administrator claims out of the personal estate, he shall succeed according to the rule of the spiritual court where these things are determinable, altho' the infant legatee dies before the portion or legacy becomes due: but so far as such legacy is charged upon the land, the court of chancery will not countenance the loading of an heir, merely for the benefit of an administrator. 1 *P. Will.* 496. 601.

But in the case of *Van and Clark*, July 1, 1739. Lady Craven devised to Godfrey Clark (whom also she made executor

executor and residuary legatee) her messuage and tenement in Lincoln's-Inn-Fields, and all her real and personal estate not otherwise disposed of, to the intent that out of the said real and personal estates so devised, her several legacies might be paid; amongst which, she gave to Thomas Lewis, to be paid within one year and a half after her decease, 2000 l. in trust and for the use of his daughter Mary Lewis, to be put out at interest, and the principal and interest to be paid to her at her age of eighteen, or marriage, which should first happen. Thomas Lewis died in the lifetime of the testatrix. Mary Lewis died about half a year after the testatrix, unmarried. The representative of Mary brought his bill to have the 2000 l. paid to him. The defendant Clark admitted personal assets sufficient, but submitted to the court whether the plaintiff was intitled, and insisted that the house in Lincoln's-Inn-Fields was in the first place charged with this, and that it was not a charge merely on the personal estate, but on the mixed fund of real and personal; and therefore the legatee dying before the day of payment, it ought to sink. By the lord chancellor Hardwicke; The infant dying before the time of payment to the trustee, I am of opinion makes this legacy not raisable for the benefit of the plaintiff her representative. If a legacy is given out of a *personal* estate payable at a certain time; or if given at a certain time, and interest in the mean time; it is a vested legacy. But the rule of this court as to legacies out of *real* estates is otherwise; for if given at a certain time, or payable at a certain time, yet if the legatee dies before the time is come, it sinks into the inheritance. So when a legacy is given out of a mixed fund of real and personal estate, at a certain time, or to be paid at a certain time; the construction is the same, as if given out of a real estate only. There is but a slight difference, between the cases of legacies given at a day, or payable at a day; but the distinction is adhered to, only to give a consentaneous jurisdiction with the ecclesiastical courts: nor is there any case that I know of, to warrant a distinction between legacies given out of a *mixed* fund of real and personal estate, and out of real estate only. If the infant had survived the year and half (for the death of the trustee makes no distinction) it would have been extremely clear she would have been intitled to the legacy; and if then she had died before eighteen or marriage, her representatives would have been intitled. But if this had been merely *personal*; as she died within the year and half,

her representative could not have been intitled: for the whole gift is in the direction of the payment; which makes that the substance. In the present case, it is not a legacy merely out of a personal estate, but out of both funds, and the real charged in the first place on the estate in Lincoln's-Inn-Fields. And this construction is more agreeable to the intention of the testatrix, as the sum was intended clearly as a portion for Mary: And the court always goes as far as it possibly can, to hinder the raising portions out of land for the benefit of representatives.

1 *Atk.* 510. (d)

36. The question how far the executor shall be intitled Surplus. to the surplus, altho' he be not by the express words of the will appointed residuary legatee, hath been long litigated, and received a diversity of determinations.

In the case of *Foster and Munt*, *M.* 1687. The testator devised particular legacies to his children and grandchildren, and 10 l. a piece to his executors for their care;

(d) This distinction between a portion and other legacy was recognized in *Dawson v. Killet*, 1 *Bro.* 119. Where the testator gave an estate to his wife for life, and if there should be no issue between them, then to Killet charged with several sums to different legatees. One of these survived the testator, but died before the wife; and Lord *Thurlow*, C. held the charge vested and transmissible to his representatives, for "in the case of a portion, the court has construed a sum so given to be so connected with the purpose for which it was given, that it was not intended to be given for any other purpose; so that the purpose failing, the land ought not to be charged." But "this is a devise after the death of the wife to Killet, and the testator charges the estate of Killet (meaning the interest of Killet in the estate) with the sums in question, which distributes the estate between Killet and the legatees. Upon the death of the testator, the remainder vested in Killet, and the moment it vested in Killet, the charges vested in those to whom they were given." See also *Tunstal v. Bracken*, 1 *Bro.* 124. 2d ed. *S. C. Amb.* 167. *Manning v. Herbert*, *ib.* 575. *Jeale v. Tickener*, *ib.* 703. And in *Embrey v. Martin*, *Amb.* 230, lord *Hardwicke* said of such a legacy, it is a conditional limitation, and there is a legal remedy for raising the money: it is a condition subsequent as all conditions turned into limitations are: It is to be raised after J. T. (the remainder man) comes into possession. Note: A legacy may vest, subject to be divested, by a subsequent appointment of a person to whom the testator gives such power, or by the birth of another child or the legatee's dying under 21, &c. *E. of Salisbury v. Lambe*, *Amb.* 383. *Shepherd v. Ingram*, *ib.* 448. *Walcott v. Hall*, 2 *Bro.* 305.

the

the surplus of the personal estate being 5000 l. and upwards. The question was, Whether the surplus should be a trust for the children, or go to the executors. And it was decreed a trust for the children. For as the legacy to the executors was given for their care, unless such care was to turn to the benefit of others, and not of themselves, the will would be absurd; and therefore it necessarily followed, that the testator designed them only to be trustees for the next of kin. 1 *Vern.* 473. 2 *Vern.* 648. And although no such declaration had been made, yet the legacy being given generally, the law made the same construction, and it was for their care; it being impossible to imagine, that the testator would give a general legacy, if he intended the executor should take the whole. 2 *Abr. Cas. Eq.* 443.

H. 1697. *Earl of Bristol and Hungerford.* The testator devised lands to be sold for payment of his debts, and ordered that the surplus should be deemed part of his personal estate and go to his executors, and gave to his executors 100 l. apiece as a legacy. The question was, Whether the executors should have the surplus to their own use, or should distribute according to the statute of distribution. For the executors it was insisted, that the surplus should be part of his personal estate, and go to them, and that he meant it to their own use; and his giving them a legacy of 100 l. apiece cannot alter the case, for the surplus perhaps might be nothing; and therefore he gave them the 100 l. that they might at all events be sure of something, and not to exclude them the benefit of the surplus: and this being a devise of the surplus, after debts and legacies paid, cannot be a trust in them, for then all their trust is performed, when debts and legacies are paid. On the other side it was said, that the words in the will, that the surplus should be part of his personal estate and go to his executors, were only intended to exclude the heir, who else would have had it, and not to give any greater interest to his executors than they would have had otherwise. And of that opinion was the lord chancellor, who decreed that they were trustees of the surplus for the next of kin. 1 *Abr. Cas. Eq.* 244.

But in the case of *Griffiths and Rogers*, T. 1704, where a man deviseth his library of books to one, except ten books such as his wife should chuse, and made her executrix; it was decreed, that she should not by this devise be excluded from the benefit of the surplus of the personal estate. 1 *Abr. Cas. Eq.* 245.

In the year 1725, in order to settle this point, the lord chancellor King brought a bill into the house of peers, which passed that house, but was thrown out by the commons. The bill was to have settled it for the benefit of the executor. *Str.* 569.

July 15, 1740. *Newstead and Johnston, Grace Lawson* by her will gave several legacies to her children, and then directs 1000*l.* to be taken out of her partnership stock in trade, and settled in strict settlement on her son; the residue of her partnership stock she gave to a trustee, with very particular directions as to the management, in trust for the separate use of her daughter *Elizabeth Johnston*, who was a feme covert, and appoints *Elizabeth Johnston*, her executrix, but makes no disposition of the surplus. The bill was brought for an account of this surplus, and that the executrix might be a trustee of the same for the next of kin to the testatrix.—By the lord chancellor *Hardwicke*: The cases in regard to excluding executors from taking the surplus of the personal estate, by reason of the particular legacies before given to them, have been very various, and undergone different determinations, according to the different circumstances and opinions and way of reasoning of different persons concerning them; and it is absolutely impossible to reduce all those cases to any certain general rule, without some contrariety between them. But I think the present case a very plain one, that the executrix here should not be excluded from the surplus.—The law is clear, that where a man makes his will, and an executor; it is a gift in law of all his personal estate to him. So is the rule of the ecclesiastical court. Therefore it is, that where a suit is brought in such a case for a distribution of the residuum undisposed of by the will, this court will prohibit them from proceeding in such suit; because they are bound to give the residuum to the executor. And this court interposes upon a supposed trust in the executor, of which that court has no cognizance. And I remember some cases, one at the latter end of queen Anne's time, and another since, and another when I sat as chief justice in the king's bench, where such prohibitions have gone. So that the ground upon which executors have been in any cases compelled to distribute the surplus, has been, upon certain circumstances in equity, which have induced a violent presumption, amounting to evidence, that the executor was intended only a trustee.—The first case was *Foster and Munt*;

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Munt; where it was sent to the master to inquire what the surplus amounted to. And I have heard, that arose in a great measure from an ill opinion the lord chancellor *Jefferies* had of the executor's behaviour in obtaining that will. And it being reported to amount to 5000*l.* he thought it was absurd to say the testator would have given the executor so small a legacy as 10*l.* for his care and pains, if he had meant at the same time to give him the surplus. But there was no particular evidence of any fraud in the case, but only such a general charge in the bill. So that the decree was founded wholly on that single point.—From that time, it was taken, where a legacy was given to an executor for his care and trouble, without any disposition of the surplus, that he should be considered as a trustee. And that was founded upon good reason: for such a legacy for care and pains, was a plain declaration of the testator's intention, that as to the rest, the executor should not take it to his own use; for it were ridiculous to suppose, that the testator should give him a small legacy for his trouble in managing an estate for himself.—Afterwards the court went further in the like kind of reasoning, and held, that where a particular legacy was given to the executor generally, without saying for care and pains, even this would exclude him from the surplus, because of the absurdity (as no doubt there would be) in giving him some, and giving him all. From whence the court raised an implication, that since the testator had given him a part, he never intended him the whole. And this point is now established: tho' it was at first objected that the particular legacy might be owing to a doubt of the testator, that the whole personal estate might not prove more than sufficient to pay all the legacies; in which case the executor could have nothing. For which reason the testator might be unwilling to leave him to the chance of the surplus, but would secure something to him by particular legacy, and then in case of a deficiency it would abate only in proportion. However this point has been now long established, and is not to be contrived by such an argument. And I remember in a case of *Farrington* and *Keetly*, lord *Macclesfield* said, that he had consulted Mr. *Vernon*, who had then left the bar who told him that he did not then trouble himself with taking notes of modern resolutions upon this point; because he looked upon it to be as plain and settled, as that an estate to a man in fee should descend to a man and his heirs.—Other cases have been determined in favour

the next of kin, upon the circumstances of the proximity of blood : But these determinations have been overruled in later cases ; because that reasoning might produce great uncertainty. For if that distinction were to be admitted, then a distinction would arise as to those of a nearer degree of kindred and those who are more remote ; and if the testator's estate was to depend on such circumstances, it would bear a very uncertain construction : tho' in the case of *Ball and Smith*, there was a distinction in favour of a wife.—I mention these things to lay them out of the case : For the ground of my determination is, that the legacy is given to a feme covert of stock in trade, in trust for her separate use, and under very particular circumstances. The intent of the testatrix is manifest. She gives the particular legacy in trust for the wife, who was her daughter ; because otherwise it would have passed to the husband as his absolute property ; for tho' upon her death it would have passed from her to the administrator *de bonis non*, yet the husband would have it in point of property and interest, as he would be entitled to it after the debts and legacies were paid out of the assets : Which reason does not extend to the residuum ; for that it does not appear but she intended the husband should have that as well as her daughter ; and no implication can arise upon a will but by a necessary construction ; if so, the testatrix had no occasion to make an express devise of that in trust, as she did of the other.—It was said in the argument of this cause, that a particular legacy given in trust for an executor, will have the same effect in point of law, and bar him of the residuum, as much as if the legal interest of the legacy were given him. And that is certainly true : because it implies nothing which makes any difference between such a devise in trust, and an absolute one : but, as I said before, here was a particular reason why this legacy was expressly given in trust, for the husband could not have been otherwise excluded ; and it is, that the trustee may enter into partnership with the son, and he is to improve the stock for the separate use and benefit of the wife ; which prevents the common implication, that the residuum should not pass. Therefore I think there is no ground in this case, to make the executor account for the surplus ; and, as to that, the bill must be dismissed (e).

(e) S. C. 2 Ark. 46.

Wills. Form and manner.

June 9, 1745; *Southcot and Watson*. General *Pulteney* by his will gives in the first part of it, to Mrs. *Watson*, an annuity of 400 l.; and in the last clause gives her all his household goods and furniture (three pictures excepted), and all his plate, linen, watches, jewels, and cloathes whatsoever, and declared her sole executrix. The bill was brought for an account of such part of the personal estate as is undisposed of, and for a distribution. And by the lord chancellor *Hardwicke*: The bequest of the specific things to Mrs. *Watson* excludes her from the residue. 3 *Atk.* 226.

Oct. 24, 1750; *Blinkhorn and Feast*. The testator gave a pecuniary legacy to *A.* and another of a different value to *B.* both infants, and made them his executors. The question was, as to the residue of his personal estate, whether it should result to the next of kin, or go to his executors. By the lord chancellor *Hardwicke*: Though the law casts the whole personal estate upon the executor; yet as a will is to be construed chiefly according to the intention of the testator, if it appear manifestly his design that the executor shall not have it, it shall be distributed by this court. As where a specific legacy is given to an executor, he shall not have the residue; as it would be absurd to think, that the testator after he had given him what he thought convenient, should also intend to give him the whole residue, which would include the particular legacy. Yet in many cases this construction may be improper; and therefore the rule of law has been suffered to take place. As in the case of *Griffith and Rogers*, where the executrix had a specific legacy of ten books. And in the case of *Jones and Westcomb* (Prec. Ch. 316.) where a man, possessed of a long term, devised it to his wife for life, and after her death to the child she was then enſient with, and made her executrix. For in this case it was necessary to devise the term to her specifically, for the sake of the limitation to the child. In the present case, not to mention that it is improbable the testator would have made these persons who are infants his executors, merely for the purpose of distributing his personal estate, without any benefit to themselves; it was very proper he should give them these legacies, though he might intend they should after have the residue; for they do not take the legacies, as they will the residue; for this they are entitled to jointly and equally, and the survivor will take the whole. But the legacies are unequal in value, and their interest in them different and
separate.

separate. And it cannot be inferred that the residue includes the particular legacies ; for as they are bequeathed, the legatees are entitled to them in severalty, and with different interests ; whereas if he had not separated them, they would have devolved jointly, and otherwise than he intended they should. And he decreed the residue to the executors.

Finally ; in the case of *Lawson and Lawson*, Apr. 19, 1777, upon an appeal from the chancery to the house of lords, it was determined, that unless in cases where the contrary is inconsistent and incompatible with the apparent intention of the testator, or there is violent presumption of fraud, the residue of the personal estate, after payment of debts and legacies, shall go to the executor (f).

37. By the statute of the 29 C. 2. c. 3. *No devise in writing, of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any clause thereof, shall be revocable, otherwise than by some other will or codicil in writing, or other writing declaring the same, or by burning, cancelling, tearing or obliterating the same by the testator himself, or in his presence and by his directions and consent ; but all devises and bequests of lands and tenements shall remain and continue in force, until the same be burnt, cancelled, torn or obliterated by the testator or by his directions in manner aforesaid, or unless the same be altered by some other will or codicil in writing, or other writing of the devisor, signed in the presence of three or four witnesses declaring the same.* s. 6. Wills, how revocable.

And no will in writing concerning any goods or chattels or personal estate shall be repealed, nor shall any clause, devise or bequest therein be altered or changed, by any words, or will by word of mouth only, except the same be in the life of the testator committed to writing, and after the writing thereof read unto

(f) 7 Bro. P. C. 511. In this case, the wife was executrix, and had property specifically given to her, which was hers before marriage. And the authority was cited in *Martin v. Rebow*, 1 Bro. 154. to prove that a wife having a *specific legacy* bequeathed to her, might take the residue, although any other executor having a *pecuniary legacy* could not. But per lord *Thurlow*, C. : The case of a wife may make a circumstance in evidence, but it cannot make a rule of law. The rule (of *Foster and Munt*) is laid down, and has been acted upon for years past, that where a testator gives the executor a legacy, he pays him for his trouble, and turns him, as to the residue, into a trustee. And here the wife, who was executrix, having a real estate bequeathed to her, with a house in town, plate, &c. but no pecuniary legacy, an account was decreed to be taken of the residue, to be distributed according to the statute.

the testator, and directed by him, and proved to be so done by three witnesses at the least. *f. 22.*

Apr. 30, 1754. *Ex parte Hallier.* The question before Sir George Lee, as judge of the prerogative court, was, Whether the execution of a second will is a revocation of the first, though the second is afterwards cancelled, and whether such cancelling sets up the first will again? He gave sentence that it was a revocation, and that the cancelling the second did not set up the first. *3 At. 748.*

11. 1089; *Eggleston and Speke.* Lady Speke by will gave her lands to one and his heirs. Afterwards she made another will, by which also she gave her lands to the same man and his heirs; but this last will was held void to pass lands, because the witnesses did not subscribe it in her presence. It was objected, that this was good however as a revocation of the former will. But by the court, It cannot operate as a revocation, because contrary to her apparent intent. To revoke by a will, within the words of the statute, must be by a will attested by three witnesses, and subscribed by them in the presence of the testatrix, which this will was not. *Cartb. 81.*

11. 1710; *Coyne and Yver.* A man makes his will duly executed and attested, and at the same time in like manner executes a duplicate thereof. Some time after, having a mind to change one of his trustees, he orders his will to be written over again, without any variation whatsoever from the first, save only in the name of that trustee. And when it was so written over, he executes it in the presence of three witnesses, and the three witnesses subscribed their names, but not in his presence. After this, the testator cancels the duplicate, by tearing off the seal; and then dies. The question was, whether this second will, not being good as a will to pass lands, should yet be a revocation of the first, and if it should not, whether the cancelling the other should be a revocation thereof within this statute. And it was decreed, that neither the making the second, nor the cancelling of the first, was a revocation thereof, though in the second there was an express clause that he did thereby revoke all former and other wills: wherein the lord chancellor took this distinction, that the second was not intended barely a revocation of the first, so as to signify his intention of dying intestate; but it was intended as an effectual will to pass the lands to the persons, and in the manner thereby directed; and therefore if it was not good

as a will to that purpose, it was no revocation of the first.
1 *Abr. Eq. Cas.* 408.

E. 1754; Ellis and Smith. A man makes a will, and by it revokes a former will. The only proof of the execution of this latter will was, by three witnesses, who did not see him sign or seal it, but upon their being called in he acknowledged it to be his handwriting and seal, pointing with his finger to the will; upon which they attested it. Two questions arose: 1. Whether considering this as an original will, it was well executed. 2. If it is, whether it is well executed as a revocation, because by the statute it ought for this purpose to be *signed in presence of the witnesses*. By the lord chancellor *Hardwicke*: As to the former question, if this had been *res integra*, it would have been a matter of doubt with me; but it is *res adjudicata*, and must now be taken as decisive. All the cases where an attestation by three witnesses at different times is held good, are authorities in point; for they must all be founded upon the proof of this very fact, the acknowledgment of the testator that it was his handwriting. It could not be a different execution before each witness, for then there would be three executions, and the act would not be complied with, as it requires three witnesses to one execution: and as to the *sealing*—putting any thing on the seal, as a finger, *animo signandi*, is good enough. But he seemed to think that sealing was not *signing* within the statute, contrary to the *obiter* opinion in *Lemain and Stanley*. (3 *Lev.* 1.)—As to the second, he said, that the words *signed in the presence of three witnesses*, refer to the next preceding words [*other writing*] only, and not to a will or codicil; and so it was determined (3 *Mod.* 218.) in the case of *Hoyle and Clarke*.

H. 10 G. 3.; Glazier v. Glazier. This cause had been tried at the assizes, and a verdict given for the plaintiff the heir at law, against the defendant who was devisee in two wills. It now came before the court, upon a motion on the part of the defendant, for a new trial. Which was opposed by the counsel for the plaintiff, who argued that both wills were revoked: and consequently, their client took as heir at law. The question turned upon the revocation of the first will, by making the second. The first will was not cancelled. The second was cancelled by the testator himself. Both wills were in the testator's custody at the time of his death. The counsel for the plaintiff, the heir at law, argued, that the se-

cond will was a complete instrument at the time when it was executed. That it clearly proved the testator's intention of revoking the former. And that the execution of it was as much a revocation of the former, as if he had thrown the former into the fire. That the preservation of it was merely accidental, and of no consequence. That it had been already totally extinguished, so that it could never revive. That as it had never been republished, it remained a mere nullity; and that no subsequent event could hinder the execution of the second will from operating as a revocation of the former. The second will was therefore the testator's only subsisting will, so long as it remained uncanceled. And when he thought fit to cancel and destroy it, it is manifest that he meant to die intestate, and that his heir at law should take. If a woman makes a will, and then marries, her prior will is thereby revoked; and shall remain so, altho' she should immediately become a widow. They cited a case of *Ashburnham and Bradshaw*; and also the case *ex parte Hellier*, 3 *Atkyns* 798., where Sir George Lee gave sentence, that the execution of a second will is a revocation of a first, tho' the second be afterwards cancelled: and that the cancelling the second did not set up the first; which they said, was the same point, only that it was personal property: And this sentence was affirmed by the delegates. They denied the two cases of *Eggleston* and *Speke*, and of *Onyons* and *Tyrer*, to be like the present case. The former is only, that a second will shall not revoke the first, if the second is not good in law, but void. The latter is, that a second will, devising lands to the same person and revoking all former wills, and this second will subscribed by three persons but not in the testator's presence, shall not revoke the former will, so as to let in the heir at law.——The counsel on the other side, beginning to speak, were stopped by lord Mansfield, who said the case was so plain, as to render it unnecessary to proceed. He observed, with regard to the case *ex parte Hellier*, that Mr. *Atkyns* only reports what passed in chancery. There might be other circumstances appearing to the ecclesiastical court, which might amount to a revocation of a will of personal estate. Here, the testator has by both wills devised the lands in question to the defendant. His cancelling the second is a declaration, that he doth not intend that to stand as his will. Doth not that speak, that his first will shall stand? If he had intended to revoke the first will when he made the second,

it must have operated as a declaration that the defendant should not take. But that could not be his intention; because he devises to the defendant by both. A will is ambulatory till the death of the testator. If the testator lets it stand till he dies, it is his will. If he does not suffer it to do so, it is not his will. Here, he had two. He has cancelled the second: It has no effect, no operation: it is as no will at all, being cancelled before his death. But the former, which was never cancelled, stands as his will. *Burr. Mansf. 2512.*

In the case of *Rolfe and Harwood, H. 14 G. 3.* In the common pleas. The jury found, that *John Lacy* esquire, had made two wills, one in 1748, and the other in 1756, and that the disposition made in the latter was different from that in the former, but in what particulars the jurors did not know; and they further added, that they do not find that the testator cancelled, or that the defendant (the devisee under the former will) destroyed the latter will, but what is become thereof they are ignorant. *De Grey* chief justice, *Gould* and *Nares* justices, were of opinion, that this was a sufficient revocation of the former will, to let in the title of the heir at law; it being proved to be the last will of the testator, and containing a different disposition from the former will, although, in what particulars it did not appear. *Blackstone* justice was of opinion, that this was not a sufficient revocation, because it did not specifically appear, that the latter revoked the former: and nothing shall be presumed on a special verdict: It is setting up a second will in the dark, which neither the court nor jury ever saw, and of the contents whereof they are wholly ignorant. Upon this, a writ of error was brought in the king's bench; and there the court unanimously reversed the judgment of the common pleas. Afterwards, a writ of error being brought in parliament, the house of lords upon hearing the opinion of the barons of the exchequer in favour of the judgment of the court of king's bench, affirmed the judgment of that court, that this was not a sufficient revocation. *3 Wilson, 497. Black. Rep. 937.*

M. 16 G. 3. Mole and Thomas. William Palin having several times declared himself discontented with his will, being one day in bed near the fire, ordered Mary Wilson who attended him to fetch his will, which she did, and delivered it to him; it being then whole, only somewhat sealed. He opened it, looked at it, then gave it something of a rip with his hands, and so tore it as almost to
tear

Wills. Form and manner.

tear a bit off : then rumbled it together, and threw it on the fire ; but it fell off. However it must soon have been burned, had not Mary Wilson taken it up, and put it in her pocket. Palin did not see her take it up, but seemed to have some suspicion of it, as he asked her what she was about, to which she made little or no answer. He at several times afterwards said, That was not, and should not be his will, and bade her destroy it. She said at first, So I will, when you have made another. But afterwards, upon his repeated inquiries, she told him she had destroyed it, though in fact it was never destroyed. She asked him, when his will was burned, whom his estate would go to ? He answered, to his sister and her children. He afterwards writ to his brother John Mills, telling him he had destroyed his will, and would make no other till he had seen him, and desired him to come ; for (says he) if I die intestate it will cause uneasiness. However he died without making any other will. The jury thought this a sufficient revocation, and gave a verdict for the heir at law. It was moved for a new trial. But the court were of opinion, that this was a sufficient revocation ; and said, that a revocation under the statute may be effected, either by framing a new will amounting to a revocation of the former, or by some act done to the instrument itself, as burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliteration, by the testator, or in his presence, and by his direction ; any of these, joined with a declared intent, is a sufficient revocation within the statute. *Black. Rep.* 1043.

Even a latter will, though in other respects void, yet may be a sufficient revocation of the former. As where there was a devise of lands to one, and afterwards the deviser by a will duly executed and attested devised the lands to another who was a papist ; it was decreed, that both the devises were void : for though the latter was void as a will, yet it was good as a revocation. *2 Abr. Eq. Cas.* 771. (g)

But a will which will pass personal estate, is not a sufficient revocation of a former will whereby a real estate is devised. *Comyns*, 451.

(g) So a deed intended to operate as an appointment to uses but not sufficient for that purpose, was held to revoke a will the party appearing to have had that intention. *Shove v Pincke*, 5 T. Rep. 124 & 310.

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And although the statute says, that no will in writing concerning personal estates shall be repealed by word of mouth only, except the words be put into writing, and read to and allowed by the testator, and proved to be so done by three witnesses; yet where a man by will in writing devised the residue of his personal estate to his wife, and she dying, he afterwards by a nuncupative codicil bequeathed to another all that he had given to his wife, this was resolved to be good: for by the death of the wife, the devise of the residue was totally void; and the codicil was no alteration of the former will, but a new will for the residue. 1 *Abr. Cas. Eq.* 408.

Also, the statute hath not taken away revocations of wills by *act of law*; as if the testator afterwards make a feoffment, or do any other act inconsistent with the will: but such revocation remains as before the statute. *Cartb.* 81. (b) [Implied revocation of a will.]

If a man devises lands to one and his heirs, and afterwards mortgages the same lands to another for years or in fee; though a mortgage in fee is a total revocation at law, yet in equity it shall be a revocation *pro tanto* only. 1 *Abr. Eq. Cas.* 410.

And the reason is, because a mortgage is not considered as a conveyance of the estate, but only as a charge upon it; being merely a security, and in the consideration of equity carries only a chattel interest, the creditor gains nothing real, it affords no dower, and goes to executors. *Sparrow and Hardcastle*, May 6, 1754. 3 *Atk.* 798.

But if lands be devised to one in fee, and afterwards mortgaged to the same devisee; this is a revocation *in toto*, being inconsistent with the devise: but if the mortgage had been to a stranger, it had been a revocation *quoad* the mortgage only. *Prec. Cha.* 514.

If a man seised in fee, devises it to one in fee or for life, and afterwards makes a lease to another for years; this, even at law, shall not be a revocation but during the years. 1 *Roll's Abr.* 616.

So if a husband possessed for forty years, devises it to his wife, and after leases the land to another for twenty years,

(b) So if a testator suffer a recovery of, or sell the lands devised. *Marwood v. Turner*, 1 *P. Wms.* 165. *Arnold v. Arnold*, 1 *Bro.* 401.; and the same of an equitable estate, *Freeman v. Freeman*, cor. lord Hardwicke, C. 1 *Wils.* 308.

and dies ; this lease is not any revocation of the whole estate, but only during the twenty years, and the wife shall have the residue by the devise. *Id.*

But where a man seised of a lease for lives, devised it, and afterward surrendered the old lease, and took a new one to him and his heirs for three lives ; it was decreed, that this renewal of the lease was a revocation of the will as to this particular. For by the surrender of the old lease, the testator had put all out of him, had divested himself of the whole interest ; so that there being nothing left for the devise to work upon, the will must fall, and the new purchase, being of a freehold descendible, could not pass by a will made before such purchase. 3 *P. Will.* 166. 170. [*Marwood v. Turner.*]

June 10, 1743. Sir *Thomas Abney and Miller.* The testator by his will devised all his college leases which he then held of Magdalen college to Mrs. Burton his mother, to be sold by her immediately after his decease, and ordered the money arising by such sale to be distributed according to the directions of the said will. Some years after making the will, he surrendered the college leases devised by it, and accepted two new leases of the premises, but one of them was not sealed with the college seal, till after the death of the testator. Lord Hardwicke decreed, that the lease actually renewed after the will made, was a revocation of the devise (1), but otherwise as to the lease not perfected for want of the college seal. 2 *Atk.* 593.

But where the testator devised *all and singular his leasehold estate*, and afterwards renewed a lease ; it was held by lord Hardwicke clearly, that this leasehold estate passed by the will : for that this is not a specific legacy, but only an enumeration of the several particulars of the personal estate, but yet is a general devise of the whole. 3 *Atk.* 199.

Tho' a covenant or *articles* do not at law revoke a will ; yet if entered into for a valuable consideration, amounting in equity to a conveyance, they must consequently be an equitable revocation of a will, or of any writing in nature thereof. 2 *P. Will.* 624.

A woman's *marriage*, is alone a revocation of her will. *Id.* [4 *Rep.* 60. *b. Forse v. Hembling.*]

(1) *S. P. Hone v. Medcraft*, 1 *Bro.* 160.

A man made a will, and appointed one (who was no relation) to be his executor. He afterwards went abroad, where he became a governor of one of the plantations, and sent over for an English woman of his acquaintance, whom he married, and had children by; and died, without an actual revocation of his will. Yet it was determined, that this *total alteration of his circumstances* was an implied revocation. 1 *P. Will.* 304. *Eyre and Eyre.*

So in the case of *Lugg and Lugg, M. 8 W.* before the delegates. One being single made his will, and devised all his personal estate. Afterwards he married, and had several children, and died without other will or disposition. It was ruled, that there being such an alteration in his estate, and circumstances so different at the time of his death from what they were when he made the will, there was room and presumptive evidence to believe a revocation, and that the testator continued not of the same mind. 2 *Salk.* 592. *L. Raym.* 441.

And in the case of *Brown and Thomson, T. 1702.* The lord keeper was of opinion, that alteration of circumstances may be a revocation of a will of *lands*, as well as of a personal estate; notwithstanding the statute, which doth not extend to an implied revocation. 1 *Abr. Cas. Eq.* 413. (k)

Of seamens wills [and those of marines].

By the statute 26 *Gen. 3. cap. 63.* No will made by any petty officer or seaman in the king's service, whereby

(k) And accordingly, marriage and the birth of a child has been adjudged a revocation of a will of *lands*, in *Christopher v. Christopher*, 4 *Bur.* 2182. and *Sprange v. Stone*, *Amb.* 721. though a child were born after the father's death. *Doe v. Lancashire*, *T. Rep.* 49. But it seems that marriage or the subsequent birth of a child alone, are not of themselves sufficient to support the presumption of a revocation. See *Dr. Hay's Judgment*, *Hil.* 1770, *Shepherd v. Shepherd*, 5 *T. Rep.* 51. (which doctrine however Mr. Fonblanque has combated in his note to *Treat. on Eq.* ii. 35.) And as marriage and the birth of a child, when taken together, only furnish ground on which to presume an alteration of the testator's mind, such implied revocation may be rebutted by evidence, either written or parol, which proves a revocation. *Brady v. Culist*, 1 *Doug. Rep.* 31.

any

any wages, pay, prize-money, or allowance of money of any kind due for such service is bequeathed, shall be valid, unless, if made while the party is in the service, it be signed before and attested by the captain, or the officer then commanding, and one of the signing officers of the ship to which the party belongs, and unless it specify in the body thereof the name of the ship, and the number at which the maker of the will stands upon the ship's books, and contains a full description of the residence, profession, or business of the person in whose favour it is made, and the day of the month and the place where it was executed, or by the agent of any of his majesty's hospitals or quarters appointed to receive sick and wounded seamen, in which the party may be at the time; or if made by such officer or seaman discharged from the service, within the bills of mortality, unless it be attested by the officer appointed by the treasurer of the navy to inspect such wills; or if made at any of the ports where seamen's wages are paid, unless it be attested by the treasurer of the navy, chief or second clerk there; or if made at any other place, unless it be attested by the minister and churchwardens of the parish in England or Ireland or by two elders of the parish in Scotland. In order to obtain a probate thereof, the will must be sent to a proctor by the inspector of wills appointed by the treasurer of the navy.

If any such petty officer or seaman should die intestate, the person claiming administration must apply by petition to the said inspector, who is to grant a certificate directed to a proctor, that letters of administration may pass in favour of the petitioner, if entitled thereto by law.

If any proctor, register or other officer of any ecclesiastical court shall be aiding and assisting in procuring probate of a will, or letters of administration, for the purpose of enabling any person to receive such wages, pay, prize-money, or allowance of money of any kind, without first obtaining the certificate from the inspector of seamen's wills, or person authorised to officiate for him, every such proctor, register, or other officer shall forfeit 500*l.* and for ever after be incapable of acting in as capacity in any ecclesiastical court in Great Britain & Ireland.

[And by the 32 G. 3. c. 34. After the 1st day of August 1792, no letter of attorney or will of a *non-commission officer of marines* or *marine* shall be valid unless made according to the 26 G. 3. c. 63. s. 1.

All are to be deemed petty officers, seamen, marines, &c. Except such as are rated upon the books of such ship, admirals or flag officers, and their secretaries, captains, and lieutenants, masters, second masters, and pilots, physicians, surgeons, chaplains, boatswains, gunners, carpenters, and purfers, captains of marines, captain lieutenants of marines, lieutenants, and quarter-masters of marines. *f. 8.*

Every lieutenant, on board any of his majesty's ships, shall, upon a page of every muster book of such ship, sign his name for the purpose, and for the purpose only, that the inspector of seamen's wills, or such person as shall be deputed by him, may have an opportunity of comparing the same with the name of any such lieutenant attesting the will, &c. executed by or in favour of any petty officer, seaman, non-commissioned officer of marines or marine. *f. 10.*

And all captains of ships shall, upon their monthly muster books or returns, specify which of the men mentioned in the said returns, have granted or issued any will or testament during that month or space of time from the preceding returns, by inserting the date thereof opposite to the party's name. *f. 11.* The muster books, &c. in case of sailing from any foreign station, at a time when no opportunity shall offer of transmitting them to the navy-board, to be left with the naval officer of the place, if any, or with some respectable merchant, with directions to forward the same to the commissioners of his majesty's navy by the first safe opportunity, and in case of the removal of the commander, to be delivered over to his successor, and a receipt given for the same. *f. 12 & 13.*

Provided that it shall be lawful for the minister of any parish, to whom the inspector of seamen's wills shall transmit his check of any letter of attorney or will, passed and allowed by him, to deliver the said check to the attorney or executor in the said letter of attorney or will named and appointed. *f. 14.* And all seamen's letters of attorney, and wills made prior to 1st August 1786, and those of marines prior to 1st August 1792, shall be examined and inspected by the inspector of seamen's wills for the purpose of preventing frauds, forgeries, or impositions of any kind therein, and if such inspector shall see no cause to suspect the authenticity of the same, he shall affix the stamp of his office, and issue checks for the same, but if he shall see good cause to suspect the truth and authenticity of such letter of attorney or will, he shall report the same to the treasurer,
or

or to the paymaster of the navy, and shall enter his caveat against such letter of attorney or will, which shall prevent any money from being had or received thereon until the same shall be authenticated to the satisfaction of the said treasurer or paymaster. *f. 15.*

Administration
how to be ob-
tained.

The wages, pay, prize-money, or allowances of petty officers or seamen, non-commissioned officers of marines, and marines dying intestate, are to be paid only upon letters of administration obtained in the following manner:

The person claiming such administration shall send or give in a note or letter to the inspector of seamen's wills, stating the name of the deceased, the name of the ship or ships to which he belonged, and that he has heard or been informed of his death, and requesting the inspector to give such directions as may enable him to procure letters of administration to the deceased, or to the like effect, upon receipt whereof the inspector of seamen's wills shall deliver or send to the person claiming such administration, a paper in the words and form following, or to the like effect:

L I S T.

Sir,

1st Degree—Widow.
2d ——— Child.
3d ——— Father.
4th ——— Mother.
5th ——— Brother or Sister.
6th ——— Grandfather or
Grandmother.
7th ——— Uncle, Aunt, Ne-
phew, or Niece.
8th ——— Cousin-german.
9th ——— Cousin-german,
once removed.
10th ——— Second Cousin.
his ——— and { sole, or
one of his } nearest of kin, no one, to the
best of my knowledge and belief, of a nearer degree be-
ing living at the time of the death of the said deceased, who
died a { bachelor or }
widower }

My place of abode is ———

C. D.

WE hereby certify, that we personally know the above
subscribing C. D. and believe what { he } has stated to be
true.

9.

E. F.

G. H.

Both inhabitants of the parish of ——— in the
county of ———

No.

No. —

WE hereby certify, that the above E. F. and G. H. are known to us, are house-keepers, and persons of good repute.

Witness our hands,

Dated at ——— } this ——— day of ———	I. K. Minister.
	L. M. { Churchwardens. }
	N. O. { or Elders. }

N. B. If the person applying is the widow of the party deceased, she must forward, herewith, an extract from the parish register, or some other authentic proof of her marriage.

If the deceased died after he had left the naval service, an extract from the parish register of his burial, or some other authentic proof of his death, must likewise be sent to this office.

If the person applying knows any proctor in Doctors Commons, { *he* } is desired to mention his name, that he may be employed in obtaining the letters of administration.

This application, when filled up and attested, is to be sent by the general post, under cover, directed to the Treasurer or to the Paymaster of his Majesty's Navy, London.

And the said paper being filled up and certified, the same shall be returned, addressed to the Treasurer, or to the Paymaster of his Majesty's Navy, London, who upon receiving the same shall direct the inspector of seamen's wills to examine the same, and make such inquiry relative thereto as may appear to him necessary on that behalf, and being satisfied, he shall forthwith make out a certificate in the following form, or to the like effect :

Act of Parliament, 32 George III. Ch. 34.

No. —

Certificate to obtain Letters of Administration.

Navy Pay-office.

*HAVING duly examined an application made to this office by C. D. of ——— and county of ———, stating that { *the* }
is the { *sole, or one* } next o' kin of A. B. originally of ———,
and late a { *seaman* } belonging to his majesty's ship ———, and
who died intestate, a { *bachelor or* } upon the ——— day of ———
and without leaving any one of a superior degree of kindred*

Wills. Form and manner.

to him; and it appearing that no will of the deceased has been lodged in this office, I therefore grant this abstract of said application, and certify that I believe what is therein stated to be true, and also that the said C. D. may obtain letters of administration to the effects of the said deceased, which appear not to exceed the sum of — pounds; provided always that {^{the} or he } is otherwise entitled thereto by law.

I. P. Inspector.

To —

Proctor in Doctors Commons.

N. B. The previous commission or requisition is to be addressed agreeably to the superscription of the within cover, in which the same is to be inclosed, and forwarded by the proctor; and when the commission or requisition shall be returned to this office it will be forwarded to him, and he is then to sue out letters of administration, and send them to the inspector, with his charge noted thereon.

And after filling up the blanks therein as the case may be, shall sign and address the same to a proctor or proctors in Doctors Commons; the said inspector of seamen's wills shall at the same time inclose and send with such certificate a letter addressed to the minister and churchwardens, or elders, as the case may be, of the parish within which the person applying for such letters of administration then resides; and the treasurer or the paymaster of his majesty's navy, or the said inspector, or either of them, shall frank the said letter, so as to carry the same, and the previous commission or requisition to be inclosed therein, free of the charge for postage, and which letter so to be addressed to the minister, and to the churchwardens or elders, as the case may be, shall be in the words, figures, and form following, or to the like effect:

No. —

Navy Pay-Office, — day of —

Reverend Sir,

HAVING received an application attested by you and two { churchwardens or elders } of your parish, from C. D. also of your parish, stating that {^{the} or he } is the — and {^{sole or} one of the } next of kin of A. B. late a {^{seaman or} marine } belonging to his majesty's navy, and requesting leave to administer to his effects;

I am

*I am directed by act of parliament of the thirty-second of George the Third, chap. 34, to forward you the enclosed { commission or } for the purpose of swearing { him } accord-
{ requisition } ingly; provided, to the best of your knowledge and belief, { he } answers the description contained in the same.*

I am, Reverend Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

I. P. Inspector.

*P. S. When the { commission or } is executed, you will please
{ requisition } to return it, addressed*

To the Treasurer, or

*To the Paymaster of his Majesty's Navy,
London.*

*And specify and describe the receiver general of the land tax, collector of the customs, collector of the excise, or clerk of the dock, whose abode is nearest to the person applying, who will be directed to pay { her or } the wages due to the deceased.
{ him }*

To A. B.

Minister of the parish of —

*N. B. If the application above mentioned was not attested by you, as stated therein, be pleased to return the enclosed { commission or } immediately, that means may be taken to
{ requisition } discover the imposition.*

*And the inspector, before he sends such certificate as be-
fore directed to the proctor in Doctors Commons, shall fill
up the blanks therein agreeably to the circumstances of the
case; and the proctor or proctors to whom such certificate
shall be addressed and sent, and which shall likewise in-
close the letter to the minister, churchwardens, or elders,
as aforesaid, shall, immediately upon receipt of the same,
for out the previous commission or requisition, or take such
other proper and legal steps as may be necessary towards
enabling the person so applying for letters of administra-
tion to the deceased intestate, to obtain the same, and shall
inclose such previous commission or requisition, or other
legal and necessary instrument, with instructions for exe-
cuting the same, in the letter so to be addressed to the mi-
nister and churchwardens, or elders, and which had been
transmitted to him by the inspector of seamen's wills, along
with the aforesaid certificate, and shall forward such letter
and inclosures as aforesaid by the general post, agreeably
to the address put thereon by the treasurer of the navy,*

the paymaster of the navy, or the inspector of seamen's wills. *f.* 16.

And the minister, and the churchwardens, or elders, as the case may be, shall, immediately upon the receipt of such letter as aforesaid, with the previous commission or requisition, or other instruments inclosed therein, take such steps as to them may seem proper or necessary for procuring the execution of them, and, being so executed, shall transmit the same to the treasurer or to the paymaster of his majesty's navy, London; and if the person applying for such letters of administration reside at a distance from the place where the wages, prize-money, or other allowances of money due to the deceased, are payable, he or they shall specify and describe the receiver general of the land tax, collector of the customs, collector of the excise, or clerk of the check, who may be most convenient or nearest to such person applying for such administration; and the said treasurer or paymaster of his majesty's navy shall, immediately upon the receipt thereof, send the said previous commission or requisition, or other legal instrument, executed by the person applying for the administration as aforesaid, to the aforesaid proctor in Doctors Commons, who in pursuance thereof shall forthwith sue out and procure letters of administration in favour of the person so applying for the same, in the manner and form above mentioned, to the estate and effects of the person who has so died intestate as aforesaid. *f.* 17.

Executors how
to obtain pro-
bates of wills.

And where any petty officer, seaman, non-commissioned officer of marines, or marine, belonging, or who shall have belonged to any of his majesty's ships, has died, or hereafter shall die, and shall have left a will or testament, appointing any executor or executors therein, any pay, wages, prize-money, or allowance of money; which may have been due or owing to such testator at the time of his death, shall not be paid over to or recovered by such executor or executors, but upon probates of such wills, to be obtained in the following manner, *viz.* after such wills shall have been transmitted, inspected, and lodged in the office of the treasurer of the navy, as directed by the aforementioned act of the twenty-sixth year of the reign of his present majesty, the inspector of seamen's wills and powers of attorney shall issue, or cause to be issued, a check in lieu thereof, with directions to return the same upon the testator's death, and to which check there shall be subjoined a blank certificate, to be signed by two reputable house-keepers of the parish where such executor is resident at the

time

time such certificate shall be so returned to the pay office of the treasurer of the navy, certifying that they personally know and believe that he is the person described as executor in the said check; and also another blank certificate, to be signed by the minister of the said parish, and two of the churchwardens, or two elders of the same, as the case may be, certifying that such two persons who certified as above mentioned are resident within the parish, and of good repute; and such check and certificates shall be in the form and words following, or to the like effect:

No. —

C H E C K.

Navy Pay Office.

IT being directed by Acts of Parliament, twenty-sixth George III. chap. 63, and thirty-second George III. chap. 34, that wills granted by petty officers and seamen, non-commissioned officers of marines, and marines, belonging to his Majesty's navy, shall be lodged in this office, for purposes therein specified; and that a check shall be issued for every such will, mentioning the particular heads thereof, which, by virtue of the said act, shall stand in place of the same;

This is therefore issued to shew receipt at this office of a will, — dated at — upon the — day of — granted by A. B now of — formerly of his majesty's ship — in favour of C. D. and appointing E. F. executor {or} and which is attested by G. H. and I. K. The above E. F. upon the testator's death is entitled, upon production of this check, to demand of this office the wages, pay, or any other allowances due to the deceased. and that the above mentioned will be directed and sent to a proctor in Doctors Commons, to obtain a probate thereof, which is also to be lodged in this office.

WE hereby certify, That we personally know the above-described E. F. the present holder of this check; and that he is an inhabitant of this parish.

L. M.

N. O.

Both inhabitants of the parish of — in the county of —

P 3

WE

Wills. Form and manner.

WE hereby certify, That the above L. M. and N. O. are known to us, are housekeepers, and persons of good repute.

Witness our hands,

*At — this
— day of
—*

P. Q. Minister.

*R. S. { Churchwardens
T. U. { or Elders. }*

If the testator dies after he leaves the naval service, a certificate of his burial, or some other authentic proof of his death, must likewise be sent to this office.

If the execut^{or}_{rix} knows any proctor in Doctors Commons, ^{the}_{or he} is desired to mention his name, that he may be employed in obtaining the probate.

The above certificates are to be filled up upon the testator's death, and the check to be sent by the general post, under cover, directed to the Treasurer, or to the Paymaster of his Majesty's Navy, London.

And the said check having been with the certificates duly filled up, returned to the treasurer of the navy, or to the paymaster of the navy, in the event of the testator's death, and the said original will having been passed and stamped in the manner specified and directed by the aforesaid act, passed in the twenty-sixth year of the reign of his present majesty, the inspectors of seamen's wills, or the persons authorized to act for him, shall note thereon the amount of the wages due to the said deceased, and shall forward the said will to such proctor or proctors in Doctors Commons as aforesaid, together with a letter addressed to the minister and churchwardens, or elders, as the case may be, of the parish within which the said executor or executors, applying for such probate of will, shall then reside; and the treasurer or the paymaster of his majesty's navy, or the said inspector, or either of them, shall frank the said letter, so as to carry the same, and the previous commission or requisition to be inclosed therein, free of charge for postage; and which letter, so to be addressed to the minister and churchwardens, or elders, as the case may be, shall be in the words, figures, and form following, or to the like effect:

No. —

Navy Pay-Office, — 179-

Rev. Sir,

HAVING received a check, formerly issued by this office, to which there are certificates annexed, attested by you and
two

two { churchwardens } of your parish, certifying that C. D. also of your parish, is the person described in the said check to be the execut^{or}_{rix} to A. B. late a { seaman } { marine } belonging to his majesty's navy, and requesting that a probate of the will of the said A. B. may be granted;

I am directed by act of parliament of the thirty-second of George the third, chap. — to forward you the enclosed { commission } { requisition } and copy of the will, for the purpose of swearing the person so named execut^{or}_{rix} accordingly.

I am, Rev. Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

I. P. Inspector.

P. S. When the { commission } { requisition } is executed, you will please to return it, together with the copy of the will, addressed

To the Treasurer, or

To the Paymaster of his Majesty's Navy,
London.

And specify and describe the receiver general of the land-tax, collector of the customs, collector of the excise, or clerk of the check, whose abode is nearest to the execut^{or}_{rix} who will be directed to pay { him } { her } the wages due to the deceased.

To A. B.

Minister of the parish of —

And the said proctor having received the said will, and the said letter so written by the inspector, shall immediately sue out the previous commission or requisition, or take such other proper and legal steps as may be necessary towards enabling the said executor or executors, so applying for probate of the said will, to obtain the same, and shall enclose such previous commission or requisition, or other legal and necessary instrument, with instructions for executing the same, as also a copy of the said will, in the letter so to be addressed to the minister, churchwardens, or elders, and shall forward such letter and inclosures as aforesaid by the general post, agreeable to the address put thereon by the treasurer of the navy, by the paymaster of the navy, or by the inspector of seamen's wills. s. 18.

And the minister and the churchwardens, or elders, as the case may be, shall immediately upon receipt of such letter as aforesaid, with the previous commission or requisition, or other instruments inclosed therein, take such

steps as to them may seem proper or necessary for procuring the execution of such previous commission or requisition, or other instrument directed by the proctor to be executed, and the same being so executed, he or they shall transmit the same to the treasurer or to the paymaster of his majesty's navy, London; and if the person applying for such probate of will shall be and reside at a distance from the place where the wages, prize money, or other allowances of money due to the deceased, are payable, he or they shall specify and describe the receiver general of the land tax, collector of the customs, collector of the excise, or clerk of the check, who may be most convenient, or nearest to the person applying for such probate; and the said treasurer or paymaster of his majesty's navy shall immediately upon receipt thereof send the said previous commission or requisition, or other legal instruments, executed by the person applying for the probate as aforesaid, to the aforesaid proctor in Doctors Commons, who in pursuance thereof shall forthwith sue out and procure such probate. *§. 19.*

Creditors desirous of administering to petty officers, seamen, &c.

And when any person or persons alleging him, her, or themselves to be creditor or creditors of any petty officer, seaman, non-commissioned officer of marines, or marine, dying intestate, or leaving a will, of which the executor or executors shall renounce the execution, or shall refuse to act thereupon, shall in that character be desirous of procuring letters of administration, or letters of administration with will annexed, in order to receive any wages, pay, prize money, or other allowances of money of any kind, due to such petty officers or seamen, non-commissioned officers of marines, or marines, in respect of services in his majesty's navy, the same shall not be paid unto any such creditor or creditors as aforesaid, but upon letters of administration, or letters of administration with will annexed, to be obtained in the following manner; (*videlicet,*) Such creditor or creditors shall apply by letter or note to the inspector of seamen's wills, stating the nature and amount of his demand, and if the person upon whose account the wages, pay, prize money, or other allowances are due, shall have died after he left the naval service, such creditor shall also exhibit a satisfactory proof of such death, and if he knows any proctor in Doctors Commons, whom he may wish to employ, he shall mention his name to the said inspector, who shall further require a certificate, signed by two reputable housekeepers of the parish where such creditor is resident, certifying that they personally know him, and believe that he is the person whom he describes himself

self to be, and also another certificate from the minister of the said parish, and two of the churchwardens, or two of the elders of the same, as the case may be, certifying that such two persons who signed and certified as above-mentioned, are resident within the parish, and of good repute; and upon receiving such certificates, together with a stated account in writing of such creditor's demand, he shall sign his name to such account exhibited by such creditor, and shall also put a stamp thereon, in token of his approbation thereof; and every such account, and the vouchers exhibited by such creditor, shall be kept by the said inspector as vouchers of the accounts of the treasurer of the navy, and such inspector shall immediately make, or cause to be made out a certificate, stating the nature and amount of such creditor's demand upon the estate of such petty officer, seaman, non-commissioned officer of marines, or marine, as aforesaid, deceased, and shall sign and stamp, and forward the same to the proctor or proctors in Doctors Commons as shall have been named by such creditor, and he shall also inclose and send therewith a letter addressed to the minister and churchwardens, or elders, as the case may be, of the parish within which the person applying as creditor for such letters of administration then resides, and the treasurer or paymaster of his majesty's navy, or the said inspector, or either of them, shall frank the said letter so as to carry the same, and the previous commission or requisition, or other necessary instruments to be inclosed therein, free of the charge for postage; and which letter so to be addressed to the minister, and to the churchwardens, or elders, as the case may be, shall be in the following words, figures, and form, or to the like effect:

No. —

Navy Pay-Office, — 179-

Reverend Sir,

HAVING received certificates attested by you and two { churchwardens } of your parish, from C. D. stating that he is resident therein, and desiring to administer to the effects of A. B. late of his majesty's navy, as his creditor;

I am directed, by act of parliament of the thirty-second of George the Third, ch. 34. to forward you the inclosed { commission } for the purpose of swearing him accordingly.

I am, Reverend Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

I. P. Inspector.

P. S.

Wills. Form and manner.

*P. S. When the { commission
requisition } is executed, you will please
to return it, addressed*

To the Treasurer, or

*To the Paymaster of his Majesty's Navy,
London.*

*And specify and describe the receiver general of the land tax,
collector of the customs, collector of the excise, or clerk of the
cheek, whose abode is nearest to the above creditor, who will
be directed to pay that part of the wages due to the deceased which
{ he } appears by law entitled to receive.*

To A. B.

Minister of the parish of ———

And the proctor or proctors to whom the aforesaid certificate shall be addressed and sent, and which shall likewise inclose the letter to the minister, churchwardens, or elders, as aforesaid, shall immediately upon receipt of the same sue out the previous commission or requisition, or take such other proper and legal steps as may be necessary towards enabling the person so applying as creditor for letters of administration to such deceased to obtain the same, and shall inclose such previous commission or requisition, or other legal and necessary instruments, with instructions for executing the same, together with a copy of the will in cases of administration with the will annexed, in the letter so to be addressed to the minister, churchwardens, or elders, and shall forward such letter and inclosures as aforesaid by the general post agreeable to the address put thereon by the treasurer of the navy, paymaster of the navy, or the inspector of seamen's wills, and if it shall be necessary to cite the next of kin, notice of such citation shall be previously given to the said inspector, who shall point out one or more public papers, in which such citation shall be inserted.

And the minister and churchwardens, or elders, as the case may be, shall, immediately upon the receipt of such letter as aforesaid, with the previous commission or requisition, or other instruments inclosed therein, take such steps as to them may seem proper or necessary for procuring the execution of such previous commission or requisition, or other instrument, directed by the proctor to be executed, and, being so executed, he or they shall transmit the same to the treasurer, or to the paymaster of his majesty's navy, London; and if the person applying for such administration shall be and reside at a distance from the place

place where the wages, prize money, or other allowance of money due to the deceased, are payable, he or they shall specify and describe the receiver general of the land tax, collector of the customs, collector of the excise, or clerk of the check, who may be most convenient or nearest to such person claiming such administration; and the said treasurer or paymaster of his majesty's navy shall, immediately upon receipt thereof, send the said previous commission or requisition, or other legal instruments, executed by the person applying for the administration as aforesaid, to the aforesaid proctor or proctors in Doctors Commons, who in pursuance thereof shall forthwith sue out and procure letters of administration in favour of the person so applying as creditor for the same, in the form and manner above mentioned, to the estate and effects of the person who has died as aforesaid, but which letters of administration may and shall only entitle such administrator, as creditor, to receive such part of the estate of such petty officer, seaman, non-commissioned officer of marines, or marine, as shall satisfy the amount of the claim or demand made by him as aforesaid, together with expences incurred in establishing his right as aforesaid to receive the same, and the balance of such intestate's estate (if any) after satisfying the demand of such creditor, and expences incurred, shall remain in the hands of the treasurer of the navy, subject to the claim and demand of any other creditor, next of kin, or executor, to take and receive the same, when legally authorized so to do. *f.* 20, 21.

And as soon as any letters of administration, or probates of wills, or letters of administration with will annexed, have been obtained, and passed the seal of the proper court, in the manner hereinbefore directed in the different events hereinbefore specified, the proctor or proctors who have sued out the same shall immediately send such letters of administration, or probates of wills, or letters of administration with will annexed, addressed to the treasurer or to the paymaster of his majesty's navy, together with an account of his or their charges and expences in obtaining the same, which said charges and expences shall not exceed the sum or sums hereinafter allowed to be charged in the different events hereinafter specified; and the said treasurer or paymaster of his majesty's navy, upon receiving such letters of administration, or probates of wills, or letters of administration with will annexed, shall direct the inspector of seamen's wills, or the person authorized to act for him, to issue, or cause to be

Checks and certificates how to be issued by the inspector of seamen's wills.

be issued, a check, containing the heads of such letters of administration, or probate of will, or letters of administration with will annexed, as the case may be; and the said inspector, or the person authorized to act for him, shall note thereon the amount of the said proctor or proctors charges and expences, provided the same shall be at and after the rates hereinafter allowed to be charged, and likewise specify and describe upon the said check the revenue officer or clerk of the check, residing as aforesaid nearest to the administrator or executor so to be named in such check, if such communication shall have been made to him; and in cases of letters of administration, or letters of administration with will annexed, granted to creditors, he shall also note upon such check the amount due to such creditors, and which check of letters of administration, or letters of administration with will annexed, so prepared, shall be delivered over by him to the said administrator, and which check of probate of will shall be delivered over by him to the said executor, together with the copy of the will which had been transmitted to him by the proctor or proctors in Doctors Commons, the said copy being first stamped by the inspector, if the said administrator, or the said administrator with will annexed, or the said executor, as the case may be, shall be present or demand the same in person, but if he shall not be present, but be and reside at a distance, then and in that case the said inspector shall deliver such check, and such copy of will, to the deputy paymaster, and which shall be in the following form, or to the like effect:

No. _____

CHECK.

Navy Pay-Office, — day of —

IT being directed by acts of parliament, twenty-sixth George the Third, chap. 63, and Thirty-second George the Third, chap. 34, that letters of administration, and probates of wills, granted to the representatives of petty officers and seamen, non-commissioned officers of marines, and marines belonging to his majesty's navy, shall be lodged in this office, as vouchers to the treasurer for payments made thereon, and that a check shall be issued for every such administration and probate of will, and administration with will annexed, specifying the particular heads thereof, which by virtue of the said act shall stand in place of the same;

This

This is therefore issued to shew receipt at this office of
 { Letters of Administration
 Probate of Will
 Letters of administration with will annexed. } *granted to C. D. of*

— in the county of — as { Administrat
 Execut
 Administrat with will annexed }
of A. B. late of his majesty's ship — dated — day of —

No. —

Remittance bill to be addressed to — at —

The aforesaid { Letters of administration
 Probate of will
 Letters of administration with will annexed } *were*
sued out by — proctor in Doctors Commons, whose charges
amount to —

I. P. Inspector.

To the Deputy Paymaster of his Majesty's Navy.

Provided, that where any sum not exceeding the sum of ten pounds shall be due for the services as aforesaid of any petty officer or seaman, non-commissioned officer of marines, or marine, deceased, in order that the widow, next of kin, creditor, or person named as executor in any will or testament of such petty officer or seaman, non-commissioned officer of marines, or marine, may not be put to great expence, it shall and may be lawful for the inspector of seamen's wills, after having taken the previous steps to ascertain the justness of their respective claims to probate or administration, or administration with will annexed, (in like manner as he has been hereinbefore directed to take in cases of granting certificates to Doctors Commons for letters of administration, or letters of administration with will annexed, or for probates of will) to issue or cause to be issued a certificate in the following form, or to the like effect:

Act of Parliament, thirty-second George III. chap. 34.

No. —

CERTIFICATE.

Navy Pay Office, — day of —

HAVING duly examined a claim presented to me as Inspector of seamen's wills, &c. by A. B. of — in the county of — stating that { ^{he} _{she} } *is the — of C. D. originally of — and lately a* { ^{seaman} _{marine} } *belonging to his majesty's ship — and who died at — on the —*

I there-

Wills. Form and manner.

I therefore hereby certify, that I believe the contents as therein stated to be true, and also that the said A. B. is entitled to receive whatever wages, prize money, and other allowances of money may be due to the said deceased, provided the amount thereof does not exceed the sum of ten pounds.

Remittance bill to be addressed to — at — ;

I. P. Inspector.

To the Deputy Paymaster of the Navy, who shall take care to note hereon all sums which he shall pay, or cause to be paid, upon the authority of the same.

And which certificate, so prepared, shall be delivered over by him to the said widow, next of kin, creditor, or person named as executor, if he or they shall be present, but if he or they shall not be present, but be and reside at a distance, then and in that case the said inspector shall specify and describe upon the said certificate the revenue officer residing as aforesaid nearest to such widow, next of kin, creditor, or person named as executor, and shall deliver such certificate to the deputy paymaster. *f. 22, 23.*

Deputy paymaster to ascertain and pay the wages due, or if the party reside at a distance, to make out a remittance bill.

And the said deputy paymaster, upon receiving such check, or such certificate, addressed to him, as the case may be, shall cause the whole of the wages due thereon to be calculated and ascertained in the usual manner, in which calculation consideration shall be had to the proctor's charge, if any such charge shall have been incurred, which shall be abated and deducted from the said wages, and be immediately paid to the said proctor, or some person authorized to receive the same on his behalf, and the amount due on such check or certificate, as the case may be, being so ascertained, and the proctor's charge, where there may be any, being so deducted, the net balance, or that part of the net balance which may be due to the administrator, executor, widow, next of kin, or person named as executor or creditor, shall immediately be paid to him or them, if he or they shall be present; and the check or certificate upon which the same was so paid, shall also be delivered to him or them, that it may be and remain in his or their hands, and stand in place and instead of letters of administration, or probate of the will, or letters of administration with will annexed, as an authority to receive whatever other sums may be due or become due to the estate of such deceased. *f. 24.*

And in case the said executor or administrator, widow, next of kin, or creditor, or person named as executor, shall not be present, but be and reside at a distance, the said deputy paymaster, or treasurer's clerk, shall make out, or cause to be made out, a remittance bill or bills for the net balance, or that part of the net balance ascertained as aforesaid, and which shall be in the following form, or to the like effect :

No. ——— Day of ———

Sir,

PAY to B. C. of ——— on { ^{his}
her
their } £. s. d.
producing and delivering the duplicate hereof,
the sum of ——— being on account of the
wages of D. E. belonging to his majesty's ship
the ——— if the same be demanded within
six calendar months from the date hereof,
otherwise you are to return this bill to the
treasurer of the navy, at the pay-office of the
navy, London.

To { The Receiver General of the Land Tax
in the County of ———
The Collector of the Customs at the
Port of ———
The Collector of the Excise at ———
The Clerk of the Check at ——— }

Signed { F. G. { Commissioner of the
Navy.

Attested { H. I. { Clerk to the Treasurer
of the Navy.

By virtue of the act of the thirty-second of George the Third.

N. B. The personating or falsely assuming the name and character of any person entitled to receive the wages of any inferior officer or seaman, non-commissioned officer of marines, or marine, or procuring any other to do the same, in order to receive wages due to such officer or seaman, non-commissioned officer of marines, or marine, is made felony without benefit of clergy, by the thirty-second of George the Third.

The

The officer to whom the within bill is addressed, is directed by act 32 Geo. III. ch. 34, to examine the duplicate thereof when presented, and inquire into the truth, by the oath of the person presenting the same; and being satisfied, he is to testify to that purpose upon the back of the bill, and pay the amount without fee or reward; but if he shall not be able to pay the amount, from not having public money sufficient in his hands, he shall note the cause of his refusing payment, and shall appoint another day, within one month at furthest from that time, and shall deliver back the bill, so noted, to the person presenting it. And if, upon complaint to the commissioners, it shall appear that the officer to whom this is addressed has unnecessarily delayed payment, taken any fee, or made any deduction whatsoever, he shall be fined a sum not exceeding fifty pounds.

Which bill shall be signed, attested, forwarded, and transmitted in the manner directed in cases of parties desiring their wages to be remitted at the pay of a ship, by the aforesaid act, passed in the thirty-first year of the reign of his late majesty (1); and which remittance bills shall be made payable to such persons only as shall be expressed as administrators, executors, widows, next of kin, or creditors, in the check or certificate issued as before directed by the inspector; and all the money payable by the treasurer of the navy upon such check of administration, or probate of will, with copy of will annexed, being made into a remittance bill or bills, the treasurer's clerk shall examine the said check, and if it shall appear that there is no further sums due by the said treasurer of the navy, but that the full sum due by him upon such authority has been paid and satisfied, his said clerk shall enclose the said check, together with the said copy of will, in the letter or cover which contains the bill of remittance, and forward it by the same conveyance to the administrators, or executors, widows, next of kin, or creditors, that it may be and remain in their hands, and stand in place and instead of the original administration, or probate of the will, as an authority to receive whatever other sums may be due, or become due to the estate of such deceased.

Remittance bills
to be paid by the
receiver general

And as soon as the duplicate of any remittance bill or bills made out in favour of or granted in the manner here-

(1) *i. e.* Two bills are to be made out, which shall be duplicates and cut out indentwise, one whereof shall be sent to the payee of the bill, and the other to the person on whom it is drawn. 31 G. 2. c. 10. s. 13, 14.

inbefore directed in the different events specified, to any administrator, executor, widow, next of kin, creditor, or person named as executor, to any petty officer, seaman, non-commissioned officer of marines or marine, shall be produced and delivered to any receiver general of the land tax, collector of the customs, collector of the excise, or clerk of the check in Great Britain respectively, within six calendar months from the date thereof, he is hereby required and enjoined to examine such duplicate, and inquire into the truth thereof by the oath of the person producing the same, which oath he is hereby authorized and directed to administer, and upon being duly satisfied to testify the same on the back of such bill, and immediately to pay to the person or persons to whom such bills shall be made payable, and who shall be entitled to receive the same, without fee or reward on any pretence whatsoever, the sum contained in such bill, taking his, her, or their receipt for the same on the back thereof, which bill so paid, upon being produced and delivered, together with the duplicate thereof, at the navy office, shall be immediately assigned for payment by three or more commissioners of the navy, and shall be immediately repaid by the treasurer of the navy to such receiver general of the land tax, collector of the customs, collector of the excise, clerk of the check, or to the order of any of them respectively who shall have paid such bill; but in case the duplicate of such bill shall not be produced and delivered, and the payment thereof be demanded within six calendar months from the date thereof, then the said receiver general of the land tax, collector of the customs, collector of the excise, or clerk of the check, shall return such bill to the treasurer of the navy, who shall cause such bill to be immediately cancelled, and from and after the cancelling thereof, the sum so contained in such bill shall accrue and become payable to such executor, administrator, widow, next of kin, creditor, or person named as executor to such inferior officer or seamen, non-commissioned officer of marines, or marine, for whose wages or pay it was made out, or to their lawful representatives in case they shall be dead, in the same manner as if such bill had never been issued. *f. 25, 26.*

Provided always, that if any such receiver general of the land tax, collector of the customs, collector of the excise, or clerk of the check, to whom the duplicate of any of the bills hereinbefore directed to be made out and

addressed to him as aforesaid shall be tendered for payment, shall not then have in his hands public money sufficient to answer the same, and shall for that reason refuse or delay the immediate payment thereof, such receiver general, collector of the customs, collector of the excise, or clerk of the check, shall immediately indorse on the back of the said duplicate the day of its being so tendered to him, and the cause of his refusal or delay to pay the same, and shall appoint thereon, for the payment of such bill, some future day, within the space of one month at the farthest from the day of its having been first tendered to him as aforesaid, and such duplicate, with the indorsement thereon, shall immediately be delivered back to the person presenting the same; and if upon complaint to be made to the respective commissioners appointed by his majesty, his heirs or successors, to manage the said several duties of the land tax, customs, or excise, or to the commissioners of the navy, if the person complained of be a clerk of the check, it shall appear that such receiver general, collector of the customs, collector of the excise, or clerk of the check, hath unnecessarily and wilfully refused or delayed the payment of such bill, or that such receiver general, collector of the customs, collector of the excise, or clerk of the check, or any person employed by or under any of them, hath directly or indirectly received or taken any fee, reward, gratuity, discount, or deduction whatsoever, on account of the payment of the said bill, it shall and may be lawful to and for any three or more of the said commissioners to convict and fine any such offender under their respective direction in any sum not exceeding fifty pounds, according to the nature and degree of the offence, which shall be paid to the informer or informers against such offender or offenders. *f. 27.*

Bills and duplicates to be allowed in passing the accounts of the treasurer of the navy, and persons forging certificates, checks, &c. to suffer death. *f. 28, 29.*

Sums to be paid
for probates of
wills and letters
of administra-
tion.

The following sums are to be paid for the seal, parchment, writing, and suing forth of probates of wills and letters of administration granted in pursuance of this act, for the purpose of receiving *wages, or pay, or allowances of money of any kind, which shall remain due to the deceased, viz.*

For

	£.	s.	d.
For probates of wills, if the goods and chattels are under the value of 20 l.	0	15	2
For letters of adminiftration,	1	4	2
For probates of wills under 40 l.	1	8	8
— Adminiftration,	1	17	8
For probates of wills under 60 l.	1	11	2
— Adminiftration,	2	8	6
For probates of wills under 100 l.	1	13	8
— Adminiftration,	2	11	0
For commiffions or requisitions to swear ex- cutors or adminiftrators :			
Under 20 l.	0	15	0
And under 100 l.	1	3	0

But if the probates or letters of adminiftration be granted to the widow, children, father, mother, brother, or fitter, in purfuanee of this act, *for the fame purpose of receiving wages, or pay, or allowances of money of any kind, which fhall remain due to fuch warrant or petty officer, &c.* then the following fums are to be paid, viz.

	£.	s.	d.
For probates of wills under 20 l.	0	6	0
— Adminiftration,	0	14	0
For probates of wills under 40 l.	0	19	6
— Adminiftration,	1	7	6
For probates of wills under 60 l.	1	3	0
— Adminiftration,	1	11	0
For probates of wills under 100 l.	1	7	6
— Adminiftration,	1	15	6
For commiffions or requisitions to swear ex- cutors or adminiftrators :			
Under 20 l.	0	12	0
Under 40 l.	0	15	6
Under 60 l.	0	16	6
Under 100 l.	0	18	6

Sec. 31, 32.

And no more than 5 s. are to be taken for the fuing forth of the probate of any will or letters of adminiftration granted to the widow, children, father, mother, brother, or fitter, of any fuch feaman or marine, &c. and 5 s. for commiffions or requisitions to swear fuch widow, &c. unlefs the goods amount to 100 l., *f. 33.* : (which laft mentioned charge of 5 s. muft be underftood to be demandable

where the probate or letters of administration are not for the purpose of receiving *wages, or pay, or allowances of money remaining due*, as in *§. 32.* but for general purposes, as to obtain administration of the goods and chattels of the deceased).

A bill of the expences of obtaining letters of administration to creditors, is to be laid before and taxed by one of the registers of the prerogative court of Canterbury, or their deputies, who are entitled to a fee of 3 s. 4 d. for the same; and the proctor is to transmit such letters of administration, with the bill of expences so certified, to the treasurer or paymaster of his majesty's navy. Proctors taking more than the prescribed sums forfeit 50 l. and registers and other officers of any ecclesiastical court, procuring letters of administration or probate contrary to this act and the 26 G. 3. to be incapacitated to act, and forfeit 500 l. *§. 24.*

But if any extraordinary pains, trouble, or expence has attended the suing out letters of the administration or probate, the proctor may in consideration thereof make a proportionable addition to his bill; but if the same shall appear unreasonable or exorbitant to the treasurer or paymaster of the navy, the bill shall be returned to Doctors Commons to be checked and taxed as aforesaid, without fee or reward, unless the said charges and expences shall have arisen in consequence of any litigation or suit, when the registers, &c. shall be permitted to charge 3 s. 4 d. *§. 35.*

The following table of expences of obtaining probates or letters of administration under this act, is to be found in Mr. Tomlins's Treatise on Wills, exhibiting the difference of expence between proving a will, or obtaining letters of administration in the common form, and *by commission*, where the executor or administrator does not attend personally.

1. If granted to a widow, child, parent, brother or sister, being executors or next of kin, *to receive wages, &c.*
2. If granted to other persons, being executors or next of kin, *to receive wages, &c.*
3. If granted to widow, children, parents, brother or sister, *for other general purposes.*

Where the value of the goods is		In common form.			By commission.		
		Probates.			Probates.		
		£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
1.	Under 20 l.	0	6	0	0	18	0
	20 l. and under 40 l.	0	19	6	1	5	0
	40 l. and under 60 l.	1	3	0	1	18	6
	60 l. and under 100 l.	1	7	6	2	4	0
2.	Under 20 l.	0	15	2	1	10	2
	20 l. and under 40 l.	1	8	8	2	11	8
	40 l. and under 60 l.	1	11	2	2	14	2
	60 l. and under 100 l.	1	13	8	2	16	8
3. Under 100 l.		0	5	0	0	10	0

IV. Of the probate of wills, and administration of intestates effects.

Which chapter divides itself into two parts; viz:

I. Of the probate of wills.

II. Of the administration of intestates effects.

And,

I. Of the probate of wills.

1. **I**T appears to have been a matter of great controversy, Origin of the jurisdiction.
to whom the probate of wills and granting administration did originally belong, and whether these were matters entirely of ecclesiastical cognizance; but it seems now to be the better opinion, that the probate of testaments did not originally belong to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but to the county court, or to the court baron of the respective lord of the manor where the testator died, as all other matters did. 2 *Bac. Abr.* 398.

The truth is, there were wills before there was any ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and consequently, the cognizance thereof pertained then solely to the civil magistrate. After the establishment of Christianity and of the ecclesiasti-

cal jurisdiction in England, until the time of the conquest, the courts ecclesiastical and temporal were conjoined, the bishop and earl sitting together for the transaction of business in the county court. Upon the separation of the courts in the time of king William the first (m), it doth not appear unto which of the two jurisdictions the cognizance of wills immediately acceded. But so early as the reign of king Henry the first, Sir Henry Spelman observes that in Scotland the cognizance of wills belonged to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and he adds, doubtless then also in England. And Glanvil doth testify thus much in the time of king Henry the second; who saith, that if there be any dispute concerning a testament, the same is to be heard and determined in the Court Christian. *Spelm. Rem.* 132.

And in the preamble of the statute of the 18 Ed. 3. ft. 3. c. 6. it is expressed, that *causes testamentary notoriously pertain to the cognizance of holy church.*

Nevertheless, from the constitutions and laws which were made of ancient time against lords of manors detaining the goods of the deceased in prejudice of their creditors, of their families, and of their souls; it seemeth that the lords of manors did for some time retain a jurisdiction with respect to the goods of their deceased vassals. And from this source possibly may be deduced the power of granting probate of wills and administration of intestates effects that still remaineth in divers manors. Which power having been enjoyed time out of mind, and without interruption, is allowed to be good. And where the lord of a manor hath the probate of testaments within his manor, if such will be proved in the ecclesiastical court, a prohibition lieth; because the jurisdiction thereof belongeth to another; else the party might be doubly vexed. *5 Co.* 73. *2 Bac. Abr.* 402. (n)

But, excepting in such like particular cases, it is now certain, however it might have been formerly, that the spiritual court is the only court that hath jurisdiction of the probate of wills; and, as incident to such jurisdiction, hath power to determine all those matters that are necessary to the authenticating thereof. *2 Bac. Abr.* 398.

(m) See Courts, 3.

(n) The granting of probates of wills regularly belongs to the ecclesiastical courts; but some courts baron have this right by prescription, as the manor of Mansfield, and those of Cowle and Caversham in Oxfordshire. *Wentworth Off. of Executor*, 43.

And the reason why the probate of testaments hath been given unto spiritual men is, because it is to be intended, that they have more knowledge what is for the profit and benefit of the soul of the testator, than laymen have ; and that they will look more than laymen, that the debts of the deceased be paid and satisfied out of his goods, and that they will see his will performed, so far as his goods will extend. *Perk.* 213. (o)

2. And, generally, the person before whom the testament is to be proved is the bishop of the diocese where the testator dwelled, or his officer. *Swin.* 427. Bishop.

Archdeacons, as such, have no power to grant probate or commit administration, although most archdeacons in England do it ; but they do it not as archdeacons, but by a prescriptive right. *Gibf.* 478.

3. But there are also certain peculiar ecclesiastical jurisdictions, where by prescription or composition or other special title, the probation and approbation of the testaments of such as dwell and die within those places, doth appertain to the judge of that peculiar. *Swin.* 427. Peculiar.

Concerning which it is ordered by *Canon* 126, as followeth : Whereas deans, archdeacons, prebendaries, parsons, vicars, and others exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction, claim liberty to prove last wills and testaments of persons deceased within their several jurisdictions, having no known or certain registers, nor publick place to keep their records in, by reason whereof, many wills, rights and legacies, upon the death or change of such persons and their private notaries, miscarry and cannot be found, to the great prejudice of his majesty's subjects ; we there-

(o) The reader will find the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts in wills traced with great learning in Ch. B. Gilbert's argument in the case of *Marriot v. Marriot*, *Gilb. Eq. Rep.* 203. and *Stra.* 666. This power appears to have been assumed by them by degrees, after the charter of Will. I. separated the ecclesiastical from the hundred or county court. See **Courts**, 3. In the Roman law, we find that Justinian Cod. 1. 3. 28. enables bishops or their superiors to sue for legacies left to pious uses, such as to support the poor, redeem captives, &c. But he prohibits them from proving or registering wills, which it appears they had attempted ; confining that power to the secular magistrate. Cod. 1. 3. 41. & 6. 23. 23. It is remarkable that before the introduction of Christianity, the pontifical college at Rome could compel an heir to perform the will of the deceased in certain cases where no action was given by the civil law, as where a monument was to be erected. *Dig.* 5. 3. 52.

fore order and enjoin, that all such possessors and exercisers of peculiar jurisdiction, shall once in every year exhibit into the publick registry of the bishop of the diocese, or of the dean and chapter, under whose jurisdiction the said peculiars are, every original testament of every person in that time deceased, and by them proved in their several peculiar jurisdictions, or a true copy of every such testament, examined, subscribed and sealed by the peculiar judge and his notary. Otherwise if any of them fail so to do, the bishop of the diocese or dean and chapter, unto whom the said jurisdictions do respectively belong, shall suspend the said parties and every of them from the exercise of all such peculiar jurisdiction, until they have performed this our constitution.

Archbishop's
prerogative in
case of bona
notabilia.

4. All testaments are proved and administrations granted in the prerogative court of the several archbishops respectively, where the party dying within the province of such archbishop hath bona notabilia in some other diocese than where he dieth. *4 Inst. 335.*

And this power is reserved in the statute of frauds and perjuries; by which it is provided, that *nothing in the said statute shall extend to alter or change the jurisdiction or right of probate of wills concerning personal estates, but that the prerogative court of the archbishop of Canterbury and other ecclesiastical courts, and other courts having right to the probate of such wills, shall retain the same right and power as they had before in every respect: subject nevertheless to the rules and directions of the said act.* 29 C. 2. c. 3. s. 24.

And by the statute of the 23 H. 8. c. 9. (which directeth that persons shall not be cited out of their proper diocese) it is enacted, that *the same shall not extend to the prerogative of the archbishop of Canterbury, for calling any person out of the diocese where he shall be inhabiting, for probate of any testament; nor shall be in any wise prejudicial to the archbishop of York, concerning probate of testaments within his province and jurisdiction, by reason of any prerogative.* s. 5. 7.

The law concerning this matter is, that five pounds is the sum or value of notable goods. But where by composition or custom in any county, bona notabilia are rated at a greater sum, the same is to continue unaltered: as in the diocese of London, it is ten pounds by composition.

4 Inst. 335.

If he who dieth had goods in both dioceses, to the amount of 5 l. in the whole; the same shall be bona notabilia, and consequently under the archbishop's jurisdiction. *1 Roll's Abr. 908, 909.*

Rolls

Rolls says, If a man dieth in one diocese, not having any goods there, but had bona notabilia in another diocese; this shall be sufficient bona notabilia for the archbishop to grant administration: because the ordinary where he dieth, by the law is to take as great care of the testator and of his goods, as the other ordinary where the goods are. And he saith, Mr. *Selden* told him, that he had been informed by those of the Court Christian, that this is the usual course there. 1 *Roll's Abr.* 909.

But if a man die upon a journey, the goods that he then hath about or with him, shall not be as bona notabilia, to cause administration to be committed or the will to be proved in the prerogative. *Swin.* 2. 438, 439.

By the statute of the 4 An. c. 16. *Whereas great trouble and expence is frequently occasioned to the widows and orphans of persons dying intestate to monies or wages due for work done in her majesty's yards or docks by disputes happening about the authority of granting probate of the wills and letters of administration of the goods and chattels of such person; for the preventing thereof, it is enacted, that the power of granting probates of the wills and letters of administration of the goods and chattels of such persons is hereby declared to be in the ordinary of the diocese or such other persons to whom the ordinary power of probate of wills or granting letters of administration do belong, where such persons shall respectively die; and that the wages or pay due from the queen to such persons for work done in any of the yards or docks, shall not be taken or deemed to be bona notabilia whereby to found the jurisdiction of the prerogative court. s. 26.*

Debts owing to the testator are bona notabilia, as well as goods in possession. 1 *Roll's Abr.* 909.

And they shall be bona notabilia in that diocese where the bonds or other specialties be, and not where the debtor inhabits. 1 *Roll's Abr.* 909.

But if the debts be only by simple contract, without specialty; then they are to be esteemed bona notabilia in that place where the debtor is. *Went.* 46.

Judgments obtained in the courts at Westminster, upon actions laid in the country, are bona notabilia, not where the action was laid, but where the judgment was obtained, because the record is there. *Carth.* 148.

E. 12 W. Hilliard and Cox. In debt by an administrator on an administration committed by the bishop of London, the defendant pleaded in bar, that the intestate at the time of his death was resident in another diocese. And it was held good upon demurrer. And by the court; The

The simple contract debts are personal. and administration must be committed of them where the party dies. And if a man hath two houses in several dioceses, and lives most at one, but sometimes goes to the other, and being there for a day or two dies; administration of his personal estate shall be granted by the bishop of this diocese, for he was commorant there, and not there as a traveller. *1 Salk. 37.*

A bill of exchange shall be said to be bona notabilia where the debtor is, and not where the bill is; for it is no specialty in law: for if an executor pays debts upon simple contract, or suffers judgment to pass against him; in such actions he may plead such payment or judgment in bar to an action upon a bill of exchange. *3 Salk. 164. Yeoman and Bradshaw.*

In case lands be given to executors for payment of debts or legacies; it seemeth that this shall not be bona notabilia, altho' it be assets. *Went. 46.*

Where one dies possessed of goods in London and Dublin; in that case the resolution seems to have been, that the archbishop of Canterbury by his prerogative was to grant administration of the goods in London, and the archbishop of Dublin for those in Dublin. *Gibbs. 472.*

In case one have bona notabilia both in the province of Canterbury and in the province of York; the will must be proved either before both metropolitans, if within each of their jurisdiction there be bona notabilia in divers dioceses; or else, if there be not so in any of the places then before the particular bishops in those several dioceses where the goods are. *Went. 46.*

Or, if within the one jurisdiction metropolitan the testator had goods in divers dioceses, and in the other but in one diocese: then in the one place is the will to be proved before the archbishop, and in the other place before the particular bishop, as it seemeth. *Went. 47.*

Where one dies possessed of goods in the diocese of an archbishop, and in a peculiar of the same diocese; then shall be several administrations, and the archbishop shall have no prerogative, because the peculiar was first derived out of his jurisdiction. *Gibbs. 472. Cro. El. 719.*

But where one dies possessed of goods in several peculiars within the same diocese: in that case administration shall not be granted by the bishop of the diocese, but by the metropolitan; inasmuch as they are exempt from ordinary jurisdiction. *Gibbs. 472. Swin. a. 440.*

By Canon 92. *Forasmuch as many heretofore have been by apparitors both of inferior courts and of the courts of the archbishops prerogative much distracted, and diversly called and summoned for probate of wills, or to take administrations of the goods of persons dying intestate, and are thereby vexed and grieved with many causeless and unnecessary troubles molestations and expences; we constitute and appoint, that all chancellors, commissaries, or officials, or any other exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction whatsoever, shall at the first charge with an oath all persons called, or voluntarily appearing before them, for the probate of any will, or the administration of any goods, whether they know, or (moved by any special inducement do firmly believe, that the party deceased (whose testament or goods depend now in question) had at the time of his or her death, any goods or good debts, in any other diocese or dioceses or peculiar jurisdiction within that province, than in that wherein the said party died, amounting to the value of 5 l. And if the said person cited or voluntarily appearing before him, shall upon his oath affirm, that he knoweth. or (as aforesaid) firmly believeth, that the said party deceased had goods or good debts in any other diocese or dioceses or peculiar jurisdiction within the said province to the value aforesaid, and particularly specify and declare the same; then shall he presently dismiss him, not presuming to intermeddle with the probate of the said will, or to grant administration of the goods of the party so dying intestate. Neither shall he require or exact any other charges of the said parties, more than such only as are due for the citation and other process had, and used against the said parties, upon their further contumacy; but shall openly and plainly declare and profess that the said cause belongeth to the prerogative of the archbishop of that province; willing and admonishing the party to prove the said will, or require administration of the said goods, in the court of the said prerogative, and to exhibit before him the said judge the probate or administration under the seal of the prerogative, within forty days next following. And if any chancellor, commissary, official, or other exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction whatsoever, or any their register shall offend herein, let him be ipso facto suspended from the execution of his office, not to be absolved or released until he have restored to the party all expences by him laid out contrary to the tenor of the premises: and every such probate of any testament, or administration of goods so granted, shall be held void and frustrate to all effects of the law whatsoever. Furthermore, we charge and enjoin that the register of every inferior judge do, without all difficulty or delay, certify and inform the apparitor of the prerogative court, repairing unto him once a month and no oftener, what ex-*

ecutors

executors or administrators have been by his said judge for the incompetency of his own jurisdiction dismissed to the said prerogative court within the month next before; under pain of a month's suspension from the exercise of his office for every default therein. Provided that this canon or any thing therein contained, be not prejudicial to any composition between the archbishop and any bishop or other ordinary, nor to any inferior judge that shall grant any probate of testament or administration of goods to any party that shall voluntarily desire it, both out of the said inferior court, and also out of the prerogative. Provided likewise, that if any man die in itinere, the goods that be bath about him at that present shall not cause his testament or administration to be liable unto the prerogative court.

Shall be held void and frustrate] In the case of *Smith and Bingham*, it was declared, that administration committed by the archbishop by his prerogative, to one who did not die possessed of goods in divers dioceses, was merely void; which declaration was repeated in the case of *Turner and Vansdal*: But the more current doctrine is, that such administrations are not void, like those granted by a bishop, where are bona notabilia, but only voidable by sentence; because the metropolitan hath jurisdiction over all the dioceses in his province, whereas a bishop can by no means have jurisdiction in another diocese. *Gibf. 472.*

In the case of *Sir Richard Rains and the Commissary of Canterbury, H. 1 An.* it was said, that if administration be committed in a diocese where there are bona notabilia, tho' such grant be ipso facto void, yet they do not grant a new administration in the prerogative court, before they repeal that; and in that case they shall not be prohibited. *7 Mod. 146.*

And by canon 93. *Furthermore, we do decree and ordain, that no judge of the archbishop's prerogative shall henceforward cite or cause to be cited ex officio any person whatsoever to any of the aforesaid intents, unless he have knowledge that the party deceased was at the time of his death possessed of goods and chattels in some other diocese, or dioceses, or peculiar jurisdiction within that province, than in that wherein he died, amounting to the value of 5 l. at the least: decreasing and declaring, that whoso bath not goods in divers dioceses to the said sum or value, shall not be accounted to have bona notabilia. Always provided, that this clause here, and in the former constitution mentioned, shall not prejudice those dioceses where by composition or custom bona notabilia are rated at a greater sum. And if any judge of the prerogative court, or any his surrogate, or his register or apparitor, shall cite or cause any person to be cited into*

into his court, contrary to the tenor of the premises; he shall restore to the party so cited all his costs and charges, and the acts and proceedings in that behalf shall be held void and frustrate. Which expences, if the said judge or register or apparitor shall refuse accordingly to pay; he shall be suspended from the exercise of his office, until he yield to the performance thereof.

Are rated at a greater sum] One of the sums mentioned by Lindwood, under which nothing should be reputed bona notabilia, is 23 l. 3 s. 0^d. And Plowden fixes the sum at 10 l.; of which Swinburne saith, that it seemed to him to be the opinion most commonly received. *Gibb.* 472.

The probate of every bishop's testament, or granting of administration of his goods, altho' he hath not goods but within his own jurisdiction, doth belong to the archbishop. - 4 *Inst.* 335.

5. If there be a new and uninhabited country, found out by English subjects, as the law is the birth-right of every subject, so wherever they go, they carry their laws with them; and therefore such new found country is to be governed by the laws of England; tho' after such country is inhabited by the English, acts of parliament made in England, without naming the foreign plantations, will not bind them: for which reason it has been determined, that the statute of frauds and perjuries, which requires three witnesses to a will, and that these should subscribe in the testator's presence, doth not bind *Barbados*. But where the king of England conquers a country, it is a different consideration; for there the conqueror, by sparing the lives of the people conquered, gains a right and property in such people; in consequence of which, he may impose upon them what laws he pleases. 2 *P. Will.* 75.

Wills in the
British colonies.

By the statute of the 25 G. 2. c. 6. for avoiding doubts concerning who shall be deemed legal witnesses to wills [which is inserted before under the head *concerning the qualification of the witnesses*]"—“Whereas in some of the British colonies or plantations in America, the act of the 29 C. 2. has been received for law, or acts of assembly have been made whereby the attestation and subscription of witnesses to devises of lands tenements and hereditaments have been required; therefore to prevent doubts which may arise in relation to such attestation, it is enacted, that this act shall extend to such of the said colonies and plantations, where the said act of the 29 C. 2. is by act of assembly

assembly made, or by usage received as law, or where by act of assembly or usage the attestation and subscription of a witness or witnesses are made necessary to such devise; and shall have the same force and effect in the construction of, or for the avoiding of doubts upon, the said acts of assembly, and laws of the said colonies and plantations, as the same ought to have in the construction of, or for the avoiding of doubts upon the said act of the 29 C. 2. in England.—Provided, that no devise or legacy shall be made void by this act, unless the will whereby such devise or legacy shall be given, shall be made after March 1st, 1753.”

An estate in the plantations is testamentary, and affects to pay debts: for if the executor hath goods of the testator in any part of the world, he shall be charged in respect thereof. *6 Co. 46. 2 Vent. 358.*

An appeal from decrees made in the plantations, lies only to the king in council. *2 P. Will. 261.*

Wills of lands
not subject to
the ecclesiastical
jurisdiction.

6. Wills only concerning goods and chattels are under the cognizance and direction of the ecclesiastical law. *Gibbs. 463.*

And the probate of testaments concerning lands only, and no goods contained therein, ought not to be in the spiritual court; and if there be a suit to compel to have the probate of such testaments, a prohibition lieth. *Cro. Car. 396.*

But where a will is concerning lands and goods, and so is a mixt will; the probate thereof shall be intire in the spiritual court, and ought not to be of parcels: but the probate of the will for the land will not prejudice the heir; for it shall not be evidence at the common law; nor the witnesses being there examined, shall such examinations be given in evidence at the common law. *Cro. Car. 396.*

And where a will doth contain in it lands and goods; generally, the courts temporal will not grant a prohibition to stay the probate thereof for the whole: but if in a special case, it be alleged, that the testator was of nonsane memory, or the like; a prohibition will be granted for the whole. For if the spiritual court should be suffered to proceed, and prove the will there, and allow it there, for the personal estate; it would be an evidence to induce the jury, upon a trial at law, to pass for the will as to the lands and tenements. *E. 12 J. Egerton and Egerton. Cro. Jac. 346.*

Will of goods
not effectual be-
fore probate.

7. But a devise of a personal estate is not looked upon to be of any effect until probate is made of the will by the executor;

ecutor ; neither can an executor or other person give a will in evidence concerning a personal chattel without producing the probate ; for this will is no will until it has received a sanction, or an allowance of it in the spiritual court ; for they are to judge whether it be a will or not ; and the temporal courts are not to look upon it as a will till probate be made : And in an action of trover for goods which a testator gave to his sister in his lifetime, brought against his executor for them who would have given in evidence a former will, to have shewn that he had no power to give those goods ; this was refused, because he ought to have produced the probate. *Chaunter and Chaunter*, 1708. *Viner, Executors*, A. a. 20.

And a probate obtained in the ecclesiastical court cannot be set aside in any other court either of law or equity(p). In the case of *Barnesby and Powel*, Aug. 5, 1748 ; A probate of a forged will was obtained in the ecclesiastical court, by a fraud upon the plaintiff in procuring his consent to such probate ; and by the like means a decree in the court of exchequer was obtained to establish the said will as to the real estate. Upon these facts being disclosed, and a bill filed in chancery, an issue was directed to try the validity of the will at law, which the jury found to be forged. And the question was, what could now be done, especially with respect to the personal estate ; and the decree in the exchequer likewise standing in the way with respect to the real estate. Lord Hardwicke said, as to the decree in the exchequer, the same having been obtained by fraud, tho' he could not set it aside, yet he could decree that no use should be made of it. As to the personalty, undoubtedly the jurisdiction of wills of personal estate belongs to the ecclesiastical court, according to the rules of which court it must be tried, notwithstanding that the will is found forged by a jury at common law by examination of witnesses ; which is sometimes unfortunate, causing different determinations : nor can this court help it. But in the present case his lordship decreed, that the defendant should consent in the ecclesiastical court to a revocation of the probate ; and tho' he would not then decree the defendant a trustee of the personal estate, lest it might create some jealousy of infringing on the ecclesiastical court, yet he

(p) *Vide infra* 23.

Refusal of an
executorship.

decreed an account of the personal estate to be taken, and the same to be paid into the bank for the benefit of the parties entitled. 1 *Ver.* 119. 284.

8. He that is named executor cannot be precisely compelled to stand to the will, and undertake the executorship, unless he have already meddled with the goods of the testator as executor; for then, he is not only to be compelled to perform the office of an executor, but also if he should refuse, and the ordinary commit the administration unto him, this refusal is void, and he shall be charged as executor. *Swin.* 384.

Therefore if the executor named in the testament resolve not to stand to the executorship, but to refuse the same; then must he beware that he do not administer the goods of the deceased as executor; for having once administered as executor, he may at any time after be compelled to undergo the burden of an executor, and also may be sued as executor by the creditors of the testator; tho' he cannot sue others as executor, for that he hath not the will under the ordinary's seal. *Swin.* 469.

And a person is then said to administer as executor, so as thereby he may be compelled to stand to the executorship, when he doth perform those acts which are proper to an executor; as to pay the debts due by the testator, or to receive any debts due unto the testator, or to give acquittances for the same, with other such like acts. *Swin.* 469.

But if a man do those acts which are not proper to an executor, he is not said to have administered as executor to the effect as aforesaid; as to feed the cattle of the deceased, lest they should perish; or to take into his custody the goods of the deceased, to the end they may be safe from being stolen or purloined; or to dispose of the testator's goods about the funeral: for these be deeds of charity common to every christian, and not peculiar to an executor. Likewise, to make an inventory of the goods of the deceased, is not to administer as executor; or to deliver to the wife her convenient apparel; or to take the testator's horse and ride him, or to use him as his own, supposing him not to be the testator's but his own; or to take the goods of the testator by his lawful gift. And generally, whosoever as a mere trespasser entereth on the goods of the testator, whether it be to things living, as horse, kine, sheep, or dead things, as pots, pans, dishes, converting the same to his proper use, and not to the use

use of the testator, as to the payment of the testator's debts or legacies, doth not administer as executor. *Swin.* 471, 472.

Howbeit, in these cases and such like, whosoever saith to be adjudged executor administering of his own wrong, the most safe course is, not to meddle at all, but utterly to abstain from all manner of use of the testator's goods; and namely, let him beware that he do not sell any goods, or kill any cattle of the deceased. *Swin.* 472.

Further, although a person hath not meddled with the goods of the testator, and is therefore not compellable; yet if a legacy be left to him, he may be compelled to stand to the executorship, or else to lose his legacy. *Gibb.* 469.

The refusal to take upon him the executorship cannot be by word only; but it must be entred and recorded in court. *Swin.* 2. 443.

And when an executor hath once administered, he cannot afterwards refuse to prove the will, and take upon him the executorship; and in that case the ordinary ought not to accept such a refusal, but to compel him to prove the will, and take upon him the executorship. Yet if the judge doth admit one to administer, notwithstanding his having been formerly refused, it shall stand good. *Swin.* 2. 443.

9. An executor of his own wrong is such as takes upon him the office of an executor by intrusion, not being constituted by the testator or deceased, nor (for want of such constitution) substituted by the ordinary to administer. *Went.* 171. Executor of his own wrong.

If a man gets goods of an intestate into his hands after administration is actually granted, it doth not make him executor of his own wrong; but if he gets the goods into his hands before, tho' administration be granted afterwards, yet he remains chargeable as a wrongful executor, unless he delivers the goods over to the administrator before the action brought, and then he may plead plene administravit. 1 *Salk.* 313. (q)

An executor of his own wrong cannot bring an action; for he cannot shew the testament containing his name, as he ought. *Br. Administrator*, 8.

(q) Per *Holt*, C. J. *S. P. Curtis v. Vernon*, 3 *T. Rep.* 587. Affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber, 2 *H. Bla.* 18. See *Coulson's Case*, 5 *Rep.* 30.; and 2 *Bac. Abr.* 390.

Neither can he retain for his own debt or legacy. *Me. 527. Poph. 125. (r)*

But he renders himself liable to the action, not only of the right executor, but also to the suits of the testator's creditors; yet only so far, as the goods which he so wrongfully administered amount unto. *Swin. 339. Harr. Justin. 87. Vin. Executors, E. 2. 4, 5.*

So also, it is said, he shall be sued for legacies, as well as a lawful executor. *Nov, 13.*

But if he doth lawful acts with the goods, as paying of debts in their degrees, it shall alter the property against the lawful executor; as if he pay just and honest debts, the rightful executor shall not avoid that payment. It is true, the rightful executor may maintain against him an action of trover; but he shall only recover in damage so much as the wrongful executor hath misapplied. By Holt chief justice. *12 Mod. 471. (s)*

But Mr. Wentworth is of opinion, that albeit such payment shall stand good as against other creditors, yet it is not good as against the rightful executor or administrator: for then any stranger might usurp the office of executor, and take from him that liberty and election, to prefer which creditor he will in first payment; yea, might take from the executor power to pay himself before others, in case there were a debt due to him, which would be unreasonable. *Went. 182.*

And as he himself is liable to the suit of the lawful executor, creditors, or legatees; so also, in case of his death, are his executors or administrators liable, by the statute of the 30 C. 2. c. 7. altho' in other cases, a personal wrong dieth with him that did it. And altho' he hath obtained probate, yet if upon appeal such probate shall be annulled and made void, acts done by him pend-

(r) Though he be a creditor of a superior nature. *Curtis v. Vernon, ubi supra.*

But if a wrongful executor afterwards procure administration, he may plead this *puis darrein continuance* to justify a retainer. *Vaughan v. Browne, 2 Stra. 1106.* If a creditor sell goods after the death of the debtor, under a bill of sale which is so aside as fraudulent because possession did not accompany and follow it, he may be sued as executor *de son tort*. *Edwards v. Harben, 2 T. Rep. 587.*

(s) S. P. by Buller J. in *Padget v. Priest, 2 T. Rep. 97.* And it is for the court to say what acts make an executor *de son tort* but for the jury to decide whether they are sufficiently proved. *It*

in

ing the appeal shall not be good. As in a case *M. 5 An* in the common pleas. An action was brought by the plaintiff, as executor, for money due from the defendant of his testator. The defendant pleads, that another person was appointed executor to the testator, and proved his will, and that he, the defendant, had paid him part of the money in satisfaction of the whole, and that the said person on receipt thereof discharged the defendant. The plaintiff replied, that the probate granted to the other person was afterwards, upon appeal, annulled by sentence in the ecclesiastical court, and the will by which he was made executor adjudged to be forged, and the will by which the plaintiff is appointed executor allowed. On demurrer, the question was, whether payment to one who was executor de facto, and had probate of the will, was good to bind the rightful executor. And the court gave judgment, that it was not. And by Trevor chief justice: An executor derives all his authority from the testator himself; and, as executor, without any thing more, he has the power of disposing of the estate of the testator, of releasing a debt due to the testator, and the like. True it is, before an action brought, a probate is necessary: but that is only requisite to ascertain the court that the plaintiff is executor and has a right to bring his action, not to give the plaintiff any title or interest to the estate of the testator. If the testator appoints no executor, or dies intestate, the administrator is appointed by the ordinary, and derives his authority from him; and therefore if administration is granted, all acts by him as long as the administration continues in force are good, and even tho' it be afterwards repealed. But there is a difference taken (6 Co. 18.) when an administration is repealed upon a citation, or upon an appeal. If it is upon an appeal, which suspends the administration, all acts after such suspension are void: if it is repealed upon a citation, all the acts of the administrator, till the repeal, are good; for by the citation the grant of the administration is not suspended; therefore if the administration be repealed, all acts done by an administrator which a rightful administrator might have done, shall be allowed, for in them he acted in the place of the rightful administrator. But it is otherwise in the case of an executor; for the probate of the will gives no authority at all to him: and therefore if he is not the rightful executor, he has no authority; and it would be unreasonable, that a person who has no authority should dispose of the interest of another. The right-

in execution the testator's will is not a trust or confidence to administer the goods of the testator, but also an interest annexed to the will. And therefore the property of all the goods after administration is immediately vested in him. And consequently, the discharging by another person of the goods of the testator, or release of his debts, is a dispositive of the interest of the rightful executor, and therefore such discharging does not bind him. And this case is not like the case of an officer, who officiated without legal authority, as the deputy of the deputy of a sheriff: the official acts done by him are good: for he is an officer of fact, and in the immediate and open execution of his office, and the parties did not know what he was the authority of not.—And in fact, in this case of an executor whose interest might have possibly happen; but it would be a more general inconvenience, if a wrongful executor should be allowed to dispose of the right and interest of a rightful executor. *Comyns* 150. *Almon*.

*Case of the
Executors;
In re of the
Will of the
Testator.*

10. Where there are divers executors named in the will, and some of them do refuse, and others of them prove the testament; they who refuse may after at their pleasure administer, notwithstanding such refusal before the ordinary. 9 Co. 37. *Baron's Use of the Law*, 161. *Park* 212.

And this is what in the spiritual court is called a double probate; which is in this manner: The first that comes in, takes probate in the usual form, with reservation to the rest. Afterwards, if another comes in, he also is to be sworn in the usual manner, and an ingrossment of the original will is to be annexed to such probate in the same manner as the first; and in the second grant, such first grant is to be recited. And so on, if there are more that come in afterwards.

For notwithstanding their refusal at first, they still continue executors; and at any time during the lives of their companions, they may prove the will, they may pay debts, make releases, and they must be joined in all suits where the co-executors are plaintiffs, because they are all privy to the will; but not where they are defendants, because the plaintiff in the action is not bound by law to take notice of any but those who have proved the will. *Swin.* a. 444.

(1) Vid. *infra*, *Getting in the Effects*, 27.

For the king's courts have always used to allow the probate of some of the executors, to enable them all to sue actions: so that the probate of the testament doth not give to them any interest or title either to things in action or in possession, for they have all their title and interest by the testament, and not by the probate: but yet without the probate, the judges allow them not to sue actions. 9 Co. 38.

It is holden, that he which did refuse the executorship, cannot assume that office after the death of his fellow executor. *Swin.* 326. 418. [*Dyer* 160. b.]

But in the case of *House* and *Lord Petre*, Dec. 19, 1700. Before the delegates: The common lawyers held, that if one executor refuseth before the ordinary, and the rest prove the will, yet at common law, he who refused may at any time come in and administer; and tho' he never acted whilst his companions were living, yet after their death he shall be preferred before any other executor made by a co-executor; altho' the civilians held, that by their law the renunciation was peremptory. 1 *Salk.* 311. (u)

11. If a man maketh two executors and dieth, and one of them proveth the will in the name of them both, against the will of the other; this is not any administration for him who consented not to the probate: but he may plead *ne unques executor*; for the probate maketh him not executor, if he doth not administer. 1 *Roll's Abr.* 918.

Where one executor excludes the other.

(u) *Rex v. Sir Ed. Simpson*, 3 *Burr.* 1463; and 1 *Bla. Rep.* 456. A motion was made for a mandamus to the judge of the prerogative court of the archbishop of *Canterbury*, to admit the retraction of a renunciation of an executorship made by one *Brown*. There were two executors, and probate had not been granted to either, but *Brown* had taken the oath of renunciation, "that he had not and would not intermeddle in the estate, &c. but renounced all right of execution of the will." Against the mandamus, it was said, that by the law and practice of the ecclesiastical courts, no retraction could be admitted after renunciation upon oath, which would be to admit him who was bound to perjure himself for it; for the mandamus, that upon good cause the court below can absolve from the oath, and the common, not the canon law, must govern this point, by which an executor has a right to demand probate, altho' he has renounced. But the parties entered into a rule by consent that probate should be granted to both executors, (who were also trustees, but insolvent,) they giving proper securities and indemnifications to each other, and to the *cestuy que trust*.

Where all refuse; administration to be committed.

12. Swinburne says, when all the executors named in the testament do refuse; it is lawful for the bishop or ordinary to commit administration, and to annex the will to the letters of administration; and the administrator shall have action, and may administer the goods of the deceased, as if he had died intestate; and their authority or act done is good and effectual in the law in the mean time, until the executors undertake the executorship; for then the ordinary may revoke the administration before by him committed. *Swin.* 380. 383. *1 Roll's Abr.* 907.

So also if a man make an executor, but this is not known, or is concealed: the ordinary may grant administration, and this shall be good until the other prove the will. *1 Roll's Abr.* 907.

And so in like manner, if the person be disabled to be executor, or no executor at all be named in the will. *Swin.* 380.

But (lord Coke says) if they shall refuse before the ordinary, and the ordinary commit administration to another, there they cannot administer afterwards. *9 Co.* 37.

And by lord chancellor Talbot, in the case of *Robinson and Per. B.* 1734. Where there are two executors, and one renounces, he is still at liberty, whenever he pleases, to accept of the executorship; otherwise, if both renounce, and the ordinary commits administration to another. *3 P. Wms.* 251.

Within what time the will shall be proved.

13. Regularly (that is, by the civil law), testaments ought to be intimated to the official or commissary of the bishop or the diocese, within four months next after the testator's death. *Swin.* 2. 447.

What the executor may do before probate.

14. And the executor, for goods of the testator taken from him, or a trespass done upon the lease land, or a distraining or impounding of goods or cattle, may maintain, before the will be proved, actions of trespass, or replevin, or detinue; for these actions arise upon the executor's own possession. *Wms.* 34.

But before the proving of the will, an executor cannot maintain a suit or action of debt, or the like: and the reason is, for that therein he must shew forth the will proved under the seal of the ordinary. *Went.* 34.

And in general, an executor is a complete executor before probate, to all purposes but bringing of actions; so that he may release an action, assent to a legacy, may be sued, may alien or otherwise intermeddle with the goods of the testator. *1 Saund.* 301.

For

For by adminiftring, the executor hath accepted of and taken upon him the whole adminiftration before the probate; and is thereby intitled to receive all debts due to the testator; and all payments made to him are good, and shall not be defeated, altho' he should die and never prove the will. 1 *Salk.* 306, 307.

Also the executor may in convenient time after the testator's death, enter into the house descended to the heir, for the removing and taking away of the goods, so as the door be open, or at least the key be in the door: and this seemeth to be understood of the door of each room. For altho' the door of entrance into the hall and parlour be open, the executor cannot by that justify the breaking open of the door of any chamber, to take the goods there; but only may take those in the rooms which be open. And this seemeth to be proved by the case of the chest with evidences: which, it is said, the executor may take, and put out the deeds, delivering them to the heir, that is to say, the chest being unlocked. Now a chamber or other room within the house locked is an inclosure of better respect than a chest. But if the goods be not removed within convenient time, the heir may distrain them as damage-feasant. *Went.* 92.

T. 5 Ja. Stodden and Harvey. Trespass: Upon demurrer, the case was; Lessee for life of a house and pasture land dies; his executors suffer his cattle to go there for six days after his death, and then removed them; and in trespass, justify for that time; averring, that in that time of six days they could not procure any other land or place to put in the cattle. Whereupon it was demurred. And whether that were a convenient time to remove them was the question. And the court seemed to incline, that six days is but a convenient time for the removing of their cattle: and the law allows a convenient time for their removing, especially it being averred, that they had not any other place to remove them unto. But for a fault in the plea, wherein he pleaded a lease of the house, but not of the land in the declaration mentioned, it was adjudged for the plaintiff. *Cro. Ja.* 204.

In like manner, the executor before probate may be sued for the debts of the testator; unless he refused the executorship in due manner so as administration may be granted, and so there be somebody suable for the testator's debts. *Went.* 36.

So a bill for discovery of effects may be brought before probate: As in the case of *Dulwich college and Johnson,*
R 4 E. 1688.

E. 1688. A bill for a discovery of the personal estate was brought before the will was proved, the will being controverted in the spiritual court. And this was pleaded to the bill; but over-ruled: a discovery being for the benefit of all persons interested, and necessary for the preservation thereof. And such discoveries have often been ordered, pendente lite in the spiritual court. 2 *Vern.* 49.

And in the case of an administrator, a court of equity will allow of a bill brought by an administrator before administration is actually taken out: as in the case of *Fell and Lutwidge*, Feb. 3, 1740. The widow brought a bill for recovery of the effects of her late husband, and did not take out administration till after the bill brought. It was objected, that the bill was brought too early. By the lord chancellor Hardwicke: It is very true, that this would have been an exception in an action at law; but it is not so to a bill brought in this court. And the exception was over-ruled. *Bernard, Cha. Ca.* 320.

Ordinary to cite
the executor to
prove the will.

15. By the 21 *H. 8. c. 5.* *The ordinary, or other person having authority for probate of testaments, may convent before them persons named executors of any testament, to the intent to prove or refuse the testament, as they might do heretofore.*

And by the 1 *Ed. 6. c. 2.* *All summons and citations or other process ecclesiastical, in all causes of probates of testaments, and commissions of administrations of persons deceased, shall be made in the name and with the stile of the king, as it is in writs original or judicial at the common law; and the teste thereof shall be in the name of the archbishop, or bishop or other having ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and the commissary, official, or substitute exercising jurisdiction under him, shall put his name in the citation or process after the teste. s. 3.*

And the ordinary may sequester the goods of the deceased, until the executors have proved the testament: so may the metropolitan, if the goods be in divers dioceses. *Stat. 2. 477, 478.*

And if the executors do not appear upon the process, the ordinary may excommunicate them. But they may pray time to advise; and the ordinary may grant in the mean time letters *ad colligendum bona defuncti*. *Treat. of Eq. b. 4. c. 1. s. 4. [Braker v. Charter, Cro. Eliz. 92.]*

Mandamus to
compel the or-
dinary.

16. On the other hand (inasmuch as the executor, tho' he may be sued, and pay debts, and release an action, yet cannot have an action, before probate) the ordinary is bound to prove the will; and if the executor accept, and desire probate, and is refused by the ordinary, a writ will go from the temporal courts, to compel him to proceed

a probate, where the will is not controverted; and that, notwithstanding an appeal to the delegates, as it was in the case of *Dunkin* and *Mun*, *M. 26 C. 2.* in which such writ was granted to the prerogative court. *Gibbs. 469.*

But if the validity of the will is contested, it is a sufficient answer by the ordinary to a writ of mandamus, to return, that a suit is depending before him concerning the same, and not yet determined. *Bur. Mansf. 2295. Rex v. Dr. Hay.]*

17. The manner and form of proving testaments, is of two sorts: the one is called the vulgar or common form; the other is termed the solemn form, or form of law. *Swin. 448.* Manner of proving the will

The vulgar or *common form* is more compendious or brief than the other: for after the death of the testator, the executor presenteth the testament to the judge; and in the absence, and without citing or calling of such as have interest, produceth witnesses to prove the same; who testifying upon their oaths *vivâ voce*, that the testament exhibited is the true whole and last testament of the party deceased, the judge doth thereupon (and sometimes upon lesser proof) annex his probate and seal to the testament, whereby the same is confirmed. *Swin. 448.*

It is not necessary to the proof of a written will, that the witnesses hear it read, so as they can depose that the testator declared before them, that the self same writing now produced is or was his last will and testament. *God. 2. L. 66.*

In *1 P. Will. 741.* It is said, that in proving a devise of lands, the proper way is, that the witness should not only prove the executing the will by the testator, and his own subscribing in his presence; but likewise that the rest of the witnesses subscribed their names in the testator's presence: and so one witness proves the full execution of the will.

But in the case of *Townsend* and *Ives*, May 9, 1748; at the Rolls: A bill was preferred by the legatees to have the real estate sold for the payment of their legacies which were charged thereupon, against the heir at law of the testator who is an infant, and to have the will established. There were three witnesses to the will all now living, but only one has been examined, who proved the execution of it, and the attestation of the other two witnesses. But Fortescue master of the rolls refused to establish the will, without the examination of all the witnesses; for it is a rule, that all the witnesses, if living,

living, must be examined to prove the will: Besides, the heir at law is, in this case, an infant; who if of age, has a right to cross-examine all the witnesses. And as no admission of this sort can be received for an infant, this court must protect his right, and therefore must insist upon all those requisites which he would have a right to insist upon if he were of age, and capable of making a defence for himself. 1 *Wilson*, 216.

So in *Ogle and Cook*, Dec. 10, 1748; Upon a bill for establishment of a will and performance of the trust, it was objected, that only two of the witnesses to the will were examined, and some account ought to be given why the third was not, as that he could not be found, or the like. Lord Hardwicke held it necessary to the establishment of a will; for if after the decree, the heir at law should controvert it, the court would order an injunction: nor did he care to make a precedent to the contrary; for if this other witness were called, he might say something material against it: and therefore ordered it to stand over till the third was examined. 1 *Ves.* 177.

E. 12 *G.* 2. *Croft and Paulet*. On a trial at bar in ejectment, the defendant made title under a will, the attestation of which was in these words, *signed, sealed, published, and declared, as and for his last will and testament, in the presence of us, A. B. and C.* The will was in 1723, and the witnesses were all dead, and their hands proved in common form. But then it was objected, that this was not an execution according to the statute; and the hands of the witnesses could only stand as to the facts they had subscribed to, and signing in the presence of the testator was not one. But the court, on the authority of a case in the common pleas, said it was evidence to be left to a jury of a compliance with all circumstances. And a verdict was given for the will. *Str.* 1109.

Generally, by the civil law, the testimony of two witnesses is required; and if in the probate of a will the testimony of one witness is disallowed in the ecclesiastical court, a prohibition lieth not: for that court having jurisdiction of the matter, hath it also as to the manner of proof and proceedings. 2 *Roll's Abr.* 300.

But Dr. Godolphin says, where there is no controversy or dispute touching the will, there the single oath of the executor alone is sufficient for the probate thereof in common form. *God. O. L.* 65.

And this, it is said, is the practice throughout the province of Canterbury. But within the province of York, it

it hath been usual (tho' now discontinued in some of the dioceses) to swear also one witness to the will.

When the testament is to be proved in *form of law*, it is requisite that such persons as have interest, that is to say, the widow and next of kin to the deceased, to whom the administration of his goods ought to be committed if he had died intestate, are to be cited to be present at the probation and approbation of the testament; in whose presence the will is to be exhibited to the judge, and petition to be made by the party which preferreth the will, and enacted for the receiving, swearing and examining of the witnesses upon the same, and for the publishing or confirming thereof: whereupon witnesses are received and sworn accordingly, and are examined every one of them secretly and severally; not only upon the allegation or articles made by the party producing them, but also upon interrogations ministred by the adverse party, and their depositions committed to writing: afterwards the same are published; and in case the proof be sufficient, the judge doth by his sentence or decree pronounce for the validity of the testament. *Swin. 448, 449.*

Which difference of form in proving the will, worketh this diversity of effect; namely, that the executor of the will proved in the absence of them which have interest, may be compelled to prove the same again in due form of law; and if the witnesses be dead in the mean time, it may endanger the whole testament, especially if ten years be not past since the probation, whereby necessary solemnities are presumed to have been observed: whereas the testament being proved in form of law, the executor is not to be compelled to prove the same any more; and altho' all the witnesses afterwards be dead, the testament doth still retain its full force. *Swin. 449.*

But probably this word *ten* in figures may have been mistaken for *thirty*; for Dr. Godolphin says, The will being proved only in common form, it may be questioned at any time within thirty years next after, by common opinion, before it work prescription. *God. O. L. 62.*

And this proving of the will in solemn form is for the most part at the instance of some person who desireth to invalidate the same; in which case, his proctor, at the time of exhibiting the will, ought to accept the contents thereof so far forth as it maketh for the benefit of his client; otherwise if any legacy is given to him in the will, he shall lose it for his general impugning of the will. *1 Ought. 21.*

And

And in such case, where an executor hath been called to prove the will by witnesses, and hath fully proved it; if the party who caused him to do this, shall not, after publishing the attestation, except against the will or the witnesses, nor propose any matter to hinder the passing of sentence for the validity of the will, the judge doth not usually condemn him in costs: but otherwise it is, if he shall propose such matter and fail in the proof; for then he will be condemned in costs, at least from the time of such proposal. *1 Ought. 20.*

But where the parties interested do not call the executor to prove the will in solemn form, yet the executor himself may cause the will to be proved in this manner: As where an executor hath the greatest part of the goods of the deceased bequeathed unto himself, and he doubteth after the witnesses shall be dead, that the wife or children or other kindred of the deceased will contest the validity of the will, he may cite them in special, (and all others pretending interest in general, and so is the usual practice,) to see the will proved by the witnesses; which being done, the will shall not be set aside afterwards (provided there hath been no irregularity in the process) when the witnesses are dead. *1 Ought. 20.*

Where the executor is infirm, or lives at a great distance, it is usual to grant a commission to some grave clergyman in the neighbourhood, to administer the oaths, and perform the other requisites for granting probate of the will. So also in the granting of administrations. *1 Ought. 322.*

Besides these forms of proving testaments above recited, which are referred to that kind of probation which is called the publication of the testament; there is yet another form which is called the opening of the testament, which form doth respect written or closed testaments, in the making whereof the civil law did require that the witnesses should put to their seals: and after the death of the testator, at the opening of the written or closed testament, the same law did also require that the same witnesses should be called by the magistrate to acknowledge their seals, or to deny the sealing. But as we do not observe that solemnity of the civil law in the sealing of the testaments by the witnesses, no more do we observe that solemnity which the civil law requireth in opening of testaments sealed; unless this may seem to have some resemblance with this third form about the opening of the testament, which is enacted by the statute of the 21 H. 8. c. 5. which
saith,

saith, that the bishop, ordinary, or other person having authority to take probate of testaments, shall upon the delivery of the seal and sign of the testator, cause the same seal to be defaced, and thereupon incontinent redeliver the same seal unto the executor or executors, without claim or challenge thereunto to be made.

l. 5. Swin. 450.

Dr. Swinburne says, if a testament be made in writing, and afterwards be lost by some casualty; yet if there be two witnesses [that is, in the case of goods and chattels] which did see and read the testament written, and do remember the contents thereof, these two witnesses so deposing of the tenor of the will, are sufficient for the proof thereof in form of law; so that they be otherwise as well in respect of their skill as of their integrity, greater than all exception, and specially some other likelihoods concurring therewithal to make their testimony more credible.

Swin. 450.

If an executor proves a will of a personal estate, where in one of the legacies is forged, the executor in such case hath no remedy in equity; but ought to have proved the will, with special reservation to that legacy. *Plume and Beale.* 1 Peere W. 388. 2 Vern. 8. 17. In which case, the forgeries are to be decreed against in the ecclesiastical court, and the will engrossed without them, and so annexed to the probate.

18. By a constitution of archbishop Stratford: *After the testament shall be proved according to custom before the ordinary; the execution or administration of any goods shall not be committed, but to such as shall faithfully promise, to render a just account of their administration, when they shall be thereunto duly required by the ordinary.* Lind. 177.

Executor's oath
to render a just
account.

Shall faithfully promise] And that by oath, saith Lindwood; which may be before the administration. Lind. 177.

And Swinburne says, in what manner soever the testament be proved, the executor before he be admitted by the ordinary to execute, and before he have the will under the seal of the ordinary, is to promise by virtue of his oath, to make a true account when he shall be thereunto lawfully called by the ordinary. Swin. 451.

By the ancient canon law, a proctor having a special proxy, might make oath instead of the executor or administrator, and swear upon the soul of his client; but now by canon 132, it is ordained, that forasmuch as in the proving of testaments and suits for administration of the goods of persons dying intestate, the oath usually taken by proctors of courts

courts in animam constituentis is found to be inconvenient; therefore from henceforth every executor or suitor for administration shall personally repair to the judge in that behalf or his surrogate, and in his own person (and not by proctor) take the oath accustomed in these cases. But if by reason of sickness or age or any other just let or impediment, he be not able to make his personal appearance before the judge; it shall be lawful for the judge (there being faith first made by a credible person, of the truth of his said hindrance or impediment) to grant a commission to some grave ecclesiastical person, abiding near the party aforesaid, whereby he shall give power and authority to the said ecclesiastical person, in his stead to minister the accustomed oath above mentioned to the executor or suitor for such administration, requiring his said substitute, that by a faithful and trusty messenger he certify the said judge truly and faithfully what he hath done therein.

Which oath, to be administered to the executor, is usually in this form: “ You shall swear, that you believe
 “ this to be the true last will and testament of A. B.
 “ deceased; that you will pay all the debts and legacies
 “ of the deceased, as far as the goods shall extend, and
 “ the law shall bind you; and that you will exhibit a
 “ true, full, and perfect inventory, of all and every the
 “ goods, rights, and credits of the deceased, together
 “ with a just and true account, into the registry of the
 “ ——— court of ——— when you shall be lawfully called
 “ thereunto. So help you God.”

Bond to the like
purpose.

19. By the same constitution of archbishop Stratford; *after the testament shall be proved according to custom before the ordinary, the execution or administration of any goods shall not be committed but to such as are able and if need be shall give sufficient security, to render a just account of their administration, when they shall be thereunto duly required by the ordinary.* Lind. 177.

And Lindwood hereupon observeth, that it seemeth hereby that the ordinary may remove the executor appointed by the testator, from the administration, especially where there is just cause, as where he cannot give security for a due account. Lind. 177.

And Swinburne says, the executor (if it be bebovesful) shall enter into bond, to make a true account when he shall be thereunto lawfully called by the ordinary. Swin. 451.

But in the case of the *King* and *Sir Richard Raines*, M 10 W. A mandamus was directed to Sir Richard Raine

to command him to grant probate of the will of Edith Pinfold to one Richard Watts, who was made executor of it. Sir Richard Raines makes return to it, and admits, that Edith Pinfold made her will, and Watts executor of it; but says further, that it clearly and judicially was proved and appeareth to him, that Watts is worth nothing, but absconds for debt; and therefore that it is lawful to him to defer the granting of the probate, until Watts find sufficient security to perform the intent of the will. And it was argued by Sir Bartholomew Shower, Mr. Montague, and Dr. Waller the king's advocate general (a civilian), that this return was good, and that a peremptory mandamus ought not to be granted. And Dr. Waller said, that in fact the case was thus: Edith Pinfold made her will, and Richard Watts her nephew her executor, and devised to him 100 l. for a legacy, and some cattle; she devised also to Baines her brother 500 l., and the residue of her personal estate to the son of Baines: the will was brought by Baines to the prerogative court to be proved; and it was opposed by one Huntley, but the cause was not promoted at all by Watts; sentence passed in the prerogative court for Baines; upon which Huntley appealed to the delegates, and the sentence there was confirmed; whereupon the will was returned into the prerogative court, and then Watts claimed probate: but upon examination it appeared to the judge, that he was an insolvent and necessitous man, and had received his legacy, and therefore the judge required caution; upon which Watts obtained this mandamus, and to it the judge made this return, which (by Dr. Waller) is good: For if there is any default in the judge in the administration of his office, it is a proper subject for an appeal; for this will, being of chattels, is altogether of ecclesiastical cognizance; and therefore as the spiritual judge shall determine concerning the validity of the will, so he ought to make a judgment, whether he ought to grant probate of it or administration, or if the executorship be conditional, as it may be, whether the condition be performed, or the like: in all which cases, if he makes a false judgment, the proper remedy is by appeal, and not to come in this manner for remedy to the king's bench. He argued further, that the judge hath done nothing in this case but what he ought to do; for in such cases he may properly require caution. In the time of the heathen emperors, the testaments were reposed in the colleges of the *pontifices*; and from the time that the emperors became christian,

christian, the bishops were intrusted with them. Now the civil law was, that security should not be demanded *de herede*, which at that time included what we now call executor, unless he was insolvent; and then it was lawful to demand caution or security. But after this, the canon law followed: and then they made use of the word executor, which was before included in the word heir: and of them there are three sorts; first, *legitimus*, to wit, the ordinary; secondly, *datus*, namely he whom the ordinary appoints, and he always gives security; thirdly, *testamentarius*, who came instead of the heir, which is he whom we call executor by way of pre-eminence. And then, as the heir before, if he was insolvent, always gave caution; so for the same reason, an insolvent executor always gives caution. To say the truth, there is a difference made, when the testator knew at the time of the making his will, that the person whom he constituted executor was then insolvent, and when the executor is become insolvent by matter *ex post facto*; but at what time Watts became insolvent, doth not appear in this case; and therefore to justify the acting of a judge, the court will intend, if it be material, that he became insolvent since the death of the testatrix, rather than at the time of the will made. In *Lind.* 167. it is said that no religious person shall be executor, unless his superior takes care to give caution for the due execution of the will, and for the loss that may happen by his administration; and, *Lindwood* gives the reason of it, because it appears that such a person is insolvent; which proves that insolvent persons ought to give caution. So *Lind.* 177.—before the executor be admitted by the ordinary to execute the will, he ought to take an oath (which is the constant practice, and yet no mention is found of such oath, before that which these constitutions in *Lindwood* make of it; and yet before the late statute, if quakers refused to take such oath, no probate of any will used to be granted to them)—and *if need be*, says *Lindwood*, he shall give sufficient caution. To the same purpose *Swinburne* says, that the executor, if it be behoveful, shall enter into bond. To which *Sir Bartholomew Shower* added, that if an executor is non compos, the ordinary is not bound to grant probate to him; because he hath an apparent disability to execute the will; which strongly resembles this present case. Also, he said, that if the executor refuses to take the oath, this amounts to a refusal of the office, and the ordinary may grant administration with the will annexed.

Why

Why then shall not the refusal to give security, amount to a refusal of the office of executor; since there is no positive law, that in such case the ordinary shall administer an oath, more than in this case that he shall demand caution? Further, he said, that although mandamuses are granted oftentimes to compel the granting of administration, because they are founded upon the act of parliament which appoints the granting of administrations: yet one cannot find any precedents of mandamus, to compel the judges at the civil law to execute their law, which seems to be the present case.——Against this it was argued by Mr. Northey and Mr. Eyre, that the prerogative court cannot in such case require caution, for the same reasons that the court afterwards gave for the ground of their judgment, and therefore unnecessary to be repeated——And by Holt chief justice; Wills and testaments are of ecclesiastical cognizance, not by force of the civil or canon laws (for they bind no farther here, than as they have been received here) but by the law of the land. Then if the ecclesiastical courts proceed to enlarge the power of the judge, contrary to that which the common law allows, the king's bench will prevent all sorts of incroachments. As if an executor be sued in the ecclesiastical courts to make distribution, he not being residuary legatee; though that were allowed by the canon law, yet the king's bench would want a prohibition to stay any such suit; for all suits for distribution were prohibited by the king's bench, until the statute of the 22 & 23 C. 2. c. 10. made them lawful. Dr. Waller has not quoted any canon law, that the ordinary in such case ought to take caution; and the common law will not permit him to exact security, for the insolvency of the executor. For suppose in this case (as the fact is) the executor will not give security, and yet will not renounce the executorship; the ordinary cannot compel him to give security. What must be done? Tho' a refusal of the oath amounts to a refusal of the office of executor (because the oath is allowed by the common law, for it is proper to take a promissory oath, that he will execute the office justly, which he is going to execute) yet the refusal to give security will not amount to a refusal of the office of executor: because it is against common right, to require collateral security. Then the testament will continue in force; the ordinary cannot grant administration with the will annexed; and so there will be a failure of justice, no body being capable to sue the testator's creditors. One

half of what one finds in Lindwood is not the law of the land. And as to the case of religious persons, objected out of Lindwood, he said, that if a monk be made an executor, he cannot accept the office without leave of his superior; and then if the superior gives him leave to be executor, without giving other collateral security, the superior by his leave given is become security; and if the monk commits a *devastavit*, the suit shall be against the abbot and the monk, and the execution will be of the goods of the house.—And Turton justice agreed with Holt chief justice in every thing.—But Rokeby justice seemed to be of opinion, that the grievance in the present case would be properly remedied by appeal. And he said that in the province of York security was always given upon the granting of the probate of a will, without any dispute made about it. Upon which a day was given to Dr. Waller, to certify the king's bench, by producing precedents, whether the practice had been in the prerogative court to take caution in such case. At which day no precedent of it being shewn, nor satisfaction thereof given to the court, Holt chief justice, with the concurrence of the other judges, pronounced the opinion of the court, that a peremptory mandamus ought to be granted in this case; because the ecclesiastical court cannot require caution in this case: 1. For when a man is made executor, nobody can add qualifications to him, other than those which the testator has imposed; but he shall be who, and in what manner, the testator shall judge proper. 2. The executor has a temporal right of which he is barred by the refusal of the probate, inasmuch as he cannot before probate sue in Westminster-hall. 3. There are no precedents in the canon law to warrant this; and the practice has been always contrary. And if any cases happen, in which equity may be requisite, there is another channel here where it runs, without resorting to the spiritual court, namely, the chancery. And a peremptory mandamus was granted.—And the reporter says, Mr. Robert Eyre told him, that the lord chancellor Somers well approved of this resolution. *L. Raym.* 361. (x)

But after all, this adjudication proceeds upon a supposition, that there is no canon law which requireth such caution, and Lindwood's authority alone was not judged

(x) *S. C.* 1 *Salk.* 299. *Str.* 672.

sufficient in this case. But the aforesaid constitution of archbishop Stratford is undoubtedly a part of the canon law, which requires, that *they shall give sufficient security, if need be*. In the province of York, bond hath been usually given. But perhaps this might arise from the custom within that province, which continued down until the fourth year of king William, of reserving out of the effects of the deceased a rateable part for the wife and children, which the testator could not dispose of by will; and consequently, as to so much, it was an intestacy, which in some cases amounted to one half, in others to two thirds, of the whole personal estate.

And in the case of *Folkes and Dominique*, T. 13 G. 2. where the executor was under the age of 17 years, the court allowed a bond [for due administration] given by the administrator with the will annexed, during the minority of the executor to be good at common law, and not obtained by coercion. *Str.* 1137. (y)

20. All this being done, the bishop's officers are to keep the will original, and certify the copy thereof in parchment under the bishop's seal of office; which parchment so sealed is called the will proved. *Bacon's Use of the L.* 160. Probate making out.

21. By the 2 & 3 An. c. 4. In order to render it more easy for the clothiers and others to borrow money upon land security for the promotion of trade, it is enacted, that a memorial of all wills and devises in writing, whereby any honours, manors, lands, tenements and hereditaments, within the *West Riding* of the county of York, may be any way affected in law or equity, may at the election of the party or parties concerned, be registered in such manner as by the said act is directed: and every devise by will of the honours, manors, lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any part thereof, contained in any memorial so registered as aforesaid, that shall be made and published after the registering of such memorial, shall be adjudged fraudulent and void against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration; unless a memorial of such will be registered as aforesaid. But this Register of wills in particular places.

(y) See *the King v. Sir Edw. Simpson*, 3 Burr. 1463. 1 Bla. Rep. 456. *et supra* 10. That the court of chancery considers an executor as a trustee, and if insolvent will compel him to give security before he enters upon the trust, or appoint a receiver, *vide supra*, *Form and Manner*, 9.

not to extend to copyhold estates, nor to leases at rack rent, nor to any lease not exceeding twenty-one years where possession goeth along with it.

By the 5 *An. c.* 18. there are some further regulations concerning the same.

The statute of the 6 *An. c.* 35. containeth regulation to the like purpose for the *East Riding* of the said county of *York*: Which same regulations are also extended to the *West Riding*, in aid of the two former acts.

By the 7 *An. c.* 20. The like for the county of *Middlesex*.

By the 8 *G. 2. c.* 6. The like for the *North Riding* of the said county of *York*.

And by the 25 *G. 2. c.* 4. Further regulations with respect to the county of *Middlesex*.

Probate of a will of lands, not evidence.

22. The probate of a will, or a copy of the will out of the register of the spiritual court, are not to be allowed as evidence in the case of lands. *Dike and Polhill*. L. Raym. 744.

H. 7 G. 2. Morse against Roach and others. In the chancery: Before the year 1718, the method was to deliver out a will of land to be proved at trials, or on commissions, upon security. Since that, the registers have refused to deliver out the will, but insist upon being paid for attending with it; and where it was wanted at a distance, their demands did run very high. In this case an order was made (upon producing three precedents) that it should be delivered out on security; it being a bill brought by creditors and legatees, who were not likely to suppress it. *Str.* 961.

Nov. 23. 1738. *Frederick and Aynscombe*. A will was executed at Bullogne; and proved here in common form; and deposited in the prerogative court of Canterbury. One of the witnesses resided at Bullogne. On a bill brought to perpetuate the testimony to the said will, it was moved, that the register of the prerogative court, or the record keeper, might be ordered to deliver out to the defendant the original will, on his giving a reasonable security to return the same, after the examination of the witness at Bullogne. And it was directed by the lord chancellor Hardwicke, that the defendant should be at liberty to take out a commission to examine his witness at Bullogne; and it appearing that the defendant was the only devisee who could claim any real estate under the will, he ordered the will to be delivered out by the proper officer to a person to be named by the defendant, on his giving security

curity to be approved of by the prerogative court, to return the will in three months. He said, if the defendant had not been the sole devisee of the real estate, but there had been other persons under the will interested in it, and they had refused their consent, he would not have made this order; because the taking a will out of the kingdom is different from any former cases, they having gone no further than ordering them to different parts of England. 1 *Atkyns*, 627.

23. The seal of the ecclesiastical court (as to goods and chattels) doth authenticate the will, and is not to be contradicted; because, as there is no way in the temporal courts to prove the will relating to chattels, it must go on in the spiritual court, and the determination must there be final (x). For the temporal court cannot make a judgment concerning the will, contrary to what was made in the ecclesiastical court; and therefore if a probate is shewn under the seal of the ordinary, they cannot give in evidence that the will was forged, or that another person was executor; but they may give in evidence, that the seal was forged, or that there were bona notabilia, because it is not in contradiction to the real seal of the courts, but it admits the seal, and avoids it. And since the ecclesiastical court hath now the probate of wills settled by custom, the temporal court cannot prohibit them in their inquiries whether the testator was compos

Probate of a will of goods and chattels, how far evidence.

(x) During the existence of a probate, which is a judicial act of the ecclesiastical court, the courts of common law cannot admit evidence to impeach it, having no jurisdiction upon the subject; and therefore though the will be forged, and the probate afterwards revoked by the court that granted it, payment of money to the executor, while the probate was unimpeached, shall discharge the debtor, he being bound by the judicial act of a court having competent authority. *Allan v. Dundas*, 3 T. Rep. 125. But the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical court commences only upon the death of the testator, and therefore if a probate of a forged will be procured during the lifetime of the supposed testator, it is a mere nullity, and need not be revoked, though the person forging it may be indicted for forgery. See *Cogan's case* in *Leach's Crown Law*, and *St. Tr. Duch. of Kingston's case*. An anomalous case however exists on this subject, viz. *Barnesley v. Powel*, *supra* 7.; where the will appearing to have been forged, and the probate to have been obtained by a fraud on the plaintiff in procuring his consent to it, Lord Hardwicke, C. decreed that the defendant should consent to a revocation.

mentis or not, or whether the will be revoked or not, be cause that is necessary for authenticating the will. *St.* 671, 672.

And by Holt chief justice ; the judge of the spiritual court is the only proper judge to determine the validity of wills for things personal, and therefore the probate is undeniable evidence to a jury ; and he said, he remembered a case in the time of lord chief justice Kelyng, where an executor brought an action, and at the trial produced the probate, and the defendant's counsel offered to prove, that the supposed testator died intestate ; but Kelyng chief justice told them, that the probate was evidence uncontrovertible ; and with him concurred the other judges, and so it hath been always held since. *L. Raym.* 262.

But yet it is held that if the probate of wills and granting administrations be traversed or denied in the king's courts, and issue joined, that the ordinary did not commit administration to such a one, or that the testament is not proved before the ordinary, or that he whose will is proved before the ordinary died intestate, or that he of whose goods administration is granted as of one intestate made a will ; in these and the like cases it is held, that certificate shall not be made by the ordinary, but that it shall be tried by jury : and the reason given for it is, that probate of wills and granting administration originally did not belong to the ecclesiastical cognizance, but were given to them of later times ; and that therefore nothing but the probate and granting administration, which were given to them, doth appertain to their jurisdiction ; but the *trial* thereof is not given to them, but is left to the trial of the common law. *Gibbs.* 468. 9 *Co.* 40.

But before this time (in the 31 *El.*) in case of refusal or no refusal, how it should be tried ; this distinction was laid down : where the issue is, whether the executor did refuse before such a day, or after, there the trial shall be by jury ; contrary, where the issue is upon refusal generally, because the refusal is before the ordinary as a judge. And the case then before the court being this, " That " the bishop certified that he did not refuse, whereas in " truth he had refused before the commissary : " the court held, that they could not write to the commissary, since the bishop and not he was the officer unto the court to that purpose, and that the party could not aver against the certificate of the bishop any more than against the return of the sheriffs. *Gibbs.* 468.

M. 8 G. The King against Vincent and others. Indictment for forging a will relating to a personal estate; and on the trial a forgery was proved: but the defendant's producing a probate, that was held to be conclusive evidence in support of the will. *Str.* 481.

T. 12 G. The King and Rhodes. The defendant exhibited a will in doctors commons as executor, and demanded probate. After a long contest there, it was determined in favour of the will; and upon appeal to the delegates, the sentence was confirmed. Afterwards the parties who had been concerned in cooking up the will fell out amongst themselves about the division of the estate; and thereupon it came out, that the will was forged; and upon full affidavits of the forgery, a commission of review (which it was agreed was the only method to bring the matter over again) was granted by the lords justices; and an indictment was also found for the forgery, and stood ready for trial in the king's bench. Upon motion for a *habeas corpus ad testificandum*, Raymond chief justice declared, that he would not try the cause. For there being yet a sentence subsisting in favour of the will, and the validity of that being now put under a proper examination; he did not think it fitting to determine the property by an indictment, which would come on more properly after the sentence was reversed. *Str.* 703. (a)

In the case of *St. Leger and Adams*; Holt chief justice said, Without doubt the register's book in the spiritual court is good evidence to prove that there was a will, although it be lost. *L. Raym.* 731.

And in the case of *Shepherd and Shorthose*, *H. 7 G.* Where the probate is lost, an exemplification of it from the act of the spiritual court hath been allowed as evidence of the will being proved. *Str.* 412.

H. 8 W. Hoe and Nelthorpe. It was held by Holt chief justice, that the copy of the probate of a will is good evidence, where the will itself is of chattels, for there the probate is an original taken by authority, and of a public nature; otherwise, where the will is of things in the

(a) In *Goodrick's* case at the O. B. in 1784, it was the opinion of the judges that the trial for forgery should be postponed till the ecclesiastical court had determined upon the validity of the probate cited in 3 *T. Rep.* 126. See also *Gilb. Eq. Cas.* 207, 208: *Palm.* 163.

realty, because in such case the ecclesiastical courts have no authority to take probates, therefore such probate is but a copy, and a copy of it is no more than the copy of a copy. 3 Salk. 154.

By the statute of the 4 An. c. 16. intituled, An act for the amendment of the law, and the better advancement of justice, *No advantage or exception shall be taken of or for the default of alledging the bringing into court letters testamentary; but the court shall give judgment according to the very right of the cause, without regarding any such imperfections omissions and defects, or any other matter of like nature, except the same shall be specially and particularly set down and shewn for cause of demurrer.*

Fee for probate.

24. By the 31 Ed. 3. st. 1. c. 4. *Whereas the ministers of bishops and other ordinaries of holy church, take of the people grievous and outrageous fine, for the probate of testaments and for the making of acquittances thereof; the king hath charged the archbishop of Canterbury and the other bishops, that they cause the same to be amended; and if they do not, it is accorded, that the king shall cause to be inquired by his justices of such oppressions, and extortions, to hear them and determine them, as well at the king's suit, as at the suit of the party, as in old time hath been used.*

By a constitution of archbishop Mepham; *For the insinuation of the testament of a p^r or person, the inventory of whose goods shall not exceed 100s. nothing shall be demanded.* Lind. 170.

And by a constitution of archbishop Stratford: *We ordain, that for the probation, or approbation, or insinuation of any testaments whatsoever, nothing at all shall be taken by the bishops or other ordinaries: but we permit 6d. and no more to be taken by clerks writing such insinuations, for their labour. But if the inventory of the goods of any person deceased do exceed the sum of 30s. in the computation, and do not extend to 100s.; the bishops, or ordinaries, or persons deputed by them, and auditing the accounts, or other ministers assisting them in the auditing of such accounts, shall not take for the account, and doing all things concerning the same, and letters of acquittance, or others letters whatsoever, above 12d. And if the inventories contain the sum of 100s. or more, and less than 20l.; they shall not take above 3s. But if they contain the sum of 20l. or more, and less than 60l.; they shall not take above 5s. If they contain the sum of 60l. or upwards, and less than 100l., they shall take 10s. and no more. If they contain the sum of 100l. or more, and less than 150l.; they shall not take above*

above 20s. And so for every 50l. further, they shall take, besides the said sum of 20s. the sum of 10s. and no more. But we permit the clerks, for every letter of acquittance which they shall write in this behalf, to take 6d. above the premises for their labour. And if any person in any the cases aforesaid shall take above the sum before ordained, in money or other things; he shall pay double within a month to the fabrick of the cathedral church. And bishops neglecting to pay the same within the time limited, shall be prohibited ab ingressu ecclesie; and the other inferiours neglecting the same as aforesaid, shall be suspended ab officio et beneficio, until they shall pay the same.

Probation] That is, taking the proofs. *Lind. 181.*

Approbation] That is, the decree for the validity of the testament. *Lind. 181.*

Insinuation] That is, publication thereof amongst the acts of the judge. *Lind. 181.*

Do exceed the sum of 30s. in the computation] Lindwood seems to resent this constitution, as arbitrary and unreasonable; and observes, that the officers of the court were left at liberty to demand what they would, when the inventory was under 30s. *Lind. 181.*

For their labour] But if it shall happen that witnesses are to be examined, and their depositions to be taken in writing; it seemeth that for this they shall be rewarded besides, according to the quantity of their labour. And the same is to be understood, if the testament be long in writing; and it be to be registred, that then the register shall receive a reasonable satisfaction. *Lind. 181.*

By the 21 H. 8. c. 5. it is enacted, that *Nothing shall be demanded received nor taken, by any bishop ordinary archdeacon chancellor commissary official or any other person or persons who shall have power to take or receive probation insinuation or approbation of testament or testaments, by himself or themselves, nor by his or their registers scribes praisers summoners apparitors or by any other of their ministers, for the probation insinuation and approbation of any testament or testaments, or for writing sealing, praising, registering, fines, making of inventories, and giving acquittances, or for any other cause concerning the same, where the goods of the testator or person so dying do not amount clearly over and above the value of 100s. except only to the scribe to have for writing of the probate 6d. and for the commission of administration of the goods of any man dying intestate not being above the like value of 100s. clear, 6d; and that nevertheless the bishop ordinary or other person having power to take the probation or approbation of testaments refuse not to approve any such testament, being lawfully tendered*

tendered or offered to them to be proved or approved, so that such testament be exhibited to him or them in writing, with wax thereunto affixed ready to be sealed, and that the same testament be lawfully proved before the same ordinary (before the sealing) to be true whole and the last testament of the same testator, in such form as hath been commonly accustomed in that behalf. §. 2.

And when the goods of the testator do amount over and above the clear value of 100s. and do not exceed the sum of 40l.; that then they shall not for the probation insinuation and approbation of any testament or testaments, or for the registering, sealing, writing, praising, making of inventories, giving of acquittances, fines, or any other thing concerning the same, take or cause to be taken of any person but only 3s. 6d. and not above; whereof to be to the bishop or ordinary or other person having power to take the probation or approbation of such testament, for him and his ministers 2s. 6d. and not above; and 12d. residue of the said 3s. 6d. to be to the scribe for registering the same. And where the goods of the testator, or person so dying, do amount above the clear value of 40l.; that then they shall not take for the probation insinuation and approbation of any testament or testaments, or for the registering, sealing, writing, praising, making of inventories, fines, giving of acquittances, or any thing concerning the same probate of a testament, but only 5s. and not above; whereof to be to the said bishop ordinary or other person having power to take the probation of such testament, for him and his ministers 2s. 6d. and not above; and 2s. 6d. residue of the said 5s. to be to the scribe for registering the same; or else the same scribe to be at his liberty to refuse the 2s. 6d. and to have for writing of every ten lines of the same testament, whereof every line to contain ten inches, one penny. §. 3.

And that every such bishop or ordinary, or other person having power to take probation of testaments as aforesaid, their registers scribes and ministers, shall approve insinuate seal and register from time to time the said testament, and deliver the same sealed with the seal of their office, to the executor or executors named in any such testaments, for the said sum or sums aforesaid, and in manner and form as is above rehearsed, with convenient speed, without any frustratory delay. §. 3.

And if any person shall require a copy of the said testament so proved, or of the said inventories so made; that then the said ordinary or other persons having authority to take probate of testaments or their ministers, shall from time to time with convenient speed, without any frustratory delay, deliver or cause to be delivered a true copy or copies of the same, to the said persons

so demanding the same; taking for the search and for the making of the copy of either of the said testament or inventory, but only such fee as is before rehearsed for the registering of the said testament; or else the scribe or register to be at his election and liberty, to have for every ten lines thereof, being of the proportion before rehearsed, one penny. l. 5.

Provided, that where any person or persons having power to take probate of testaments, have used to take less sums of money than is abovesaid, for the probaton of testaments or commissions of administrations, or other cause concerning the same; they shall take and receive the same as before this act they have used to take, and not above. l. 6.

And every bishop ordinary archdeacon chancellor commissary official and other person having authority to take probate of testaments, their registers scribes praisers summoners apparators and all other their ministers whatsoever they be, that shall do or attempt or cause to be done or attempted against this act in any thing, shall forfeit for every time so offending to the party grieved in that behalf so much money as any such person abovesaid shall take contrary to this present act; and over that shall forfeit 10l. whereof one moiety shall be to the king, and the other moiety to the party grieved that shall sue for the same in any of the king's courts: but that every of them, which shall incur or fall into the danger of such penalty or forfeiture, shall be charged only for himself, and none of them to be chargeable to that penalty for other's offence. l. 7.

§. 2. Or for any other manner of cause concerning the same]
And it maketh no difference, whether the probate be written upon the testament itself, or upon a transcript ingrossed; and in this latter case, if a greater fee be taken by the judge on account of ingrossing, this is within the prohibition of the statute, as was adjudged in the case of
Kaufe and Real *where the fee taken did amount to 4s. 10d.; and it was said, that if the executor required any to ingross the testament, he may agree with him, whom he requireth to do it, as he can; but the judge ought not to exact any fee on that account due to him. 4 Inst. 336. Gibf. 485.*

Upon the whole, Dr. Gibson observes, that it is agreed on all hands, that the fees given by this act are become much too small, by the great alteration of the value of money, and the prices of things; and therefore now the known and established custom of every place, is reasonable: which, as he hath been informed (he says), hath been adjudged a good rule. Gibf. 487.

By

By *Can. 132.* it is ordained, that no judge or re- shall in any wise receive for the writing drawing or se of any such *commission* (as in the said canon before is tioned) above the sum of 6 s. 8 d. whereof one m to be for the judge, and the other for the register o court.

And by the statute of the 26 H. 8. c. 15. *Foras as divers of the king's subjects inhabited within the archdeaconry of Richmond in the county of York, have been of time seve and grievously exalted and impoverished by the par vicars and others such as have benefices and spiritual prom within the same, as by taking of every person when he is in the name of a pension or of a portion, sometime the part of all his goods and sometime the skird part, to their impoverishment; it is enacted, that no manner of spiritual ion or others who shall have any manner of benefice or other ritual promotion within the said archdeaconry, shall in no ask levy demand or take after the decease of any person, such portions or pensions, nor any other demand or duty i name or lieu of the same, on pain of a præmunire; but all the king's subjects of the said archdeaconry, and their es tors and administrators shall be ordered intreated and use their goods and chattels after their decease, in like manner contained in the statute of the 21 H. 8. c. 5. for proba testaments, and none otherwise: any use, custom, toll, co sition, prescription, or ordinance heretofore obtained or by the contrary notwithstanding.*

And by the 31 G. 2. c. 10. *No ecclesiastical court any person whatsoever, under any pretence, shall take more 1 s. for the seal, parchment, writing and suing forth of probate of any will, or any letters of administration, gra to the widow or children, father or mother, brother or s of any inferior officer, seaman, or marine, dying in the p his majesty's navy, and for the pains trouble and expence att ing the suing forth of such probate or letters of administra and if the goods do amount to the value of 20 l.; nor more 1 s. unless the goods do amount to the value of 40 l.; nor 1 s. unless the goods do amount to the value of 60 l. in all cases where it shall be necessary to issue commission under the seal of the court, father or mother, brother or sister, being executors or administrators of such inferior off officers or marines: no ecclesiastical court, or any person w shall, under any pretence, take more than 1 s. for seal, parchment, writing and suing forth of any such com ion, and for the pains trouble and expence attending the s and if the goods do amount to 20 l.; nor more than 2 s. n*

the goods do amount to 40 l.; nor more than 3 s. unless the goods do amount to 60 l.: On pain of forfeiting 50 l. to the party grieved; to be recovered, with full costs, by action of debt bill plaint or information, in any of his majesty's courts of record at Westminster, or elsewhere. s. 23.

25. By the several stamp acts (37 G. 3. c. 90. included); **Stamps.** for every skin or piece of vellum or parchment or sheet or piece of paper on which shall be written any probate of a will for any estate above the value of 20 l. shall be paid a stamp duty of 10 s.: except of common seamen or common soldiers slain or dead in the service (b). [If the estate is of the value of 100 l. and under 300 l.—2 l. 10 s. If of the value of 300 l. and under 600 l.—8 l. If 600 l. and under 1000 l.—12 l. If 1000 l. and under 2000 l.—18 l. If 2000 l. and under 5000 l.—30 l. If 5000 l. and under 10,000 l.—45 l. If 10,000 l. and upwards—60 l.

Inventory, or any copy thereof, 5 s.

Copy of a will, 6 d. per sheet of 40 words.

The following shews the expence of proving short wills, or obtaining letters of administration, including all the fees, and the stamps imposed by stat. 37 Geo. 3. c. 90.

Where the value of the goods is	In common form.						By commission where the executor does not attend.					
	Probates.			Admini- stration.			Probates.			Admini- stration.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
under 5l.	0	7	0	0	9	6	0	17	0	0	18	0
5l. and under 6l.	0	15	6	1	2	6	1	13	7	1	19	8
6l. and under 20l.	1	2	0	1	9	2	2	1	0	2	8	8
20l. and under 40l.	2	3	0	2	4	0	3	14	0	3	6	8
40l. and under 100l.	2	3	0	2	14	6	3	14	0	3	19	8
100l. and under 300l.	4	15	6	5	17	10	6	9	0	6	13	0
300l. and under 600l.	10	12	2	11	4	6	12	6	6	12	9	8
600l. and under 1000l.	14	15	6	15	7	10	16	9	10	16	13	0
1000l. and under 2000l.	24	2	10	24	17	8	25	17	10	20	3	6
2000l. and under 5000l.	35	2	10	35	17	8	36	17	10	37	3	6
5000l. and under 10,000l.	52	2	10	52	17	8	53	17	10	54	3	6
10,000l. and upwards	68	14	2	69	11	0	70	11	2	70	16	10

26. If the executor die intestate, the testator also from **Executor dying.** that time shall be deemed intestate, and administration may

(b) See 5 & 6 W. & M. c. 21. s. 6.; but, for seamen's wills, *supra*, p. 227—229.

be committed in this case of the goods not administered. *Swin.* 382. 1 *Roll's Abr.* 907.

But if the executor maketh an executor and dieth; his executor shall be executor to the first testator, in case there be no executor. *Swin.* 329.

And if the executor of an executor assume the administration of the first testator's goods, he cannot afterwards refuse the administration of the goods of the latter testator; but he may accept the latter, yet refuse the former. *T.* 17 § *Wolfe and Heyden.* *Hutt.* 30.

[Where the executor dies before the proving of the will, his executor cannot take upon himself the execution of the first will; but administration of the goods of the first testator, with the will annexed to it, is to be committed to the executor of the executor, if the residue of the goods of the first testator (the legacies performed) were bequeathed by his last will to the first executor; or (else) to such other person or persons to whom the said residue is bequeathed; otherwise to the next of blood to the first testator demanding it. And this (ex relatione Dr. Drury judge of the prerogative court of Canterbury) is the usage and custom of the said court, and agreeable to law, as seemed to him; to which the court gave credit. *Dyer* 372. *Ipsel v. Stanley.*]

E. 4 & 5 *P. & M.* Two executors, one of them proved the will, the other refused before the ordinary, who thereupon granted administration to the other, who made his executor, and died; and that executor alone brought an action of debt, for a debt due to the first testator: and adjudged, that the action did lie; for tho' he who refused might administer at any time, yet it must be in the lifetime of his companion; and he being dead, that election is gone. *Dyer*, 160.

II. Of the administration of intestates effects.

This matter concerning the administration of intestates effects, so far as the same hath respect unto peculiar jurisdictions, bona notabilia, process in the king's name, the oath in *annam constituentis*, administration by commission, and the fees of administration of seamen's effects, hath been treated of already in the law concerning the probate of wills.

I. As to the disposition of intestates effects, and granting administration, it is plain, that by the common law, and

before the statute of the 13 Ed. 1. st. 1. c. 19. here
ing, the ordinary had the absolute disposal of in-
s effects. 2 Bac. Abr. 398.

lord Coke thinks, that this was granted to him by
particular constitutions; and therefore says, that
ly the kings of England, by their proper officers
wont to take goods of intestates in their hands,
36. [*Henslow's case.*]

there are several instances, in Madox's history
exchequer, where the king issued a mandate to his
s, to attach the goods of divers persons who died
te. *Mad. Exch.* 237.

this seemeth to have been only in case where they
indebted to the king; who by the law, was to be
d before the other creditors; according to the sta-
f magna charta, c. 18. which enacteth as follows :
that holdeth of us lay fee do die, and our sberiff or
do shew our letters patents of our summons for debt,
the dead man did owe to us; it shall be lawful to our
or bailiff to attach and inroll all the goods and chattels
dead, being found in the said fee, to the value of the
lbt, by the sight and testimony of lawful men, so that
g thereof shall be taken away, until we be clearly paid
debt.

so much as remained over and above the king's
or if nothing was owing to the king, then the
was in the sole power of the ordinary to dispose.
therefore if a man died intestate, neither his wife,
or next of kin, had any right to a share of his
, but the ordinary was to distribute it according to
nscience to pious uses; and sometimes the wife and
en might be amongst the number of those whom he
nted to receive it; but however, the law trusted him
the sole disposition. 2 Bac. Abr. 398.

the first statute that abridged the power of the ordinary
1, was the aforementioned statute of the 13 Ed. 1.
c. 19. by which it is enacted as followeth: *Whereas*
the death of a person dying intestate, which is bounden to
either for debt, the goods come to the ordinary to be dis-
the ordinary from henceforth shall be bound to answer
bits as far forth as the goods of the dead will extend, in
sort as the executors of the same party should have been
re, if he had made a testament.

ing intestate] There be divers kinds of intestates;
that maketh no will at all; another, that maketh a
and executors, and they refuse, in this case he dieth
quasi

quasi intestatus, and these are within the purview of this act. Therefore the ordinary is the person whom the law appointeth to have the charge or administration of the goods and chattels of the party that dieth intestate, or *quasi intestatus*. And justly did the law in this case appoint the ordinary; for the law presumed, that he who had the care of his soul in his lifetime, would after his death have care of his temporal goods and chattels, to see them well disposed and administered. 2 *Inst.* 397.

Which is bounden to some other for debt] This is not only intended of an obligation or deed in writing, but howsoever he was charged in law, as for rent upon a lease, or upon an assumpsit, or the like. 2 *Inst.* 397.

For debt] This act is not only intended of that which is properly a debt, but of all duties, covenants, or just causes of action, such as might be brought against executors. 2 *Inst.* 397.

The goods come to the ordinary to be disposed] So that this statute doth not give this power of disposing, but supposeth it in the ordinary; the statute being as to this, in affirmance only of the common law. 5 *Co.* 83.

But unless some of the goods or chattels came to the hands and possession of the ordinary, he was not to be charged by the common law; but if they came to his hands, and he should neither administer and pay the debts and duties himself, nor commit them over to the kin and friends of the intestate that would, the common law did charge him, and so doth this act which is made in affirmance of it. 2 *Inst.* 397.

Goods come to the ordinary] If a man die intestate, and a stranger taketh the goods: the ordinary shall not have an action of trespass for taking of them (unless he had taken them into his possession). But the executor or administrator before seizure may have an action of trespass. 2 *Inst.* 397.

Come to the ordinary] Neither can the ordinary have any action of debt, covenant, or any other action which belonged to the intestate; but those to whom the ordinary committeth administration may have all these actions by the statute of the 31 *Ed.* 3. (hereafter following); but before that statute, there was no remedy by law given to the administrators, to recover those things in action. 2 *Inst.* 397, 398.

But by the common law, an action of debt did lie against the administrators, but it was by the name of executors until the said statute of the 31 *Ed.* 3. 2 *Inst.* 398.

To the ordinary] If the ordinary take goods of the intestate, being out of his diocese, he shall not be charged as ordinary by this act; because he taketh them of his own wrong, and not as ordinary, in which right he is to be charged by this act. 2 *Inst.* 398.

Ordinary] That is, not only the bishop, but every one that is in stead of the bishop, in this matter of taking care and cognizance of the goods of intestates; as archdeacon, chancellor, commissary, official, and those who have peculiar jurisdiction. Some of whom having, from time to time, accidentally omitted their title or stile of jurisdiction in the letters of administration by them granted, have occasioned various contests in the courts of common law, concerning the validity of administrations executed in virtue of such letters; as the judgments upon the validity or invalidity of them have been also various. The enumeration of which is not material; since there is one safe short and plain rule (viz. the inserting in all such letters the stile of jurisdiction; as well as the name of the ordinary) which, being observed, is a security for ever against all such contests. *Gibbs.* 478.

And not only an ordinary or guardian of the spiritualities or others that be in the place of the ordinary of right, are within this act; but also such as usurp the place, and are in possession by wrong, are to be charged by this act: 2 *Inst.* 398.

To be disposed] If it be demanded what interest the ordinary hath in the goods of the person intestate, which come to his hands: it is answered, that he hath such an interest, as the administrator to whom administration is committed during the minority of an executor, to the behoof and profit of the executor, and not otherwise, nor in other manner. So as the ordinary may administer for the good of the intestate, but cannot give the goods of the intestate, or do any thing to his prejudice. 2 *Inst.* 398.

The ordinary from henceforth shall be bound] If goods of the intestate come to the hands of the ordinary, and he dieth, altho' the words be that *the ordinary shall be bound*, yet his executors or administrators shall be charged in an action of debt; for when this act bindeth the ordinary, by consequence his executors or administrators are bound. But if the ordinary commit administration to one, and he taketh the goods into his possession and dieth, no action lieth against his executors. 2 *Inst.* 398.

If the ordinary take goods into his hands of the intestate, and after commit administration, and the ordinary retaineth the goods; he shall be charged, notwithstanding the committing of administration. 2 *Inst.* 398.

Shall be bound to answer] At the common law, the ordinary might have had trespass for goods taken out of his possession: but no action did lie against the ordinary: but now by this statute, an action lies against him; but he cannot have action by this statute. 1 *Roll. Abr.* 906.

Ordinary may
be compelled.

2. If administration is denied by the ordinary, to the person who is intitled to it; a mandamus will go from the temporal courts to grant it; except a controversy is depending, whether there is a will or not; for then (as Holt chief justice said) suppose the will should prove good, what will the granting of administration signify? *Gibb.* 478.

H. 3 G. 2. K. and Bettlesworth. In the case of a will, a mandamus was granted to Dr. Bettlesworth, as judge of the prerogative court of Canterbury, to grant probate of the earl of Londonderry's will, to the executors therein named. The doctor returned, that it was the custom and practice of the prerogative court, that if any creditor of the deceased enters a caveat against granting probate, and swears himself to be a creditor, there goes out a commission of appraisement, till the return whereof the judge hath not used nor ought to grant any probate; then he sets out, that two creditors, who swore to their debts, entered a caveat, and prayed a commission of appraisement; which was decreed and issued, but is not yet returnable; and for that cause he cannot as yet grant a probate. Upon argument, the court held the return to be ill; for that the judge can only stay the probate, where there is a contest about the validity of the will. This commission of appraisement can be of no use but to spend money, and delay the executor from getting in the effects of the testator. And by the 21 *H. 8. c. 5.* the probate is to be granted *with convenient speed, without any frustrary delay*; and the ecclesiastical court shall never be suffered to set up their practice against the law of the land. And a peremptory mandamus was granted. *Str.* 857.

H. 4 G. 2. Smith's case. It was moved for a mandamus to Dr. Bettlesworth, commanding him to grant administration to Smith of the goods of his deceased son, during the minority of his grandson. Against this it was insisted, that a father hath not an equal right with the

son; and that the spiritual court hath always considered these administrators only as trustees for the infant, and have never kept to any rule in granting them, but according to the circumstances of the family: where there are several in equal degree, as children, they have always chosen which they pleased. And by the court, when we grant a mandamus, it is to oblige the judge to do right to the party who sues the writ; but as there is no law which says, to whom these administrations during minority shall be granted, there is no law to be put in execution. In the case of the next of kin, he is intitled *de jure*, and therefore in this case we grant a mandamus of course. We will grant no mandamus in this case. *Str.* 892. [*Vid. infra*, 14.]

M. 7 G. 2. K. and Bettefworth. John Kynaston esq. made his will, and two persons executors, and left the residue of his personal estate to his youngest son Edward. The executors renounced; and the residuary legatee moved for a mandamus to be admitted to prove the will, and have administration with the will annexed. And a rule was made to shew cause. On shewing cause, it was insisted, that this case differed from lord Londonderry's where the commission of appraisement was set up, against the immediate grant of the probate, which the statute of the 21 H. 8. c. 5. requires shall be without any frustratory delay; and the ordinary hath no election there: whereas in the present case, he is not bound to grant the administration to the residuary legatee, none of the statutes mentioning him; on the contrary the statute of the 21 H. 8. c. 5. which takes notice of the renunciation of executors, leaves the matter to the election of the ordinary. And of this opinion was the court: who said, if the commission of appraisement was a grievance, it would be proper matter of appeal, but they could not break into the practice of the court below. And lord Hardwicke mentioned a case in chancery before lord Macclesfield, between Wheeler and the archbishop of Canterbury, where it was held, that these sort of administrations are not within the statute of distribution; which brings it to Smith's case, where a mandamus to grant administration during the minority of an executor, to the father of the executor, was refused; because there was no law obliging the spiritual court to do. And the rule for a mandamus was discharged. *Str.* 956.

H. 4 G. 2. K. and Bettefworth. Mandamus to grant administration to John Cullom, of Joan his wife. Re-

turn : that by articles before marriage it was agreed, t
the wife should have power to make a will, and disp
of her leasehold estate ; that pursuant to this power,
made a will, and her mother executrix, who hath d
proved the same. To this return it was objected, t
she might have things in action not covered by the de
and the husband was in all events intitled to an admi
stration as to them. Which was agreed to by the cou
and a peremptory mandamus was granted. *Str.* 891.

T. 12 G. 2. K. and Bettefworth. Mandamus to gr
administration to Mr. Bridgen, husband of the late M
Bellamont deceased. The dean of the arches return
that a suit had been commenced before him, betwe
Mr. Bridgen and a son of the deceased, who claimed to
her executor under a will made by her pursuant to a de
executed before marriage ; whereby the husband agre
she should have power to make a will, and dispose
her estate ; which deed Mr. Bridgen had confessed, a
thereupon sentence had been given for the validity of t
disposition, but not for any executorship created thereby
and thereupon a new suit was instituted by the daught
against the son and Mr. Bridgen, for administration wi
the will annexed ; which is still depending. And up
consideration the court declared, that no peremptory ma
damus ought to go : for though generally the husban
is intitled to the administration as next of kin ; yet thi
is in respect of the interest he has in the estate, and be
cause nobody is in equal degree : and that is the reason
why administrations are so often granted to a residuary le
gatee : and though strictly speaking this is no will, bu
rather an appointment which is to operate in equity ; y
the true question is, whether this is such an intestacy
as is within the meaning of the statute. And the law
particularly the 29 C. 2. c. 3. considers femes covert a
having some right to dispose of their effects which can
only be by the agreement of the husband, which appear
in this case ; and this differs greatly from the case
of Cullom, where the power was only as to a leasehold
estate, whereas she might have other effects. The matter
is properly under the consideration of the spiritual court
to whom to grant the administration, and there is no rea
son for us to interpose ; and therefore the return must b
allowed. *Str.* 1112.

-*Act of ad-
ation.*

3. The person to whom administration is granted, ma
refuse to take it upon him if he will ; for the ordinary hat
not power to compel him to accept it. *Swin.* 384.

4. I

4. By the statute of the 31 Ed. 3. st. 1. c. 11. *In case where a man dieth intestate, the ordinary shall depute the next and most lawful friends of the deceased, to administer his goods.* To be granted to the widow or next of kin.

The ordinary shall depute] Before this statute the ordinary was not *compellable* to grant administration; but now by this act he is commanded, and thereby compellable to grant administration; and a refusal to do it, is a contempt to the king, and an injury to the party. 9 Co. 40.

To the next and most lawful friends] Before this act, the ordinaries might have granted administration to whom they pleased; but hereby they are restrained, to the next and most lawful friends. 9 Co. 40.

Most lawful friends] That is, to the next of blood, who are not attainted of treason, felony, or have other lawful disability. 9 Co. 40.

As, by the 9 & 10 W. c. 32. Persons denying the Trinity, or asserting that there are more Gods than one, or denying the christian religion to be true, or the holy scriptures to be of divine authority, shall for the second offence be disabled to be administrators.

And by the several acts for qualifying for offices, persons executing their offices not being qualified, after the time limited for their qualification shall be expired, shall be disabled to be administrators.

If a *bastard* dies intestate, without wife or issue, leaving a personal estate; in such case, the king shall be intitled, and the ordinary shall grant administration to the king's patentee. 3 Peere Will. 33.

And by the statute of the 21 H. 8. c. 5. *In case any person die intestate, or the executors named in any testament refuse to prove the said testament; then the ordinary or other person having authority to take probate of testaments, shall grant the administration of the goods of the testator, or person deceased, to the widow of the same person deceased, or to the next of kin, or to both, as by the discretion of the same ordinary shall be thought good. And in case where divers persons claim the administration as next of kin, which be equal in degree of kindred to the testator or person deceased: and where any person only desireth the administration as next of kin, where indeed divers persons be in equality of kindred; in every such case the ordinary to be at his election and liberty, to accept any one or more making request, where divers do require the administration: or where but one, or more of them, and not all being in equality of degree, do make request; then the or-*

dinary to admit the widow, and him or them only making request, or any one of them, at his pleasure. s. 3, 4.

To the widow of the same person deceased, or to the next of his kin] T. 9 G. It was moved for a mandamus to the official of the bishop of Gloucester to commit administration to the widow of an intestate. But by the court: That will be to deprive the ordinary of his election, in granting it to her, or the next of kin; therefore take your mandamus generally, to grant administration of the goods of the intestate. Str. 552.

Or both] And this, either jointly or separately: for the ordinary may grant several administrations of several parts of the goods of the intestate. 1 Roll's Abr. 908.

Thus in the case of *Fawtry and Fawtry*, H. 3 W. A man died intestate, leaving a wife and a brother. The ordinary had granted the administration of some particular debts to the brother, and of the residue to the wife. And a mandamus was moved for to grant administration to the wife. But by the court; the ordinary may grant administration to the brother as to part, and to the wife for the rest; in which case neither can complain; since the ordinary need not have granted any part of the administration to the party complaining. But if the intestate leave a bond of 100 l., the ordinary cannot grant administration of 50 l. to one person and 50 l. to another, because this is an intire thing. 1 Salk. 36.

To the husband
of the wife's
effects.

5. If a feme covert die intestate; administration of her goods of right appertaineth to her husband, as her next and most lawful friend within the statute. 1 Roll's Abr. 910.

And this is confirmed by the statute of the 29 C. 2. c. 3. which enacteth, that the statute of the 22 & 23 C. 2. c. 10. concerning the distribution of intestates effects. shall not extend to the estates of femes covert that shall die intestate, but that their husbands may demand and have administration of their rights, credits and other personal estates, and recover and enjoy the same, as they might have done before the making of the said act. 29 C. 2. c. 3. s. 5. (c)

And if the husband die before administration taken by him; his executors or administrators, and not the wife's next of kin, shall be intitled in equity. 1 P. W. 381.

(c) Vide infra, *Distribution*, for the explanation of this statute.

As

As in the case of *Elliot and Collier*, July 1, 1747: One question in the cause was, Whether the husband dying without administering to the personal estate the wife had in her own right, it shall go to the next of kin of the wife, or to the representative of the husband. By lord Hardwicke: The representative of the wife has no right to an account of her personal estate. That point doth not follow barely the legal right of administration; for though the ecclesiastical court are bound by act of parliament to grant the administration to the next of kin to the wife, yet that doth not bind the right in this court. For the husband surviving the wife, her whole estate vested in him at the time of her death. There are several cases where it has been held, that though the ecclesiastical court are bound to grant administration by 31 *Ed 3. c. 1.* yet those persons have been looked upon in this court as mere trustees. Suppose the wife had survived the husband, only such part of her personal estate as had continued *choses in action*, would have survived to her; for whatever he had reduced into possession, would have been the husband's. Upon the equity of the statute of distribution, this court makes an *administrator de bonis non* only a trustee for such part of the testator's personal estate as is undisposed of, for his next of kin. Therefore I am of opinion, the husband's representative is intitled to the wife's personal estate, and that it vested in the husband before administration was taken out. 3 *Atk.* 526.

But if the wife was executrix to another; then, as to the goods which she had in that capacity, administration must be granted to the next of kin to the testator. 3 *Salk.* 21.

6. Administration may be granted of the goods of the son or daughter, to the father or mother as next of blood. *Law of Test.* 466. To the father or mother, of their children's effects.

7. If one dies intestate, leaving a grandmother and uncles and aunts; the grandmother is intitled to the administration, in exclusion of the uncles and aunts. *Pre. Cha.* 527. To the grandmother before uncles and aunts.

8. If there be grandfather, father, and son; and the father dies intestate: the son shall have the administration, and not the grandfather. 2 *Vern.* 125. To the son before the father.

9. Administration must be granted to the brother of the half blood before the uncle; for he has the immediate blood of the father, which the uncle hath not. 1 *Ventr.* 425. Half blood.

And the half blood in this respect is esteemed as near as the whole. But if there is a brother, and a sister of the half blood, and the sister is married; then it must be granted to the brother, and not to her and her husband; because in effect it makes the husband administrator, who is not of kin to the intestate: and if she die, the husband would still continue administrator, and so might possess himself of the whole personal estate. 3 Salk. 21.

In general, to
the next of
kindred.

10. Generally, by the statute aforesaid, administration shall be granted to the wife or *next of kindred*: and who these *next of kindred* are, will fall in more properly under the head concerning distribution.

Residuary lega-
te, or principal
creditor.

11. There is one exception to the rule about the next of kin, in case where the executor refuseth, or accepting dies intestate; and that is, with respect to the residuary legatee: who being intitled to what remains after debts and legacies paid, hath the first and best title to be administrator of the estate; as was agreed in the case of *Thomas and Butler*, 7. 24 C. 2. For this taketh away the presumption of the statute, that the testator would have given it to the next of kin. Gibb. 479. 1 Ventr. 217.

And by King lord chancellor, A. 1725. Notwithstanding the statute of Hen. 8. administrations have been granted to the principal creditor from the next of kin, by the opinion of both civil and common lawyers; where it is visible, that the next of kin cannot have any advantage or benefit of the estate. And this hath been always taken to be out of the statute. *Piner*, Executors, K. 24.

But this, as it seemeth, should be understood only in case where the kindred refuse to accept the administration. And the practice is usually for the ordinary first to issue a citation for the next of kin in special, and all others in general, to accept or refuse letters of administration, or show cause why the same should not be granted to a creditor. And such creditor must make an affidavit of his debt, and therein set forth how much it is, and how due. And in case there are several creditors, the court generally obliges them to enter into articles and bond of average. For this kind of administration being out of the aforesaid statutes, the same falls back upon the original power which the ordinary had at common law; whereby he may grant administration to whom he pleases, and consequently may insist upon such terms as he thinks reasonable.

12. There

12. There are also other administrations, which are not within the statutes aforesaid (d): As, administration during absence out of the kingdom. Concerning which, in the case of *Clare and Hedges*, E. 3 W. it was held clearly by the court, that such administration is grantable by law, and that it may be a great conveniency so to do; for if the next of kin be beyond sea, and such administration could not be granted, the debts due to the intestate might be lost. 1 Lutw. 342.

Temporary administration, as during absence out of the kingdom.

And in the case of *Slater and May*, M. 3 An. Holt chief justice said, that it was reasonable there should be such an administrator, and that this kind of administration stood upon the same reason as an administration during the minority of an executor, namely, that there should be one to manage the estate of the testator, till the person appointed by him is able. 2 L. Raym. 1071.

13. Also, administration pending a suit; or, if there be no controversy, then until the executor comes in; which, as well as the last before mentioned, do fall of course, as soon as the consideration ceaseth upon which they were first granted. *Gibbs*. 574. 2 Bac. Abr. 415. 2 P. Will. 576. (e)

Pendente lite.

Nov. 23, 1749; *Knight and Duplessis*. The heir at law brought a bill to controvert the will, and moved for an injunction to stay the defendant from receiving the personal or the rents and profits of the real estate, and to have a receiver appointed, on the ground that there was a dispute in the ecclesiastical court concerning the probate; which not being yet granted, there was none to get in the debts, therefore this court should appoint a receiver; and as to the real estate, the tenants will not pay the rents to any of the contending parties, so that they are in danger of being lost. By lord Hardwicke: This is a very early motion for a receiver; and no ground for it; nor the least colour as to the personal estate. For if the litigation in the ecclesiastical court is likely to be long, the court has jurisdiction to grant administration pendente lite, which administrator may maintain an ac-

(d) These administrations not being within the statute 21 H. 8. c. 5. the ordinary is not bound to grant them to the next of kin. See *Briers v. Giddard*, Hob. 250. *Thomas v. Butler*, 1 Vent. 219. and *Smith's case*, supra 2. and infra 14.

(e) And such administrator may maintain an action for recovering the debts due to the deceased. *Walker v. Woolleston*, 2 P. Wms. 576. *Willis v. Rich*, 2 Atk. 285.

tion to recover the debts, whereby no loss can be to the personal estate. Nor is there any rule, that on a dispute in the ecclesiastical court concerning a probate, this court should appoint a receiver of the personal estate. *1 Vint. 322.*

During the minority of an infant executor by administration.

14. An infant, how young soever he be, may be executor; yet the execution of the will shall not be committed unto him, until he attain the age of seventeen years; for administration granted durante minori ætate ceaseth, when the infant executor attains to that age of seventeen years. *Stat. 331.*

And Dr. Swinburne says, if it be a female infant, and married to a man of seventeen years of age or more, it is then as if herself were of that age, and her husband shall have the execution of the will and administration thereof. *Stat. 331.*

And in *Priner's case*, 5 Co. 29. it is said to have been adjudged that if administration is granted during the minority of a woman, and she takes a husband of age; the administration ceaseth: for that she hath a husband who may administer as executor.

But in the case of *Jones and the earl of Strafford*, M. 1730. It was determined, that where administration is granted during the minority of an infant executrix under seventeen, and she marries an husband of full age: this doth not determine the administration. By King lord chancellor, and Raymond chief justice. *3 P. Will. 88.*

But altho' an administration during the minority of an infant executor ceaseth at his age of seventeen years; yet an administration during the minority of an infant administrator ceaseth not until his age of twenty-one. As in the case of *Freke and Thomas*, E. 13 W. Debt upon bond brought by an administrator during the minority of an administrator. Upon demurrer to the declaration, exception for the defendant was taken, that it appeared upon the declaration, that he, during the minority of whom administration was granted to the plaintiff, was above the age of seventeen, and so the administration determined: that this case doth not differ in reason, from the case of an administrator during the minority of an executor, which determines at the age of seventeen; nor from the case where a woman executrix under the age of seventeen marries a husband above the age of seventeen: for the only thing that the law considers, is the ability of the person to administer the estate of the dead, who ought to have the administration of it, which ought to be the same

in

in both cases; and in *Vaugh.* 98. the rule of averment of the age of an administrator or executor to be under seventeen, is equally put to both; and the statute of distribution will make no difference, because an infant may find sureties, tho' he cannot be bound himself. But not allowed: For by Holt chief justice, there is a difference between administration during the minority of an executor, and of another person; for an administrator during the minority of a residuary legatee, ought to be understood to be during his legal minority. For the authority that the administrator hath, is given to him by the statute; and an infant hath not been adjudged a legal person, to be intrusted with the management of an estate. But an executor, who comes in by the act of the party himself, hath been adjudged capable to administer at seventeen. But the law in the exposition of a statute will not make such construction. And care is taken of the administration, by the commission of administration during his minority to his next friend. And this is the opinion of the civilians, and it hath been held accordingly by the commissioners delegate. And therefore judgment was given for the plaintiff. *L. Raym.* 667.

And this is by construction of the statute of distribution, which requireth that the administrators shall enter into bond. 1 *Salk.* 39. And the like was determined, in the case of *Atkinson and Cornish*, *E. 10 W. L. Raym.* 338. And afterwards, in the case of *Edmund and Shaler*, *T. 7 An.* wherein this distinction was taken, that the age of seventeen years allowed to be the age when an *executor* may take the executorship upon himself, is in conformity to the *spiritual* law, which allows an infant of seventeen years to be a proctor or agent for another; but *administration* is granted by the authority of the statute of the 41 *Ed.* 3. and therefore the person who has administration granted to him ought to be capable by the ~~common~~ law, by which the legal age is twenty-one, and consequently administration granted to another during his minority, does not determine till his age of twenty-one years. *Comyns*, 159.

If an action be brought by an administrator during the minority of an executor, he must aver, that the executor is within the age of seventeen years, otherwise it is an error; but if an action be brought against such an administrator, there need no such averment, because the plaintiff is a stranger to the defendant's power. *H. 13 J. Carver and Haslerigg*, *Hob.* 251.

There

There were two executors, and one of them was an infant; and whether he must be joined in the action with the other as plaintiff, was the question: It was objected that he must not, because an infant cannot make a warrant of attorney; and if he could, he cannot instruct him. Adjudged, they may both sue by their attorney, because they both represent the person of the testator, and sue in the right of another, and therefore the infant must be joined with the other. *Foxwith and Tremain*, H. 21 & 22 C. 2. 1 Mod. 47. 1 Sid. 449. 1 Ventr. 102.

Where administration is granted during the minority of divers executors; he that comes first of age shall prove the will, and the administration ceaseth. *Law of Test.* 473, 474.

So if one maketh two executors, one of the age of seventeen, and the other under; administration during the minority of him that is under age is void: because he that is of the age of seventeen may execute the will. 1 *Brownl.* 46.

And it is said, that the ordinary may grant administration during the minority of an infant to whom he pleases; for the next of kin, in respect to administrations, only concerneth the infant, and not the person who is employed for the infant until he comes of age. *Fi z Gir.* 163. *Barnardist. Cha. Ca.* 22.

So in the case of *K. and Battisforth*, M. 4 G. 2. a mandamus was moved for, to be directed to the judge of the prerogative court, to grant administration to one *Smith*, during the minority of his two infant grandchildren. The judge had approved of him as a proper person, but insisted on his giving security to distribute the effects in equal proportions amongst the creditors. The court were of opinion, that the judge had a discretionary power in granting administration *durante minori etate*, and therefore that in this case he might insist upon reasonable or equitable terms, or otherwise refuse administration to the claimant. But they said, if a mandamus had been moved for, to grant administration generally, they would have granted it. 1 *Barnard.* 370. 425. [*S. C. supra*, 2.]

15. If a feme covert, as next of kin hath a right to administer, the administration ought not to be granted to the husband and wife; for then if she should die before him, he would continue administrator, against the meaning of the act. *Brown and Wood*, H. 23 Car. Aleyn, 36. *Style*, 74, 75.

But it was said, that if it had been granted to them only during the coverture, perhaps it might be good; because, if

if granted to the wife only, the husband might, during the coverture, have administered, *Aleyn*, 36.

If the wife, as residuary legatee, hath a right to take administration, but refuseth, and prays it may be granted to another, and not to her husband; yet it may be granted to her husband. *Vanthienen's case*, *Fitz-Gibb*. 203.

For the husband may administer in right of his wife without her consent, but she cannot administer without the consent of her husband. *Black. Rep.* 801. *Thrustout v. Coppin*.

16. If an administrator die, his executors are not administrators, but it behoveth the ordinary to commit a new administration. *1 Roll's Abr.* 907.

Administrator dying.

Where administration is granted to two, and one of them dies; the administration surviveth to him who is living. *Hudson and Hudson*, *T.* 1735. *Cas. Talb.* 127.

17. If none of the kindred will take administration, then it shall not be granted to those who shall desire it: And if none will take the administration, the ordinary may grant letters *ad colligendum bona defuncti*, and thereby take the goods of the deceased into his own hands, wherewith he is to pay debts and legacies, so far as the goods will reach; for which himself becomes liable in law, as other executors or administrators. *Swin.* 2. 448. [*Plowd.* 278.]

Where none will administer.

[Where the deceased has no kindred, as when a bastard dies without issue, his personal estate belongs to the king, and his real escheats to the lord, *vide Bastards*, III. 2. But the usual course now is for some one to procure a grant of the former from the crown, to whom the ordinary grants letters of administration as of course. *Jones v. Goodchild*, 3 *P. Wms.* 33. *Manning v. Napp*, 1 *Salk.* 37.]

[Where there are no kindred.]

18. Letters of administration are not of necessity to be granted within the limits of the jurisdiction; the granting thereof being not a judicial, but a ministerial, and therefore not a local act; wherein the bishop acts, as a person designed and appointed by the law. *Gibbs*. 478.

May be granted out of the jurisdiction.

19. But an administrator cannot act before letters of administration granted to him. *1 Salk.* 301.

Cannot act before administration.

But he may bring a bill in chancery; though this would be an exception in an action at law. *Barnardist.* 320.

20. The practice is, not to issue letters of administration, until after the expiration of fourteen days from the death of the intestate; unless for special cause (as that the

Time of granting administration.

goods would otherwise perish, or the like) the judge shall think fit to decree them sooner. 1 Ought. 323, 324.

Administrator's
oath.

21. The oath to be made by the administrator, on his taking out letters of administration, is usually in this form: "You shall swear, that you believe *A. B.* deceased died without a will; and that you will well and truly administer all and every the goods of the said deceased, and pay his debts so far as his goods will extend; and that you will exhibit a true, full and perfect inventory of the said goods of the deceased, and render a true account of your administration in to the ——— court of *C.* when you shall be thereunto lawfully required: So help you God." 1 Ought. 323, 324.

Bond on granting
administration (f).

22. By the statute of the 21 H. 8. c. 5. *In case any person die intestate, or the executors named in any testament refuse to prove the said testament; then the ordinary or other person having authority to take probate of testaments, shall grant the administration of the goods of the testator or person deceased; taking surety of him or them to whom shall be made such commission, for the true administration of the goods chattels and debts, which he or they shall be so authorised to minister. l. 3.*

And by the statute of the 22 & 23 C. 2. c. 10. *All ordinaries, as well the judges of the prerogative courts of Canterbury and York, as all other ordinaries and ecclesiastical judges, and every of them, having power to commit administration of the goods of persons dying intestate, shall and may upon their granting and committing of administrations of the goods of persons dying intestate, of the person or persons to whom any administration is to be committed, take sufficient bond with two or more able sureties, respect being had to the value of the estate, in the name of the ordinary, with the condition in form, and manner following, mutatis mutandis, viz.*

"The condition of this obligation is such, that if the
"within bounden *A. B.* administrator of all and singular
"the goods, chattels and credits of *C. D.* deceased, do
"make or cause to be made a true and perfect inventory
"of all and singular the goods chattels and credits of
"the said deceased, which have or shall come to the
"hands possession or knowledge of him the said *A. B.* or
"into the hands and possession of any other person or

(f) Vide infra, *Account*, 11.

" persons

“ persons for him, and the same so made do exhibit or
 “ cause to be exhibited into the registry of ——— court,
 “ at or before the ——— day of ——— next ensuing; and
 “ the same goods chattels and credits and all other the
 “ goods chattels and credits of the said deceased. at the
 “ time of his death, which at any time after shall come to
 “ the hands or possession of the said *A. B.* or into the hands
 “ and possession of any other person or persons for him,
 “ do well and truly administer according to law; and
 “ further do make or cause to be made a true and just
 “ account of his said administration, at or before the —
 “ day of ———; and all the rest and residue of the said goods
 “ chattels and credits which shall be found remaining
 “ upon the said administrator’s account, the same being
 “ first examined and allowed of by the judge or judges
 “ for the time being of the said court, shall deliver and
 “ pay unto such person or persons respectively, as the
 “ said judge or judges, by his or their decree or sen-
 “ tence pursuant to the true intent and meaning of this
 “ act, shall limit and appoint; and if it shall hereafter
 “ appear that any last will and testament was made by
 “ the said deceased, and the executor or executors therein
 “ named do exhibit the same into the said court, making
 “ request to have it allowed and approved accordingly,
 “ if the said *A. B.* within bouden being thereunto re-
 “ quired do render and deliver the said letters of admi-
 “ nistration (approbation of such testament being first
 “ had and made) in the said court; then this obligation
 “ to be void and of none effect, or else to remain in full
 “ force and virtue.”

Which bonds shall be good to all intents and purposes, and pleadable in any courts of justice. s. 1, 2, 3.

H. 6 An. Archbishop of Canterbury and Willis. The condition of the bond, as to administering truly according to law, is to be intended in bringing in his account, and not in paying the debts of the intestate; and therefore a creditor shall not take an assignment of the bond, and sue it, and for breach assign non-payment of a debt to him, or a devastavit committed by the administrator; for that would be endless. 1 *Salk.* 316.

June 28, 1745; *Greenside* and others against *Benson* and others. The plaintiffs were two sureties with the defendant *Mrs. Hudson* in an administration bond given to the committary of York, for her bringing in a true and perfect inventory of the intestate’s effects. The defendant *Mrs. Hudson* did afterwards exhibit an inventory in

in the spiritual court of York. The defendant *Benson*, being a creditor of the intestate by bond in the penalty of 600 l. brought an action against the defendant Mrs. *Hudson* upon that bond, and she pleaded that she had not assets above 54 l. which she paid into court. The defendant *Benson*, not being satisfied with the inventory brought in by her, procured the commissary (by indemnifying him) to assign the administration bond to him, and he put it in suit by bringing three several actions, one against her, and one against each of the sureties; and assigned for breach of the bond, that she had not exhibited a true and perfect inventory. These causes came on to be tried, and on the trial no defence was made, and there was judgment for the plaintiff by default. A bill was brought against the defendant *Benson*, insisting that he as a creditor had no right to put the bond in suit against the sureties, and prayed an injunction to stay the proceedings at law. And for this was cited the case of the *Archbishop of Canterbury and Willis*.—By the lord chancellor *Hardwicke*: There is no doubt but the archbishop's commissary may assign a breach in not delivering a true and perfect inventory, and even without citation, and nothing else appears at law, and there must have been a judgment for the ordinary, because no doubt there was a breach in not exhibiting such an inventory. What the counsel for the plaintiffs and for Mrs. *Hudson* aim at would have been right, supposing the commissary had assigned for breach the non-payment of the creditor's debts. The ecclesiastical court understand no more by an account, than some account in nature of an inventory, and depends only upon the particular wording of inventories by administrators. The ordinary, after an administrator has exhibited an inventory, cannot compel the administrator to account, but it must be at the instance of the party, and therefore the inventory and account are as to the ordinary the same thing. What the defendant Mr. *Benson* asks is, that this bond upon which the penalty is recovered, may stand only as a security for what is justly due to the creditor. The administratrix to be sure cannot now dispute the verdict, which finds she did not administer the whole assets, and she is bound by a verdict which has unravelled a matter, and it is no excuse to say that the verdict was without defence on the administratrix, for that is rather a consciousness that she had no defence. Therefore the court will not think it proper to have the whole account taken over

over again, or to alter what has been found by the verdict. The case of the sureties is not at all better: for, as the verdict was obtained against the administratrix, who was the proper person to try it, it would be hard to have this tried over again, in as many actions as the plaintiffs please. His lordship ordered an account to be taken only of what was exhibited upon the inventory, and the verdict to stand as a security for so much as that should fall short to satisfy the defendant's principal and interest on his bond. 3 Atk. 248.

T. 13 G. 2. *Folkes and Docminique*. The plaintiff declares on bond in the *detinet*, against the defendant as administrator during minority with the will annexed. And upon oyer, the condition appears to be, for exhibiting an inventory and duly administering by paying debts and legacies. The performance of all which the defendant avers. The plaintiff replies, that he had not paid a legacy of 1500 l., tho' he had more than sufficient to pay all the debts, to wit, 500 l. And on demurrer it was objected, that this was a void bond, not warranted by the statute of the 21 H. 8. c. 5. (nor by the statute of the 22 & 23 C. 2. c. 10. for neither of those statutes extendeth to administrators during the minority of an executor) nor yet by the common law; for that it requireth the administrator to pay legacies according to the ecclesiastical decision, and shall be taken to be obtained by coercion. On the contrary, it was argued that this not being on an intestacy (nor in case where an executor refuseth) is not within the statutes it is true; but it is to be supported as a reasonable bond taken by the course of the ecclesiastical court. And tho' formerly it was disputed, yet it is now settled, that they may compel distribution: that here the breach is assigned in non-payment of legacies, of which they have undoubted jurisdiction: and if it be good in any part (being a bond at common law). it is enough. And it differs from the case, where part of the condition is against a statute, for there it is void in toto. And by the court; These administrations are not within the statutes; and therefore we deny a mandamus: we must therefore consider it as a bond at common law; and then it is sufficient if it be good in that part on which the breach is assigned; as we think this is, and we cannot take it to be a bond by coercion. Therefore the plaintiff must have judgment. Str. 1137.

T. 14 G. 3. *Archbishop of Canterbury and House*. Upon rule to shew cause, why the proceedings in an action upon an administration bond sued in the name of the

archbishop shall not be stayed, with costs to be paid by the assignee of the archbishop; the grounds for staying the proceedings were, 1. That in fact the assignee, who was a *creditor* only, had no authority from the archbishop. 2. That it was not competent to the archbishop to depute such authority to a creditor.——The counsel who shewed cause cited *Greenfield* and *Benson*, 3 *Atk.* 248. as a case in point, that a creditor has a right to sue upon the administration bond. And with respect to the first point, it appeared clearly upon the affidavits, that the archbishop had given an authority to the plaintiff to sue in his name, and that the attorney for the defendant was fully apprized of it; though upon a personal application by the defendant's attorney, to know if such authority was granted, the secretary of the archbishop at first informed him that it had been refused, because Dr. *Ducarel* had advised the archbishop that it could not be granted to a creditor.—Lord *Mansfield*: No next of kin ever struggled for the administration of an insolvent estate with an honest view. What the object of the administratrix was in this case is very manifest upon the affidavits that have been read; namely, to sell the administration to the creditors. But failing of that purpose, after having obtained the administration, she makes use of all sort of chicane, delay, and false pleas to defeat the creditors, and at length absconds. This is the general state of the case. At last a creditor or creditors have brought an action upon the administration bond in the name of the archbishop, and this is an application on the part of the administratrix to stay the proceedings in the name of the archbishop with costs; on two grounds, First, that it is not competent to the archbishop to authorise a creditor to put the bond in suit, but only the next of kin. Secondly, that the archbishop in his private capacity has not deputed such authority to the present plaintiff. With respect to the first point, let us see what it is which the act requires the archbishop or his ordinary to do: He is to grant administration, and to take bonds with condition that the administrators shall duly administer the intestate's effects: that they shall give an account of such their administration, and make an inventory of the goods and chattels, and that they shall pay the surplus to the next of kin. Now it is agreed, that if the next of kin is desirous of suing upon this bond, the court will direct the ordinary to permit his name to be used, because the next of kin is interested in the surplus. In like manner if such application is made by a creditor, I see no reason why he should
not

at have the same privilege: and I know of no authority which says that the ordinary cannot empower him to put a bond in suit: On the contrary, it is *ex debito justitiæ* that he ought to do so; for though a creditor has no concern in the latter part of the condition, namely, the distribution of the surplus among the next of kin, yet he is most materially and principally interested in the administrator's delivering in a true inventory and in the due administration of the effects. To one who has a *right*, it is *ex debito justitiæ* to grant the liberty of suing in the archbishop's name; to one who has no *right*, it is *ex debito justitiæ* to refuse it. As to the objection, that it is liable to be abused: if any bad use were made of it, the court would no doubt set aside the proceedings. But in the present case, there is no pretence or even suggestion of any abuse. And therefore I am clearly of opinion, that the plaintiff is well intitled to put the bond in suit. The next ground is, that the archbishop in his private person gave no such authority to the present plaintiff. I think a personal application to the archbishop was very improper; for it is not his personal affair; his name is used *officially* only; and therefore I am not surprised that the archbishop should not recollect what was requisite upon the occasion. He might refer it to Dr. *Ducarel*; and Dr. *Ducarel* gave the answer that is stated, he was ill advised. If the case rested there, and the attorney had been misled by that answer, it would have operated differently as to the costs. But it is in evidence that he had the fullest information afterwards that the archbishop had authorized the plaintiff to sue in his name. And therefore I am of opinion, that the rule should be discharged with costs, to be paid by the attorney for the defendant. The other three judges concurred. *Cowper*, 20.

23. By the statute of the 21 H. 8. c. 5. *The ordinary shall take nothing for letters of administration, unless the goods of the person deceased amount above the value or sum of 100 s.; and in case the goods of the persons so deceased amount above the value of 100 s., and not above the value or sum of 40 l., he shall take only for the same 2 s. 6 d. and not above.* s. 4.

Fee for administration.

Here is no provision where the goods exceed the value of 40 l.: which seemeth to have been an omission not intended. And in 2 Roll. 233. Palm. 318. a person was indicted because he took 10 s. for letters of administration, against the form of the statute; but because the statute makes no provision in case the goods are above 40 l. (which was *casus omissus*), and the indictment did not set forth

But where a feme covert died intestate, and the next of kin to her obtained administration, and the husband sued for a repeal, a prohibition was denied; because in this case the ordinary had no power or election, to grant it to any person but to the husband. 3 *Salk.* 22.

And the rule seemeth to be, that an administration may be repealed, although not arbitrarily, yet where there shall be just cause for so doing; of which the temporal courts are to judge: as, if the administrator should become lunatick, or the like. So if the next of kin, at the time of the death of the intestate, happen to be incapable of administering, by reason of attaint, or excommunication; and the ordinary commits it to another; if he afterwards becomes capable, the ordinary may repeal the first administration, and commit it to the next of kin. *Gibbs.* 479.

And the same thing is much more to be said, where the administration was undue ab initio, whether as granted to other than the next of kin, or granted by an incompetent authority, or in an irregular manner without citing those who ought to have been cited. *Gibbs.* 479. 2 *Bac. Abr.* 410.

T. 5 G. 2. Harrison and Weldon. Walker Weldon died intestate, leaving Anne his wife, and Amphillis his sister. The sister upon the common oath, that she believed he died intestate without wife or children, obtained administration. And in a suit to repeal it as obtained by surprize, it appeared to be the course of the court, never to grant it to the next of kin, until the wife is cited. The sister moved for a prohibition, and insisted that the ordinary had executed his authority. But the court held, that the ordinary could not be said to have executed his authority, having never had an opportunity to make the election which the statute of the 21 *H. 8. c. 5.* gives him; that it was incident to every court, to rectify mistakes they were led into by the misrepresentation of the parties; that if there were no surprize (of which the court below was judge) there ought to be a prohibition, because then the administration will have been duly and regularly granted: but here was a plain surprize, and therefore they denied a prohibition. *Str.* 911.

And it is said, that an administration may be repealed, without any sentence of revocation to be given in any spiritual court or otherwise; as, by granting a new administration. 1 *And.* 303. *L. of T.* 476.

[It is common for persons resident in distant foreign settlements to enter into a bond to the directors or committee

[Bond to take possession of the effects of person dying intestate abroad.]

mittee of the company trading there, conditioned to take possession of the effects of persons dying intestate in their settlements, and to sell the same and remit the produce to the company in Europe, in order that it may be delivered to the lawful administrator; and such a bond has been adjudged good in law. *The African Company v. Turrell*, 6 T. Rep. 588.]

V. Of the duty of executors and administrators in making an inventory, and getting in the effects of the deceased.

Adminis-
trating
before inventory
made.

1. At the time of probate or administration granted, it is required that the executor or administrator produce an inventory of the goods chattels and credits of the deceased; and at the same time he maketh oath, that he will exhibit such (further) inventory into the court, as he shall thereafter be lawfully required to do.

And it is said, that if an executor, without making an inventory, shall intermeddle himself with the administration of the goods of the deceased (except in certain cases, as for the expences of the funeral, for insinuation of the testament, for making the inventory, for the necessary preservation of the goods) shall be bound to answer to every one of the *creditors* his whole debt. *Swin.* 228, 229. *Alton.* 107.

Also it is said, that every *legatary* may recover his whole legacy at his hands: for in this case the law presumeth, that there are sufficient goods to pay all the legacies, and that the executor doth secretly and fraudulently subtract the same. Whereas otherwise, the executor is presumed not to have any more goods which were the testator's, than are described in the inventory, the same being lawfully made. *Swin.* 228, 229. *Talb.* 183. 12 *Msd.* 346.

And therefore if any creditor or legatary doth affirm, that the testator had any more goods than are comprized in the inventory; he must prove the same: otherwise the judge is to give credit to the inventory, being made in due form of law. *Swin.* 426.

And such executor is also further punishable at the discretion of the ordinary, by the constitution here next following: and therefore it concerneth the executor, that he do not administer the goods of the deceased, until he hath caused an inventory to be made: for howsoever the act of him that is named executor is said to hold in law, before the proving of the will and the making of the inventory;

entory; nevertheless he that so presumeth to meddle and administer as executor before he maketh an inventory, is subject to ecclesiastical punishment: unless it be for doing such things as cannot be deferred till the inventory be made; as for intermeddling about the funeral, or disposing of such things as cannot be preserved by keeping, or such like. Swin. 424.

2. By a constitution of Othobon; *The executors of testaments, before they shall intermeddle with the administration of the goods, shall make an inventory in the presence of some credible persons, who shall competently understand the value of the deceased's goods; and the same shall exhibit unto the ordinary: and if any shall presume to administer, without such inventory made; he shall be punished by the discretion of his ordinary.* Athon. 107. Laws requiring the making an inventory.

And by a constitution of archbishop Stratford, it is ordered as follows: *We do enjoin, that no executor of any testament shall be permitted to administer of the testator's goods, unless he first make a faithful inventory of the said goods; the funeral expences, and the expences about the inventory only excepted. And the same inventory shall be delivered to the ordinary, within a time to be appointed by his discretion.* Lind. 176.

And by the statute of the 21 H. 8. c. 5. *The executor and executors named by the testator, or person deceased, or such other person or persons to whom administration shall be committed where any person dieth intestate. or by way of intestate, calling or taking to him or them such person or persons, two at the least, to whom the person so dying was indebted, or made any legacy; and upon their refusal or absence, two other honest persons, being next of kin to the person so dying; and in their default and absence, two other honest persons; and in their presence, and by their discretions, shall make or cause to be made a true and perfect inventory of all the goods, chattels, wares, merchandises, as well moveable as not moveable whatsoever; that were of the said person so deceased: and the same shall cause to be indented; whereof the one part shall be by the said executor or executors, administrator or administrators, upon his or their oath or oaths to be taken before the said bishops or ordinaries, their officials or commissaries, or other persons having power to take probate of the testaments, to be good and true, delivered into the keeping of the said bishop, ordinary or other person as aforesaid; and the other part thereof to remain with the said executor or executors, administrator or administrators. And no bishop, ordinary or other whatsoever person having authority to take probate of testaments, on pain in*

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this

this statute contained, shall refuse to take such inventory to him presented or tendered to be delivered as aforesaid. s. 4.

Swinburne says, if the executor enter to the testator's goods, and will make no inventory thereof, then may every legatary recover his whole legacy at his hands; for in this case the law presumeth, that there are sufficient goods to pay all the legacies, and that the executor doth secretly and fraudulently subtract the same: whereas otherwise the executor is presumed not to have any more goods which were the testator's, than are described in the inventory, the same being lawfully made. *Swin. 228.*

In the case of the *Coporation of Clergymen's sons against Swainson*, Mar. 5. 1747; where the executors made no inventory, but paid interest for a legacy during their lives, it was decreed by the lord chancellor Hardwicke, that this shall be evidence of assets; and he would not put the plaintiffs to take a strict account of the assets of the testator, as there cannot now be a personal examination of the executors. And he said, nothing is more necessary than to keep executors to deliver inventories. *1 Vez. 75.*

And in the case of *Orr and Kaines*, March, 1750; where the executor paid several legacies in full, and died, having made no inventory; it was decreed by Sir John Strange, master of the Rolls, that his representatives, having assets of the said executor, shall pay the rest. Not exhibiting an inventory (he said), which every executor ought to do, especially in a deficient estate, is an imputation upon him; and tho' not conclusive evidence, yet always inclines the court to bear harder upon an executor, because he may at any time relieve himself by an inventory, if he finds the estate deficient. He is admitted both at law on plea of *plene administravit*, and in equity on account of assets, to shew, that the money, for which by solemn inventory on oath he has charged himself, has by accident, as perhaps failure of some great merchant, not come to his hands; so that the inventory not being finally binding, is one reason why he ought to exhibit one. Besides, every executor ought, after debts and funeral expences, to see what remains for legatees; and if not enough for all, should make an estimate, and pay all in proportion: Whereas in the present case, the executor having paid the rest in full, is the strongest evidence against him. The rule is, that whenever an executor pays a legacy, the presumption is, he hath sufficient to pay all legacies; and the court will oblige him, if solvent, to pay the rest, and not permit him to bring a bill to
compel

compel the legatee, whom he voluntarily paid, to refund; although if the executor proves insolvent, so that there is no other way, the court will admit a bill by the other legatees to compel that legatee to refund. But that is not the case here; for the executor appears to have been solvent; and he hath acted so, as that the court will presume him to have received assets sufficient for all the legacies. 2 Vez. 193.

3. By *goods* in the aforesaid constitutions and statute, are included all the testator's cattle, as bulls, cows, oxen, sheep, horses, swine, and all poultry, household stuff, money, plate, jewels, corn, hay, wood severed from the ground, and such like moveables. *Law of Test.* 379.

Things to be
put into the in-
ventory;—
Goods.

4. *Chattels* comprehend all goods, moveable and immoveable; except such as are in nature of freehold, or parcel of it. And chattels are either *personal* or *real*: *Personal* are such as belong immediately to the person of a man; and for which, if they be any way injuriously withheld from him, he hath no other remedy but by personal action: Chattels *real* are such as either appertain not immediately to the person, but to some other thing by way of dependency, as a box with charters of land; or such as are issuing out of some immoveable thing, as a lease, or rent for term of years; and chattels real concern the realty, lands and tenements, interest in advowsons, in statutes merchant, and the like. 1 Inst. 118.

Chattels.

But *fishes* in a pond, *conies* in a warren, *deer* in a park, *pigeons* in a dove house, where the testator had the inheritance, or but for life, in the pond warren park and dove house; are not chattels at all, nor go to the executor, but to the heir with the inheritance: and therefore they are not to be put in the inventory of the goods and chattels of the party deceased. *Went.* 52. *Swin.* 422. But if the testator have any tame pigeons, deer, rabbits, pheasants, or partridges, they shall go to the executors; and though they were not tame, yet if they were kept alive in any room, cage, or such like place; so fish in a trunk; also young pigeons, tho' not tame, being in the dove house, and not able to fly out. *Law of Test.* 379.

Also *bounds*, *greyhounds*, *spaniels*, and the like, as they may be valuable, and may serve not only for delight, but for profit, shall go to the executors. *Law of Test.* 379.

5. *Debts, which the deceased owed to others*; ought not to be put in the inventory; because they are not the goods of the deceased, but of other persons. *Lind.* 176.

Debts owing by
the deceased.

Yet

Wills. Inventory.

Yet they may be put in, if it shall seem expedient. *id.*
— And this the rather, in case the clear value of the goods and chattels (the debts owing by the deceased being deducted) shall not exceed the sum of 40l.; thereby the better to ascertain the mortuary.

And if these debts shall be put into the inventory; the ordinary shall do well to make diligent examination, whether the testator did owe any such; that thereby the legataries, and children of the deceased, and others, may not be defrauded of their just due, by any false pretence thereof. *Swin. 423.*

wing to
raised.

6 *Lindwood* says, that debts owing to the deceased, of which there is not any writing or obligation, ought not to be put into the inventory before they be received; because, before that, they are not found to be debts, at least so as they may be handled or taken hold of. But afterwards when such debts are received, they ought to be put into the inventory as goods newly accruing. *Lind. 176.*

But unless they be bad debts, it seemeth best to insert them; and even if they be bad debts, or desperate, yet they may be inserted, specifying them as such. And if in the course of administration they shall be recovered, then they shall be accounted for in like manner as the rest of the personality: and if they cannot be recovered, or so much of them as cannot be recovered, shall not be accounted for as any part of the goods of the deceased.

7. All leases for years the executor shall have; and therefore leases ought not to be omitted forth of the inventory. 1 *Roll's Abr. 915. Swin. 421.*

If a devise be of land to one and the heirs of his body for 500 years; this is a lease for years, and therefore the executor shall have it; and the reason is, because an estate tail cannot be made of a term. 1 *Roll's Abr. 915.*

is put an-
t.

8. Estates *pur autre vie*, that is, estates held by lease during the life of another person, ought also to be put into the inventory: the same being made distributable by the statute of the 14 G. 2. c. 20. (g)

(g) Before this statute, such estates were only assets for payment of debts by 29 C. 2. c. 3. but not of legacies, except particularly derived thereout, nor were they distributable, and therefore they needed not be put in the inventory. *Oldham v Pickering, 2 Saik. 464.* As to these estates, *vid. supra, Of what*
ings.

9. All

9. Also the executor shall have all lands *extended* on any Extent. judgment, statute or recognizance. *Law of Test.* 378.

10. Also the executor shall have all arrearages of *rent* Rent. due at the death of the testator ; and therefore the same shall be put in the inventory. *Law of Test.* 378.

11. *Corn* growing upon the ground, ought to be put *Corn or other things growing* into the inventory ; seeing it belongeth to the executor : but not the *grass* or *trees* so growing ; which belong to the heir, and not to the executor. *Swin.* 421.

Also *hops*, tho' not sown, if planted ; and *saffron*, and *bemp*, because sown ; shall go to the executors. *Law of Test.* 380.

But Mr. Wentworth thinks, that *roots* in gardens, as carrots, parsnips, turnips, skirrets, and such like, shall not go to the executor, but to the heir ; because they cannot be taken without digging and breaking the soil. *Went.* 61, 62.

But lord Coke says, that if the testator shall set roots, his executors shall have that year's crop. *1 Inst.* 55.

If a man be seised for life or in fee or tail in his own right, or in the right of his wife, or for years in the right of his wife, and sows the ground with corn, but dies before it is ripe ; his executors shall have it, and not the wife or heir : but *grass* ready to be cut for hay, apples, pears, and other fruit on the trees, shall not go to the executors. And the reason of the difference is, because the former comes not merely from the soil, without the industry or manurance of man, as the latter doth. *Law of Test.* 379.

Yet if a lessee at will sows the land with *hay siew*, and by this increases the *grass*, and the lessor enters and ejects him, the lessee shall not have it. *1 Inst.* 56.

But for *clover*, *saint foin*, and the like, the reason of manurance, labour, and cultivation, is the same as for corn ; but no case hath occurred, wherein these matters have come in question ; this kind of husbandry having been in use only of late years.

If the wife had a lease for years as executrix, and the husband sows the ground with corn, and dies before it is ripe ; the corn shall go to his executors, at least so much as is more than the yearly rent of the land : but if the husband and wife were joint tenants of the land ; she shall have the corn, and not his executors. *Law of Test.* 380.

If

Wills. Inventory.

If a parson sows his glebe land, and dies before severance ; and after, his successor is admitted instituted and inducted before the corn is cut : it shall go to the executors or administrators of the deceased, who must pay tithes thereof to the successor. *1 Roll's Abr. 655.*

Things affixed
to the freehold.

12. Things that are affixed to the tenement, and are made parcel of the freehold, ought not to be put in the inventory ; because these belong to the heir, and not to the executor. *Swin. 421.*

And therefore the *glafs* annexed to the windows of the house, because they are parcel of the house, shall descend as parcel of the inheritance to the heir, and the executors shall not have it. And although the lessee himself, at his own cost, do cause the glafs to be put into the windows, yet the same being parcel of the house, he cannot take the same away afterwards, without danger of punishment for waste. Neither is there any material difference in law, whether the glafs were annexed to the window with nails, or in other manner, either by the lord or by the tenant ; for being once affixed to the freehold, the same cannot be removed by the lessee, but shall belong to the heir, and not to the executors : and therefore the same is not to be put into the inventory, as part or parcel of the goods of the deceased. *Swin. 421.*

The like may be concluded of *wainscot* ; that it ought not to be put into the inventory, as parcel of the goods of the deceased : for being annexed unto the house, either by the lessor or by the lessee, it is parcel of the house. And there is no difference whether it be affixed with great nails or little nails, or by screws, or irons thrust through the posts or walls of the house ; for howsoever it be affixed, either in manner aforesaid, or in any other manner, it is parcel of the freehold ; and if the executors shall remove it, they are punishable for the same. *Swin. 421.*

And not only glafs and wainscot, but any other such like thing, affixed to the freehold, or to the ground, with mortar and stone, as *tables dormant, leads, mangers*, and such like ; for these belong to the heir, and not to the executor : and therefore they are not to be put in the inventory of the deceased's goods. *Swin. 421.*

So also of *mill-stones, anvils, doors, keys, window shutters* ; none of these be chattels, but parcel of the freehold, or thereto pertaining ; and therefore shall not go to the executors. *Went. 61.*

An executor taking away a *furnace*, which was set in the middle of an house, and not fixed to any wall ; the
heir

heir brought an action of trespass against him : and it was adjudged for the heir, that this should go as part of the freehold and inheritance of the heir. But in the case of *Day and Austin*, Walmsley said, that lord Dyer's opinion was, that where the furnace is not affixed to the wall, the lessee might within his term take it away ; but not if it was fixed to the wall, for there it would strengthen the house. *Law of Test.* 380.

Pictures and glasses, though, generally speaking, not part of the freehold, yet if put up instead of wainscot, or where otherwise wainscot would have been put, shall go to the heir ; for the house ought not to come to the heir maimed or disfigured. 2 *Vern.* 508. *Law of Test.* 380, 381.

But in the case of *Harvey and Harvey*, *M.* 14 *Geo.* 2. In trover by the executor against the heir ; it was held by Lee chief justice, that *hangings, tapestry, and iron backs* to chimnies, belong to the executor ; who recovered accordingly against the heir. *Str.* 1141.

And the law seemeth now to be held not so strict as formerly ; and if these things can be taken away without prejudice to the fabrick of the house, it seemeth that the executor shall have them ; as tables, although fastened to the floor ; furnaces, if not made part of the wall ; grates, iron ovens, jacks, clock cases, and such like, although fixed to the freehold by nails or otherwise.

Dec. 14. 1743 ; *Lawton and Lawton*. The question was, Whether a *fire engine* set up for the benefit of a *colliery* by a tenant for life, shall be considered as personal estate, and go to his executor, or fixed to the freehold, and go to a remainder man. For the plaintiff (who was a creditor of the tenant for life) evidence was read, to prove that the fire engine was worth, to be sold, 350 l. ; and that it is customary to remove them ; and that in building of sheds for securing the engine, they leave holes for the ends of timber, to make it more commodious for removal, and that they are very capable of being carried from one place to another. And it was argued, that the testator was dead greatly indebted ; and it would be hard, when he has been laying out his creditors money in erecting this engine, that they should not have the benefit of it, but that the strict rule of law should take place. And it was compared to the case of a cyder mill, which is let in very deep into the ground, and is certainly fixed to the freehold ; and yet lord chief baron Comyns, at the assizes at Worcester, upon an action of trover brought by the executor

ecutor against the heir, was of opinion that it was personal estate, and directed the jury to find for the executor. On the other hand, for the defendant, evidence was produced to shew, that the engine cannot be removed without tearing up the soil, and destroying the brick work. By the lord chancellor Hardwicke: This is a demand by a creditor of Mr. Lawton who set up the fire engine, to have the fund for payment of debts extended as much as possible. 'Tis true, the court cannot construe the fund for assets further than the law allows; but they will do it to the utmost they can in favour of creditors. This brings on the question of the fire engine, whether it shall be considered as personal estate, and consequently applied to the increase of assets for payment of debts. Now it appears in evidence, that in its own nature it is a personal moveable chattel, taken either in part, or in gross, before it is put up. But then it is insisted, that fixing it in order to make it work, is properly an annexation to the freehold. To be sure, in the old cases, they go a great way upon the annexation to the freehold; and so long ago as Henry the seventh's time, the courts of law construed even a copper and furnaces to be part of the freehold. Since that time, the general ground the courts have gone upon of relaxing this strict construction of law is, that it is for the benefit of the publick to encourage tenants for life, to do what is advantageous to the estate during their term. What would have been held to be waste in Henry the seventh's time, as removing wainscot fixed only by screws, and marble chimney pieces, is now allowed to be done. Coppers, and all sorts of brewing vessels, cannot possibly be used, without being as much fixed as fire engines; and in brew houses especially, pipes must be laid through the walls, and supported by walls; and yet, notwithstanding this, as they are laid for the convenience of the trade, landlords will not be allowed to retain them. This being the general rule, consider how the case stands as to the engine which is now in question. It is said, there are two maxims which are strong for the remainder man: First, That you shall not destroy the principal thing, by taking away the accessory to it. And this is very true in general, but doth not hold in the present case; for the walls are not the principal thing, as they are only sheds to prevent any injury that might otherwise happen to it. Secondly, It has been said, that it must be deemed part of the estate, because it cannot subsist without it. Now collieries formerly

erly might be enjoyed before the invention of engines ;
 and therefore this is only a question of *maius* and *minus*,
 whether it is more or less convenient for the colliery.
 There is no doubt but the case would be very clear as
 between landlord and tenant. It is true, the old rules of
 law have indeed been relaxed chiefly between landlord
 and tenant, and not so frequently between an ancestor
 and heir at law, or tenant for life and remainder man.
 But even in these cases, it admits the consideration of
 public conveniency for determining the question. I think,
 even between ancestor and heir, it would be very hard
 that such things should go in every instance to the heir.
 One reason that weighs with me is, its being a mixed
 case between enjoying the profits of the land, and
 carrying on a species of trade ; and considering it in this
 light, it comes very near the instances in brewhouses of
 furnaces and coppers. That case also of the cyder mill,
 between the executor and the heir, is extremely strong ;
 for though cyder is part of the profits of the real estate,
 yet it was held by lord chief baron Comyns, a very able
 common lawyer, that the cyder mill was personal estate
 notwithstanding, and that it should go to the executor.
 It doth not differ it in my opinion, whether a shed over
 such an engine be made of brick or wood ; for it is only
 intended to cover it from the weather and other in-
 conveniencies. This is not the case between an ancestor
 and an heir, but an intermediate case between a tenant
 for life and remainder man. The reason of the thing
 weighs most in favour of the tenant for life ; and is like
 the case of corn growing, which shall go to the executor,
 and not to the heir or remainder man, it being for the be-
 nefit of the kingdom that corn should be sown. It is
 very well known, that little profit can be made of coal
 mines without this engine ; and tenants for life would be
 discouraged in erecting them, if they must go from their
 representatives to a remote remainder man, when the te-
 nant for life might possibly die the next day after the en-
 gine is set up. These reasons of publick benefit and con-
 venience weigh greatly with me, and are a principal in-
 gredient in my present opinion. Upon the whole, I think
 this fire engine ought to be considered as part of the
 personal estate of Mr. Lawton, and go to the executor
 for the increase of assets. And decreed accordingly.

3 *Atkyns*, 13.

13. But if a man be seised of a house, and possessed Heir looms.
 of divers heir-looms, that by custom have gone with the
 house

book from one to her; it seemeth that these, although in part of the inventory, shall go to the heir, and not to the executor, and therefore ought not to be put into the inventory. *1 R. 2. 15.*

So if an inventory enter upon a wardrobe book, in which are inventories of things that belong to children, and such like, the same shall go to the last inventory, but which have gone from father to son: the execution of the last inventory shall not have them, nor it seemeth that they shall go to the nature of new income: but if the last inventory enter there only for his own convenience; it seemeth that the same shall be deemed as furniture, or household goods, and shall go to the executor.

Wills will
strongly.

14. Wills, and evidences, which touch the inheritance, shall go to the heir, and not to the executor. *Wills. 62.*

And *Sherburne* saith, that a box enclosed, or the chest with evidence of the testator, though the same be not affixed to the freehold, yet because they contain those things which belong to the heir, they are to belong to the heir, and not to the executor: and therefore they are not to be put into the inventory of the deceased's goods. *Sherb. 421.*

But as to this, *Poll* makes a distinction, and saith, If the writings which concern the inheritance are in a chest, the executor shall have the chest, and the heir the writings. But if the chest be shut, the heir shall have the chest also; but if it be not shut, the executor shall have the chest. *1 Roll's Abr. 215.*

But the author of the *Law of Testaments* observeth, that this distinction seemeth not to be well taken; for if it be a box purposed for the keeping of the deeds, the heir ought to have it whether locked or open: on the other hand, if it be a box designed for other use, as for the keeping linen; it cannot be said to be appurtenant to evidences, altho' some be in it, for so may other things also; or perhaps it may be a chest or cabinet of great value, surely this shall not go to the heir, when perhaps there is not personal estate sufficient to pay the testator's debts. *Law of Test. 381.*

If a further distinction seemeth necessary, it might be this: that if the executor will not open the box, and deliver the writings, the heir rather than not have the writings may take the box also; but if the executor will deliver the writings, and retain the box, it doth not seem that one box more than another can be said to be appurtenant

in the spiritual court of York. The defendant *Benson*, being a creditor of the intestate by bond in the penalty of 600 l. brought an action against the defendant Mrs. *Hudson* upon that bond, and she pleaded that she had not assets above 54 l. which she paid into court. The defendant *Benson*, not being satisfied with the inventory brought in by her, procured the commissary (by indemnifying him) to assign the administration bond to him, and he put it in suit by bringing three several actions, one against her, and one against each of the sureties; and assigned for breach of the bond, that she had not exhibited a true and perfect inventory. These causes came on to be tried, and on the trial no defence was made, and there was judgment for the plaintiff by default. A bill was brought against the defendant *Benson*, insisting that he as a creditor had no right to put the bond in suit against the sureties, and prayed an injunction to stay the proceedings at law. And for this was cited the case of the *Archbishop of Canterbury and Willis*.—By the lord chancellor *Hardwicke*: There is no doubt but the archbishop's commissary may assign a breach in not delivering a true and perfect inventory, and even without citation, and nothing else appears at law, and there must have been a judgment for the ordinary, because no doubt there was a breach in not exhibiting such an inventory. What the counsel for the plaintiffs and for Mrs. *Hudson* aim at would have been right, supposing the commissary had assigned for breach the non-payment of the creditor's debts. The ecclesiastical court understand no more by an account, than some account in nature of an inventory, and depends only upon the particular wording of inventories by administrators. The ordinary, after an administrator has exhibited an inventory, cannot compel the administrator to account, but it must be at the instance of the party, and therefore the inventory and account are as to the ordinary the same thing. What the defendant Mr. *Benson* asks is, that this bond upon which the penalty is recovered, may stand only as a security for what is justly due to the creditor. The administratrix to be sure cannot now dispute the verdict, which finds she did not administer the whole assets, and she is bound by a verdict which has unravelled a matter, and it is no excuse to say that the verdict was without defence of the administratrix, for that is rather a consciousness that she had no defence. Therefore the court will not think it proper to have the whole account taken

over

not made into a garment in the life of the husband, yet the wife shall have this, and not the executor of the husband; inasmuch as it was delivered to her to this intent: but against the debtee of the husband, the wife shall have no more apparel than is convenient. *1 Roll's Abr. 911.*

But in the case of *Hastings and Douglas, H. 9 Ch.* A chain of diamonds and pearl, worth 370 l., usually worn by Sir John Davis's wife, who was daughter of the earl of Castlehaven, being by her husband's will devised from her; Berkeley and Jones were of opinion, that she being the daughter of a nobleman, and permitted to use them frequently as ornaments of her person, and they being convenient for her degree, she should have them as her paraphernalia; and when there are not debts to be paid (as it doth not appear that there are any in this case), she shall have them against the executors or administrators of her husband, and the husband cannot dispose of them from his wife by his will; but instantly by his death, the possession of them being in the wife's custody, the property is vested in her, and the husband cannot give them away; for it is not reasonable the husband should leave her naked of those jewels which she usually did wear, and are fit according to her calling to wear. But Richardson and Croke were of opinion, that the will was good, and that she may not take them contrary to the devise; but if the husband had not made his will of them, but had left them to the disposition of the law, and the question had been betwixt the executor or administrator and the wife, where there be not any debts or legacies to be paid, or where there be assets to pay all debts and legacies besides those jewels; there peradventure, the law will allow her to take, and to enjoy them as her paraphernalia. *Cra. Car. 343. 1 Roll's Abr. 911.*

But in the case of *Carey and Appleton, M. 26 C. 2.* The husband devised the jewels, which were the paraphernalia of the wife, and died: They were decreed to the wife. *1 Ch. Ca. 240.*

And by Macclesfield lord chancellor: Bona paraphernalia are not devisable by the husband from the wife, any more than heir-looms from the heir; so that the right of the wife to her paraphernalia is to be preferred to that of a legatee. *1 P. Will. 730.*

But it is said, that bona paraphernalia shall not be retained by the wife against debts. And in the case of *Stubb and Stubbs, H. 31 C. 2.* it was held, that where the real estate is chargeable, together with the personal, for the payment

payment of debts, and the personal estate is deficient, the bona paraphernalia shall be liable before the real estate shall come in. *Cha. Ca Finch. 415.*

But in the case of *Tipping and Tipping, M. 1721.* By Macclesfield lord chancellor: Bona paraphernalia are liable to debts in favour of creditors only, and not in favour of the heir at law. *1 P. Will. 730.*

And if creditors of the testator by judgment take the jewels after his death in execution, when the heir or executor or trustees have other assets sufficient to pay such debts; this is a default in the trustee, for which the widow ought not to suffer as to her bona paraphernalia. *2 P. Will. 80.*

And in *North-y and Northey, Dec. 6, 1740*; lord Hardwicke said, that the late cases have gone so far in the point of paraphernalia, that they have considered a wife in the nature of a creditor, and as having a lien upon real estate. Though the jewels in the present case were worth 3000 l., yet (he said) the value makes no alteration: and that there are several cases where there have been debts standing out against the husband, and yet the wife has been admitted as a creditor to the value of the paraphernalia, even upon trust estates created for payment of debts. *2 Atk. 78, 79.*

And in the case of *Incedon and Northcote, Mar. 2. 1746*; it was said by lord Hardwicke, that where there is a trust estate, charged with payment of debts, which is sufficient for that purpose, she may come round upon the trust estate to be reimbursed to the value of her paraphernalia, if the personal has been exhausted by her husband's creditors. And so it hath been determined in several cases. *3 Atk. 438. (i)*

And in *Snelson and Corbet, June 16. 1746*; where the question was, whether paraphernalia shall be liable to the payment of simple contract creditors and legacies: Lord Hardwicke said, At law, where the husband dies indebted, the widow cannot have her paraphernalia; but this court doth not determine so strictly: for if the personal estate hath been exhausted in payment of specialty creditors, she shall stand in their place as to so much upon the real assets of the heir at law; for she has a prior right; and a superior one to legatees, who take only from the bounty of the testator. *3 Atk. 369.*

(i) See *Boynton v. Parkhurst, 1 Bro. 576.*

Also if an husband pledges the wife's paraphernalia and dies leaving a sufficient estate to redeem the pledge and pay all his debts; she shall be intitled to have it deemed out of the husband's personal estate,—But if husband may alienate the same in his lifetime. 3 A

394. 5.

Also, where a daughter's portion was to be paid out of her father's personal estate, the court would not allow a widow to retain her paraphernalia. *Ch. Ca. Finch 14*

And where by marriage articles it was agreed, that a wife should have no part of the husband's personal estate but what he should give her by his will; it was decided by the court, that this bars her of her paraphernalia, as from jewels given to her by her husband in his lifetime 2 Vern. 83. (k)

Yet notwithstanding all that hath been said, if we consider what hath been used and observed, such hath ever been the general and ancient custom or rather courtesy of the province of York, as thereby widows have been tolerated, to reserve to their own use, not only their apparel, and a convenient bed, but a coffer with divers things therein necessary for their own persons; which things have been usually omitted out of the inventory of the deceased husband's goods, unless peradventure the husband was so far indebted, as the rest of his goods would not suffice to discharge the same; in which case the wife's jewels, chains, and borders, and such like, being things of decency or ornament, and not of necessity, have been usually prized and put into the inventory amongst other goods of the deceased, towards the payment of his debts and so they ought to be. *Swin. 422.*

Wife's goods or
chattels.

17. Goods to which the husband is intitled in right of his wife, and as administrator to her, are not to be put in the inventory after her death; but things which are in action must be put in. *Swin. 422. God. O. L. 153.*

In the case of *Sir John St. John, T. 15 Ch. Ca.* the husband was possessed of divers leases, and conveyed them in trust, and afterwards married with *A. B.* The lady received the money upon the leases, and with part of the money bought jewels, and other part of the money left, and died. *A. B.* takes letters of administration of the goods of his wife; and in a suit in the ecclesiastical court the court would have compelled him to have given.

(k) *S. P. Read v. Snell, 2 Atk. 642.*

that they were under 40 l., and by consequence that the taking more than 2 s. 6 d. was extortion within the statute, therefore it was adjudged to be ill, inasmuch as without that it could not appear to the court, whether he was punishable or not. *Gibbs*. 485.

Other matters relating to the said fees, are specified in the former part of this chapter, in treating of the fees for probate of wills (*f*); and the whole, more especially, under the title *Fees*. [For the fees for probate of wills and administration of the effects of seamen and marines see *ante* p. 226.]

Stamps.

24. By the several stamp acts, For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or piece of paper, on which shall be written any letters of administration (except of common seamen or common soldiers slain or dead in the service) for any estate above the value of 20 l. shall be paid a stamp duty of 10 s.: [If the estate is of the value of 100 l. and under 300 l., 2 l. 10 s.; if of the value of 300 l. and under 600 l., 5 l. 10 s.; if 600 l. and under 1000 l., 8 l.; if 1000 l. and upwards, 14 l.; if 2000 l. and upwards, 20 l.; if 5000 l. and upwards 30 l.; if 10,000 l. and upwards, 40 l., and for every inventory or copy thereof, 2 s.]

Letters of administration allowed as evidence.

25. The plaintiff could not produce any letters of administration, yet to prove himself administrator, he produced the book of the spiritual court, wherein there was an order entered, that administration shall be granted to him; and this was allowed to be good evidence. *1 Lev.* 101. *Peasly's case*.

And by the 4 *Ann. c.* 16. No advantage or exception shall be taken, for the default of alledging the bringing into court any letters of administration; but the court shall give judgment according to the very right of the cause, without regarding such omissions and defects, except the same shall be specially and particularly set down and shewn for cause of demurrer.

Revoking administration.

26. The ordinary cannot repeal an administration at his pleasure. *Swin. a.* 381.

H. 15 & 16 C. 2. Sand's case. Sir George Sands administered to his son, and afterwards a woman pretending to be his wife, sued for a repeal, but a prohibition was granted; because the ordinary had an election to grant it either to the father or wife, and had executed his power by granting it to the father. *Raym.* 93.

executor, and among other bequests, gave his second son 2000 l., to be paid at three several payments. The said second son took-out process against the elder brother, and caused him to be cited before the judge of the prerogative court (where the will was proved) in order to compel him to bring in an inventory. But it appearing to the judge, that the two first payments were made, and the third offered to be made; he gave sentence, that there was no need of an inventory at the instance of the plaintiff: which was confirmed by the delegates, first upon appeal, and afterwards upon a commission of review. *Raym.* 470.

How far the strict formalities before required, are necessary.

20. Altho' appraisements and inventories shall not be made according to the ecclesiastical law, nor to the statute aforesaid: yet, by the practice of the courts, if the goods of the deceased shall be appraised by any honest persons of the neighbourhood, and reduced into an inventory, and afterwards the said inventory shall be in due time exhibited before the judge who proveth the will or granteth the administration, upon the oath of the executor or administrator, such inventory shall receive credit in all causes and courts, and he that exhibiteth the same shall be freed from the burden of proving the truth of the inventory, that is, that the deceased had no more goods; and he retorteth the proof of any goods having been omitted, upon the legatary or other person pretending interest in the goods of the deceased. *1 Ought.* 344.

By which oath of the executor or administrator is to be understood, the oath which he took at the time of granting the probate or administration: unless the party be called afterwards to exhibit an inventory upon his corporal oath; for then he shall again take a special oath of the truth of the inventory, notwithstanding the former general oath that he took at the time of granting the probate or letters of administration. *Id.*

Strictness requisite in contestation of suit.

21. For sometimes it is demanded, and by the judge decreed, at the instance of the party having interest in the goods of the deceased, that an inventory be exhibited upon the oath of the executor or administrator, before the issuing of the probate or letters of administration under seal: and then, notwithstanding the former general oath had been taken for the faithful execution of the will or administering the goods of the deceased and for exhibiting a true inventory, a special oath hath been used to be taken, at the time of exhibiting the inventory, of the truth thereof; and that, either personally, or by virtue of a commission. *1 Ought.* 344.

And

mittee of the company trading there, conditioned to take possession of the effects of persons dying intestate in their settlements, and to sell the same and remit the produce to the company in Europe, in order that it may be delivered to the lawful administrator; and such a bond has been adjudged good in law. *The African Company v. Terrans*, 6 T. Rep. 588.]

V. *Of the duty of executors and administrators in making an inventory, and getting in the effects of the deceased.*

Administering
before inventory
made.

I. At the time of probate or administration granted, it is required that the executor or administrator produce an inventory of the goods chattels and credits of the deceased; and at the same time he maketh oath, that he will exhibit such (further) inventory into the court, as he shall thereafter be lawfully required to do.

And it is said, that if an executor, without making an inventory, shall intermeddle himself with the administration of the goods of the deceased (except in certain cases, as for the expences of the funeral, for insinuation of the testament, for making the inventory, for the necessary preservation of the goods) shall be bound to answer to every one of the creditors his whole debt. *Swin.* 228, 229. *Atton.* 107.

Also it is said, that every legatary may recover his whole legacy at his hands: for in this case the law presumeth, that there are sufficient goods to pay all the legacies, and that the executor doth secretly and fraudulently subtract the same. Whereas otherwise, the executor is presumed not to have any more goods which were the testator's, than are described in the inventory, the same being lawfully made. *Swin.* 228, 229. *Toib.* 183. 12 *Mod.* 346.

And therefore if any creditor or legatary doth affirm, that the testator had any more goods than are comprized in the inventory; he must prove the same: otherwise the judge is to give credit to the inventory, being made in due form of law. *Swin.* 426.

And such executor is also further punishable at the discretion of the ordinary, by the constitution here next following: and therefore it concerneth the executor, that he do not administer the goods of the deceased, until he hath caused an inventory to be made: for howsoever the act of him that is named executor is said to hold in law, before the proving of the will and the making of the inventory;

hibit an inventory. She brought one in; and the creditor objected to it. There was a decree for the creditor. The administratrix appealed to the superior ecclesiastical court, which affirmed the decree. The suggestion for a prohibition was their want of jurisdiction. Upon which it was answered, on shewing cause, that it being after sentence, it was now too late for a prohibition, unless it shall appear that they have determined contrary to law.—By lord Mansfield and the court: It appears upon the face of the proceedings, that the spiritual court hath no jurisdiction.—And the rule for a prohibition was made absolute. *Bur. Mansf.* 1922.

Action given to
executors.

22. By the 13 Ed. 1. st. 1. c. 23. *Executors shall have a writ of account, and the same action and process in the same writ, as the testator might have had if he had lived.*

By the common law, executors should not have an action of account, for an account to be made to the testator, because the account rested in privity; for remedy whereof this action was made. But by the law of merchants, an action of account did lie for executors. 2 *Inst.* 404.

By the 4 Ed. 3. c. 7. *Whereas in times past, executors have not had actions for a trespass done to their testators, as of the goods and chattels of the same testators carried away in their life, and so such trespasses have hitherto remained unpunished; it is enacted, that the executors in such cases shall have an action against the trespassers, and recover their damages, in like manner as they whose executors they be should have had if they were in life.*

By the 25 Ed. 3. st. 5. c. 5. *Executors of executors shall have actions of debts, accounts, and of goods carried away of the first testators, and executions of statute merchants and recognizances made in court of record to the first testator, in the same manner as the first testator should have had if he were in life; and the same executors of executors shall answer to other of as much as they have recovered of the goods of the first testators, as the first executors should do if they were in full life.*

Action given to
administrators.

23. By the statute of the 31 Ed. 3. st. 1. c. 11. *In case where a man dieth intestate; the persons deputed by the ordinary to administer his goods, shall have an action to demand and recover as executors, the debts due to the person intestate in the king's court, for to administer and dispend for the soul of the dead; and shall answer also in the king's court, to other to whom the dead person was bolden and bound, in the same manner as executors shall answer: and they shall be accountable*

to the ordinary, as executors be 'in the case of testament, as well of the time past as of the time to come

Before this act, by the common law, administrators had no property in the goods and chattels as executors had: nor could they recover debts as executors could do; but by this statute they are enabled in both those respects: and further, whereas by the common law they were charged by the name of executors, now they shall be charged by the name of administrators. *Gibf. 478.*

24. By the 32 H. 8. c. 37. *Forasmuch as by the order of the common law, the executors or administrators of tenants in fee simple, tenants in fee tail, and tenants for term of life, of rent services, rent charges, rent secks, and fee farms, have no remedy to recover such arrearages of the said rents or fee farms as were due unto the testators in their lives, nor yet the heirs of such testator, nor any person having the reversion of his estate after his decease, may distrain or have any lawful action to levy any such arrearage of rents or fee farms, due unto him in his lifetime as is aforesaid; by reason whereof the tenants of the demean of such lands, tenements or hereditaments, out of which such rents were due and payable, who of right ought to pay their rents and farms at such day and terms as they were due, do many times retain such arrearages in their own hands, so that the executors and administrators of the persons to whom such rents or fee farms were due, cannot have or come by the said arrearages of the same, towards the payment of the debts, and performance of the will of the said testators; it is enacted, that the executors and administrators of every such person to whom any such rent or fee farm shall be due and not paid at the time of his death, shall have an action of debt for all such arrearages, against the tenant that ought to have paid the same, or against his executors or administrators; or may distrain for the same upon the lands and other hereditaments chargeable therewith, so long as they continue in the seisin or possession of the said tenant in demesne, who ought immediately to have paid the said rent or fee farm so being behind, to the said testator in his life; or in the seisin or possession of any other person claiming the same only from the same tenant by purchase, gift, or descent; in like manner and form as the testator might have done in his lifetime, and shall for the same distress lawfully make avowry upon their matter aforesaid. §. 1.*

Action in case of rent in arrear.

Provided that this shall not extend to any such manor, lordship or dominion in Wales, or in the marches of the same, whereof the inhabitants have used time out of mind to pay unto the lord or owner thereof at his first entry into the same, any sum for the redemption and discharge of all duties forfeitures and

and penalties, whereof the said inhabitants were chargeable to any of their said lords ancestors or predecessors before his said entry. §. 2.

And if any man having in the right of his wife any estate in fee simple, fee tail, or for term of life, in any rents or fee farms, and the same shall be due and unpaid in the said wife's life; the husband after the death of his wife, his executors and administrators, may have an action of debt for the said arrearages, against the tenant of the demesne that ought to have paid the same, his executors or administrators, or may distrain for the same, as he might have done if his wife had been living, and make avowry upon his matter as aforesaid. §. 3.

And if any person shall have any rents or fee farms for term of life of any other person, and the same shall be due and unpaid in the life of such other person, and he died; then he to whom the same was due, his executors or administrators, may have an action of debt against the tenant in demesne, that ought to have paid the same when it was first due, his executors and administrators; or may distrain for the same upon such lands and tenements out of which the said rents or fee farms were issuing and payable; in like manner and form as he might have done, if such person by whose death the aforesaid estate in the said rents and fee farms was determined and expired had been in full life; and the avowry for the taking of the same distress to be made as aforesaid. §. 4.

And by the statute of the 11 G. 2. c. 19. Whereas where any lessor or landlord, having only an estate for life in the lands tenements or hereditaments demised, happens to die before or on the day on which any rent is reserved or made payable, such rent or any part thereof is not by law recoverable, by the executors or administrators of such lessor or landlord; nor is the person in reversion intitled thereunto, any other than for the use and occupation of such lands tenements or hereditaments, from the death of the tenant for life; of which advantage hath been often taken by the under-tenants, who thereby avoid paying any thing for the same; for remedy thereof it is enacted, that where any tenant for life shall happen to die before or on the day, on which any rent was reserved or made payable upon any demise or lease of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, which determined on the death of such tenant for life, that the executors or administrators of such tenant for life shall and may, in an action upon the case, recover of and from such under-tenant or under-tenants of such lands tenements or hereditaments, if such tenant for life die on the day on which the same was made payable, the whole, or if before such day, then a proportion of such rent, according to the time such tenant for life lived, of the
last

year, or quarter of a year, or other time in which the said rent was growing due, as aforesaid; making all just allowances, or a proportionable part thereof respectively. 1. 15.

25. An executor may sue another in the spiritual court touching his testator's goods, in this case, *viz.* if a man devise or bequeath corn growing, or goods, unto one; and a stranger will not suffer the executor to perform the testament: for this legacy, he shall sue the stranger in the spiritual court. *Swin.* 18.

In what courts to be brought.

But if a man take from the executor or administrator the goods of the deceased; for this they must use their action of trespass, and not sue in the spiritual court: for they cannot sue for the goods of the deceased in a court ecclesiastical, but at the common law. *Swin.* 18. 10 *M.d.* 21.

Also tenants may be sued at the common law by executors or administrators for rent behind, and due to the testator or intestate in his lifetime, or at the time of his death; and they may for the same distrain the land charged with the rent. *Swin.* 18.

26. All the executors do represent the person of the testator, and therefore they must all join in suit against others, and in suit by others they must all be made defendants, or at least so many of them as do administer: for tho' executors themselves must take notice by the will how many executors there be, and must frame their suit accordingly; creditors and strangers need not take notice of any more than do administer, and execute the office of executor. *Went.* 95.

In what case co-executors must all join.

T. 6 Ja. Smith and Smith. The mother and her son an infant were made executors, and administration was granted to her during the minority of her son; she married again, and then her husband and she as executrix brought an action of debt against the defendant, who pleaded in abatement that the infant was not named; and upon a demurrer to that plea, it was held that the plea was good: but if it had been set forth specially in the declaration, that there was another executor under age, tho' not joined in the action, it might have been otherwise. *Yelv.* 130. 1 *Brownl.* 101.

27. If one executor refuse to undertake the executorship, then is the other executor to be admitted alone, and may execute the will, or commence any suit or be sued alone, as if no other had been named executor. But if he alter his mind, and afterwards become willing, then (his former refusal before the ordinary notwithstanding) he

Case where one co-executor refuseth.

he may join with the other executor who proved the will; and if he release any debt due to the testator, the release is as sufficient, as if he had never refused. Which is to be understood, if he released before judgment; but after judgment, being no party to the suit, he cannot acknowledge satisfaction, because he was not privy to the judgment. *Swin.* 325.

And where there are several executors, and one of them refuseth before the ordinary, and the rest prove the will; he who refused may administer when he will, and therefore they who proved it, ought to name him in every action; but if they all refuse, and the ordinary grants administration to another, then it is too late, for in such case they cannot afterwards prove the will. *9 Co.* 38. *Henslow's case* (1).

in what case one
may do what all
may do.

28. Co executors being in law but as one person, therefore the act of one is the act of them all, and the possession of one is accounted the possession of all, and the payment of debts by or to one of them is the payment of or to all of them; and the sale or gift of the testator's goods by one is the sale or gift of all; and likewise a release before judgment of one of them, is a release of all. *Swin.* 328.

But it is not so with *administrators*; for they have but one authority given them by the bishop over the goods; which authority being given to many, is to be executed by all of them joined together. *Lord Bacon's Tracts*, 162. *1 Atk.* 460.

Also one executor shall not be charged with the wrong or devastavit of his companion, and shall be no farther liable than for the assets which came to his hands. And therefore where an action was brought against two executors, and the jury found that the two and another were made executors, and that the third wasted the assets to the amount of 600*l.* and died, and that only 16*l.* came to the hands of the two others; the court held, that they should be chargeable for no more than the 16*l.*; for that it was the testator's folly to trust such a person, which must not turn to the prejudice of the other executors. *2 Bac. Abr.* 395.

no executor
must sue an-
other.

29. Regularly, one executor cannot sue another of his co-executors, touching any thing relating to his testator's

(1) Vide supra, *Probate*, 10.

will ; or that is within the power, interest, duty, or office of an executor. 2 *Bac. Abr.* 396. (m)

But if the residue of the personal estate, after debts and legacies, be devised to both the executors, one of them may sue the other in the spiritual court for a moiety ; for this is in the nature of a gift or legacy to him, and he may bring trespass against the other executor if he takes it out of his possession, or detain it if he detains it from him. 2 *Bac. Abr.* 396.

Or, in such case, he may have relief in equity.

30. It seemeth to be now settled, that where a man maketh two executors, and deviseth to them the residue of his goods after debts and legacies paid ; and one of them dieth, that the survivor shall have the whole. 2 *Lev.* 209. 1 *Vern.* 482. Co-executor dying.

So where a man devised all the rest and residue of his goods chattels and personal estate, to two persons, their executors and administrators, and one of them died ; on a bill brought by his executor against the surviving devisee, it was held, that the survivor should take the whole to his own use, and should not be a trustee as to the moiety for the representative of him who is dead ; and that they were to be considered as jointenants, where survivorship takes place, as well in cases of chattels, as in cases of inheritance. 1 *Abr. Ca. Eq.* 243.

31. The executor of an executor (where there is no joint executor) is executor to the first testator, and hath right to all the profit, and is liable to all the charge that the first executor had, or was subject unto. But the one testator's goods shall not stand charged for the other testator's debts, but each for his own. *Swin.* 329. Executor or administrator of an executor.

If two be appointed executors, and the one maketh his testament, wherein he nameth his executor, and dieth, his co-executor surviving ; in this case, the executor of the executor is not to be joined with the executor surviving, neither in the execution of the will, nor in suits or actions. And if the executor of the executor have any goods or chattels in his hand, which did belong to the

(m) But if a debtor make his creditor and another person executors, and the creditor abstain from proving the will, or acting as executor, he may maintain an action against the other, for his debt due by the testator. *Rawlinson v. Sharv*, 3 *T. Rep.* 557.

First

first testator, the executor of the same testator surviving may have an action against the executor of the executor for the same: for the power of the executor who died first was determined by his death, the other then surviving. *Swin.* 324, 325.

Swinburne says, the executor of an executor cannot sell the land of the first testator. *Swin.* 329.

But in the case of *Rolls and Mason*, *T.* 10 *Ja.* Where the devise was, that the executor should sell; it was held, that the executor of the executor might sell, tho' not in being at the time of the devise. *2 Brownl.* 194.

So in the case of *Garfoot and Garfoot*, *M.* 15 *C.* 2. Lands were devised to be sold by the executor. The executor died. The youngest children, for whose benefit the sale was ordered, preferred a bill against the heir. The heir demurs; because it was but an authority in the executor, which is dead with him. But the demurrer was over-ruled. *1 Cha. Ca.* 35.

But the *administrator* of an executor is not liable: As in the case of *Tucker and Towel*, *M.* 9 *G.* 2. There was a libel in the spiritual court for a legacy. The defendant pleaded that it was a legacy given by the will of the testator, whose executor is dead, and he the defendant is administrator of the executor, and therefore is not liable for the legacies. Which plea the spiritual court refused, and therefore he applies for a prohibition. —By lord Hardwicke chief justice: No doubt but the spiritual court hath a general jurisdiction in suits for legacies; but the question is, whether they have in this suit as it is now brought. And I think they have not. For if an executor dies intestate, there is no privity between his administrator and the testator; and in order to continue the privity, there are administrations *de bonis non* granted, which is the constant course. Now here is a suit against the administrator of the executor, who is not administrator *de bonis non* of the first testator: so that there is no privity. But it is said, that here is what amounts to an allegation that this administrator was possessed of the testator's goods, and so may be charged as executor of his own wrong. That doth not appear. But suppose it had been so, that would not be a ground to maintain this suit, but in that case there should be an administrator *de bonis non* set up, and he might then call him to an account in a court of equity; for the ecclesiastical court has only jurisdiction to compel the immediate representative of the testator or intestate

to administer, and have power to grant probate, and to commit administration. But when they have done that, they are *functi officio*, and have no further jurisdiction, but to call the executor or administrator to account.— And a prohibition was granted. *Cases in the time of lord Hardwicke, 185.*

32. If administration is granted to two, and one dies, yet the administration doth not cease; for it is not like a letter of attorney to two, where by the death of one the authority ceaseth; but is rather an office; and administrators are enabled to bring actions in their own names; they come in the place of executors, and therefore the office survives. 2 *Vern.* 514. Administrator dying.

33. When an administrator hath judgment and dieth, his executors (as such) may not sue execution of the said judgment; for none shall have execution of this judgment, but he who shall be subject to the payment of the debts of the first intestate. 5 *Co.* 9. *Brudenel's case.* Executor of an administrator.

34. By the statute of the 17 C. 2. c. 8. *Where any judgment after verdict shall be had, by or in the name of any executor or administrator; in such case an administrator of goods not administered may sue forth a scire facias, and take execution upon such judgment.* Administrator de bonis non.

35. By the statute of the 9 Ed. 3. st. 1. c. 3. *In a writ of debt brought against divers executors, they nor any of them shall have but one essoin before appearance, that is to say, at the summons or attachment; nor after appearance, they shall have but one essoin, as the testator should have had: so that all the executors do represent the person of the testator as one person.* Actions brought against divers executors.

And tho' the sheriff do answer at the summons, that some of them have nothing whereby he may be summoned; yet there shall be an attachment awarded upon them. And if the sheriff answer, that he hath nothing whereby he may be attached; the great distress shall be awarded, so that at the great distress returned upon them, he or they that do first appear in the court shall answer to the plaintiff. And altho' some of them have appeared in the court, and make default at the day that great distress is returned upon the other; yet nevertheless he or they shall be put to answer, that first appeared at the great distress returned.

And in case the judgment pass for the plaintiff; he shall have his judgment and execution against them that have pleaded, according to the law heretofore used, and against all other named in the writ, of the goods of the testator, as well as if they had all pleaded. And it is to be understood, that if any in such case

case will sue according to the law that hath been used heretofore, he may freely do it notwithstanding this statute.

Costs.

36. In all actions brought by executors or administrators, upon contracts, bonds or other things made to the deceased, or for goods taken away in his life, they shall pay no costs by any statute. *Law of Ex. 462. 2 Bac. Abr. 446.*

That is to say; costs by the common law are not given in any case: and executors and administrators are not comprized within the several statutes which in order to prevent vexatious suits do require other persons to pay costs in like cases; for executors and administrators cannot so well be supposed to intend vexation, seeing that they sue only in the right of another; and have not perhaps so perfect a knowledge of the matter as their testator or intestate would have had if he had lived. But as they are not to pay costs, so on the contrary they are not to be allowed costs; because they are supposed to reimburse themselves any charges or expences they may have been at, in the account of the testator's or intestate's estate. *2 Atk. 108.*

So also an executor defendant shall pay costs; and the judgment is, of the goods of the testator, if there are sufficient: if not, of the executor's own goods. Also when he is defendant, and there is judgment for him, he shall have his costs. *1 Bac. Abr. 517. 2 Bac. Abr. 446.*

H. 12 G. 2. Marsh and Telleys. When an executor must declare as executor, he shall pay no costs: but if the cause of action ariseth in the time of the executor, and is therefore a matter within his knowledge, and for which he may declare in his own right, and need not to declare as executor; he shall be liable to pay costs. *Str. 682. 1106.*

So where the thing in dispute is matter, not of fact, but of law, and consequently as much within the knowledge of the executor or administrator as of the testator or intestate; it hath been adjudged, that where judgment is given against the executor or administrator upon demurrer; they shall pay costs. As in the case of *Frazer and Moore, E. 1720.* Bill by an administrator: The defendant demurs: and the demurrer is allowed; and the bill is dismissed with costs; and is said to be the constant course in equity, by the whole court of exchequer. *Bamb. 103.*

M. 3 G. Elwell against Quash and others. There were three executors one of which gave a warrant of attorney

house from heir to heir; it seemeth that these, although no part of the freehold, shall go to the heir, and not to the executor; and therefore ought not to be put into the inventory. 1 *Inst.* 185.

So if an incumbent enter upon a parsonage house, in which are hangings, grates, iron backs to chimnies, and such like, not put there by the last incumbent, but which have gone from successor to successor; the executor of the last incumbent shall not have them, but it seemeth that they shall continue in the nature of heir-looms: but if the last incumbent fixed them there only for his own convenience; it seemeth that they shall be deemed as furniture, or household goods, and shall go to his executor.

Boxes with
writings.

14. Writings, and evidences, which touch the inheritance, shall go to the heir, and not to the executor. *Went.* 62.

And *Swinburne* says, that a box ensealed, or the chest with evidence of the land, though the same be not affixed to the freehold, yet because they contain those things which belong to the heir, they also belong to the heir, and not to the executors: and therefore they are not to be put into the inventory of the deceased's goods. *Swin.* 421.

But as to this, *Rolle* makes a distinction, and saith, If the writings which concern the inheritance are in a chest, the executors shall have the chest, and the heir the writings. But if the chest be shut, the heir shall have the chest also; but if it be not shut, the executor shall have the chest. 1 *Roll's Abr.* 915.

But the author of the *Law of Testaments* observeth, that this distinction seemeth not to be well taken; for if it be a box purposed for the keeping of the deeds, the heir ought to have it whether locked or open: on the other hand, if it be a box designed for other use, as for the keeping linen; it cannot be said to be appurtenant to evidences, altho' some be in it, for so may other things also; or perhaps it may be a chest or cabinet of great value, surely this shall not go to the heir, when perhaps there is not personal estate sufficient to pay the testator's debts. *Law of Test.* 381.

If a further distinction seemeth necessary, it might be this: that if the executor will not open the box, and deliver the writings, the heir rather than not have the writings may take the box also; but if the executor will deliver the writings, and retain the box, it doth not seem that one box more than another can be said to be appurtenant

point a receiver, to whom the assignees of the commission shall account for what they have received of the testator's goods; *Ex parte Ellis*, 1 Atk. 101.; or will admit the bankrupt a creditor against his own estate for what he claims as executor, and order the money to be paid into the bank; *Ex parte Leake*, 2 Bro. 596.; excepting such beneficial interest as vests in the bankrupt himself. *Robinson v. Taylor*, Ib. 589. Where the bankrupt and another were executors of a creditor of the bankrupt, the court permitted the co-executor to prove the debt under the commission, and ordered the money to be paid into the bank, although it appeared that the will was contested by the bankrupt in the ecclesiastical court, on the ground of a former will, by which he was sole executor and residuary legatee; and it was objected that administration might be had *pendente lite*. *Ex parte Shakeshaft*, 3 Er. 198.]

VI. Of the payment of debts by executors or administrators.

Ordinary liable.

1. By the statute of *Magna Charta*, ch. 18. (which lord Coke says is in affirmance of the common law), *Where one indebted to the king shall die, the king shall be first satisfied for his debt, and the residue shall remain to the executors to perform the testament of the dead: And if nothing be owing unto the king, all the chattels shall go to the use of the dead (saving to his wife and children their reasonable part).*

Upon which, lord Coke says, three things are to be observed: 1. That the king by his prerogative shall be preferred in satisfaction of his debt by the executors, before any other. 2. That if the executors have sufficient to pay the king's debt, the heir that is to bear the countenance, and sit in the seat of his ancestor, or any purchaser of his lands, shall not be charged. 3. If nothing be owing to the king, or any other, all the chattels shall go to the use of the dead, that is to his executors or administrators, saving their reasonable parts to the wife and children as aforesaid.

And by a constitution of Othobon: *Since the uncertainty of death often deprives men of the opportunity of making their last wills, human piety acteth mercifully towards the deceased, by distributing their goods to pious uses, so that they follow and help them, and propitiously intercede for them with the heavenly Judge; therefore we, by our approbation confirming the provi-*
sion

*heretofore made (as it is said) by the prelates of the king-
m of England with the approbation of the king and barons,
concerning the goods of such as die intestate, do strictly forbid
relates and all other whatsoever, to take or seize the goods of
intestates, contrary to the provision aforesaid. Athon. 121.*

Which provision John of Athon understandeth to be that
which is made by the statute of the 13 Ed. 1. c. 19. but
his cannot be right; for this constitution was made
eventeen years before that statute. *Gibbs. 478.* But the
provision meant, seemeth plainly to be the aforesaid sta-
tute in the magna charta.

And by a constitution of archbishop Stratford it is or-
dered thus: *Forasmuch as it happeneth sometimes, that persons
dying intestate, the lords of the fees do not permit the debts of
the deceased to be paid, out of their moveable goods; we do
decree, that none shall henceforth do the same, on pain of the
greater excommunication. Lind. 171.*

2. By the statute of the 31 Ed. 3. st. 1. c. 11. *The* Executors and
administrators
liable.
*persons deputed by the ordinary to administer the goods of in-
testates, shall have an action to demand and recover as execu-
tors, the debts due to the person intestate, in the king's court,
for to administer and dispend for the soul of the dead; and shall
answer also in the king's court, to other to whom the said dead
person was holden and bound, in the same manner as executors
shall answer. And they shall be accountable to the ordinaries,
as executors be in the case of testament, as well of the time past
as the time to come.*

But before this act, action laid by the common law,
against the deputies or committees of the ordinary, by the
name of executors, but not by the name of administrators
until this act. 9 Co. 39.

By the statute of the 30 C. 2. c. 7. *The executors and
administrators of any person, who as executor in his own wrong,
or administrator, shall waste or convert any goods, chattels,
estate, or assets, of any person deceased, to his own use, shall be
liable and chargeable in the same manner, as their testator or
intestate would have been if he had been living.*

And by the statute of the 4 & 5 W. c. 24. *Forasmuch
as it hath been a doubt whether the said statute of the 30 C. 2.
did extend to the executors and administrators of any executor
or administrator of right, who for want of privity in law
were not before answerable nor could be sued for the debts due
from the first testator or intestate, notwithstanding that such
executors or administrators had wasted the goods and estate of
the first testator or intestate, or converted the same to their
own use; it is hereby declared, that all and every the executors*

in administration of his estate or administrator of right. It shall be the duty of the executor or administrator, in the discharge of his duty, to pay the debts of the deceased, in the order of their priority, and to satisfy the same in the most equitable manner, and to the satisfaction of the creditors, and to the satisfaction of the court.

And the executor or administrator, by his testament, shall charge the executor or administrator with the debts; the creditors, in the order of their priority, may sue for them in the ecclesiastical court.

But this is to be understood, that it must be understood, where there are several debts in the will, in directing it; as if the testator gave to his executor such a sum in fees and expenses of his test, or the like. Otherwise, the last shall be, as the other debts, in the temporal courts.

And the executor or administrator, shall be bound, if he has it in his power, to pay the debts of the deceased, in the order of their priority, and to satisfy the same in the most equitable manner, and to the satisfaction of the creditors, and to the satisfaction of the court. And where several persons having by bond or other securities bound themselves and their heirs, and have afterwards died seized in fee simple of any lands or tenements, and have by their wills or testaments, or by power to dispose of or charge the same by their wills or testaments, have by the defrauding of such their creditors, by their last will or testament, devised the same, or disposed thereof in such manner, as such creditors have by their said debts, for remedy of which, and for the maintenance of just and upright dealing, it is enacted, that all wills and testaments, limitations, dispositions or appointments, of or concerning any manors, messuages, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or of any rent profit term or charge out of the same, wheresoever any person at the time of his decease shall be seized in fee simple in possession reversion or remainder, or both power to dispose of the same by his last will and testament, shall be deemed and taken (only as against such creditors as aforesaid their heirs successors executors administrators and assigns) to be fraudulent, and clearly absolutely and utterly void frustrate and of none effect; any pretence, colour, feigned or presumed consideration, or any other matter or thing to the contrary notwithstanding. §. 2.

And in the cases before mentioned, all such creditors may have and maintain actions of debt upon their bonds and specialties, against the heir at law of the obligor and such devisee jointly; and such devisee shall be liable and chargeable for a false plea by him pleaded, in the same manner as any heir should have been for any false plea by him pleaded, or for not confessing the lands or tenements to him descended. §. 3.

Provided,

Provided, that where there shall be any limitation or appointment, devise or disposition, of or concerning any manors messuages lands tenements or hereditaments, for the raising or payment of any real and just debts, or any portions or sums of money for any child or children of any person other than the heir at law, according to any marriage contract or agreement in writing bona fide made before such marriage, the same shall be in full force: and the same manors messuages lands tenements and hereditaments shall be holden and enjoyed by every such person, his heirs executors administrators and assigns, for whom the said limitation appointment devise or disposition was made, and by his trustee or trustees their heirs executors administrators and assigns, for such estate or interest as shall be so limited or appointed, devised, or disposed; until such debt or portion shall be raised and paid. §. 4.

And whereas several persons being heirs at law, to avoid the payment of such just debts, as in regard of the lands descending to them they have by law been liable to pay, have sold aliened or made over the same before any process was or could be issued out against them; it is enacted, that in all cases where any heir at law shall be liable to pay the debt of his ancestor, in regard of any lands tenements or hereditaments descending to him, and shall sell aliene or make over the same before any action brought or process sued out against him; such heir at law shall be answerable for such debt, in an action of debt, to the value of the said land so by him sold aliened or made over; in which case all creditors shall be preferred as in actions against executors and administrators, and such execution shall be taken out upon any judgment so obtained against such heir, to the value of the said land, as if the same were his own proper debt; saving that the land tenements and hereditaments bona fide aliened before the action brought, shall not be liable to such execution. §. 5.

Provided, that where an action of debt upon any specialty is brought against any heir, he may plead riens per delcent at the time of the original writ brought, or the bill filed against him; and the plaintiff in such action may reply that he had lands tenements or hereditaments from his ancestor before the original writ brought, or bill filed; and if upon issue joined thereupon it be found for the plaintiff, the jury shall inquire of the value of the lands tenements or hereditament so descended, and thereupon judgment shall be given, and execution shall be awarded as aforesaid; but if judgment be given against such heir by confession of the action, without confessing the assets descended or upon demurrer, or nihil dicit, it shall be for the

and the executor shall have an inquiry of the lands to
payment of the debts of the deceased.

Item, a devise of lands made in this will, shall be
liable for the payment of the debts of the testator as the heir at law by
force of the statute relating to the same, and the executor shall be
responsible for the same before the debts are paid.

Item, of the Executor and Administrator. An heir that
inherits the land shall not be liable for the debts of the testator to the value of the
land inherited, and as long as he hath paid his an-
cestor's debts to the value of the land, he shall hold the
land discharged, and shall not be chargeable at in-
terest.

And if the executor or administrator of his ancestor,
in which he is executor or administrator, the money; the ex-
ecutor shall be liable for the debts of the testator as there are personal
assets of the testator's estate in his hands, if it is not other-
wise ordered by the will. 2 Ch. Ca. 74. 2 P. W. 175.

As to the executor's land, and covenants to pay the
money, and cetera; the personal estate of the mortgagor
shall, in favour of the debt, be applied to exonerate the
mortgage. 2 Salk. 249.

Yes, though there be no covenant in the deed for the
payment of the mortgage money, yet the personal estate
shall be liable in the hands of the executor. 2 Salk. 449.
1 Vern. 436.

If a man dies indebted by bond, and seised in fee of
divers lands, part of which he devises to one, and other
part he permits to descend to his heir (not mentioning
them in his will; the lands permitted to descend shall
be first applied to pay the bond debts. And the reason is,
because the applying the devised lands to pay the bond
debts, would disappoint the will; which equity will not
permit, if it can be avoided: Whereas it no way disap-
points the will to say, that the lands not mentioned should
be in the first place liable to pay the debts. But it seems
it would be otherwise, if the testator had devised the lands
to his heir at law, for though such devise were void (as to
the purpose of making the heir take otherwise than by
descent), yet it shows the testator's intent, that the heir
should have the land; and therefore it seemeth that the
lands devised to one, and the other lands devised to the
heir at law, should in such case contribute in proportion

to pay the bond debts. Also, for the abovementioned reason, it seemeth that the lands permitted to descend to the heir at law, and not mentioned in the will, shall be applied to pay the bond debts, before a *specific legacy*; lest otherwise the testator's intention should be disappointed.

3 *P. Will.* 367.

So where lands, upon which there was a mortgage, were devised to one, and other lands descended to the heir at law; it was decreed by the lord chancellor Hardwicke upon great deliberation, that where the personal estate is insufficient to discharge the incumbrance, the ultimate fund is the land descended to the heir at law: and although the creditor may come upon which fund he pleases, yet if he proceeds against the lands mortgaged, the devisee may have his remedy over against the heir at law; otherwise the mortgage might exhaust the whole lands devised, and there would be no benefit in the will to the devisee. 2 *Atk.* 424—439.

How far a charge upon lands for payment of debts, shall enure and be in force against purchasers of those lands from the devisee for a valuable consideration, hath been made a question. As in the case of *Elliot and Merriman, E. 1740.* Thomas Smith became indebted to several persons by bond, and likewise by simple contract. In three of these bonds, Goodwin was bound with him as surety; and afterwards Goodwin gave his own bond alone to one of the creditors, to whom Smith was bound in a single bond. Smith being thus indebted made his will, and in the beginning of it says, “My will is, that all my debts be paid; and I do charge all my lands with the payment thereof.” After which, by another clause in the said will, he gave “all his real and personal estate to Goodwin, to hold to him, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, chargeable nevertheless with the payment of all his debts and legacies.” Of this will he made Goodwin executor. The testator died in 1724. Goodwin proved the will; and in that same year sold a freehold estate of the testator's to Hunt; in the year following sold a leasehold of the testator's to White; and in 1727 sold another estate of the testator's, consisting of both freehold and leasehold, to Merriman. In the several deeds, by which these estates were conveyed from Goodwin to the purchasers, the will of Smith was recited; and to one of those deeds Elliot, a creditor of Smith, was a subscribing witness. These lands were sold in the neighbourhood by publick auction. At the time of these

sales, the creditors all of them either lived in the town where Goodwin lived, or within three or four miles of it. During all this time, and till the year 1730, the creditors went on regularly, receiving their interest, which was at 5 l. per cent, of Goodwin. Goodwin was a solvent man till 1732, and then he became a bankrupt. In 1734, the creditors of Smith brought their bill, against the purchasers of these lands, against Goodwin, and against the assignees under his commission of bankruptcy, in order to have a satisfaction of their debts out of those lands which were sold by Goodwin.—By the master of the rolls: It is almost impossible to make a determination in the present case, but that it must fall out unfortunately on the one party or the other. The dispute arising between creditors on the one side, and purchasers on the other, both these sorts of persons are entitled to the favour of this court; and in the present case, a misfortune must fall upon one of them. On whom it is to fall, is the question. And this is a question, that must so frequently have happened, that it is extraordinary to find no determination directly in point. The case is this: Smith being possessed of a real and personal estate, was indebted to several persons by bond; in three of which bonds, Goodwin was bound with him as surety; and he had contracted likewise some other debts; and being thus indebted he makes his will, and charges his real and personal estate with the payment of his debts and legacies, and makes his devise executed. It is true indeed, the words in the will do not amount to a devise of the lands to be sold for payment of the debts, and they only import a charge upon them for that purpose. However, this is such a devise, as is within the meaning of the proviso of the statute. The will is executed, and does interrupt the debtors to the testator.—The testator died in 1724. Goodwin paid interest on the debts regularly till 1730. After the testator's death, some sales of this estate were made by Goodwin, out of an estate which was intirely freehold, and some of it intirely leasehold; and a small part being sold freehold and leasehold both. The bill is brought by the creditors of Smith against the purchasers, in order to have a payment of their debts out of the lands of Smith, which were sold to them by Goodwin.—With regard to the leasehold estate, the case is so extremely plain, that the law of that must stand, and that the creditors cannot have satisfaction out of it, that is the law of the matter at least. The executors are the

ie proper persons, that by law have a power to dispose of a testator's personal estate. It is indeed true, that personal estate may be clothed with such a particular trust, that it is possible the court in some cases may require a purchaser of it to see the money rightly applied. But unless there is some such particular trust, or a fraud in the case, it is impossible to say but the sale of the personal estate, when made by an executor, must stand; and that after the sale is made, the creditors cannot break in upon it.—I will now consider the other sales that have been made, and will examine them, first, upon the general rules of the court; and in the next place, upon the particular circumstances which this case is attended with. With regard to the first of these matters, the general rule is, that if a trust directs that land should be sold for the payment of debts generally, the purchaser is not bound to see that the money be rightly applied. On the other hand, if the trust directs, that lands should be sold for the payment of certain debts, mentioning in particular to whom those debts were owing; the purchaser is bound to see that the money be applied for the payment of those debts. The present case indeed does not fall within either of these rules; because here lands are not given to be sold for payment of debts, but are only charged with such payment. However, the question is, whether that circumstance makes any difference: and I think it doth not. And if such a distinction were to be made, the consequence would be, that whenever lands are charged with the payment of debts generally, they could never be discharged of that trust without a suit in this court; which would be extremely inconvenient. No instances have been produced to shew, that in any other respect the charging lands with payment of debts differs from the directing them to be sold for such a purpose; and therefore there is no reason that there should be a difference established in this respect. The only objection that seemed to be of weight with regard to this matter is, that where lands are appointed to be sold for the payment of debts generally, the trust may be said to be performed as soon as those lands are sold; but where they are only charged with the payment of debts, it may be said, that the trust is not performed till those debts are discharged. And so far indeed is true, that where lands will be charged with the payment of annuities, those lands will be charged in the hands of the purchaser; because it was to the very purpose of making the lands a fund for that payment, that it should

should be a constant and subsisting fund: But where lands are not burdened with such a subsisting charge, the purchaser ought not to be bound to look to the application of the money. And that seems to be the true distinction. — Having thus considered the case under the general rule, I will now consider it under the particular circumstances that attend it. And the particular circumstances are such, as are far from strengthening the plaintiffs case, but rather the contrary. One of those circumstances is, the length of time the plaintiffs have lain by, without at all insisting on any charge upon these estates. *Goodwin* was a solvent man till his bankruptcy in 1732. Here have been three purchases of these estates, made at different times: one, in 1724; another, in 1725; and the third, in 1727. The first of them was made by *Hunt*, the second by *White*, and the third by *Merriman*. During all these transactions, the plaintiffs do not mention one word of their charge upon this estate; but, on the contrary, regularly received their interest of *Goodwin*, till the year 1730. 'Tis true indeed, that there is no express proof, that the plaintiffs knew of these purchases, but there is reason to imagine that they did. The purchases were made in the neighbourhood by publick auction. Some of the creditors lived in the same town that *Goodwin* did; and all of them lived within three or four miles of him. And *Elliot*, one of the creditors, was a subscribing witness to one of the purchase deeds. The want of notice too, on the part of the purchasers, is a considerable circumstance in their favour. It is indeed true, that they had notice that there were debts chargeable upon this estate; but it does not appear they knew to whom those debts were owing. Another circumstance is, that *Goodwin* was a co-obligor in three of these bonds, and to another of the obligees he afterwards gave his bond alone, which may well be considered as a satisfaction for that bond. By this it appears, that the creditors greatly relied upon *Goodwin* for their paymaster; and there is not much reason therefore, that they should now be allowed to resort to the testator's estate. Upon the whole, I am of opinion, that the plaintiffs bill must be dismissed, and even with costs, as against *White*; there being no manner of pretence for the plaintiffs to come upon that estate, it being all leasehold, and sold to *White* by the executor, who by law is the proper person intrusted to dispose of the testator's personal estate. However, with regard to the
rest

rest of the defendants, I will only dismiss the bill generally, without costs.—And so it was decreed. *Barnard. Cha. Ca.* 78.

4. By the statute of the 21 H. 8. c. 4 *Whereas divers persons, having other persons seised to their uses of and in lands and other hereditaments to and for the declaration of their wills, have by their last wills and testaments willed and declared such their lands tenements or other hereditaments to be sold by their executors, as well for the payment of their debts, performance of their legacies, necessary and convenient finding of their wives, virtuous bringing up and advancement of their children to marriage, and also for other charitable deeds to be done by their executors for the health of their souls; and notwithstanding such trust and confidence so by them put in their said executors, it hath oftentimes been seen, where such last wills and testaments of such lands and other hereditaments have been declared, and in the same divers executors named and made, that after the decease of such testators, some of the said executors willing to accomplish the trust, and confidence that they were put in by the said testator, have accepted and take upon them the charge of the said testament, and have been ready to fulfil and perform all things contained in the same; and the residue of the same executors, uncharitably, contrary to the trust that they were put in, have refused to intermeddle in any wise with the execution of the said will and testament, or with the sale of such lands so willed to be sold by the testator: And forasmuch as a bargain and sale of such lands tenements or other hereditaments so willed by any person to be sold by his executors after his decease, according to the opinion of divers persons can in no wise be good or effectual in the law, unless the same bargain and sale be made by the whole number of the executors named for the same; by reason whereof, as well the debts of such testators have rested unpaid, to the great danger and peril of the souls of such testators; and to the great hindrance and many times to the utter undoing of their creditors; as also the legacies and bequests made by the testator to his wife and children, and for other charitable deeds to be done for the wealth of the soul of the same testator that made the same testament have been also unperformed, as we to the extreme misery of the wife and children of said testator, as also to the let of performance of other charitable deeds for the wealth of the soul of the said testator, to the displeasure of Almighty God: For remedy whereof, it is enacted, that where part of the executors named in any such testament of any such*

Lands devised to divers to be sold for payment of debts, one of them may sell (n).

(n) *Vide supra, Form and Manner, 21.; et infra, 8.*

person so making or devising any such will of any lands tenements or other hereditaments to be sold by his executors, after the death of any such testator, do refuse to take upon him or them the administration and charge of the same testament and last will wherein they be so named to be executors, and the residue of the same executors do accept and take upon them the care and charge of the same testament and last will; that then all bargains and sales of such lands tenements or other hereditaments so willed to be sold by the executors of any such testator by such of the executors as shall accept and take upon him or them such care or charge of administration of the same testament, shall be as good and effectual in the law, as if all the residue of the same executors named in the said testament, so refusing the administration of the same testament, had joined with him or them in the making of such bargain or sale.

1. In what case the heir may enter for the condition broken.

5. A man deviseth his lands to be sold after his death, by his executor. One tenders to him a certain sum of money for the lands, but not to the value; and the executor afterwards held the land in his own hand two years, to the intent to sell the same dearer to some other, and took the profits all this while to his own use. Here the executor is to make the sale as soon as he can; and if he do not, the heir of the deviser may enter: for he took the profits here to his own use, not as assets. But if a man devise, that his executor shall sell his land, there he may sell at any time, for that he hath but a bare power and no profit. *Litt. sect. 383.*

A person seised in fee, deviseth the land to his executors to pay his debts, and dies; if his executors pay not every debt which the testator owed upon demand, the heir of the testator may enter for the condition broken; because in law it is a devise upon condition. *1 Roll's Abr. 439.*

But the chancery may relieve, upon the payment of such debt afterwards.

Fraudulent alienations to defeat creditors.

6. By a constitution of archbishop Stratford, *All who shall give away or alienate their goods upon their death beds, to defeat their creditors, to their wives and children; and all who shall counsel the same, or assist therein, or receive the said goods; shall incur the penalty of the greater excommunication: and the giver shall not have christian burial. And no other proof shall be required, that the gift or alienation was malicious or fraudulent, but that enough not doth remain for the purposes abovesaid.* *Lind. 161.*

And by the statute of 13 El. c. 5. *For the avoiding of fraudulent deeds, or other conveyances of lands or goods to defraud creditors and others, it is enacted, that every such deed*

deed or conveyance shall (as against such creditors) be void and of none effect.

In the case of *Taylor and Jones*, June 13, 1743; a husband who had 1733 l. stock devised to him after marriage, vests it in trustees, for the benefit of himself for life, of his wife for life, and afterwards for the benefit of his children. By Fortescue, master of the rolls: It is a fraudulent settlement as to creditors; but with respect to the wife and children, it is good as against the father, and even against a voluntary conveyance; but is void as to creditors. 2 *Aik.* 600.

7. By the statute of the 43 El. c. 8. *Forasmuch as it is often put in ure to the defrauding of creditors, that such persons as are to have the administration of the goods of others dying intestate committed unto them, if they require it, will not accept the same, but suffer or procure the administration to be granted to some stranger of mean estate, and not of kin to the intestate; from whom themselves, or others by their means, do take deeds of gift, and authorities by letters of attorney, whereby they obtain the estate of the intestate into their hands, and yet stand not subject to any debts owing by the intestate; it is enacted, that every person who shall obtain any goods or debts of any person dying intestate, upon any fraud as is aforesaid, or without such consideration as shall amount to the value of the same goods or debts, or near thereabouts (except it be in satisfaction of some just and principal debt of the value of the same goods or debts to him owing by the intestate at the time of his decease), shall be charged, so far as those goods and debts will satisfy, as executor of his own wrong.*

Fraudulent administrations to defeat creditors.

8. Assets are of two sorts; the one assets *by descent*, the other assets *in hand*. Assets *by descent* is, where a man is bound in an obligation, and dies seised of lands in fee simple, which descend to his heir, then his land shall be called asset-, (*assez, satis,*) that is, enough or sufficient to pay the same debt; and by that means the heir shall be charged, as far as the land so to him descended will stretch. Assets *in hand* is, when a man in like manner indebted makes executors, and leaves them sufficient to pay, or some commodity or profit is come unto them in right of their testator; this is called assets in their hands. *Terms of the Law.*

Assets.

There is also another division of assets, into *legal* and *equitable* assets: *Legal* assets are such as are liable to debts and legacies by the course of law; *equitable* assets are such as are only liable by the help of a court of equity.

So

Wills. Payment of debts.

So also there are *real* and *personal* assets : *Real* assets are such as concern the land ; *personal* are such as concern the personal estate only.

If a man deviseth *land to be sold* ; neither the money thereof coming, nor the profits of the land for any time to be taken, shall be accounted as any of the goods and chattels of such person deceased. 21 H. 8. c. 5. §. 5.

But if a man deviseth land to be sold by one for payment of his debts and legacies, and maketh the same person his *executor*, and dies ; the money made by such person upon the sale of the land, shall be assets in his hands. 1 Roll's Abr. 920.

But otherwise it is, where the land is devised to be sold *by the executor and others* ; for there the money shall not be assets ; for they are not trusted with it as executors. 1 Roll's Abr. 920. That is, it shall not be assets at law, but it shall be assets in equity. 1 Abr. Cas. Eq. 141. (c)

So land *articled* by the testator in his life-time to be sold, is as money. 1 Salk. 154.

If there is a *mortgage for years* (though never so many), this is assets at law ; because the whole interest is not gone from the mortgagor, the reversion in fee being left in him : But if it is a *mortgage in fee*, it is only assets in equity, because the legal estate is gone out of the obligor. Plunket and Penfon, Apr. 3. 1742.

If there is a mortgage in fee, and two descents cast, and there is more due on it than the value of the land, and though the mortgagor says he will not redeem ; yet it shall go to the executor, and not to the heir, the equity of redemption not being foreclosed or released. Taber and Grover, M. 1699, 2 Vern. 367.

(c) The court of chancery leans to construe assets *equitable* rather than *legal* ; because in the former case the debts are paid *pari passu*, being equal in conscience, whereas in the latter, they are paid in a course of administration. Therefore where an executor is also trustee for the payment of debts the assets are *equitable*, whether lands are devised to him to sell or he have only a power to sell. *Lewin v. Okeley*, 2 Atk. 50. *Hargrave v. Tindal*, 1 Bro. 136. n. *Silk v. Prime*, 1 Bro. 138. n. *Newton v. Bennet*, *ib.* 135. *Batson v. Lindgreen*, 2 Bro. 94. *Vide infra*, 25.

But

But if a mortgagee in fee enters for a forfeiture, and after some years enjoyment absolutely sells the land to J. S. and his heirs; this estate shall not be looked upon as a mortgage in the hands of J. S. but shall go to his heir, and not to his executor. *Cotton and Isles, M. 1684, 1 Vern. 271.*

A man having several mortgages, one in fee, on which he entered for a forfeiture, devised those lands which were mortgaged in fee to his two daughters and their heirs, and the mortgages to them their executors and administrators. One of the daughters died: her share of the lands which were mortgaged in fee, shall go to her heir, and not to her executors; for it was the testator's intent that those lands should pass as a real estate, though between him and a mortgagor they were but a mortgage. *Noys and Mordaunt, H. 1706, 2 Vern. 581.*

If the heir of the mortgagee forecloses the mortgagor, yet the land shall go to the executor, unless the heir thinks fit to pay him the mortgage money; and then he may have the benefit of the mortgage. *2 Vern. 67.*

If the lands are devised to one for life, remainder to another in fee, and the lands are charged with the payment of a sum of money, either by a former devise, rent charge, or mortgage; the tenant for life shall contribute and pay a proportionable part of such sum. *Hayes and Hayes, H. 25 C. 2. 1 Ch. Ca. 223.*

And in the case of *Cornish and Mew, H. 27 & 28 C. 2.* it was decreed, that the tenant for life should contribute one third, and he in remainder two thirds to redeem. *1 Cha. Ca. 271.*

The same day in another cause, where a jointress was of lands mortgaged, it was decreed, that the jointress paying the mortgage, should hold over till she and her executors were repaid with interest. *Bertue and Style, 1 Cha. Ca. 271.*

Also where the mortgagee devised the mortgaged lands to A. for life, remainder to B. in fee, and the mortgagor redeemed the land; it was decreed that A. should have one third and B. two thirds of the mortgage money. *Brent and Best, M. 1682, 1 Vern. 70.*

Lands in mortgage are devised to A. for life, remainder to B. in fee. A. dies; and a bill being brought against his executors, it was held, that though A. in his lifetime might have been compelled to contribute one third towards payment of the mortgage, in respect of his estate for life; yet his executor shall be obliged to contribute
only

only in proportion to the time that *A.* his testator enjoyed it. *Chat and Batten, T. 1696, 1 Vern. 424.*

When upon a mortgage, money is made payable to the heir or executor; there, before the day or at the day of payment, the mortgagor hath election to pay it to which he pleases; but after the day of payment is over, and the mortgage forfeited by law; though equity doth give the mortgagor relief, so as upon the payment of the money, he shall have his land, yet equity will not revive the election of the mortgagor to pay it to the heir or executor, but then he shall be forced to pay it to the executor, because it came out of the personal estate of the testator, and thither it shall return. But if in the mortgage neither heir nor executor is mentioned; then after the death of the mortgagee, the law determines it to be paid to the executor. *2 Freem. 20.*

If a man is seised of an *advowson* in fee, and the church doth become void; the void turn is a chattel: and if the patron dieth before he doth present, the advowson doth not go to his heir, but to his executor. *Wals. c. 9.*

If the grant of the next avoidance be to one, his heirs and assigns; yet it is but a chattel, and shall go to the executors: for where the thing itself is a chattel, the word *heirs* shall not make it an inheritance. *Wals. c. 10.*

M. 4 G. 2. Robinson and Tonge. Decreed, that an advowson in fee is assets in the hands of the heir for payment of debts. And the decree was affirmed in the house of lords. *Stra. 879. 3 P. Will. 399.*

And in the case of *Westfaling* and *Westfaling*, Mar. 5, 1746; lord Hardwicke decreed, that an advowson in fee in gross is assets by descent to satisfy specialty debts; and as to an advowson appendant to a manor he said there could be no doubt, because the manor itself being assets, what is appendant must be assets likewise. *3 Atk. 465.*

In the case of *Clabam* and *Pickering*, *M. 8 W.* it was adjudged, that an estate *pur autre vie*, although it be assets (by the statute of frauds and perjuries) for the payment of debts; yet it is not distributable, nor subject to the payment of legacies. *2 Saik. 464. L. Raym. 96.*

But by the statute of the 14 G. 2. c. 20. *Whereas doubts have arisen on the said statute of frauds and perjuries, where no devise of estates pur autre vie hath been made, to whom the surplus of such estates after the debts of such deceased owner thereof are paid shall belong, it is enacted, that such estates pur autre vie, in case there be no special occupant thereof,*

case will sue according to the law that hath been used heretofore, he may freely do it notwithstanding this statute.

Costs.

36. In all actions brought by executors or administrators, upon contracts, bonds or other things made to the deceased, or for goods taken away in his life, they shall pay no costs by any statute. *Law of Ex. 462. 2 Bac. Abr. 446.*

That is to say; costs by the common law are not given in any case: and executors and administrators are not comprized within the several statutes which in order to prevent vexatious suits do require other persons to pay costs in like cases; for executors and administrators cannot so well be supposed to intend vexation, seeing that they sue only in the right of another; and have not perhaps so perfect a knowledge of the matter as their testator or intestate would have had if he had lived. But as they are not to pay costs, so on the contrary they are not to be allowed costs; because they are supposed to reimburse themselves any charges or expences they may have been at, in the account of the testator's or intestate's estate. *2 Atk. 108.*

So also an executor defendant shall pay costs; and the judgment is, of the goods of the testator, if there are sufficient: if not, of the executor's own goods. Also when he is defendant, and there is judgment for him, he shall have his costs. *1 Bac. Abr. 517. 2 Bac. Abr. 446.*

H. 12 G. 2. Marsh and Yellowy. When an executor must declare as executor, he shall pay no costs: but if the cause of action ariseth in the time of the executor, and is therefore a matter within his knowledge, and for which he may declare in his own right, and need not to declare as executor; he shall be liable to pay costs. *Str. 682. 1106.*

So where the thing in dispute is matter, not of fact, but of law, and consequently as much within the knowledge of the executor or administrator as of the testator or intestate; it hath been adjudged, that where judgment is given against the executor or administrator upon demurrer; they shall pay costs. As in the case of *Frazer and Moore, E. 1720.* Bill by an administrator: The defendant demurs: and the demurrer is allowed; and the bill is dismissed with costs; and so said to be the constant course in equity, by the whole court of exchequer. *Bunb. 63.*

M. 3 G. Elwell against Quash and others. There were three executors one of which gave a warrant of attorney to

taught his trade; and if they be not of the trade, they ought to assign him to another that is of the trade, so that he may be taught according to the covenant. And judgment was given for the plaintiff. 1 *Lev.* 177.

The interest in the liberty of a *prisoner* in execution for debt is a chattel personal, and shall go to the executors. *Law of Test.* 378. 2 *Bac. Abr.* 416.

If an executor puts in suit a bond of 100l. for performance of covenants, and the parties submit to an *award*, and it is awarded that the obligor shall pay 70l. in full satisfaction, and that the executor shall release, which is done accordingly; it is said, that the executor shall be taken to have assets to the value of the whole 100l.: and though by the award he was compelled to release, it was his own act to submit to the arbitrament. 3 *Leon.* 53.

A *reversion* expectant upon an estate for life, is assets in the hands of the heir: but the creditor cannot compel the heir to sell it, but must wait till it falls. 1 *Abr. Eq. Cas.* 275.

In what case the lands and the personality shall be charged in aid of each other.

9. If there be a debt due to the king, equity will order it to be paid out of the real estate, that the other creditors may have satisfaction for their debts out of the personal estate. 1 *Vent.* 455.

A mortgage is a charge upon the personal estate, as well as upon the lands mortgaged; and the personal estate is primarily liable: for a mortgage is a general debt, and the land is only as security. 1 *Atk.* 487.

If one dies indebted by mortgage and simple contract, and one of the simple contract creditors gets judgment of assets when they shall happen, and the executor applieth the assets to pay off the mortgage; the simple contract creditors shall stand in the place of the mortgagee, as to what he hath exhausted out of the personal assets: and this being only by aid of equity, all the simple contract creditors shall come in equally with the creditor that hath judgment. *Wilson and Fielding, M.* 1718, 2 *Vern.* 763.

So in the case of *Haslewood and Pope, T.* 1734; it was decreed, that if a man devise his lands to trustees to pay all his debts, and dies indebted by specialty and simple contract, and the bond creditors recover part of their debts out of the personal estate, and afterwards they apply to be paid the rest of their bond debts out of the real estate devised for that purpose; in this case, as the testator intended all his creditors should be equally paid their debts, the bond creditors shall not come in upon the land, until the simple contract creditors have received so much thereof,

hereout, as to make them equal, and upon the level with the bond creditors, in respect of what they received out of the personal estate. It was also decreed, that where one gives a specific, or even a pecuniary legacy, and deviseth lands to pay his debts; if a simple contract creditor comes upon the personal estate; and exhausts it so far, as to break in upon the specific or pecuniary legacy, these legatees shall stand in the place of the creditors, to receive their satisfaction out of the fund raised by the testator for the payment of their debts. But where a man is indebted by bond, and leaves a personal estate, and deviseth lands to one in fee, and gives specific legacies, and the creditor by bond comes on the personal estate to pay his bond; the specific legatees shall not stand in the place of the bond creditor, to charge the land devised, because the devisee of the land is as much a specific devisee, as the legatee of a specific legacy. And in this cause the lord chancellor said, that the personal estate is the natural fund for payment of debts, and which as against creditors, unless they please, the testator cannot exempt; but against the devisee of his land he may, by appropriating his land as a fund for payment of his debts; and even in that case, according to the general rule, there ought to be express words to exempt the personal estate from the debts, or at least very plainly shewing this to have been the intention of the testator. *3 P. Will. 322.*

So where a man deviseth all his freehold houses lands and hereditaments to trustees, to hold to them in trust, that the freehold estate should be subject to, and be sold or disposed of by them, for payment of his just debts; and after disposing of some particular legacies, he gave his nephew the rest and residue of his goods, chattels, debts, rights, credits, and personal estate not before disposed of. Hereupon the question was, whether the personal estate should be first applied to the payment of the debts, notwithstanding the real estate was expressly devised for that purpose. The counsel for the defendants (who were the trustees and residuary legatee) insisted, that the real estate being not only made subject, but directed to be sold for payment of the debts, the personal estate should not be applied for that purpose. But by the whole court of exchequer, Here being no negative words to exempt the personal estate from being applied for the payment of debts, that ought first to be applied for the benefit of the heir at law (who was the plaintiff); and decreed accordingly. *Bunb. 302.*

which a man may give his real estate for payment of debts; as, first, to trustees; secondly, by way of mortgage, which the court of chancery will decree; or, thirdly, he may direct that his real estate may be sold for the payment of his debts: but in which way he pleases, none of these ways will make the real estate first chargeable, if there be not in the will either express words, or a manifest intent to direct that the real estate shall be first liable. *1 Will. 24.*

And in the case of *Brigman and Dove*, Nov. 1793. By the lord chancellor Hardwicke; I know of no authority where the words, "I make my real estate answerable for the payment of my debts," will exempt the personal estate from any special exemption of personal estate. No court ever said, that personal estate shall be applied to pay legacies, and not the debts. Nor will a particular estate in land liable to pay debts exempt the personal estate, because it is the natural fund for the payment of debts. Suppose a man deviseth a real estate to be answerable to the payment of debts, and subject to the payment of legacies, and gives it over to another, or what remains after the payment of debts, which is all one; if there are not express words to exempt the personal estate, it shall be first liable to the payment of debts. *3 Atk. 202. (p)*

(p) *Per Lord Tenterden, C.* two rules have been established

10. In an action of debt against two executors, if they plead severally by several attornies fully administered, and the jury find that the one hath assets, and that the other hath not any assets; the judgment shall be only against him who is found to have assets, and that the other who had not assets shall go quit. 1 *Roll's Abr.* 929.

In what case both executors shall be charged, where one only hath assets.

But where two executors join in an acquittance, but one only receives the money; both are chargeable for it as to creditors, who are to have the utmost benefit of the law: but the actual receiver (it is said) is only chargeable as to legatees or persons claiming under distribution; for the substantial part is the actual receiving of the money, and this only is regarded in conscience. By Harcourt lord chancellor. *M. 12 An. Churchill and Hopson*, 1 *Salk.* 318. (9)

11. Generally, if the debts are in *equal degree*; the executor may give the preference unto which he will. 10 *Mod.* 496.

What debts to be first satisfied.

So that if all the goods are but 20l. and debts are due to two by obligation, each of 20l.; the executor may pay which of them two he will. *Br. Executor*, 172.

But in this case the chancery will sometimes interpose; because this power may be an inlet to fraud. 10 *Mod.* 496.

In like manner, the executor may allow unto himself his own debt in prejudice of other debts in equal degree;

“As to all my worldly estate, I desire all my just debts should be first paid, it was decreed, that on failure of the personal estate, copyhold lands were liable as well as freehold.” *Coombes v. Gibson*, 1 *Bro.* 273.

(9) S. P. by *Ld. Northington, C. Westley v. Clarke*, reported in *Mr. Cox's* note to 1 *P. Wms.* 83. See also *Leigh v. Barry*, 3 *Atk.* where lord Hardwicke takes a difference between trustees and executors, viz. that the former, though they all join in receipts, shall only be liable for what they receive individually, because they are obliged to join for conformity, but otherwise as to executors who may act severally if they think fit. Where by a voluntary joint act of executors the testator's money gets into the hands of one of them or a stranger, they shall all be liable. *Sadler v. Hobbs*, 2 *Bro.* 114. *Scurfield v. Howes*, 3 *Bro.* 90. *Murrel v. Cox and Pitt*, 21 *Vin. Ab.* 534. But that a party's signing a receipt is not in all cases conclusive evidence against him of the receipt of money, even at law, appears by the above-mentioned cases, and *Straton v. Rastal*, 2 *T. Rep.* 366.

provided that he hath made an inventory, and provided he be not executor of his own wrong. *Swin.* 459. 2 *Bat. Abr.* 435. (But an executor of his own wrong shall not in any case be permitted to retain. 3 *Blackst.* B. 3. c. 2.)

And this remedy of retainer is by mere act of law, and grounded upon this reason; that the executor cannot, without an apparent absurdity, commence a suit against himself as representative of the deceased, to recover that which is due to him in his own private capacity; but, having the whole personal estate in his hands, so much as is sufficient to answer his own demand is, by operation of law, applied to that particular purpose. Else, by being made executor, he would be put in worse condition than all the rest of the world besides. For, though a rateable payment of all the debts of the deceased, in equal degree, is clearly the most equitable method, yet as every scheme for a proportionable distribution of the assets among all the creditors hath been hitherto found to be impracticable, and productive of more mischiefs than it would remedy, so that the creditor who first commenceth his suit is intitled to a preference in payment; it follows, that as the executor can commence no suit, he must be paid the last of any, and of course must lose his debt, in case the estate of his testator should prove insolvent, unless he be allowed to retain it. But the executor shall not retain his own debt, in prejudice to those of a higher degree; for the law only puts him in the same situation, as if he had sued himself as executor, and recovered his debt; which he never could be supposed to have done, while debts of an higher nature subsisted. 3 *Blackst.* B. 3. c. 3. (r)

But if the debt of one creditor be payable at a future day, and of another creditor presently; the executor cannot prefer such future debt, and pay it before the day of payment comes, and leave the other unpaid. But after the

(r) In debt on bond against an administrator to which he pleads debt on bond due to himself and retainer, it is not necessary to aver a good consideration for the bond, for if it can be impeached, the matter must be replied. Nor is it necessary for the administrator to set out in his plea the letters of administration, for the plaintiff, by bringing the action, has admitted him to be lawful administrator. *Picard v. Brown*, 6 T. Rep. 550.

day

debt and damages, without any writ to inquire of the lands tenements or hereditaments so descended. 1 6.

Provided, that every devisee made liable by this act, shall be liable and chargeable in the same manner as the heir at law by force of this act, notwithstanding the lands tenements and hereditaments to him devised shall be aliened before the action brought. 1. 7.

M. 12 G. Buckley and Nightingale. An heir that hath lands by hereditary descent, shall not be liable for the debt of his ancestor further than to the value of the lands descended: and as soon as he hath paid his ancestor's debts to the value of the land, he shall hold the land discharged; otherwise he might be chargeable ad infinitum. *Str.* 665.

And if an heir is sued upon a bond debt of his ancestor, in which he is bound, and he pays the money; the executor shall reimburse him as far as there are personal assets of the testator's come to his hands, if it is not otherwise ordered by the will. 1 *Cha. Ca.* 74. 2 *P. Will.* 175.

So if a man mortgages land, and covenants to pay the money, and dies; the personal estate of the mortgagor shall, in favour of the heir, be applied to exonerate the mortgage. 2 *Salk* 449.

Yea, though there be no covenant in the deed for the payment of the mortgage money, yet the personal estate shall be liable in the hands of the executor. 2 *Salk.* 449: 1 *Vern.* 436.

If a man dies indebted by bond, and seised in fee of divers lands, part of which he devises to one, and other part he permits to descend to his heir (not mentioning them in his will); the lands permitted to descend shall be first applied to pay the bond debts. And the reason is, because the applying the devised lands to pay the bond debts, would disappoint the will; which equity will not permit, if it can be avoided: Whereas it no way disappoints the will to say, that the lands not mentioned should be in the first place liable to pay the debts. But it seems it would be otherwise, if the testator had devised the lands to his heir at law: for though such devise were void (as to the purpose of making the heir take otherwise than by descent), yet it shews the testator's intent, that the heir should have the land; and therefore it seemeth that the lands devised to one, and the other lands devised to the heir at law, should in such case contribute in proportion

of the other ; and therefore the retainer of one must be considered as the retainer of the other ; and must enure for their mutual benefit in the discharge of the debts of both in proportion. Then the consequence would be very bad, were a retainer allowable in this case ; for administrators must fight for the assets, if getting the sole possession would intitle either to a separate right in them. So that, as no legal right of retainer has been shewn, the rule must take place, that he who cannot retain in law cannot in equity. The plaintiff is intitled to an equal distribution of the assets, being an equal creditor, according to conscience and equity ; and the defendant must be decreed to account. *Viner, Executors, D. 2.*

Another difference, where debts are in equal degree, is said to be, that regularly that debt shall be paid first for which suit is commenced, and not that for which no suit is commenced ; for after a suit begun, the executor (it hath been holden) may not excuse himself by any voluntary payments. *2 Cha. Ca. 201. 2 Vern. 62.*

Yet it is said, that the executor, before notice of such suit, may pay any other creditor in equal degree ; and then plead, that he hath fully administred before notice. *Br. Executors, 43. Went. 146.*

And in the case of *Mason and Williams*, it was held by Cowper lord chancellor, that pending a bill in equity against an executor, or after a decree *quod computet*, an executor may pay any other debt of a higher nature, or as high a nature, if there be *legal* assets ; but if he hath only *equitable* assets, then the court of chancery will not indemnify him, and suffer him to prejudice and disappoint the first suitor. *2 Salk. 507.*

If there be two creditors in equal degree, and both sue ; if the executor doth by covin help the creditor which began his suit last to his judgment or execution first, and there be no assets left to pay the other creditor, he must be satisfied out of the executor's own estate, if this covin be proved against him. But the confession of an action by the executor, where there is a real debt, is no covin : and such recovery by confession is a good plea for the executor against another creditor. *Swin. a. 459. (s)*

In

(s) But where debt on bond was brought against an administrator, and he pleaded a judgment confessed to an action on a simple contract, without averring " that he had no notice of the plaintiff's

In the case of *Joseph and Mott*, M. 1697. A man made his will, and died indebted to several persons by bond, more than his personal estate would pay. A bond creditor brought a bill against the executor, to have a discovery and account of the personal estate, and a satisfaction for his debt. At the hearing, the executor made default; so there was a decree against him for an account and satisfaction out of the assets, unless cause shewed: Before the decree was made absolute, another bond creditor of the testator brought an action at law against the executor, upon a bond. He appeared, and because he could not plead this decree at law, suffered judgment to go against him by default. And the account being carried on before the master, it was doubted whether he should allow this judgment on the account. The master of the rolls was of opinion, that the decree must be preferred. And it coming to be reheard before the lord chancellor, he was of the same opinion. *Prec. Ch.* 79.

But in the case of *Darston* and the earl of *Orford*, H. 1701. After a bill filed in chancery, against an executor for a discovery of assets, and answer put in, the executor voluntarily paid a bond debt without suit. The cause proceeded to a hearing, and an account was decreed. And the question was, whether this voluntary payment, pending a suit here, should be allowed on the account. And the lord keeper Wright thought the payment ought to be allowed; but this being a point of consequence, he ordered precedents to be searched. Afterwards, 3d June 1702, on precedents produced on both sides his lordship seemed to be of the same opinion, but said the case of *Joseph and Mott* was a precedent against him, but thought that to be a direct change of the law. The next day (upon consideration of the precedents) his lordship said he was bound up by them, and therefore decreed the payment (being voluntary) to be disallowed; but seemed to disapprove of the case of *Joseph and Mott*, where the judgment at law was fairly obtained. Afterwards, 21st Nov. 1702, this decree was reversed in the house of lords, and the payment allowed. *Prec. Cha.* 188. 3 *P. Will.* 401.

plaintiff's demand;'' the plea was holden to be bad, because it would enable an administrator, in many cases, to defeat a specialty creditor by confessing as many judgments as he pleased on simple contract debts. *Sawyer v. Mercer*, 1 T. Rep. 690.

So

So in the case of *Waring and Danvers, M. 1715.* The plaintiff, a simple contract creditor of the testator, brings an action on a special original against the executor, in order to recover his debt. The other simple contract creditors offered the plaintiff to come in for his proportion of his debt with them; but having first filed his original, he insisted on his whole debt, in preference to the rest. Upon which, the executor and the other simple contract creditors entered into articles, agreeing, that first the executor should be paid his debts, and then that all the simple contract creditors should equally share the assets amongst them, exclusive of the plaintiff. And in order to bar the plaintiff at law, the executor gave judgment in the several *quantum meruit*s brought by the other simple contract creditors, for the several sums which were laid as damages in the declarations, without ascertaining the damages by writ of inquiry, but those damages were so laid as not to exceed the real debt. Upon this, the plaintiff brought his bill. But the master of the rolls dismissed the bill without costs, it being a hard case; but afterwards, on consideration, he gave costs. And the decree was affirmed by the lord chancellor. The master of the rolls said, if the plaintiff desired it, he would send it to the master to see whether the judgments confessed to the other creditors be more than their real debts; but the plaintiff not thinking it worth his while, the court decreed as above. 1 *P. Will.* 295.

In the case of *Barker and Dumeres, Jan. 29, 1740.* Robert Dumeres died intestate, and on his death Edward Dumeres, who was a relation of his, applied for administration. Barker, who was a creditor of Robert by bond, opposed the granting of the administration to Edward, by reason of his insufficiency, and his intention of going over to Jersey. However, administration was granted to him. This administration was in some measure granted to Edward by the leave of this court. Barker had entered a caveat against its being granted to him, tho' that caveat was afterwards withdrawn. But as there were these objections against him, Barker filed his bill against him the 31st of October last for the payment of his debt; and prayed that he might give security to abide that determination. His answer came on the 27th of the next month; and an order was made that he should find such security, which he accordingly did. After this *Merry*, who was another bond-creditor to the intestate, brought his action at law against Edward, and Edward confessed a

judgment to him in Michaelmas term in that same year in 4000 l. This occasioned Barker's bringing his action at law against Edward, upon the same bond for which the bill was brought here; in order that Edward might not confess judgment to other persons, before he could get judgment against him. As soon as this action was brought a motion was made on the part of Edward, praying that Barker might make his election, which court he would proceed in, whether at law or in equity.—By the lord chancellor Hardwicke; It is very true, that it is the general rule of this court, that a person shall not be allowed to proceed both at law and in equity, for one and the same demand, at one and the same time. But notwithstanding that, it is as certain, that by the ancient course of the court, a person was allowed to bring his action at law against the representative of the deceased, and at the same time to bring his bill here in order to have a discovery of assets; tho' now it is established, that if the party proceeds in equity against such representative, his bill must be both for a discovery of assets, and a satisfaction for his debt; and he shall not be allowed to proceed both at law and in equity. And where the party has proceeded in both courts, several orders have been requiring him to make his election. But where the court sees that the representative is confessing judgments, that is a reason (and in my judgment shall always be a reason) that the court will not require the party to make his election. The courts of law distinguish the case of executors, in instances similar to this, from other cases. Therefore tho' the constant course of those courts is, on reasonable circumstances, to give a defendant farther time to plead, than he is obliged to plead in by the strict rule of the court; yet when an executor applies for this favour, the time for pleading shall not be enlarged, but by his consenting not to confess judgments in the mean time. 'Tis indeed true, that an executor in some instances may honestly confess judgments to other creditors; as where he does it to prevent his being doubly charged, or the like: but when this court sees, that he doth this in order to elude its orders, the court will never permit it. Now what is the nature of the present case? The original bill was filed the 31st of October last. The answer of Edward came in on the 27th of November following. And in the beginning of Michaelmas term here is a judgment confessed by Edward to Merry, in 4000 l. The administration itself was in some measure granted to Edward
by

by leave of this court. Barker had entered a caveat against its being granted to him, though that caveat was afterwards withdrawn. The proper order for the court to make in this case is, that Barker made a special election, namely, to proceed at law to recover judgment there, and to proceed in this court for a discovery, and an account of assets, but that he shall not be at liberty to take out execution upon the judgment without leave of this court. And it was ordered accordingly. *Barn. Cha. Ca.* 277.

Forfeiture for
not burying in
woollen.

12. By the statute of the 30 C. 2. c. 3. The forfeiture for not burying in woollen *shall be paid out of the estate of the person deceased; before any statute, judgment, debt, legacy, or other duty whatsoever.* s. 4.

Funeral ex-
pences.

13. Next the funeral expences shall be paid.

But in *Shelly's* case, *T. 5 IV.* it is said, that in strictness, no funeral expences are allowed against a creditor, except for the coffin, ringing the bell, parson, clerk, and bearers fees; but not for pall or ornaments. *1 Salk.* 196. Perhaps the expences of the shroud, and digging the grave ought also to have been added.

In general, it is said, that no more than 40 s. for funeral expences, shall be allowed against creditors. *3 Atk.* 249. (1)

Overseer of the
poor dying.

14. By the statute of the 17 G. 2. c. 38. *If any overseer of the poor shall die, his executors or administrators shall, within forty days after his decease, pay out of the assets all money remaining due, which he received by virtue of his office, before any of his other debts are paid.* s. 3.

Charges of pro-
bate or admini-
stration.

15. Next to these, as it seemeth, come the charges of the probate of the will, or of the letters of administration.

Debts due to the
king on record.

16. Next, debts due by the testator to the king are to be discharged; and it is not in the choice of the executor, to prefer any other debt due to any subject. *Swin.* 455.

(1) By lord *Hardwicke*, C. At law, where a person dies insolvent, the rule is, that no more shall be allowed for a funeral than is necessary, at first only 40 s. then 5 l. and at last 10 l. But the executor here having had reasonable ground to believe the estate solvent, from the large legacies left by the testator, and it not being clear that, upon the whole, there would be a deficiency, his lordship allowed 60 l. for the funeral expences, the testator having directed that he should be buried thirty miles from the place of his death. *Stag v. Punter*, *1 Atk.* 119. In *Bull. N. P.* 143. it is said the usual method is to allow 5 l.

Which

Which must be understood of such debts as are due to the king only by matter of record, and not of sums of money due to the king upon wood-sales, or sales of his minerals, for which no obligation is given: or of amercements in his courts baron or courts of his honours, which be not courts of record; or of fines for copyhold estates there; or of forfeitures to the crown of debts by contract due to any subject by outlawry or attainder, until office thereupon found. *Swin. a. 455, 456. 2 Bac. Abr. 432.*

17. By the statute of the 9 An. c. 10. *Debts due to the post-office for letters, shall be preferable in payment before any debt due to any private person.* l. 30. Debts due to the post office.

18. Next, debts due to private persons upon judgments Judgments, against the deceased in his life; and after those, debts upon judgments (altho' by mere confession, and without defence) against the executor or administrator for the debts of the deceased. *Law of Ex. 39. Treatise of Eq. 112. B. 4. Pt. 2. c. 2. f. 2.*

But it is said, that the executor is not bound to take notice of judgments against the testator in his life, without being made acquainted therewith by the creditors; for the executor is no way privy to his acts. *1 And. 159.*

But in the case of *Littleton and Hibbins, M. 42 El.* it was adjudged, that executors at their peril ought to take notice of debts upon record. *Cro. El. 793.*

In the case of *Paterfon and Huddleston, T. 2 G. 2.* An action of debt upon a bond was brought against the defendant as executor. The defendant pleads a recovery against him already had in a plea of debt, and that he had no notice of this bond at that time, and that there was no more in his hands than would satisfy this recovery. Upon this the plaintiff demurs. The court observed, that it did not appear but that this recovery might be in debt upon bond, or other matter of as high nature, and then undoubtedly the plaintiff ought to be barred. But however, if the recovery was upon a simple contract, they were unanimously of opinion, if the defendant had no notice of the bond, that the recovery would be a good bar. They said, in this consists the difference, between duties of a private nature, and duties upon record; for those executors are bound to take notice of at all events, but these they need not, where a suit is commenced against them to recover debts of an inferior nature. They said also, that there is no occasion that executors should hold out

out a suit to the last, before they make such payments ; but if an action is taken out against them, it is the same. But if an executor makes a voluntary payment of a debt by simple contract, where there are not assets to satisfy the bond debts, it is otherwise, though he hath no notice ; for there are many cases, where a man's voluntary act shall prejudice him, where the necessity of law would not. Upon the whole, judgment was given for the defendant. *1 Barnard. 186.*

If the judgment is satisfied and is only kept on foot to wrong other creditors, or if there be any defeasance of the judgment yet in force ; then the judgment will not avail to keep off other creditors from their debts. *Swin. a. 456. 2 Bac. Abr. 433.*

And of two judgments, he who first sues execution must be preferred ; but before, it is at the election of the executor to pay which he will first : Only a judgment in a foreign country, as *France*, is to be considered but as a simple contract. *Treat. of Eq. B. 4. Pt. 2. c. 2. s. 2. Swin. a. 436.*

And it is not necessary, that the judgment be limited to the courts at Westminster ; but if it be obtained in any court of record, which hath power to hold plea by charter or prescription of debt above 40 s. it is sufficient. For tho' upon such a judgment execution cannot there be had, but of such goods as are within the jurisdiction of that court ; yet if the record be removed into chancery by a certiorari, and there by mittimus into one of the benches, then execution may be had upon any goods in any county of *England*. *Swin. a. 456.*

But a judgment not *docketed*, as by the 4 & 5 W. c. 20. shall not affect any lands as to purchasers or mortgagees ; or have any preference against heirs, executors, or administrators, in the administration of the estates of their ancestors, testators, or intestates.

Which act, in order to render more easy the finding of such judgment entered, directs in what manner alphabetical lists shall be made of judgments by confession, *non sum informatus*, or *nihil dicit*, in any of the courts of record at Westminster ; to which any person may resort, on paying 4 d. and no more (u).

19. In

(u) A debt on judgment not docketed according to the directions of this act, is put by it on a level with simple contract debts.

19. In the case of *Harding and Edge*, H. 1682. In the chancery. Upon a special report, the sole question was, how a duty decreed should take place in relation to other debts in point of priority of satisfaction; and ordered, that a decree should preeede debts, on simple contracts and bonds, and take place next to judgments. 1 Vern. 143. Decree in equity.

But in the case of *Peploe and Swinburn*, M. 1719. In the exchequer. It was decreed, that creditors by judgment at law, and creditors by decree in equity, shall be paid equally without any preference. Bunb. 48.

And it is now become the established doctrine, that a decree of the court of chancery, is equal to a judgment in a court of law. So where an executrix, whose testator was greatly indebted to divers persons in debts of different natures, being sued in chancery by some of them, appeared and answered immediately, admitting their demands (some of the plaintiffs being her own daughters); and other of the creditors sued the executrix at law, where the decree not being pleadable, they obtained judgments; yet the decree of the court of chancery, being for a just debt, and having a real priority in point of time, not by fiction and relation to the first day of the term, was preferred in the order of payment to the judgments, and the executrix protected and indemnified in paying a due obedience to such decree, and all proceedings against her at law stayed by injunction. Case of *Morris* against the *Bank of England*: Decreed first at the rolls by Sir Joseph Jekyll, in Aug. 1735. Which was affirmed by the lord Talbot in Nov. 1736. And his lordship's decree affirmed in parliament in May 1737. 3 P. Will. 402. Cas. Talb. 217.

In the case of *Turwin and Gibson*, July 31, 1749; where a sum was decreed to the plaintiff, it was ruled by lord Hardwicke, that the solicitor in the cause, for his trouble and money disbursed for his client, had a right to be paid out of the sum decreed; and that in this case the administrator cannot apply the assets in the course of administration. And this, he said, is the constant rule in chancery. 3 Atk. 720.

debts. Therefore, on a plea of plene administravit to debt on a judgment obtained against the intestate, but not docketed, the administrator may give in evidence payment of bond and other specialty debts which exhausted the assets. *Hickey v. Hayter*, 6 T. Rep. 584.

20. Next,

Supremacy
of the law.

22. Next, with your recognizances at common law.
Law of Ex. 22.

And with your fixtures merchant or staple, or recognizances at common law, & further back. *Law of Ex. 39.*

And with recognizances and fixtures trading is equal
power, & it is the statute & section, to give precedence
to fixtures & fixtures. *Law of Ex. 434.*

Neither precedes the fixture nor another, both the time
it is made & the time it is made is equaling the goods,
excepting the time it is made of the fixture & each. But as
to the goods & the time of the fixture, he who first
takes the goods & the fixture is preferred; and before taking
the fixture, the statute will give precedence to which
it is made of.

And with fixtures and recognizances, those which
are fixtures & fixtures are preferred those which are for
the use of the fixture & fixtures. *Stat. 2.*

And with fixtures and fixtures, it is not take place
of fixtures & fixtures.

Supremacy

And with fixtures and fixtures, it is not take place
of fixtures & fixtures. *Stat. 2.*

And with fixtures and fixtures, it is not take place
of fixtures & fixtures. *Stat. 2.*

So where a person claims the equity of redemption, as
a purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice
of the mortgage, the mortgagee cannot tack his bond to
it, and can only give a part of the general assets of the
mortgagor. *3 And 253.*

But if a mortgagor, after making a mortgage, bor-
rows money of a mortgagee upon bond, and the mort-
gaged premises descend upon an heir at law, or come to
a volunteer; the court will not suffer them to redeem the
mortgage, without paying the bond: and this is to pre-
vent a circuitry; because the moment the estate descend-
ed, or came to the volunteer, it became assets, and li-
able to the bond. And the same rule will hold, as

to a devisee of the mortgaged premises. 3 *Atk.* 630. 659.

22. Next, debts by specialty, as those by bonds or other obligations, sealed by the testator. 2 *Bac. Abr.* 434. Rent, bonds, and other obligations.

Also rent arrear, and unpaid by the testator, is equal to a debt by specialty; for this favouring of the realty, the executor can no more wage his law against such a debt, than he can to a debt by specialty. 2 *Bac. Abr.* 434.

So where debt was brought against an executor for rent reserved on a parol lease, after the lease was determined, and the executor pleaded that the testator entered into an obligation, and that he had not assets above 5 l., which were not sufficient to discharge this obligation; on demurrer it was resolved, that this rent, though reserved on a parol lease, was yet equal to an obligation, and that it still remained in the realty, though the term was determined. 2 *Bac. Abr.* 434.

Also by the custom of London, if a citizen of London dies indebted by *simple contract*, such debt is equal to a debt by specialty. 2 *Bac. Abr.* 434.

B. 1715, *Parker and Harvey*. The grantor's covenant in a marriage settlement for him and his heirs, that the premises were free from incumbrances, shall come in equally with creditors on bond. *Vin. Executors*, Q. 2. 39.

If two men are *partners* in trade, and one of them gives a bond to leave his wife 1000 l., and dies; and the other partner administers: If the wife would be paid out of the separate estate of her husband, on there being effects, she shall have a preference before other creditors: But if there is no separate estate, and the wife would have satisfaction out of the partnership effects, then all the partnership debts must be first paid. 3 *P. Will.* 182.

Any *voluntary* bond is good against an executor or administrator, unless some creditor be thereby deprived of his debt: Indeed, if the bond be merely voluntary, a real debt (though by simple contract only) shall have the preference. But if there be no debt at all, then a bond, however voluntary, must be paid by an executor. 3 *P. Will.* 222. *Comyns*, 255.

A man, having a wife who lived separate from him, afterwards married another woman who knew nothing of the former wife's being alive; but it being discovered to the second wife that the former was alive, the husband

(in order to prevail with the second wife to stay with him) some years afterwards gave a bond to a trustee of the second wife, to leave her 1000l. at his death, and died not leaving assets to pay his simple contract debts: If this bond had been given immediately on the discovery, and they had parted thereupon, it had been good; but being given in trust for the second wife, after such time as she knew the first was living, and to induce her to continue with the husband, this was worse than a voluntary bond, and decreed to be postponed to all the simple contract debts. But if such bond had been given to the second wife as a recompence for the injury done her, and thereupon she had left the husband, it had been a good bond, and to be paid before any simple contract debts. 3 P. Will. 339. 349.

If there be *divers* obligations of the like kind, it seemeth to be in the power of the executor to discharge which obligation, and to gratify which of the creditors he will: which being done, the other creditors are without remedy, if there be no assets; unless the day of payment in the one obligation (as was observed before) be expired, and the day of payment of the other obligation is not yet come; in which case, the former obligation is to be first satisfied; or unless there be suit commenced for some obligation, for then it is not in the power of the executor to discharge another obligation for which no action is brought, in prejudice of the former suit. But an executor may confess judgment on one obligation, and plead that judgment to an action brought on another obligation. And if there be two obligations, and the two several creditors bring several actions against the executor, he that first obtaineth judgment must be first satisfied. *Swin.* 457. 458. 2 *Bac. Abr.* 434, 5.

Although the executors are not named in an obligation, yet the law will charge them, for, that they represent the estate of the testator. And the law is the same of administrators. But the heir shall not at any time be charged, without express mention of the heir. *Dyer*, 23.

23. Debts by simple contract are postponed to all others, being debts of an inferior nature; yet an executor is bound, as far as he hath assets, to pay them, as much as any other debt; and therefore a simple contract creditor need not allege, that the executor had assets to satisfy debts of a superior nature, and his also; but if the truth be, that the executor hath only assets sufficient to satisfy such superior debts, he must plead it. 2 *Bac. Abr.* 434.

But

But by the 29 C. 2. c. 3. *No action shall be brought whereby to charge any executor or administrator upon any special promise to answer damages out of his own estate, unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorised.* s. 4.

But albeit the law requires, that debts should be paid according to their superiority, as herein set forth; yet may an executor pay a debt on a simple contract before a specialty, if he hath no notice of such specialty: for otherwise it might be in the power of the obligee to ruin the executor by keeping his bond in his pocket until the executor shall have paid away all the assets in discharging simple contract debts. 2 *Bac. Abr.* 434, 5.

But of debts upon record, the executor ought to take notice at his peril. 2 *Bac. Abr.* 435.

And in the case of *Greenwood* and *Brudnish*, T. 1720. A man mortgaged his lands, and gave a bond to perform covenants, and after died intestate. His widow, without taking letters of administration, possessed herself of his personal estate, and paid it all away in satisfying debts on simple contract. About seven years after, an old dormant entail was discovered, and the heir in tail brought an ejectment, and recovered possession. Whereupon the mortgagee sued the widow upon the bond. She brought a bill for an injunction, having paid away all the testator's assets before any notice of this bond, and therefore alleged that she ought not to be chargeable with a default. The defendant demurred, and the demurrer was clearly allowed, the bill being an attempt to alter the course of law. But if any extraordinary fraud had been charged on the defendant, by which she had been deceived, or induced to pay away the assets, that might have varied the case. *Prec. Cha.* 534.

24. A person indebted by bond and simple contract, deviseth lands to trustees to be sold for payment of his debts: It was resolved and declared to be the constant rule, that the creditors should have in proportion, and that the bonds to be first satisfied; for it shall be construed, that (one of them being as much a debt as the other) the testator intended they should all be paid alike; and if the value of the land fall short, they shall be satisfied in proportion: So legatees shall have equal proportion pro rata, according to the greatness or smallness of the legacy; for land is made debtor: But otherwise it is of judgments;

In what case debts shall be paid *pari passu*.

for these do affect the land by their own strength and nature, and would have had the preference whether such devise had been made or not. 2 *Freem.* 49-175.

But if a man only charge his lands with the payment of debts, so that the lands descend subject to them; bonds shall be preferred to simple contract debts. 1 *P. Will.* 430.

A man deviseth his lands to two persons in trust, to be sold for payment of his debts, and maketh the same persons *executors*. The question was, whether bond debts should have a preference, or all debts be paid *pari passu*? The difference was taken, when the same persons that are trustees to sell the lands are executors likewise, and where not; for in the former case, after the land is sold, it is assets even *at law*; and therefore to decree them to pay otherwise than according to the legal course, would be to decree a *devastavit*. And in this case it was decreed, that bond debts must be preferred. *Proc. Chs.* 127.

But in the case of *Lewin and Okely*, July 26, 1740; Where there was a devise to trustees for the payment of debts, and the same persons were made executors, it was held by lord Hardwicke, that this shall be equitable, and not legal assets, and all the creditors must be paid *pari passu*. There have been cases (he said) in which it was held, that where trustees are made executors, debts shall be paid in a course of administration, but the modern resolutions have been otherwise. 2 *Atk.* 50.

A *lease* for years, or a bond or grant of an *annuity* taken in a trustee's name, being *personal* assets, shall be applied in a course of administration, and not for the payment of all the debts equally. 2 *Vern.* 764.

If a man possessed of a term for years, mortgageth it and dies, leaving debts, some by bond, and some by simple contract; the *equity of redemption* is *equitable assets*, and shall be liable to all the debts equally. 3 *P. Will.* 341.

And the distinction seemeth to be this: Where there are *legal* assets, that is, assets which are liable at law without the help of equity, there the executor may apply them according to the course of law, which allows and requires a preference to be made in certain cases as hath been mentioned; but where there are only *equitable* assets, that is, assets which are not liable without the help of a court of equity, in such case the court will direct the application thereof according to that course which is most equitable

And by the lord chancellor Hardwicke, in the case of *Walker and Jackson*, July 22, 1743: upon a rehearing at Lincoln's inn hall. The general rule is, that the personal estate shall be first charged with payment of debts and legacies, and the testator cannot exempt it from being liable to his debts, as against creditors; but as between heir and executor, he may charge them upon any other fund which is not primarily liable, and discharge the personal estate. There are several ways, by any of which a man may give his real estate for payment of his debts; as, first, to trustees; secondly, by way of charge in equity, which the court of chancery will decree to be performed; or, thirdly, he may direct that his real estate may be sold for the payment of his debts: but let him do which way he pleases, none of these ways will make the real estate first chargeable, if there be not in the will, either express words, or a manifest intent to discharge the personal estate, but it shall be first liable. *Bamb. 302.* 1 *Wilson 24.*

And in the case of *Bridgman and Dove*, Nov. 27, 1744: By the lord chancellor Hardwicke; I know of no authority where the words, "I make my real estate liable to pay my debts," will exempt the personal estate without any special exemption of personal estate. Nor has the court ever said, that personal estate shall be applied only to pay legacies, and not the debts. Nor will making a particular estate in land liable to pay debts exonerate the personal estate, because it is the natural fund for payment of debts. Suppose a man deviseth a real estate liable to the payment of debts, and subject to those debts gives it over to another, or what remains after the payment of debts, which is all one; if there are not express words to exempt the personal estate, it shall be first applied in exoneration of the real estate. 3 *Atk. 202. (p)*

10. 18

(p) *Per Lord Tenterden*, C. two rules have been established on this subject: 1. That the personal estate is liable, in the first instance, to the payment of debts. 2. That a declaration plain shall stand in lieu of express words to discharge it, if it appear to be the testator's intention. *Duke of Ancester v. Mayer*, 1 *Bro. 454.* And it frequently happens that a variety of charge from the real to the personal estate, or the reverse may be gathered from the parts of the will. *Hove v. Malt* 1 *Bro. 260.*, with the cases cited. Under the following de

interest. And he said, that on a general devise of lands for the payment of debts, he should think that simple contract debts ought not to carry interest. *Barnard. 230.*

The arrears of an annuity or rent charge, are never decreed to be paid with interest where the sum is uncertain, but only where it is certain and fixed. *Cas. Tulbot, 2.*

In the case of *Littan and Litton, T. 1719.* Interest of an annuity was decreed by the lord chancellor from the very day it became due. But Mr. Peere Williams adds a query as to this, and says, it seems the arrears should carry interest only from the first day of payment next after the arrears of the annuity became due; if payable half yearly, then from the next half year day; if quarterly, then from the next quarter day; and so has been the common rule in these cases. *1 P. Will. 541.*

Debt barred by
the statute of
limitation.

26. *T. 1700, Staggars and Welby.* At the lord chancellor's house. It was held by Cowper lord chancellor, that if one by will subject his lands to the payment of his debts, debts barred by the statute of limitation shall be paid; for they are debts in equity, and the duty remains; the statute hath not extinguished it, though it hath taken away the remedy. *1 Salk. 154. 2 Vern. 374.*

T. 1726, Blakeway and the earl of Strafford. In 1707, Sir Henry Johnson was indebted to Blakeway in 343*l.* In 1714 he received 50*l.* in part. In 1719 Sir Henry died, having made his will and devised his lands to his executors, in trust to pay his debts. The executors renouncing, the earl of Strafford administered with the will annexed. Blakeway brought his bill to be paid out of the assets. The earl of Strafford pleaded the statute of limitations; and that neither he, nor (as he believed) Sir Henry, made any promise to pay the debt, within six years before the bill brought. Lord chancellor: I would be cautious in giving any relief against an act of parliament: but it is plain, the debt is not extinguished by the statute of limitations, since the statute must be pleaded, which the defendant is not bound to do; and if he afterwards will acknowledge the debt, it takes it out of the statute: and his lordship over-ruled the plea. Upon appeal brought in the house of lords, this decree was reversed, and the plea ordered to stand for an answer. *2 P. Will. 373. (y)*

But

(y) But with liberty to except, and saving the benefit of the plea to the defendant, till the hearing of the cause. *3 Br. P. C.*

But if the debtor by his will directs that *all his debts* shall be paid, or makes any provision for the payment of his debts in general; this will revive it, and bring it out of the statute, and make his executors liable. *Pres. Cha.* 385.

So if the debtor, upon application for that particular debt, acknowledges and promises payment (for a bare acknowledgment is not sufficient); this will bring it out of the statute: for the acknowledgment and promise is a new evidence of the debt. *Id.*

But in the case of *Norton and Freeker*, *H.* 1737. It was said by the lord chancellor *Hardwicke*, that an executor is not *compellable*, either in law or equity, to take advantage of the statute of limitations, against a demand otherwise well founded. *1 Atk.* 526.

27. Where a testator is much indebted, and the executor is desirous to be rid of the assets; the executor's safest way is, to file a bill in chancery against the creditors to the end they may, if they will, contest each other's debts, and dispute who ought to be preferred in payment. *2 Vern.* 37.

Executor may file a bill, to determine priority of payment.

28. In debt against an executor, if the defendant plead fully administered, if any assets be found in his hands, although there be not to the value of the debt; yet the plaintiff shall have judgment for his whole debt of the goods of the testator. *1 Roll's Abr.* 929. (x)

Plea of plene administravit.

But

P. C. 305. And the like order was made in *Jones v. E. of Strafford*, 3 *P. Wms.* 89. But no further proceedings appear to have been had in either case. See *Mr. Coxe's notes, ubi supra*. The point is, however, considered as settled by Lord Mansfield, who expresses himself thus in *Trueman v. Fenton*, *Corpus* 548. "Where a man devises his estates for payment of his debts, a court of equity says, (and a court of law in a case properly before them would say the same,) all debts barred by the statute of limitations shall come in and share the benefit of the devise; because they are due in conscience, therefore though barred by law they shall be held to be revived, and charged by the bequest." See also *Lacon v. Briggs*, 3 *Atk.* 107.

(x) The judgment in such case used to be against the executor for the whole debt and damages, to be levied *de bonis testatoris, et non, &c.* the damages *de bonis propriis*. *Lil. Entr.* 504. But in *Harrison v. Beecles*, 3 *T. Rep.* 688., lord Mansfield, with the assent of the other judges, would not suffer the plaintiff to recover of the executor more than the assets in his hands with judgment,

A a 4

quando

But if it be found, that he had nothing in his hands, the judgment shall be, that the plaintiff shall take nothing by the writ, and shall not have judgment of the debt: for he hath waved this advantage by taking of the issue, and judgment is to be given upon the verdict. 1 Roll's Abr. 929. (a)

Plea of *ne unque*
executor.

29. If an executor plead *ne unque executor*, and is found executor; the judgment shall be general, to recover the debt, for his false plea. 1 Roll's Abr. 930.

In an action of debt against an executor, who pleadeth that he is not executor, nor even administered as executor, and this is found against him; the judgment shall be of the goods of the testator, if there are any such; if not,

quando acciderint for the residue. But if to an action on a bond the executor plead *payment* and *non est factum*, but omit to plead *plene administravit*, and a verdict and judgment be had against him, this amounts to a confession of assets, and to an action of debt upon that judgment suggesting a *devastavit*, he cannot plead that he has fully administered, but will be liable for both debt and damages *de bonis propriis*. See *Erving v. Peters*, 3 T. Rep. 685. and *Rock v. Leighton*, Ib. 690. So if a person bind himself as *administrator*, to abide by an award to be made, touching matters in dispute between his intestate and another, and the arbitrators award that he as *administrator* should pay, he cannot plead *plene administravit* to debt on the bond; for by submitting to such an award, he has admitted assets. *Barry v. Rush*, 1 T. Rep. 691. But a mere general *submission* to an award by an administrator is not of itself an admission of assets. *Pearson v. Henry*, 5 T. Rep. 6. If an executor plead that he has fully administered, and the plaintiff does not take issue on that plea, but takes judgment of assets *quando acciderint*, on a *scire facias* on that judgment he can only have execution of such assets as shall have come to the executor's hands since the judgment. But if it appear to the court on affidavit, that assets have come to the executor's hands, between the purchasing of the original writ and the judgment, the court will permit the plaintiff to enter up his judgment in such a manner as to reach them, except the executor can shew that some injustice will thereby be done him, as in case he should have fairly paid other debts in the interval. *Mara v. Quin*, 6 T. Rep. 1. In chancery, if a plaintiff pray an account, or procure a receiver to be appointed, this is a waiver of an admission of assets. *Wall v. Busby*, 1 Bro. 484.

(a) For here the plaintiff might have had judgment for the debt of the goods of the testator which might hereafter come to be administered. *Lil. Ent.* 505.

of his own goods; as well for the debt, as for the damages and costs. 1 *Roll's Abr.* 930. 1 *Atk.* 293. (b)

30. An executor shall not be forced to pay legacies, until the legatees shall give bond to refund in proportion, or in the whole, for the satisfaction of debts, if any shall appear unsatisfied. *Cha. Ca. Finch*, 136, *Viner*, Devise, Q. d. 7.

Debts to be paid
before legacies.

For debts are to be paid before legacies: and if the spiritual court will compel an executor to pay a legacy before he pay the testator's debts; a prohibition will lie. *Law of Ex.* 182.

But where lands are devised for payment of debts and legacies, and the debts are such as land is not liable to satisfy, as debts by simple contract; there, it is said, the debts shall have no preference of the legacies: but if there be not sufficient to pay all, they shall be paid in proportion. 2 *Freem.* 270.

So if a man bind himself in an obligation to perform a certain thing, and deviseth divers legacies, and dieth, leaving only sufficient to satisfy the obligation if this shall come to be forfeited; yet this obligation shall not be any bar of the legacies, because it is uncertain whether the obligation will ever come to be forfeited: but the executor shall make a conditional delivery of the legacy, to wit, that if the obligation shall be recovered against him, the legatee shall re-deliver the legacy. 1 *Roll's Abr.* 928.

[When executors pay a sum of money on their testator's account, which was not due, in an action to recover it back, they must declare in their own right, and not as executors; but if the money was due in conscience, such an action will not lie. *Munt v. Stokes*, 4 *T. Rep.* 565.]

VII. Of the payment of legacies, and distribution of intestates effects.

And,

I. Concerning the payment of legacies.

II. Concerning the distribution of intestates effects.

[III. Concerning the stamp duties chargeable on legacies and the distributive shares of an intestate's estate.]

(b) What constitutes an executor of his own wrong. See *supra*, Probate, 9.

I. Con-

I. Concerning the payment of legacies.

What persons
are incapable of
a legacy.

1. **BY** the statutes of the 25 C. 2. c. 2. and the 1 G. 2. c. 13. persons required to take the oaths and otherwise qualify themselves for offices, who shall act without such qualification, shall be incapable of any legacy.

By the 9 & 10 W. c. 32. Persons denying the Trinity, or asserting that there are more gods than one, or denying the christian religion to be true, or the holy scriptures to be of divine authority, shall for the second offence be incapable of any legacy.

And by 5 G. c. 27. Artificers going out of the kingdom, and exercising their trades in foreign parts, shall be incapable of any legacy.

In what cases
legacies are
taken away or
extinguished.

2. A legacy is extinct, by taking a bond for it. *Yelo. 39.*

Where the *statute of limitation* was pleaded in bar to a legacy demanded, due twenty years before; it was held by the lord chancellor, that a legacy is not barred by the statute, nor ever had been so held. *2 Freem. 22.*

The father by his will gave to his daughter 1000*l.* to be first paid after his debts, besides a share out of the dividend of his estate. Afterwards, on her marriage, an *agreement* was made, for what she should have out of her father's estate, and that it should be only 1100*l.* and that was to be in full of what was intended her thereout. It was decreed by the master of the rolls, and confirmed by the lord chancellor, that this was an ademption of the legacy, and that the 1100*l.* was to be in full of what the daughter was to have out of the said estate. *Hale and Aiton, 21 C. 2. 2 Cha. Ca. 35. (c)*

A man

(c) As an agreement may be a satisfaction of a legacy, so a legacy may be a satisfaction of an agreement; as where a man had one daughter, to whom 800*l.* was secured by marriage settlement, and afterwards he gave her 800*l.* by his will for her portion, and 200*l.* *per ann.* Lord keeper *Harcourt*, held that the daughter shall have but one 800*l.* though she may elect which of the portions she pleases. *Copley v. Copley, 1 P. Wms. 147.* So also, the bequest of the residue of testator's personal estate to a younger son, being greater than the provision by the father's marriage settlement, was decreed a satisfaction of that portion. *Rickman v. Morgan, 1 Bro. 63, and 2 Bro. 394.* And a legacy has been decreed to go in part satisfaction

A man by his will gave his four daughters 600l. apiece, and afterwards married his eldest daughter to the plaintiff, and gave her 700l. portion. After that, he makes a codicil, and gives 100l. apiece to his unmarried daughters, and thereby *ratifies and confirms his will*; and dies.

The plaintiff preferred his bill for the legacy of 600l. given to his wife by the said will. It was held by the master of the rolls, that the portion given by the testator in his life-time should be intended in satisfaction of the legacy. And it was agreed to be the constant rule, that where a legacy is given to a child, who afterwards, upon marriage or otherwise, receives the like or a greater sum, it shall be intended in satisfaction of the legacy, unless the testator declares his intention to be otherwise. And it was said, the words of *ratifying and confirming* do not alter the case, though they amount to a new publication, being only words of form, and declare nothing of the testator's intent in this matter. 2 *Freem.* 224. Irod and Hurst, T. 1698. [S. P. by lord Hardwicke in *Farnham v. Phillips*, 2 *Atk.* 214. (d)]

A man seised in fee, devised to his children 1000l., payable at several times, by 50l. a year, with which sums he charged his lands, and then died. One payment of 50l.

satisfaction of a provision by settlement. *Warren v. Warren*, 1 *Bro.* 305. But this is question of *intention*. See *Hanbury v. Hanbury*, with the cases there cited, 2 *Bro.* 352 & 529. and lord Tenterlow's judgment in *Rickman v. Morgan*, 1b. 394. *Jeacock v. Falkener*, 1 *Bro.* 295. *Barret v. Beckford*, 1 *Vesey* 519.

(d) But this rule does not apply to portions given by a stranger or distant relation, not *in loco parentis*, which shall not adeem a legacy given by his will. And the reason of the distinction is, that a parent is under a debt of nature to portion his child, and though he gives a legacy generally, he must be understood to mean it as a portion. If therefore he gives a sum of money afterwards upon marriage, it is for the same end, and consequently an ademption of the legacy. But a stranger not being under this obligation, shall be taken to have meant a double bounty, unless the contrary appear by evidence. *Shudal v. Jekyll*, 2 *Atk.* 516. *Powel v. Cleaver*, 2 *Bro.* 500. In *Harrop v. Whitmore*, 1 *P. Wms.* 681., the portion given by a father was less than the legacy, yet the latter was held to be adeemed. How far a legacy is a satisfaction for a debt, *vide supra*, Of what Things, 9. And when a distributary share shall be taken to be a performance of the intestate's covenant, *vide Lee v. d'Aranda*, 1 *Vesey*, 1. *Blandy v. Widmore*, 2 *Vern.* 709. 1 *P. Wms.* 324.

became

became due; then the lands were aliened by *fine* and proclamations, and five years passed. The devisee sued for the whole. But it was decreed, that what became due after the fine, was barred by the fine; but not the 50*l.* due before: For a trust is barred by fine. *H. 30 & 31 C. 2. Wakelin and Warner, 2 Cha. Ca. 247.*

Legacy given out of a *term for years*; if the term determines, the legacy is extinct, *Cha. Ca. Finch, 464.*

A legacy of a *lease of tithes* is extinguished by a renewal of the lease; but a republication of the will after the renewal restores the legacy. *2 Vezey, 418. (c)*

A legacy was devised out of *debts* due in several counties, and they were all called in before the testator's death; yet the legacy remained good. And a difference was taken between a pecuniary and a specific legacy: for in the first case the legacy will remain, though the debt upon which it is charged be paid in: but the specific legacy may be lost by being altered. So where the legacy was greater than the debt out of which it was directed to be paid did amount unto; yet such sum being expressly devised, and there being assets, it was decreed to be paid. *Cha. Ca. Finch, 152. Raym. 335.*

T. 1728, Ford and Fleming. One by will devised thus: I give to my grand-daughter Mary Ford (the plaintiff) the sum of 40*l.*, being part of a debt due and owing to me for rent from G. M. she allowing what charges shall be expended in getting the same; also, I give unto my two grandsons the rest and residue of what is owing to me from the said G. M. which is about 40*l.* more, to be equally divided between them, they allowing charges as aforesaid. Afterwards, the testator received the whole debt owing for rent from G. M. For the plaintiff it was insisted, that there was a difference between a specific and a pecuniary legacy; that though the disposing of a specific might be an ademption of it, yet this being a pecuniary legacy, the paying the money to the testator would be a loss of it. On the other side it was insisted, that there is a difference between a voluntary and a compulsory payment; that though the first was no ademption, yet the second was, and that the testator compelled G. M. to pay in the money. But the lord chancellor was of opinion, that there was no foundation for the difference taken in the books between a voluntary and compulsory

(c) *Vide supra, Of what things, 18.*

ayment : for the latter might be, with an intent to secure the legacy at all events ; and decreed to the plaintiff the sol. legacy. 1 *Abr. Cas. Eq.* 302.

So in the case of *Ashton and Ashton, M.* 1735. where the testator deviseth a debt, and afterwards receives it, or otherwise calls it in : In neither of these cases is this an redemption of the legacy ; seeing this might be done from an apprehension of such debt being in danger, and with a design to secure it ; and being personal estate, and not diminished by remaining in the testator's coffer instead of the hands of the debtor, it may well pass by the will. 3 *P. Will.* 386. (f)

M. 1736, *Partridge and Partridge.* The testator devised to the legatee 1000l. capital south sea stock. At the time of making his will he had 1800l. of such stock ; and after by sale reduced it to 200l. ; which he after increased to 1600l., and died. Between the making his will and his death, the act took place, which changed three fourths of the capital south sea stock into annuities. This legacy is not taken away or impaired, by the sale, or by the act of parliament. *Cas. Talb.* 226. (g)

3. The legatary or devisee may not of his own head take the goods or chattels devised to him, out of the possession of the executor, because the law gives him a remedy for the same, and because the law doth not appoint

Legacy where
to be sued for

(f) *S. P. Att. Gen. v. Parkin, Amb.* 596. *Bronsdon v. Winter*, ib. 57. Vid. tamen *Badrick v. Stevens*, 3 *Bro.* 431.

(g) *S. P. Bronsdon v. Winter, Amb.* 57. Where the testator bequeathed 2000l. capital stock in the South-Sea company ; at the time of making his will, he had just 2000l. in that stock, but afterwards sold it, and *Verney, M. R.* held, that this was not a specific legacy, nor adeemed, but decreed the executor to make good the 2000l. stock, out of the testator's personal estate. It remains to consider the effect of repeating a legacy. And if a testator gives a pecuniary legacy to *A.* by his will, and in a codicil also give the same *A.* a pecuniary legacy, the legatee is entitled to both sums, except a contrary intention can be collected from the will. But if the same corpus or specific body be twice given to the same person, the legacy shall not be doubled. *Ridges v. Morrison*, 1 *Bro.* 389. *Hookey v. Hatton*, ib. 390, with the authorities there cited. Neither shall it be doubled if the same sum be twice given to the same person in the same writing, but one legacy only shall be demanded except the contrary appear to have been the testator's intention. *D. of St. Alban's v. Miss Beauclerk*, 2 *Atk.* 636.

that

that the legacies shall be paid until the debts of the testator be first satisfied. *Swin.* 19. 2 *Bac. Abr.* 435.

For if the executor do detain the legacy, or do slack the performance of the testator's will; the legatary must sue the executor in the ecclesiastical court, for the same legacy so detained or not satisfied. *Swin.* 18.

For where a devise is made of goods, if the executor will not deliver them to the devisee, he hath no remedy by the common law. *Terms of the L. Devise.*

For an action on the case lieth not against an executor for a legacy; unless he promise to pay it upon good consideration; for legacies are only to be recovered in the spiritual court, or in the courts of equity. 1 *Sid.* 46: *Vin. Actions*, O. c. 7. (b)

And

(b) The jurisdiction of the court of chancery in suits for legacies is but of modern date compared with that of the ecclesiastical courts, being said to have commenced in the time of lord C Nottingham; but when aided by a *discovery* and *account*, it is more effective, and therefore more generally resorted to. The court also considers the executor as a trustee for the legatee, and will compel him (if he appears to have wasted the estate or to be in insolvent circumstances) to give security for the legacy if payable at a future day, or to bring the money into court. 1 *Cha. Ca.* 121. 3 *Bro.* 365. *Infra*, 4. And as it is a rule that he who seeks must do equity, if a husband and wife sue for the personal legacy left to the wife, the court will not compel the payment of it till a proper settlement be made on her. *Brown v. Eiton*, 3 *P. Wms.* 202. The court will also see money put out for children; which excellent provisions could be but imperfectly obtained in the ecclesiastical court, and with still greater difficulty in an action for a legacy at common law, in which the legatee if he recovered at all must recover without any terms. These reasons induced the court of K. B. in a late case, to decide that an action for a legacy does not lie at common law. *Dicks et Ux. v. Strutt*, 5 *T. Rep.* 690. But such action will lie if the executor having assets in his hand assent to the legacy, for the moral obligation which he is under to pay the legacy provided he has assets, is a sufficient consideration for his undertaking to pay it. *Atkyns et Ux. v. Hill*, and *Hawkes et Ux. v. Saunders*, *Corwp.* 284—294. *Pearson v. Henry*, 5 *T. Rep.* 6. Such promise must, however, be in writing, by 29 *C. 2. c. 3. § 4.* But in *Camden v. Turner*, C. B. sittings after *Trin.* 5 *G. 1.* King, C. J. held, that an action for money had and received lay against an executor for a legacy which he had owned *lay ready for the plaintiff whenever he would call for it*; cited by Buller, J. in *Hawkes v. Saunders*, *ubi supra*;

out a suit to the last, before they make such payments ; but if an action is taken out against them, it is the same. But if an executor makes a voluntary payment of a debt by simple contract, where there are not assets to satisfy the bond debts, it is otherwise, though he hath no notice ; for there are many cases, where a man's voluntary act shall prejudice him, where the necessity of law would not. Upon the whole, judgment was given for the defendant. *1 Barnard. 186.*

If the judgment is satisfied and is only kept on foot to wrong other creditors, or if there be any defeasance of the judgment yet in force ; then the judgment will not avail to keep off other creditors from their debts. *Swin. a. 456. 2 Bac. Abr. 433.*

And of two judgments, he who first sues execution must be preferred ; but before, it is at the election of the executor to pay which he will first : Only a judgment in a foreign country, as *France*, is to be considered but as a simple contract. *Treat. of Eq. B. 4. Pt. 2. c. 2. s. 2. Swin. a. 436.*

And it is not necessary, that the judgment be limited to the courts at Westminster ; but if it be obtained in any court of record, which hath power to hold plea by charter or prescription of debt above 40 s. it is sufficient. For tho' upon such a judgment execution cannot there be had, but of such goods as are within the jurisdiction of that court ; yet if the record be removed into chancery by a certiorari, and there by mittimus into one of the benches, then execution may be had upon any goods in any county of *England*. *Swin. a. 456.*

But a judgment not docketed, as by the 4 & 5 W. c. 20. shall not affect any lands as to purchasers or mortgagees ; or have any preference against heirs, executors, or administrators, in the administration of the estates of their ancestors, testators, or intestates.

Which act, in order to render more easy the finding of such judgment entered, directs in what manner alphabetical lists shall be made of judgments by confession, *non sum informatus*, or *nihil dicit*, in any of the courts of record at Westminster ; to which any person may resort, on paying 4 d. and no more (u).

19. In

(u) A debt on judgment not docketed according to the directions of this act, is put by it on a level with simple contract debts.

and appointed to special uses in way of equity, and not as a legacy, and therefore not to be sued for in the ecclesiastical court, but in a court of equity: and the ecclesiastical court cannot hold plea of a legacy in equity, but where it is a legacy in law indeed. *Cro. Car.* 395, 396. *Swin.* a. 19.

So if a man devise lands to be sold for the payment of debts, and dispose of the *surplus* to several persons; that cannot be sued for in an ecclesiastical court, but only in a court of equity; because that is not a legacy merely of goods and chattels, but it ariseth originally out of lands and tenements; and they have a testamentary jurisdiction touching chattels only. *Str.* 672.

So where the testator devised a legacy to one, to be paid out of the *profits* of his lands, and he deviseth those very lands to his executor for a term of years, and died; adjudged, that this was a temporal matter, and not testamentary, because the legacy was to arise out of the profits of the lands. *Swin.* 20.

But where the testator devised *leases* to his eldest son, and that out of the same he should raise such a sum of money for portions for his daughters, who libelled in the spiritual court for their portions; it was adjudged, that this should not be accounted as a rent issuing out of the lands, but as a testamentary legacy, and to be recovered in that court. *1 Bulst.* 153.

M. 2 An. Ewer and Jones. It was held by Holt chief justice clearly, that a devisee may maintain an action at common law, against a tertenant for a legacy devised out of land; for where a statute, as the statute of wills, gives a right; the party by consequence shall have an action at law to recover that right. *2 Salk.* 415.

But the usual remedy in such like cases, is in equity. *3 Salk.* 223.

It is said, that where the ecclesiastical court and a court of equity have a concurrent jurisdiction, whichever is first possessed of the cause has a right to proceed: and the same of all other courts. But where the husband hath sued in the spiritual court for a legacy given to the wife, the court of chancery hath granted an injunction to stay proceedings; because the spiritual court cannot oblige him to make an adequate settlement on her. *Proc. Cha.* 546.

So where a personal legacy was given to an infant; it was held, that the same is more properly cognizable in chancery than in the ecclesiastical court; and if the mat-

ter had proceeded to sentence in the ecclesiastical court, yet it was proper to come into chancery for the executor's indemnity; for in the chancery legatees are to give security for the money, but not in the spiritual court; and the chancery will see the money put out for the children. *1 Vern. 260*

So where there is a trust, or any thing in nature of a trust, notwithstanding the ecclesiastical court hath an original jurisdiction in legacies, yet the chancery will grant an injunction to stay the proceedings in the ecclesiastical court; trusts being properly cognizable only in equity. *1 Atk. 491.*

So where a will is suppressed or destroyed, the suit for a personal legacy may be in equity in the first instance, without resorting to the spiritual court; otherwise it would put the plaintiff upon great difficulties; for in the spiritual court, the plaintiff must prove it a will in writing, and must likewise prove the contents in the very words, and must also prove the whole will, though the remainder of it doth not at all belong to, or regard his legacy; which the temporal courts do not put a person upon doing. Much more, when the legacy is charged both out of personal and real estate; for as to the real estate, there is no occasion to resort to the ecclesiastical court at all. *3 Atk. 361.*

Legacies may be recovered in the spiritual court against an *administrator with the will annexed*, or against an *executor of his own wrong*. *1 Roll's Abr. 919.*

Where the executor, being sued in the spiritual court for a legacy, pleads the legatee's release, and that court tries the validity of that release, the common law will not prohibit them, provided they try it by the rules of the common law; because they have jurisdiction of the legacy, which is the original cause. *2 Roll's Abr. 307.*

But where *plene administravit* was pleaded in the spiritual court, and proved by one witness, which they would not allow; a prohibition was granted. *Het. 87.*

So where an executor, being sued for a legacy in the spiritual court, pleaded the plaintiff's release, which was disallowed there, because the witnesses were dead, and that court refused to allow circumstantial proofs of the release; a prohibition was granted. *2 Roll's Abr. 302.*

4. An executor may in some cases be compelled to give security to pay a legacy; as where 1000 l. was devised to a person to be paid at the age of twenty-one years; and upon a bill exhibited against the executor, suggesting a

Security to be given, when the day of payment is distant.

devastavit, and praying that he might give security to pay the legacy when due, it was decreed accordingly. 1 *Ch. Ca.* 121.

The testator devised 800 l. to an infant, to be paid by his executor when the said infant should attain to the age of twenty-one years. The infant by his guardian exhibited a bill, that the executor might give security for the payment of the money. And so it was decreed. *Swin. a. 40. Law of Ex. 187.*

The testator bequeathed his personal estate to his wife for life, and what she should leave at her death to be equally distributed between his own kindred and hers; if the estate be so small, that she cannot live upon it without spending the stock, it seems she shall not be obliged to give security; otherwise she shall. *Proc. Ch. 71.*

H. 11 Ja. Prowe's case. If a person possessed of a lease for years, devise that his executor out of the profits thereof shall pay to every one of his daughters 20 l. at their full age; the executor may be sued in the spiritual court, to put in surety to pay the legacies, and no prohibition shall be granted; for this is to issue out of a chattel. 2 *Roll's Abr.* 285.

But in the case of *Palmer and Mason, M. 1737.* Where 500 l. was given to the grand-daughter, to be paid at 21 or marriage; and if she died before either of those contingencies happened, then to go over to another: It was said by lord Hardwicke, as the legacy was devised over, nothing vested in the grand-daughter till one of the contingencies should happen; and therefore she was not entitled to have the legacy secured. 1 *Atk.* 505. (i)

Payment to an infant.

5. Mr. *Wentworth* says, In case an infant be of the age of discretion, to wit, fourteen years, he holdeth it

(i) But per lord *Tiburlow*, C. in *Green v. Pigott*, 1 *Bro.* 103., the latter cases have been, that the fund should be appropriated, and whether a legacy be payable at a fixed or a contingent future day, the effect is the same; and his lordship approved of the decree of the master of the rolls, ordering the legacy to be laid out in the purchase of Bank 3 per cent. consolidated annuities in the name of the accountant general, upon the trusts, and subject to the contingencies of the testator's will. See also *Billings v. Sandom*, 1 *Bro.* 393. *Newlan v. Nottgen*, 16. 489 et supra *Ferm and Manner*. 35. n.; and this is the more necessary, as in case of the executor's bankruptcy his certificate is a bar, and the residuary legatees are not liable, *Wain v. Haie*, 2 *Bro.* 305.

clear,

clear, that the payment of a legacy to him made will stand good, whether he who makes such payment have any acquittance or not; for if he have proof of the payment, he is well enough acquitted from any second payment. *Went.* 219.

And he thinks on demand and acquittance tendered, he ought to pay it to an infant of tender years (in presence of his guardian); payment according to the testator's appointment being the matter which acquitteth the payer. *Went* 220, 221.

And Mr. *Clerke* says, If a legacy be left to an infant under seven years of age, the father (or next of kin) shall apply to the judge before whom he intends to sue for the legacy, and allege that such a person deceased made his will, and appointed such a one executor, and in the said will bequeathed unto his son being an infant (under seven years of age) such a legacy; and that by reason of such age, the said infant hath not a person able and fit to sue for the same; and shall implore the office of the judge in that behalf, and request that curators be assigned to the infant, to sue for and recover the said legacy from the executor: Whereupon the judge usually assigneth such father or next of kin to be curators in that behalf. *1 Ought.* 357.

But if the minor is above seven years of age, the judge doth not, ex officio, constitute a curator, but the minor is to choose one, either personally, or by commission (as in case where he lives at a great distance, or otherwise), or sometimes by special proxy under his hand and seal, requesting that such curator may be assigned by the judge as aforesaid. *Id.* 358, 359, 360.

And if the executor, on suit of the minor by such curator as aforesaid, pay to the curator the legacy due to the minor, he is discharged from any further payment thereof to the minor when he comes of age; although the curator never pay it to the minor, or shall become insolvent: And the reason is, because he pays it by the decree of the judge. And therefore it is advisable for the executor, not to pay the legacy until suit hath been commenced against him by the curator, and he the said executor hath been cited: and then let him offer to pay the legacy *judicially*, that is, according to the forms of the court; and the same being entered in the acts of the judge, the executor is discharged. *Id.* 362, 3.

And in this case the judge is not wont, nor is obliged, to deliver the legacy to the curator for the use of the

minor, until he hath given caution for the indemnity of the judge and of the executor in this behalf, and for the payment thereof to the minor when he shall come of age. *Id.* 363.

And in the court of chancery, in the case of *Bullen and Allen*, T. 28 C. 2. An infant exhibited a bill by his guardian, for a legacy of 100 l. devised to him. The defendant by his answer confessed the legacy, and that he was always ready to pay it, so as he might be lawfully discharged, which the plaintiff by reason of his infancy could not do: and therefore insisted that it might be paid without interest. Which was decreed accordingly, and the defendant to be indemnified. *Cha. Ca. Finch.* 264.

And in the case of *Dyke and Dyke*, H. 25 Cha. 2. Where legacies were devised to infants payable at a certain time, which expired during their infancy, and the executor refused to pay the same, because the legatees could not give any discharges by reason of their infancy, it was decreed, that the master should put out the money at interest in the name of the guardian, or of such other person as he should think fit, and that the defendant should be indemnified against the infants. *Cha. Ca. Finch.* 95.

In the case of *Holloway and Collins*, H. 26 & 27 C. 2. A legacy of 125 l. was given to the plaintiff, being but ten years old, and at that age was paid to the plaintiff's father, who died insolvent. This was held by the lord keeper to be good payment: but the attorney general urged very much the ill consequence of this; for the law must be the same if it were 1000 l. and extends to other cases of like nature, not to legacies only; and said, that the executor ought to have sued in this court to have paid it. And the lord keeper said, it may be so where the legacy will bear the charge of suit, but not otherwise. But the executor having taken a bond to save him harmless, it was decreed that he should pay it over again, for he had paid it at his own peril. 1 *Cha. Ca.* 245.

But in the case of *Strickland and Hudson*, E. 7 An. lord chancellor Cowper said, that the master of the rolls, who had longer experience than himself, would never allow a child's legacy to be paid to the father or mother upon any security whatever, by reason of the strife it might occasion in a family. 3 *Cha. Ca.* 168.

And in the case of *Doyley and Tollserry*, M. 1715; a legacy of 100 l. was devised to an infant of about ten years of age; the executor paid this legacy to the father, and took

took his receipt for it. When the infant came of age, his father told him he had received the legacy, but could not pay it him immediately, and said he would not have him trouble the executor, for he would give it him. The son rested satisfied with this for about fourteen or fifteen years; and his father and he having carried on a joint trade together, became bankrupts. This legacy of 100 l. being amongst other things assigned by the commissioners for the benefit of the creditors, the assignee brought a bill against the executor for an account and payment of this legacy. The defendant insisted on the extreme hardship of his case, if he should be obliged to pay the legacy over again; that he had justly paid it to the father, whilst he was in good circumstances; and that if application had been made sooner, he might have had his remedy over against the father; that the father was by nature guardian to his child; and that formerly payment to him was allowed to be good. The lord chancellor said, that if the father had not made the son such promise of recompence, and the son had acquiesced all that time, the case might have been more doubtful; but this promise of the father drew him to forbear applying to the executor sooner; and since the father had not and could not now make good his promise, being a bankrupt, the reason of the son's forbearance was at an end; he thought the rule of this court in not suffering parents to receive their children's legacies was founded on very good reason; and therefore lest hereafter this case should be cited as a precedent, when the circumstances attending it might be forgot, and to discountenance and deter others from paying such legacies to the parents (tho' he did not deny the hardship of that particular case) he decreed for the plaintiff against the executor. 1 *Abr. Cas. Eq.* 300. 3 *Bac. Abr.* 484.

Nov. 11, 1740; *Phillips and Paget*. Mrs. Paget by her will gives a legacy of 100 l. to each of the three children of Mr. Philips, and makes the defendant her executor, leaving him the bulk of her estate, provided he pays the three legacies of 100 l. within a year after her death, pursuant to her will. The defendant, within the time, pays to the children's own hands their legacies. The eldest of them was 16 years old at the time, the next 14, and the youngest 9 only. And in his answer he denies that he knows this money ever came to the father's hands. But the children have now brought their bill against the defendant, to be paid their several le-

gacies, suggesting that their father had embezzled the money paid by the defendant during their infancy, and is insolvent; and that this was a fraudulent payment to the father, and therefore it must be paid over again. Lord Hardwicke asked the counsel for the defendant, if they knew any instance where an executor paying so large a sum as 100l. into the hands of minors, had been allowed such payments: Indeed, in cases where the legacies have been very small, the payment has been allowed by the court. But in this case, notwithstanding the sum is above 100l. yet as the payment by the executor to the children themselves is so fully proved, and not at all controverted by the plaintiffs, and their losing the benefit of it is owing to the negligence and insolvency of the father, I will not strain the rules of this court to make an executor pay it over again; especially as he made this payment to save a forfeiture, it being an express condition of his own taking under the will, that he should discharge their legacies within a year after Mrs. Paget's death. But the next day the lord chancellor said, that upon looking into the cases, he found this a very doubtful point; and unless the defendant will agree to give the plaintiffs something, he would not determine it, without taking time to consider it. The defendant, upon this recommendation of the court, agreed to pay in 50l. to be divided between the three plaintiffs; and each side were to abide by their costs; and it was made part of the decree that the 50l. was paid by consent of all parties. And his lordship directed each of the plaintiffs, upon receiving their respective shares, to release the legacies under the will. The case of *Dorley* and *Tollferry*, he said, must have had some other circumstances; for the rule is laid down too strictly, that in all cases where executors pay infants legacies to their fathers, in order to deter executors from such payments, it shall be paid over again. Lord Cowper confirmed the decree of the master of the rolls in that case; but he seemeth to have had a remorse of judgment at the time; for in the register's office it appears, his lordship ordered the deposit to be divided between the parties. 2 *Atk.* 80.

And in the case of *Rotheram* and *Fanshaw*, Mar. 25, 1748; lord Hardwicke said, *arguendo*, that where a suit is instituted in the spiritual court, for an infant's legacy, by a father, to have it paid into his hands; the court will grant an injunction: because it will not allow the
 infant's

infant's money to come into the father's hands. 3 *Atk.* 629.

6. By the civil law, a testator cannot enjoin his executor to pay interest for the non-payment of a legacy. And though interest or usury be only forbidden by the civil law beyond such a sum, yet it being entirely prohibited by the canon law, it follows *a fortiori* that he cannot do it by that law. *Ayl. Par.* 342.

In what case a legacy shall bear interest, and from what time.

And by the laws of this realm, the receiving of interest for money was for a long time prohibited: but afterwards, from the unreasonableness of the thing itself, and the inconvenience thereof to society, these restrictions vanished by degrees, and it became lawful to receive interest within certain bounds prescribed by the legislature; and as in other matters, so also in the case of legacies, the courts both ecclesiastical and temporal have allowed interest to be paid for legacies withheld in certain instances. And, generally, it is said, if a legacy be bequeathed to be paid divers years after the testator's death, this difference is to be observed; if the day were given in favour of the legatee being an infant, who could not safely receive it any sooner, then he shall have the profit; but if the respite was in favour of the executor, then the legatee shall have the bare legacy without interest. *Went.* 352.

M. 1727. *Bilson and Sanders.* A legacy was given to an infant, the testator having a great deal of money in bank stock. The executor was residuary legatee. A bill was brought in the exchequer for the legacy. And the question was, Whether it should bear interest, and from what time? Chief baron Pengelly and baron Hale; It is a certain rule, that where a fund is certain, as where charged on land, it shall bear interest, because it plainly appears the rents are received: So the fund on which it is charged produces a profit here, it is equally certain, and therefore should bear interest, and should be from the testator's death. But this was opposed by Carter and Comyns, barons, that it should only bear interest from a year after the testator's death; for as legacies are to be paid after debts, the executor has that time to inquire, till which time they are not payable, so not to bear interest: which was agreed. A difference was offered to be made, that as there was a legacy to an infant, it could not be safely paid, and therefore could not bear interest. To which it was answered by the chief baron, that it might be safely paid into the hands of an infant, having proper evidence of the payment, as in *Wentworth's Executor*, 313.

And by Carter; it may be paid into the hands of the guardian, having evidence; but if he takes security from the guardian which should prove defective, there, as he doth not rely on the security the law gives, he must depend on that taken at his peril. *Select Cases in Chancery*, 72. *Bunb.* 240.

June 22, 1743. *Butler and Freeman*. The grandfather of the plaintiff, by will, after directing his debts and legacies to be paid, gives all the rest and residue of his personal estate to his grandson the plaintiff at his age of 21, and if he die before that age, then to the defendant Freeman, whom he makes his executor. The plaintiff brought his bill for the interest of the residue, to be paid to him during his infancy. The defendant Freeman by his answer insisted, that the plaintiff is not entitled to it, unless he attains his age of 21: but that it ought to accumulate: and if the plaintiff dies before 21, that it will equally belong to the defendant with the residue. The father of the plaintiff insisted, that the residue must be confined to what the testator left at the time of his death, and that the interest made after his death ought to be considered as an undisposed part, and go to him as next of kin to the testator, according to the statute of distribution: or if the court should be against him in this point, that then he is entitled to receive it for the maintenance of the plaintiff. By the lord chancellor Hardwicke: I am of opinion, that the plaintiff is not entitled to the interest that arises from this residue; and tho' the words *rest and residue* must be confined to what shall be found at the death of the testator, after his debts, funeral expences, and legacies are paid, yet that the interest ought to accumulate till the plaintiff arrives at his age of 21, and as often as it amounts to a competent sum to be placed out by a trustee appointed by the master. I am not quite so clear how the interest would go, if the accident should happen of the plaintiff's dying before 21, whether to the representative of the plaintiff, or to the defendant Freeman: but that is not necessary to be inquired into at this time. As to the father's claim, I am of opinion he has no right to the interest, because the testator has given *all the rest and residue* of his personal estate, so that he cannot be said to have left any part undisposed, and consequently can have no title to it as next of kin under the statute of distribution. For as the devise of the residue is contingent, it not vesting till the grandson's age of 21, the interest is so likewise, and must accumulate in the

the mean time: nor can the father by the rules of this court entitle himself to it as maintenance for the infant, because it is given by a grandfather to a grandson upon a contingency of attaining his age of 21; and as nothing is said how the produce of it shall be applied, he is not entitled as a grandson to be maintained out of the produce. The law of nature obliges only fathers to maintain their children; and unless the child, from the mean circumstances of the parent, is in danger of perishing for want, the court will not direct the interest that shall be made of a contingent legacy to be applied for that purpose: So that unless the parent is totally incapable, or under particular circumstances, as having a numerous family of children, and is bordering upon necessity, the law of the land and of nature make it incumbent on the parent to maintain his child. In the case of *Acherley and Vernon*, 1 P. Will. 783, where the testator Mr. Vernon had left 6000l. to the plaintiff his niece, to be paid to her at her age of 21, and she insisted that the interest of this money ought to be allowed for her maintenance; lord Macclesfield was of opinion, that the interest in that cause ought to follow the principal, for it was a vested legacy, and payable at 21. But there it was a sum of money separated and detached from the rest of the estate, and a vested legacy; here it is a contingent one, and not a specific sum, but of the residue of his personal estate, which makes a difference between the cases; and the father likewise in the present case possessed of a good estate, and in considerable circumstances. Therefore his lordship decreed the interest which has arisen upon the residue of the testator's personal estate since his death, or which may arise, to be paid into the hands of a trustee, to be laid out in real or government securities as often as it shall amount to a competent sum. 3 Atk 58.

July 2, 1744; *Heath and Perry*. The testator by his will gave 1000l. a-piece to five brothers and sisters, (but who were no relations to him,) to be paid to them at their respective ages of 21, in case they should respectively attain that age, and not otherwise; and if any of them should happen to die before they attain their respective ages of 21, that then and in such case the legacy or legacies of 1000l. so given to them respectively shall be void. The legatees brought a bill for interest on their legacies. By lord Hardwicke: Cases of this kind, how far a legatee, who is not entitled to the payment of the legacy immediately, shall have interest in the mean time, depend

depend upon particular circumstances. Some upon relationship, some upon the necessities of legatees; and most of them upon the particular penning of wills; and there is hardly one case which can be cited that is a precedent for another. Some things are certain in these cases; for if a legacy is given generally at marriage, or at 21, then the vesting and time of payment are the same, and shall not vest till marriage or 21. To go one step further; where a legacy is actually vested, as if given to an infant payable at 21, yet it shall not carry interest, unless something is said in the will that shews the testator's intention to give interest in the mean time: But all these cases are subject to this exception, if it is in the case of a child; for then let a testator give it how he will; either at 21, or at marriage, or payable at 21, or payable at marriage, and the child has no other provision, the court will give interest by way of maintenance, for they will not presume the father so unnatural as to leave a child destitute. But in the present case, the legatees are mere strangers to the testator; and nothing shall be taken out of the estate for their benefit during their non-age. 3 Atk. 101.

Supposing interest to be due, another question arises, From what time the interest shall accrue. Concerning which, in the case of *Jolliffe and Crew*, E. 1701, it was determined as follows: viz. If a legacy be devised generally, and no time ascertained for the payment, and the legatee be an infant; he shall be paid interest from the expiration of the first year after the testator's death; but it seems a year shall be allowed for so long the statute of distribution allows before the distribution be compellable, and so long the executor shall have, that it may appear whether there be any debts: But, if the legatee be of full age, he shall only have interest from the time of his demand after the year; for no time of payment being set, it is not payable but upon demand, and he shall not have interest but from the time of his demand: otherwise it is in case of an infant, because no laches are imputed to him. But where a certain legacy is left payable at a day certain; it must be paid with interest from that day. 2 Salk. 415. Prec. Cha. 161.

And in the case of *Maxwell and Wattenball*, T. 1723; the following points were resolved, 1. If one gives a legacy charged upon land, which yields rents and profits, and there is no time of payment mentioned in the will; the legacy shall carry interest from the testator's death, because the land yields profit from that time. 2. But if

If a legacy be given out of a personal estate, and no time of payment mentioned in the will; this legacy shall carry interest only from the end of the year after the death of the testator. 3. If a legacy be given, charged upon a reversion: here it shall carry interest only from a year after the death of the testator, a year being a convenient time for sale. 4. If a legacy be given out of a personal estate, consisting of mortgages carrying interest, or of stocks yielding profits half yearly; it seems in this case the legacy shall carry interest from the death of the testator. 5. If a legacy be brought into court, and the legatee hath notice of it, so that it is his fault not to pray to have the money, or that the money should be put out; the legatee in such case shall lose the interest from the time the money was brought into court: but if the money was put out, the legatee shall have the interest which the money put out by the court did yield. 2 P. Will. 26. (k)

As to the *quantum* of interest, the determinations have been various: in the case of *Guillam and Holland*, Oct. 14, 1741; Lord Hardwicke said, where a portion is charged upon land, and the will doth not mention interest, the court will not give any more than 4 *per cent.* tho' the legal interest is 5 *per cent.* and this rule hath also been extended to the cases of legacies and portions charged upon personal estate. 2 Atk. 343.

In the case of *Incedon and Northcote*, Mar. 2, 1746; Lord Hardwicke said at first, as no more had been allowed for many years than 4 *per cent.* interest to children for maintenance, he did not care to break through the rule: But afterwards, in consideration of the interest of money being altered lately, mortgages being then at

(k) Where a parent gives a legacy to a child unprovided for, the child shall have interest from the day of the parent's death. Per Sir L. Kenyon, M. R. in *Carey v. Askew*, 2 Bro. 59. And in *Green v. Pigot*, 1 Bro. 103, a legacy being given to a female infant, to be paid at 21, or marriage, with interest at 4 *per cent.* (but if she died before, to sink into the residue); Lord Thurlow, C. ordered the money to be paid into the Bank, in order to secure the legacy, and if greater interest was made, that it should be for the benefit of the child. But an executor cannot appropriate a legacy in this manner without the direction of the court, for if the stock fall in value, his estate must make good the difference. *Cowper v. Douglas*, 1 Bro. 231.

four and a half, and several at five *per cent.* he ordered the children should have four and a half *per cent.* interest. 3 *Atk.* 438.

In *Bryant and Speke*, Dec. 6, 1748; Lord Hardwicke said, The general rule is, that legacies out of real estate carry one *per cent.* lower than legal interest; but if out of personal estate, because of the higher interest of money than land, it shall carry the legal interest, unless particular circumstances induce the court to vary therefrom. And this, he said, was in conformity to the ecclesiastical court, which gives legal interest upon legacies out of personal estate. 1 *Vez* 171.

In *Beckford and Tobin*, Nov. 4, 1749; It was said by the lord chancellor Hardwicke, that in general the court exercises as large a discretion as to the rate of interest upon legacies, where interest is not particularly given, as in any case; and that it is difficult to reduce it to a certain rule. - The most general rule hath been, between interest of legacies charged on land, and on personal estate; and where nothing more, the court has said, that land never produces profit equal to the interest of money, and will follow the course of things, and give interest, where charged on land, one *per cent.* lower than the legal interest. So it was when the legal interest was at six; but in general, where a legacy is out of personal estate, the court gives five; and unless that is taken to be a sort of rule, there will be no distinction between them. - Nevertheless, in the present case the fund out of which the interest was to arise yielding no more than four, the court allowed but four *per cent.* 1 *Vez.* 308.

M. 1733. *Ferrers and Ferrers.* The countess dowager of Ferrers was by settlement and will of her late husband earl Robert, entitled to a jointure estate of 1000*l.* a year, but was kept out of possession by earl Washington, the son of earl Robert by a former venter; and now insisted upon the arrears, and interest, from the time of her husband's death; comparing it to the case of arrears of an annuity, or rent charge, which are decreed to be paid with interest. By Talbot lord chancellor: The arrears of an annuity or rent charge are never decreed to be paid with interest, but where the sum is certain and fixed; and also where there is either a clause of entry, or *nomine pœnæ*, or some penalty upon the grantor which he must undergo, if the grantee sued at law: and which would oblige him to come into this court for relief, which the court will not grant but upon equal terms, and those can be no other but decreeing the grantor to pay the arrears, with

became due; then the lands were aliened by *fine* and proclamations, and five years passed. The devisee sued for the whole. But it was decreed, that what became due after the fine, was barred by the fine; but not the 50l. due before: For a trust is barred by fine. *H. 30 & 31 C. 2. Wakelin and Warner, 2 Cha. Ca. 247.*

Legacy given out of a *term for years*; if the term determines, the legacy is extinct, *Cha. Ca. Finch, 464.*

A legacy of a *lease of tithes* is extinguished by a renewal of the lease; but a republication of the will after the renewal restores the legacy. *2 Vezey, 418. (e)*

A legacy was devised out of *debts* due in several counties, and they were all called in before the testator's death; yet the legacy remained good. And a difference was taken between a pecuniary and a specific legacy: for in the first case the legacy will remain, though the debt upon which it is charged be paid in: but the specific legacy may be lost by being altered. So where the legacy was greater than the debt out of which it was directed to be paid did amount unto; yet such sum being expressly devised, and there being assets, it was decreed to be paid. *Cha. Ca. Finch, 152. Raym. 335.*

T. 1728, Ford and Fleming. One by will devised thus: I give to my grand-daughter Mary Ford (the plaintiff) the sum of 40l., being part of a debt due and owing to me for rent from G. M. she allowing what charges shall be expended in getting the same; also, I give unto my two grandsons the rest and residue of what is owing to me from the said G. M. which is about 40l. more, to be equally divided between them, they allowing charges as aforesaid. Afterwards, the testator received the whole debt owing for rent from G. M. For the plaintiff it was insisted, that there was a difference between a specific and a pecuniary legacy; that though the disposing of a specific might be an ademption of it, yet this being a pecuniary legacy, the paying the money to the testator would be a loss of it. On the other side it was insisted, that there is a difference between a voluntary and a compulsory payment; that though the first was no ademption, yet the second was, and that the testator compelled G. M. to pay in the money. But the lord chancellor was of opinion, that there was no foundation for the difference taken in the books between a voluntary and compulsory

(e) *Vide supra, Of what things, 18.*

rest, if the estate would bear it; for every one must suppose it to have been the intention of the father, that his children should not want bread during their infancy: That for this reason it had been held, that though a legacy were devised over in case of the legatee's dying before twenty-one, yet the infant legatee ought to have interest allowed him during his infancy, in order for his maintenance; with this difference only, that where the estate has appeared to be small, the court, in whose discretion it always lies to determine the quantum of interest, has ordered the lower interest: And it seemeth, that if one, not a parent, gives a legacy to an infant, payable at twenty one, without any devise over, and the infant has nothing else to subsist on; the court will order part of this legacy, in order to provide bread for the infant, to be paid presently, allowing interest for the same to the person paying it, out of the remaining principal; though this is done very sparingly. 2 *P. Will.* 21.

M. 1684. *Barlow and Grant.* Upon a bill for 100*l.* legacy given to a child, the defendant insisted upon an allowance of 16*l.* a year, for keeping the legatee at school. It was objected, that only the bare interest of the money ought to have been expended in his education, and not to have sunk the principal, as in this case the defendant had done. But the lord keeper thought it fit and reasonable to be allowed; and said, the money laid out in the child's education was most advantageous and beneficial for the infant, and therefore he should make no scruple of breaking into the principal, where so small a sum was devised, that the interest thereof would not suffice to give the legatee a competent maintenance and education; but in case of a legacy of 1000*l.*, or the like, there it might be reasonable to restrain the maintenance to the interest of the money. 1 *Vern.* 255.

But if the legacy is devised over, it seemeth to be otherwise; and that the court in such case will not diminish the principal but only allow the interest thereof to the first legatee, until the time that the legacy shall become payable. 1 *Cha. Ca.* *Leech and Leech*, *H.* 26 & 27 *C.* 2. *Prec. Cha.* 195. *Brewin and Brewin*, *E.* 1702.

Also a legacy in the hands of the father given to his children by a relation or other, shall not be diminished by the father; because he is obliged to maintain his own children: As in the case of *Darley and Darley*, Dec 6, 1746. A bill was brought by the plaintiff for two legacies

cies of 50 l. each, left to himself and his sister under the will of their grandfather, and for the interest that has been made thereof. The sister's legacy he claims by assignment from her. The defendant, being executor to the father, insists, he is not obliged to account to the plaintiff for principal or interest, one hundred and five pounds being expended for putting him out apprentice, and much more than fifty pounds in the maintenance and clothing of the sister. By the lord chancellor Hardwicke: Where legacies are given to a child by a relation, a father cannot make use of such legacy in maintenance of the child, but must provide for him out of his own pocket; nor can he set him out in the world, or put him out an apprentice, or clerk, with the money arising from the legacy; and if he does, he shall not be allowed it. And be ordered interest to be computed on the legacies given to the plaintiff and his sister, from the time they respectively attained their ages of 21, at 5 *per cent.* and that what shall be found due for principal and interest of these legacies be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff, he having admitted assets of the father for that purpose. 3 *Atk.* 399.

8. Nov. 4. 1684. *Palmer and Trevor.* Morley devised 100 l. to his daughter Eliz. Palmer, a feme covert, and dies. The executor pays it to Elizabeth, who spends it in her own maintenance. Her husband sues for it; and the question was, whether this was a good payment to the wife, it being in proof that at the time of making the will, Palmer and his wife lived apart, and the husband did not allow her maintenance, and so it is a strong presumption that the deviser intended this for her separate use. By the lord keeper: If it had been so given in express terms, the payment to her had been good; but as it is, the husband must have it decreed: he said, that in case where a tenant paid his rent to his landlady, not knowing that she was married, yet the husband made him pay it over again, and no help for it. Moreover the will appointing the legacy to be paid within six months after the testator's decease; the lord keeper decreed the husband interest from that time, but if no time limited, no interest. 1 *Vern.* 261. (1)

Payment to a
feme covert.

(1) But if the husband sue for a personal legacy given to the wife, the court will not compel the payment of it till a proper settlement be made on her. *Brown v. Ekin*, 3 *P. Wms.* 202. cited *supra* 3. in not.

Security to refund.

9. In the case of *Grove and Banfon, M. 21 Car.* It is said generally, that an executor is not bound to pay a legacy, without security to refund, in case there be a defect of assets. 1 *Cha. Caf.* 149.

And in the case of *Noel and Robinson, M. 1682*, it is said, that if they give sentence in the ecclesiastical court for the payment of a legacy, a prohibition will lie, unless they take security to refund in case of insufficiency of goods to discharge debts, and the like; for a diminution of legacies is to be made *pro rata*, if the testator's estate will not extend to pay them all. 2 *Ventr.* 358. 3 *Bac. Abr.* 483. *Ayl. Par.* 313.

And Mr. Oughton says, If the testator hath given bond with any person, for the payment of a debt after certain years to come, or for the performance of any covenants or contracts at a future day; although the executor in this case hath goods in his hands sufficient to pay the legacies, yet if the said sum for which the testator was bound is not paid, or the said covenants be not fulfilled, in such case, the executor for his indemnity may offer judicially the legacy upon this condition, that the legatary first give proper security to keep him indemnified with respect to the debts and covenants aforesaid, at least proportionably, regard being had to the other legacies. Which if the legatary shall refuse, the executor may leave the same with the register upon the condition. 1 *Ought.* 369, 370.

The form of which security to be given as aforesaid, may be this:

“ Know all men by these presents, &c.” (as in the common form of bonds) :

“ Whereas E. F. late of — deceased, did on the — day
“ of — duly make and execute his last will and testament,
“ and did therein, amongst other legacies, give and be-
“ queath unto the above bounden A. B. the sum of — and
“ therein and thereof did name and appoint the above-
“ named C. D. executor, who hath proved the same in
“ the consistory court of — and taken upon himself the
“ execution thereof: And whereas the said C. D. hath
“ at the request of the said A. B. actually paid to him
“ the said A. B. the whole legacy of — altho’ there may
“ be cause to apprehend a deficiency of assets for pay-
“ ment of the other legacies: The condition of this obli-
“ gation is such, that if such deficiency shall actually
“ and bonâ fide happen, the said A. B. his executors
“ administrators, shall within — days next after requi-
“ rement made in

in that behalf to him made, refund and pay back unto him the said C. D. his executor or executors, administrator or administrators, his or their rateable part or share of such deficiency, Then this obligation to be void, otherwise of force."

And in a court of equity, common justice will compel legatee to refund, although no security hath been given for that purpose. 1 *Vern.* 93, 94.

And by the lord chancellor Hardwicke, legatees are not obliged to give security to refund upon a deficiency of assets. 1 *Atk.* 491. 1 *Vez.* 342.

And the rule is, where an executor pays a legacy, the presumption is, that he hath sufficient to pay all legacies, and the court will oblige him, if solvent, to pay the rest, and not permit him to bring a bill to compel the legatee, whom he voluntarily paid, to refund; although, if the executor prove insolvent, so that there is no other way, the court will admit a bill by the other legatees to compel that legatee to refund. 2 *Vez.* 194.

10. The ancient law was, that if a man bequeath 20 l. to one, and 20 l. to another, and 20 l. to a third, and makes his executor and dies, having goods but to the value of 20 l. in all; of which goods the executor maketh an inventory: in this case he may pay which of the three he pleaseth his whole legacy, and the other two are without remedy: or he may, if he please, pay every one of them a rateable part: and in case the executor make no inventory, yet he is chargeable no further than the value of the goods; and so if every legatary in such case should sue him, they must prove sufficiency of goods, or otherwise they shall get nothing. *Curs.* 186.

If assets fall short, in what case legatees shall abate.

But Mr. Clark says (agreeable to the rule in the courts of equity) If after payment of the debts and funeral expenses there be not sufficient for all the legataries, there must be a proportionable distribution according to the quantity of each legacy. 1 *Ought.* 366.

And Dr. Swinburne says, If the executor do make an inventory according to the laws and statutes of this realm; then he need not pay to any legatary his whole legacy, tho' he be first named in the will, in case there is not sufficient to answer unto every legatary his whole legacy; but may retain a rateable part or proportionable deduction from every legacy; saving in certain cases: whereof one is, when some special thing is bequeathed, as the testator's signet, or his white horse; which special legacy (as

some do deem) is to be satisfied and paid wholly without diminution, in respect of any other general legacies, or of legacies which consist in quantity. Another case: when the father doth bequeath something to his daughter for her dower, or towards her marriage. Another when the testator doth bequeath any thing in satisfaction or recompence for some injury by him done, or of good or evil gotten. For those legacies are not to be diminished by reason of other general legacies, or legacies consisting in quantity, which shall remain wholly unsatisfied, rather than those aforesaid legacies shall be diminished; and consequently in these cases, it is not in the power of the executor to gratify any other legatary at his election. *Swin.* 227, 228.

And he says further, that if the executor enter into the testator's goods, and will make no inventory thereof, then may every legatary recover his whole legacy at law; for in this case the law presumeth, that there are sufficient goods to pay all the legacies, and that the executor doth secretly and fraudulently subtract the same. Whereas otherwise the executor is presumed not to have any more goods which were the testator's than are described in the inventory, the same being lawfully made. *Swin.* 228, 229.

And altho' the testator made no provision for refunding, yet the common justice of a court of equity will compel a legatee to refund; and it is certain that a creditor shall compel a legatee, and that one legatee shall compel another to refund, where there is a defect of assets, *1 Vern.* 94.

And even if one of the legatees get a decree for his legacy, and is paid, and afterwards a deficiency happens, the legatee who recovered shall refund notwithstanding. *1 P. Will.* 495.

But if the executor had at first enough to pay all the legacies and afterwards, by his wasting the assets, occasions a deficiency; the legatee who has recovered his legacy, shall have the advantage of his legal diligence, which the other legatees neglected by not bringing their suit in time. *Id.*

And although a legatee shall refund against creditors, where there be not sufficient assets to pay all the debts; and likewise against legatees, where all of them have not an equal share, in regard of assets falling short; yet it has been said, that an executor himself shall never bring

legacy back when he hath once assented to it, unless he paid the debts of the testator by compulsion. *M.* 1682. *Noel and Robinson.* 1 *Vern.* 90. 2 *Ventr.* 358.

And the author of the *Law of Executors* saith; That if an executor voluntarily pay a legacy, and afterwards debts appear, he cannot compel the legatee in equity to refund. *Law of Ex.* 186.

But more particularly, the author of the *Law of Testaments* observeth, that if an executor applies the assets in satisfaction of legacies, and afterwards debts appear of which he had no notice at the time of paying the legacies, he may compel the legatees to refund. 1 *Cha. Cas.* 136. So he may, if compelled by a decree in chancery to pay legacies: But if an executor voluntarily pays a legacy, and afterwards assets prove deficient to pay the other legacies; neither the executor nor any of the other legatees shall compel such legatee to refund. 2 *Vern.* 205. *Law of Test.* 260, 261.

But in the case of *Noel and Robinson* before mentioned, it was said by the lord chancellor to be a point not as yet determined, whether the executor himself, after he hath once voluntarily assented to a legacy, shall compel the legatee to refund. 1 *Vern.* 94.

And in the case of *Davis and Davis*, *E. 4 G.* On a bill by an executor against a legatee, to refund a legacy voluntarily paid him by the executor, the assets falling short to satisfy the testator's debts; it was decreed by Sir Joseph Jekyll, master of the rolls, that the defendant should refund to the plaintiff; and that an executor may bring a bill against a legatee to refund a legacy voluntarily paid him, as well as a creditor; for the executor, paying a debt of the testator out of his own pocket, stands in the place of the creditor, and has the same equity against a legatee to compel him to refund. *Viner, Devises*, Q. d. 35.

So where a *specific* legacy is devised, the legatee must have it inure, though there are not sufficient assets to pay the rest of the legacies (*m*): But if 100 l. is devised to one, and

Specific legacy or devise.

(*m*) If one gives a specific legacy of a horse, diamond, or land, and also a pecuniary legacy, and there are not assets to pay both, the specific legatee shall be preferred, and have his whole legacy: for were the executor to make him contribute towards the pecuniary legacy, this would be, *pro tanto*, to make

and several money legacies to others, and the testator directs that the legacy of 100l. shall be paid *in the first place*; yet if the other legacies fall short, the legatee of 100l. must make a proportionable abatement of this legacy. *H. 1681. Brown and Allen. 1 Vern. 31.*

In the case of *Blower and Morret*, July 10, 1752; Lands were devised to trustees to be sold, for payment of debts and legacies; the testator afterwards gives to his wife a general legacy of 500l., to be paid to her immediately after his decease, out of the first money that should be got in after his death. It was insisted this 500l.

such specific legatee buy his legacy, against the manifest intention of the testator. *Clifton v. Burt, 1 P. Wms. 678.* But if the question is between two or more specific devisees, they shall contribute equally on a deficiency of assets: Thus one seised in fee of land, and possessed of a lease for years, devised the fee to *A.* and the lease to *B.*, and died indebted by bond; on a deficiency of assets, both devisees were ordered to contribute to the payment of the bond, but the simple contract debts to fall on the leasehold estate. *Long v. Short, 1. P. Wms. 403.* But had the fee been mortgaged, *A.* would have taken it *cum onere*. *Infra, Oneal v. Meade*, unless the testator had added "after payment of all debts." *Carter v. Barnardiston, 1 P. Wms. 505.* in which case the specific devisees of land incumbered and land unincumbered shall contribute to discharge the mortgage. But where the question was not between two specific devisees, but a specific devisee of land incumbered by mortgage, and the heir taking by descent, lord Hardwicke C. after great consideration, decreed that the land devised should be exonerated out of the real assets descended. *Galton v. Hancock, 2 Atk. 430.* If lands be devised to pay debts, a legatee, whether specific or pecuniary, shall be paid out of the lands, if the simple contract creditors have exhausted the personalty. *Hosford v. Pope, 3 P. Wms. 322.* In order to give effect to these rules for the payment of legacies, the court either makes an equitable arrangement of the assets in the nature of marshalling them; that is, if there are two claimants, one of whom can resort to the real estate and the other cannot, directs the first to resort to that fund on which the second has no lien; or, if the first receive satisfaction out of the personalty, allows the second to stand in his place, *pro tanto*, against the real estate. But the court does not primarily subject any fund to a claim to which it is not subject by the nature of the claim. See the cases cited by Mr. Coxe, in his note to the case of *Clifton v. Burt, 1 P. Wms. 679.*; and as to what is a sufficient description to render a legacy specific, see the cases collected by Mr. Fonblanque in his note to *Treat. of Eq. B. 4. Pt. 1. c. 2. s. 5.*

Marshalling
assets.

legacy

legacy should not abate in proportion with others, from the particular directions attending it. By lord Hardwicke: Cases of this kind, of a claim by pecuniary legatees of a priority of satisfaction, so as not to abate in proportion with others, seldom come before the court; and there are fewer in which the court has given way to claims of that kind; there must be therefore very strong words to induce the court to give way to it; for in most cases, the court has disclaimed the laying weight on particular words, as the saying *imprimis*, or *in the first place*, or a direction for the time of payment; because if the court was upon such grounds to give a preference to one pecuniary legatee, there would be no end of it, considering the variety of expression, and the incorrectness with which wills are frequently drawn. And I am of opinion, that the direction to be paid to his wife immediately after his decease, is not sufficient to give her a preference; for that only relates to the time of payment: He directs, that whereas the general rule of law is, that legacies should not be paid until a year, this shall be paid immediately. The consequence is, that if it is not then paid, it should carry interest immediately; which is always considered as a compensation for delay of payment, and puts her in the same condition as if it was paid. *2 Ves. 420.*

In the case of *Oneale and Meade, H. 1720.* A man seized of an estate in fee which he had mortgaged for 500 l., and also possessed of a leasehold, devised the mortgaged estate to his eldest son in fee, and the leasehold estate to his wife, and died, leaving debts which would exhaust all his personal estate, except the leasehold given to his wife. The question was, whether there being (as usual) a covenant to pay the mortgage money, the leasehold premises devised to his wife should be liable to discharge the mortgage. It was decreed by the master of the rolls, that as the testator had charged his real estate by this mortgage, and also specifically bequeathed the leasehold to his wife, the heir shall not disappoint her legacy, by laying the mortgage debt upon it, as he might have done had it not been specifically devised; and though the mortgaged premises were also specifically given to the heir, yet he must take them with their burden, as probably they were intended; and that by this construction, each devise would take effect: And that this resolution did not in the least interfere with the case of *Clifton and*

Burt, M. 1720. (1 P. Will. 678. et sup. in not.) because in that case there was no mortgage. 1 *P. Will.* 693.

And as there is a benefit to a specific legatee that he shall not contribute, so there is a hazard the other way; for instance, if such specific legacy, being a lease, be evicted, or being goods be lost or burnt, or being a debt be lost by the insolvency of the debtor, in all these cases the specific legatee shall have no contribution from the other legatees, and therefore shall pay no contribution towards them. 1 *P. Will.* 540

But the devisee of an annuity for life, charged on the personal estate, where there is a deficiency of assets, shall abate in proportion with the other legatees; for this is not to be considered as a specific legacy. 3 *Atk.* 693.

Also charities, tho' preferred by the civil law, yet they ought to abate in proportion. 2 *P. Will.* 25.

And if the testator's personal estate is not sufficient to pay all legacies, the executors having legacies bequeathed them shall abate in proportion with the other legatees, even though the legacies be given them for their care and trouble, and not generally; for those are only words of course; and as they need not take upon them the office unless they please, they accept the legacies subject to that contingency. 2 *P. Will.* 25. *Barnard. Cha. Rep.* 435. 2 *Atk.* 171.

In like manner land legatees and money legatees shall abate proportionably. 2 *Cha. Ca.* 155.

If the executor hath only bad debts, he may offer to assign them to the legatee, and shall be quit. 1 *Ought.* 370, 1.

If a man by will gives a lease, or a horse, or any specific legacy, and leaves a debt by mortgage or bond in which the heir is bound; the heir shall not compel the specific legatee to part with his legacy in case of the real estate; for tho' the creditor may subject this specific legacy to his debt, yet the specific or other legatee shall in equity stand in the place of the bond creditor or mortgagee, and take as much out of the real assets, as such creditor by bond or mortgage shall have taken from his specific or other legacy. 1 *P. Will.* 730.

But if one owes debts by bond or mortgage, and deviseth his lands to another in fee, and leaves a specific legacy, and dies, and the bond creditor or mortgagee comes upon the specific legacy for payment of his debt; the specific

specific legatee shall not stand in the place of the bond creditor or mortgagee to charge the land : because the devisee of the land is as much a specific devisee as the legatee of a specific legacy ; for it was as much the testator's intention that the devisee should have the land, as that the other should have the legacy ; and a specific legacy is never broke in upon, in order to make good a pecuniary one. 3 *P. Will.* 324. *H. siewood v. Pope.* 2 *Salk.* 416. *Hern v. Merick* (a).

But if a man, indebted by mortgage, deviseth his lands to another in fee (after payment of his debts and funeral charges), and also doth bequeath divers pecuniary legacies, and the personal estate is not sufficient to satisfy both the legacies and the mortgage ; in such case, if the mortgagee shall not hold to the real, but shall fall upon the personal estate, the legatees shall stand in his room for so much out of the real estate, as he shall take out of the personal ; that being a proper fund for their payment. *Cas. Talb.* 53.

So if a man give legacies to his daughters, charging his real estate with the payment thereof : and other legacies to his brother, without charging his real estate with the payment of these : if the daughters recover their legacies out of the personal estate, then the brother shall stand in the place of the daughters, and take so much out of the land for his legacy, as the daughters had exhausted out of the personal assets. 2 *P. Will.* (619).

(a) It does not appear in *Hern v. Merick*, as in *Hastewood v. Pope*, that the pecuniary legacy was *specific*. The case, with the reason of the decision, is thus stated by C. B. Gilbert, in *Lex Prætoria*, § *Wills*.—"A. seised in fee and indebted by bonds, gives by his will legacies to his younger children (whom he had otherwise provided for before), and devises his land to his eldest son in tail, whom he also made executor. The eldest son pays the bonds with the personal estate, whereupon the legatees, in the place of the bond creditors, bring their bill against the real estate, to be paid out of it ; and the bill was dismissed, *first*, Because where there is an express specific legacy of any particular thing, they do not commonly break into such specific legacies in favour of the pecuniary legacies : But, *secondly*, Because the children in this case being provided for in the life of the testator, their legacies are not upon meritorious consideration, (as in satisfaction of a debt, or as provision for younger children,) and therefore according to a former rule being mere volunteers, they are not to induce a charge on the real estate."

Co-executor
dying, who shall
be sued.

II. Where there are divers executors, and some of them are dead, the legatary must sue the surviving executors, and not the executors or administrators of those that are dead. And if all the executors are dead, he must sue the executors or administrators of him that died last, and not the executors or administrators of the rest: And the reason is, because it is presumed, that the goods of the deceased not administered by the other executors, remained with the surviving executor; or if they did not, it was through his own default; because when the other executors were dead, he might and ought to have proceeded against their executors or administrators for restitution of the goods not administered. 1 Ought. 364.

II. Concerning the distribution of intestates effects.

And herein

- i. *Of the statutes of distribution.*
- ii. *Of customs in particular places.*
- iii. *Of the custom of the city of London in particular.*
- iv. *Of the custom of the province of York.*
- v. *Of the custom within the principality of Wales.*

i. *Of the statutes of distribution (c).*

By the 22 & 23 C. 2. c. 10. commonly called the statute of distribution, it is enacted as followeth: *All ordinaries, as well the judges of the prerogative courts of Canterbury and York, as other ordinaries and ecclesiastical judges, and every of them, having power to commit administration of the goods of persons dying intestate, shall and may and are enabled to proceed and call administrators to account, for and touching the goods of any person dying intestate; and upon hearing and due consideration thereof, to order and make just and equal distribution of what remaineth clear (after*

(c) By the statutes quoted by the author, the distribution of a testator's personal estate is given to the ecclesiastical courts; but a bill for that purpose is very proper in the court of chancery, for the spiritual court has but a lame jurisdiction in that case. *Treat. of Eq. Ed. Fonb. 322.*

all

all debts, funerals, and just expences of every sort first allowed and deducted (amongst the wife and children, or children's children, if any such be, or otherwise to the next of kindred to the dead person in equal degree, or legally representing their stocks pro suo cuique jure, according to the laws in such cases, and the rules and limitations hereafter set down; and the same distributions to decree and settle, and to compel such administrators to observe and pay the same by the due course of his majesty's ecclesiastical laws: saving to every one supposing him or themselves aggrieved, their right of appeal, as was always in such cases used. §. 3.

Provided, that this act, or any thing herein contained, shall not any ways prejudice or hinder the customs observed within the city of London, or within the province of York, or other places, having known and received customs peculiar to them; but that the same customs may be observed as formerly, any thing herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding. §. 4.

And all ordinaries and other persons by this act enabled to make distribution of the surplusage of the estate of any person dying intestate, shall distribute the whole surplusage of such estate or estates, in manner and form following; that is to say, one third part of the said surplusage to the wife of the intestate, and all the residue by equal portions, to and amongst the children of such persons dying intestate, and such persons as legally represent such children, in case any of the said children be then dead, other than such child or children (not being heir at law) who shall have any estate by the settlement of the intestate, or shall be advanced by the intestate in his lifetime, by portion or portions equal to the share which shall by such distribution be allotted to the other children to whom such distribution is to be made: And in case any child, other than the heir at law, who shall have any estate by settlement from the said intestate, or shall be advanced by the said intestate in his lifetime by portion not equal to the share which will be due to the other children by such distribution as aforesaid; then so much of the surplusage of the estate of such intestate, to be distributed to such child or children as shall have any land by settlement from the intestate, or were advanced in the lifetime of the intestate, as shall make the estate of all the said children to be equal as near as can be estimated: But the heir at law, notwithstanding any land that he shall have by descent or otherwise from the intestate, is to have an equal part in the distribution with the rest of the children, without any consideration of the value of the land which he hath by descent or otherwise from the intestate. §. 5.

And

And in case there be no children, nor any legal representatives of them; then one moiety of the said estate to be allotted to the wife of the intestate, the residue of the said estate to be distributed equally to every of the next of kindred of the intestate, who are in equal degree, and those who legally represent them. §. 6.

Provided, that there be no representation admitted among collaterals, after brothers and sisters children. §. 7.

And in case there be no wife, then all the said estate to be distributed equally to and amongst the children. §. 7.

And in case there be no child, then to the next of kindred in equal degree of or unto the intestate, and their legal representatives, as aforesaid, and in no other manner whatsoever. §. 7.

Provided also, and be it enacted, to the end that a due regard be had to creditors, that no such distribution of the goods of any person dying intestate be made, till after one year be fully expired after the intestate's death; and that such and every one to whom any distribution and share shall be allotted, shall give bond with sufficient sureties in the said courts, that if any debt or debts truly owing by the intestate shall be afterwards sued for and recovered, or otherwise duly made to appear, that then and in every such case he or she shall respectively refund and pay back to the administrator his or her rateable part of that debt or debts, and of the costs of suit and charges of the administrator by reason of such debt, out of the part and share so as aforesaid allotted to him or her, thereby to enable the said administrator to pay and satisfy the said debt or debts so discovered after the distribution made as aforesaid. §. 8.

Provided always, and be it enacted, that in all cases where the ordinary hath used heretofore to grant administration cum testamento annexo; he shall continue so to do, and the will of the deceased in such testament expressed shall be performed and observed, in such manner as it should have been if this act had never been made. §. 9.

And by the 29 C. 2. c. 3. §. 25. for explaining the said statute, it is declared, that nothing therein shall extend to the estates of feme coverts that shall die intestate, but that their husbands may demand and have administration of their rights, credits, and other personal estates, and recover and enjoy the same, as they might have done before the making of the said act.

And by the 1 J. 2. c. 17. If after the death of a father any of his children shall die intestate without wife or children, in the lifetime of the mother; every brother and sister, and the
repre-

four and a half, and several at five *per cent.* he ordered the children should have four and a half *per cent.* interest. 3 *Atk.* 438.

In *Bryant and Speke*, Dec. 6, 1748; Lord Hardwicke said, The general rule is, that legacies out of real estate carry one *per cent.* lower than legal interest; but if out of personal estate, because of the higher interest of money than land, it shall carry the legal interest, unless particular circumstances induce the court to vary therefrom. And this, he said, was in conformity to the ecclesiastical court, which gives legal interest upon legacies out of personal estate. 1 *Vez* 171.

In *Beckford and Tobin*, Nov. 4, 1749; It was said by the lord chancellor Hardwicke, that in general the court exercises as large a discretion as to the rate of interest upon legacies, where interest is not particularly given, as in any case; and that it is difficult to reduce it to a certain rule. The most general rule hath been, between interest of legacies charged on land, and on personal estate; and where nothing more, the court has said, that land never produces profit equal to the interest of money, and will follow the course of things, and give interest, where charged on land, one *per cent.* lower than the legal interest. So it was when the legal interest was at six; but in general, where a legacy is out of personal estate, the court gives five; and unless that is taken to be a sort of rule, there will be no distinction between them.—Nevertheless, in the present case the fund out of which the interest was to arise yielding no more than four, the court allowed but four *per cent.* 1 *Vez.* 308.

M. 1733. *Ferrers and Ferrers.* The countess dowager of Ferrers was by settlement and will of her late husband earl Robert, entitled to a jointure estate of 1000*l.* a year, but was kept out of possession by earl Washington, the son of earl Robert by a former venter; and now insisted upon the arrears, and interest, from the time of her husband's death; comparing it to the case of arrears of an annuity, or rent charge, which are decreed to be paid with interest. By Talbot lord chancellor: The arrears of an annuity or rent charge are never decreed to be paid with interest, but where the sum is certain and fixed; and also where there is either a clause of entry, or *nomine pœnæ*, or some penalty upon the grantor which he must undergo, if the grantee sued at law: and which would oblige him to come into this court for relief, which the court will not grant but upon equal terms, and those can be no other but decreeing the grantor to pay the arrears, with

report of the same case in *Comb.* 378. it is said by Holt chief justice, they never pretended to distribution in the case of an executor; and they only do it in the case of an administrator by virtue of the statute; and he denied the notion in 2 *Inst.* 33. that executors must divide. Dr. *Sayer* on the contrary endeavoured to maintain, that the spiritual court had concurrent jurisdiction with the court of chancery in this case, as well as in legacies; and insisted that this is a partial intestacy, as to the surplus. But the court was clearly of opinion, that the spiritual court could not intermeddle; and said, that in case of an intestacy, they used to be prohibited, as in *Carter* 125. 1 *Lev.* 233. and that the statute of distribution enlarged, and not barely confirmed their power, as appears by the history of that statute in *Raym.* 496, &c. And the rule for a prohibition was made absolute. And the court offered, that if the common lawyers on the doctor's side, who were *Recve*, *Lee*, and *Fazakerley*, would say that they thought there was any thing in it, the plaintiff should declare in prohibition; but they declined it. *Str.* 865.

[Nor order the testator's goods to be brought in.]

To order and make just and equal distribution] *T. 10 W. Clerke and Clerke.* Clerke died intestate. His wife took out letters of administration to him. Clerke, brother to the intestate, cited the defendant into the spiritual court, to make distribution of the intestate's estate. The defendant there suggests, that the brother hath goods of the intestate in his hands to the value of 200l. And upon this the spiritual court orders him to bring the 200l. into court, to the end it may be distributed. And for not bringing it in they excommunicate him. Upon which he moves in the king's bench for a prohibition; and it was granted as to the whole process that compelled him to bring in the 200l. For by the court; The spiritual court hath power to make distribution of the estate, when it is come in, but not to fetch it in; because that is to hold plea of debt: but the spiritual court might refuse in this case to proceed to the distribution, until the brother had brought in the 200l. but they cannot excommunicate him for not bringing it in. *L. Raym.* 585.

Distribution] Where there is only *one* person that can take, the statute vests the right in that person; altho' in such case it is not strictly and literally a distribution. 3 *P. Will.* 50.

Shall not any ways prejudice or hinder the customs observed within the city of London, or within the province of York

or other places] Which customs will be considered in their order afterwards.

One third part of the said surplusage to the wife of the intestate] And this, it is said, altho' she be a papist. For in the case of dying intestate, it is the act of the law. It is the legislature that gives these distributive shares to the widow and next of kin. It is a succession *ab intestato* to a personal estate, similar to a descent of land, where an heir, tho' a papist, if above the age of 18 years and 6 months, may inherit. T. 1730. *Davers and Dewes.* 3 P. Will. 48.

By the same reason, it should seem, that a papist is capable of taking as tenant by the curtesy, or tenant in dower. *Ibid.* 49. in a note by the editor.

The residue—to and amongst the children] An infant *in ventre sa mere*, at the time of the death of the father, was held clearly, by the lord chancellor, to be intitled to a share by the statute of distribution; for he is, in the eye of the law, a child, and ought to be provided for as well as the rest. M. 1698. *Ball and Smith.* 2 Freem. 230.

Other than such child or children, not being heir at law] Altho' by this statute the heir at law shall not abate, in respect of the land which he hath by descent or otherwise from the intestate; yet if he hath had any advancement from his father in his lifetime, otherwise than by land as aforesaid, he shall abate for the same, in like manner as the other children.

In like manner it seemeth that *cobheiresses* shall bring together into hotchpot such advancement (not being lands) as they shall respectively have received from their father, before they shall be intitled to receive their several distributive shares; agreeably to the general purport of the act, which is, evidently, to promote an equality as much as may be.

[Hotchpot or collatio bonorum.]

Note, Littleton saith (1 *Inst.* 176.) that *hotchpot* signifieth a pudding; unto which his learned commentator assenteth: but this doth not explain to us the meaning of the word, but carries us further from it; for it doth not import that kind of food in general, but metaphorically such only as is compounded of divers ingredients. *Hotch* is a Saxon word, not yet altogether out of use, and signifieth to *shake*: And *pot* is a word well known. And the compound *hotch-pot* is nothing but shaking things together in an urn or other vessel; and is easily transferred to a commixture of the children's portions. And this is what by the civilians is called *collatio bonorum*.

Heir

Heir at law] E. 5 G. 2. *Pratt and Pratt* at the rolls. Lord chief justice Pratt died seised of borough English lands, leaving several children. And having made no will, it became a point upon the statute of distribution, whether the youngest son (to whom the lands descended by the custom of borough English) should abate for these lands, or should be considered as an heir at law, who by the statute is to have a distributive share without any allowance for lands by descent. And it was ruled by Sir Joseph Jekyll, master of the rolls, that he should allow for these lands. For he said, the statute only intended to provide for the heir of the family, who is the common law heir, and not for one who is only heir by custom in some particular places. *Str.* 935.

But in the case of *Lutwyche and Lutwyche*, E. 1733. Thomas Lutwyche, esquire, died intestate, possessed of a personal estate, and seised of a copyhold in fee, at Turnham Green, which was in the nature of borough English. The question was, whether the youngest son, upon whom the copyhold descended, should have an equal share with the other children of the personal estate, exclusive of the copyhold, or only so much as with that copyhold would make his portion equal to that of the other children. By Talbot lord chancellor: The heir at law is the eldest son, and not the heir in borough English; and the exception in the statute extends only to the eldest son. Yet nevertheless the youngest son, who is heir in borough English, shall not bring the borough English estate into hotch-pot. There is no law to oblige him to do this, but only this statute; and there are no words in the statute that require it; for the statute speaketh only of such estate as a child hath by settlement, or by the advancement of the intestate in his lifetime. And it was decreed, that the youngest son should have an equal share with the other children, without regard to the value of the borough English estate.

And the case of *Pratt and Pratt* came after this case before the lord chancellor Talbot; and he reversed the decree of the master of the rolls, and decreed agreeable to this case. *Cas. Talb.* 276.

Who shall have any estate by the settlement of the intestate, or shall be advanced by the intestate in his lifetime] It hath been determined, that small inconsiderable sums, occasionally given to a child, cannot be deemed an advancement or part thereof. Thus maintenance money, or allowance made by the father to his son at the university,
or

or in travelling, or the like, is not to be taken as any part of his advancement; this being only his education: and it would create charge and uncertainty, to inquire minutely into such matters. So, putting out a child apprentice, is no part of his advancement; for it is only procuring the master to keep him for seven years instead of the parent. *Hender and Rose*, at the Rolls, T. 1718. But the father's buying an office for the son, tho' but at will, as a gentleman pensioner's place, or a commission in the army, these are advancements pro tanto. *Norton and Norton*, M. 1692. By the lords commissioners, *Rawlinson and Hutchins*. 3 P. Will. 317.

Also a provision made by a *marriage settlement*, although it is in the nature of a purchase, yet is such an advancement, as that a child claiming a distributive share shall first bring the said advancement into hotchpot. As in the case of *Phyney and Phyney*, H. 1708. The father, on his son's marriage, covenanted in case of a second marriage, to pay to the first son by the first wife 500l. There was a son, and several other children of the first marriage. The father of these children died intestate. By the court: The heir must bring the 500l. into hotchpot, although in nature of a purchaser under a marriage settlement. 2 Vern. 638.

So in the case of *Edwards and Freeman*, M. 1727. Before King lord chancellor, assisted by Raymond chief justice, and the master of the rolls, and Price and Fortescue justices. Mr. Freeman, on his marriage, entered into articles, in consideration of the said marriage, and of 4000l. portion, to settle an estate to raise portions for daughters, in case there were no sons, that is to say, if but one daughter the sum of 5000l. if two or more then the sum of 6000l. equally amongst them, to be paid at their respective ages of 18 years, or days of marriage, which should first happen: and 80l. a year maintenance in the mean time to each daughter. The marriage took effect; and they had issue one daughter only, and no son. Then the wife dies. Afterwards Mr. Freeman married a second wife; and had by her a son and a daughter; and died intestate, leaving a personal estate to the amount of 20,000l. The daughter by his first wife, at that time was about 12 years of age; and some time after, married the plaintiff Mr. Edwards: And they brought their bill, to have an account of the personal estate of Mr. Freeman, and their distributive share thereof. And the only question was, whether this 5000l. should not be looked upon
to

to be so far an advancement of the plaintiff the wife of Mr. Edwards, that if she would have any farther share of her father's personal estate, they must bring this 5000l. into hotchpot.—For the plaintiffs it was argued, that they were intitled to a distributory share, without regard to this 5000l. which was no advancement, either within the words or meaning of the act, which intended only an advancement of children after they are in being, and when they are about being married or disposed of in the world; but this, if any, was an advancement long before the plaintiff was born, and when it was wholly unknown and uncertain whether there ever would be such a daughter. That it was likewise contingent and uncertain, after she was born, whether she would ever be intitled to this fortune or not; for if she had died before 18 or marriage, it would have sunk into the inheritance for the benefit of the heir; and she was but 12 years of age at the time of her father's death, and therefore might have died before she was intitled to this 5000l. That the statute must operate, either at the time of the father's death, or within a year after at furthest; but in this case the plaintiff was not intitled to her 5000l. either in her father's lifetime, or within a year after; and the distribution was not to wait, till it should appear whether she would attain 18 or be married: That this 5000l. was not a voluntary provision moving from the father, but the plaintiff was a purchaser thereof, in consideration of her mother's portion; and suppose a child had money of his own, and agreed with his father, in consideration thereof, to have a portion from his father after his death; or if a collateral relation had purchased such a portion from the father for his child, certainly this would not be an advancement: and the intent of the statute was, to make them all equal out of the father's personal estate, not out of what was purchased for them by others, or by the mother, as in this case.—On the other side, it was argued for the defendants, that the 5000l. thus provided for by the settlement, was an advancement within the meaning of the statute; which appears throughout to intend and preserve an equality between the children: That the statute makes no distinction, whether it was a voluntary provision of the father, or arose from the contract of the parties; and a child provided for either way, is provided for; and it is not like the cases put, where a child, either with his own or a relation's money, purchases an estate, or a sum of money from the father, but a direct sale, as much as it would

ld have been to any stranger: That this portion, not payable till after the father's death, was nevertheless a provision for her by him, in his lifetime, as the speaks; as the principal part of it, to wit, the security, was executed by him, in his lifetime; and as he not at liberty to controul it; and suppose he had in such a portion payable at his death, this would certainly have been a good provision within the statute; and the portion is payable as soon as possibly it can be paid, namely, at 18 or marriage; and a maintenance of 80l. a year in the mean time; and tho' it is said, that a portion out of lands sinks in the inheritance, if the party dies before it becomes payable, which if it were a personal estate it would not, yet that is not material here, since the statute makes no distinction whether the portion is payable out of the real or personal estate: that if a bill had been brought immediately after the father's death for a distribution, there could be no inconvenience in setting apart a sum to answer the contingency, when it should happen, no more than in the case of debts, which is every day done; and there are some estates that are not got in till several years after their deaths, and a distribution may very properly be made thereof from time to time, as they come in.—And the court were all clear of opinion, that this was an advancement by the father in his lifetime, within the meaning of the statute tho' contingent and future, so that she could have that and her distributory share likewise. And the master of the rolls said, that the civil law made no difference between a real and personal estate, but only moveable and immoveable: and the words of the act, which speak of a provision made by the father in his lifetime, are very proper to distinguish between that and a provision made by his will. And the chief justice said, suppose the father had left but 2000l. personal estate, it would be extremely hard, that the eldest daughter should have her 5000l. and a share of the 2000l. also. And the second chancellor said, he thought any settlement in or out of lands, either by annuity, rent, or portion, would be a provision within the statute; and that such provision might be valued and brought into the collatio bonorum, they think it worth their while; that the 5000l. whether called contingent or not, is an interest, and such a one as would happen within a reasonable time, to wit, six or seven years after the father's death; that the distribution must be made as the estate stands at the father's death,

death, and the parties are to give bond to refund, if debts afterwards appear; and future debts due to the intestate must be distributed as they can be got in; that here the contingency has happened, and she is now at liberty to say, whether she will stick to that provision, or bring it into the computation of collatio bonorum, in order to have an equal share with the rest. But as to the 80l. a year maintenance, that is not to be brought in, being only for the education and maintenance of the daughter, which the parents were best judges of.—And accordingly the decree was pronounced. 1 *Abr. Eq. Cas.* 249. [S. C. 2 *P. Wms.* 435.]

So in the case of *Lloyd and Twissam*, H. 1715; the lord chancellor Cowper was of opinion, that the word *portion* in the statute, with respect to younger children, includes an estate in *land* as well as in money; and that this land, in the computation of the estate to be distributed, is to be added to, and computed with the other parts of it: but with respect to the eldest son, whatever land came to him from his father, by descent, or otherwise; he is to have his share, without any consideration of the value of such land. *Viner, Executors*, (Z. 10.) 3.

So if the father settles a *rent* out of his lands upon a younger child, this is an advancement. 2 *P. Will.* 441.

Likewise if the father by deed settles an *annuity* upon a child, to commence after his death; this is an advancement *pro tanto*: and by the same reason, a *reversion* settled on a child, as it may be valued, is an advancement also. 2 *P. Will.* 442.

But whatever a child receives out of the *mother's* estate, it is said, shall not be brought into hotchpot. As in the case of *Holt and Frederick*, T. 1726. A man married, and had three children, two sons and a daughter. His wife survived him; and having, out of her own estate, given 1000l. to her daughter in marriage, died intestate, leaving those three children. The question was, whether the daughter, who had received this 1000l. ought to bring it into hotchpot, before she should receive any further share of her mother's personal estate. The lord chancellor King said, it weighed with him, that the act of distribution was grounded upon the custom of London, which never affected a *widow's* personal estate; and that the act seems to include those within the clause of hotchpot who are capable of having a wife as well as children, which must be husbands only. And so in this case (though
without

without much debate) his lordship ruled, that the daughter should not bring the 1000l. which she had received in her mother's lifetime, into hotchpot. 2 *P. Will.* 356.

And if a child who has received any advancement from his father shall die in his father's lifetime, leaving children; such children shall not be admitted to their father's distributive share, without bringing their father's advancement into hotchpot: As in the case of *Proud and Turner*, *M.* 1729. A father had several children, and in his lifetime advanced in part one of them. The child thus advanced in part died in his father's lifetime, leaving issue. Afterwards the father died intestate, possessed of a considerable personal estate. It was ruled, that the issue of the dead child must bring into hotchpot what their father received in part of advancement, as he, if living, must have done; in regard the issue stands in the place and stead of the father, claims under him, and cannot be in a better condition than the father, if living, would have been, and had claimed his distributive share. 2 *P. Will.* 560.

And the reason is, because such children do not take in their own right, but as representing their father deceased.—But whether those grandchildren, having been advanced some more some less by their father in his lifetime, shall bring their several advancements into hotchpot one with the other, before they shall distribute their deceased father's share of their grandfather's personal estate, doth not appear to have been determined. If their father also died intestate, then it seemeth that they shall be required to bring into hotchpot; for in such case they take, not from their grandfather, but from their father: and this brings it within the general rule foregoing.

But where there are only grandchildren, their fathers or mothers respectively having died in the lifetime of their grandfather; in such case they take in their own right, and not by representation of their father or mother deceased. Whether these also shall bring into hotchpot, either all together, or those descended from the same stock amongst themselves respectively, may upon the like grounds be matter of doubt. But it seemeth that this case is farther off from the rule than the former. For here they do not take by representation, but each in his own right. And the statute doth not seem to require that the collatio bonorum shall extend further than to children, or the representatives of such children: In like manner as the

custom of London doth not extend to grandchildren (as will appear afterwards); so neither doth the custom of the province of York.

A doubt likewise may arise, and the solution thereof will be the same, where a grandchild hath received some advancement, not from his father, but from his grandfather; whether or no such grandchild shall bring his said advancement into hotchpot with the brothers and sisters of his father deceased. The grandchild in this case taketh not in his own right, but as representative of his father; and therefore, as it seemeth, should not bring his own portion, but only his father's portion, into hotchpot—But concerning these points, no adjudication hath occurred (p).

By portion not equal to the share which would be due to the other children] A child partly advanced shall bring in its advancement only amongst the other children; but the wife shall have no advantage of it. *H. 1701. Ward and Lant. Prec. Cha. 182. 184.*

To every of the next of kindred to the intestate, who are in equal degree] Here it is very material to inquire, who are these next of kindred in equal degree. For the perfect understanding whereof, it is to be observed, that kindred are distinguished either by the *right* line, or by the *collateral*: The *right* line is of parents and children, computing by *ascendents* and *descendents*: The *collateral* line is between brothers and sisters, and the rest of the kindred among themselves. *Ayl. Par. 327.*

And forasmuch as proximity between two persons proceeds either from this, that they are descended one from the other (which makes the connexion between ascendants and descendants), or from their being both descended of one and the same person (which makes that of collaterals); we judge therefore of the proximity between two persons, by the number of generations which make both the one and the other of the said connexions. And these generations are called *degrees*, by which we step from one

(p) This question is discussed by Vinnius in his *Traet de Collationibus*, c. 12. where he quotes the opinion of some civilians, that if a grandfather leave a son and daughter, and grandchildren by a deceased daughter, which grandchildren had received advancement from their grandfather in his lifetime, they shall collate their advancements one with another, but not with their uncle and aunt, but he himself is of opinion that they shall collate with the brother and sister of their deceased mother.

person

person to another, in order to make the computation of their kindred, in the manner hereafter explained. 1 *Strahan's Dem.* 631.

Those of the right line are reckoned upwards, as parents; or downwards as children: those of the collateral line are reckoned *ex transverso* or side-ways, as brothers and sisters, uncles and aunts, and such as are born from them. . *Ayl. Par.* 327.

And there is no difference between the *civil* and *canon* law in the ascending and descending line; but every generation, whether ascending or descending constitutes a different degree: Thus the father of John is related to him in the first degree, and so likewise is his son; his grandfather and grandson in the second; his greatgrandfather and greatgrandson in the third. This is the only natural way of reckoning the degrees in the direct line, and therefore universally obtains, as well in the *civil* and *canon*, as in the *common* law. *Blackst. Descents*, 8.

But there is a difference in reckoning the *collateral* line. Thus, if we would know in what degree of collateral kindred two persons stand according to the *civil* law; we must begin our reckoning from the one of them, by ascending to the person from whom both are branched, and then by descending to the other to whom we do count, and it will appear in what degree they are: For example.—In brother's and sisters sons; take one of them, and ascend to his father, there is one degree; from the father to the grandfather, that is the second degree; then descend from the grandfather to his son, that is the third degree; then from his son to his son, that is the fourth degree. 1 *Inst.* 23.


But by the *canon* law, there is another computation. For the canonists do ever begin from the stock, namely. from the person of whom they do descend, of whose distance the question is: For example, if the question be, In what degree the sons of the two brothers stand by the canon law, we must begin from the grandfather, and descend to one son, that is one degree; then descend to his son, that is another degree; then descend again from the grandfather to his other son, that is one degree; then descend to his son, that is a second degree. So in what degree either of them are distant from the common stock, in the same degree they are distant between themselves. And if they be not equally distant, then we must observe another rule, viz. in what degree the most remote is distant from the common stock, in the same degree they are

distant between themselves ; and so the most remote makes the degree. 1 *Inst.* 24.

Collateral kinsmen agree with the lineal in this, that they descend from the same stock or ancestor ; but they differ in this, that they do not descend from each other. Collateral kinsmen then are such as lineally spring from one and the same ancestor, who is the *stirps*, root, or common stock, from whence these relations are branched out. As if John has two sons, who have each a numerous issue ; both these issues are lineally descended from John as their common ancestor ; and they are collateral kinsmen to each other, because they are all descended from this common ancestor, and all have a portion of his blood in their veins, which denominates them *consanguinei*. Blackst. Desc. 9, 10.

And the very being of collateral consanguinity consists in this descent from one and the same common ancestor. Thus John and his brother are related ; why ? because both are derived from one father : John and his first cousin are related ; why ? because both descend from the same grandfather : And his second cousin's claim to consanguinity is this, that they both are derived from one and the same greatgrandfather. In short, as many ancestors as a man hath, so many common stocks he hath, from which collateral kinsmen may be derived. And as we are taught by holy writ, that there is one couple of ancestors belonging to us all, from whom the whole race of mankind is descended ; the obvious and undeniable consequence is, that all men are in some degree related to each other. *Id.* 10, 11.

The different manner of calculating the degrees, may perhaps be better apprehended by the following table : Wherein it is to be observed, that the numeral roman letters at the top express the degrees by the *civil* law, and the figures at the bottom express the degrees by the *canon* law.



And here it is evident, that the degrees in the *descending* and *ascending* lines are by both laws the same. Thus the son is in the first degree, the grandson in the second, and the greatgrandson in the third, by both laws, in the *descending* line. So the father is in the first degree, the grandfather in the second, and the greatgrandfather in the third, and so on, by both laws, in the *ascending* line.

But in the *collateral* line the calculation is different.

Thus the cousin german is in the fourth degree by the civil law, and in the second degree by the canon law. For by the civil law, we ascend first to the father, which is one degree; from him to the common ancestor the grandfather, which is the second degree; from the grandfather we descend to the uncle, which is the third degree; and from the uncle to the cousin german, which is the fourth degree. But by the canon law, we begin at the common ancestor the grandfather, and reckon downwards from him to the father, which is one degree; from the father to the intestate is the second degree: so, on the other side, from the grandfather to the uncle is the first degree; and from the uncle to the cousin german is the second degree: And by what degree they are distant from the common ancestor, by the same degree they are distant from each other, that is, in the second canonical degree.—So in reckoning to the son of the nephew, or brother's grandson: By the civil law, we ascend to the father, which is one degree; from the father we descend to the brother, which is the second degree; from the brother to the nephew, which is the third degree; and from the nephew to the son of the nephew, which is the fourth degree. But by the canon law we begin at the common ancestor the father, and reckon down from him to the intestate, which is one degree: Then on the other side, from the same common ancestor the father to the brother is one degree; from the brother to the nephew is the second degree; and from the nephew to the son of the nephew is the third degree: And by the rule before laid down, in what degree the further of them is distant from the common ancestor, in the same degree they are distant from each other; so that here the intestate and the son of his nephew, or brother's grandson, are distant by the canon law in the third degree of kindred.

And the reason of the different methods of computing the degrees of consanguinity in the collateral line, between the civil law on the one hand, and the canon law on the other, seemeth to be this: The civil law regards
consan-

And in case there be no children, nor any legal representatives of them; then one moiety of the said estate to be allotted to the wife of the intestate, the residue of the said estate to be distributed equally to every of the next of kindred of the intestate, who are in equal degree, and those who legally represent them. s. 6.

Provided, that there be no representation admitted among collaterals, after brothers and sisters children. s. 7.

And in case there be no wife, then all the said estate to be distributed equally to and amongst the children. s. 7.

And in case there be no child, then to the next of kindred in equal degree of or unto the intestate, and their legal representatives, as aforesaid, and in no other manner whatsoever. s. 7.

Provided also, and be it enacted, to the end that a due regard be had to creditors, that no such distribution of the goods of any person dying intestate be made, till after one year be fully expired after the intestate's death; and that such and every one to whom any distribution and share shall be allotted, shall give bond with sufficient sureties in the said courts, that if any debt or debts truly owing by the intestate shall be afterwards sued for and recovered, or otherwise duly made to appear, that then and in every such case he or she shall respectively refund and pay back to the administrator his or her rateable part of that debt or debts, and of the costs of suit and charges of the administrator by reason of such debt, out of the part and share so as aforesaid allotted to him or her, thereby to enable the said administrator to pay and satisfy the said debt or debts so discovered after the distribution made as aforesaid. s. 8.

Provided always, and be it enacted, that in all cases where the ordinary hath used heretofore to grant administration cum testamento annexo; he shall continue so to do, and the will of the deceased in such testament expressed shall be performed and observed, in such manner as it should have been if this act had never been made. s. 9.

And by the 29 C. 2. c. 3. s. 25. for explaining the said statute, it is declared, that nothing therein shall extend to the estates of feme coverts that shall die intestate, but that their husbands may demand and have administration of their rights, credits, and other personal estates, and recover and enjoy the same, as they might have done before the making of the said act.

And by the 1 J. 2. c. 17. If after the death of a father any of his children shall die intestate without wife or children, in the lifetime of the mother; every brother and sister, and the
repr-

actly the same degrees of kindred, as (for instance) uncles and nephews of the deceased; which multiplicity, though no inconvenience in the Roman law of partible inheritances, yet would have been productive of endless confusion, where the right of sole succession, as with us, is established. The issue or descendants therefore of the brother of John, are all of them in the first degree of kindred, with respect to inheritances, as their father when living was: those of his uncle in the second; and so on; and are called to the succession in right of such their representative proximity.

The right of representation being thus established, the rule with regard to the descent of real estates amounts to this; that, on failure of issue of the person last seized, the inheritance shall descend to the issue of his next immediate ancestor. Thus if John dies without issue, his estate shall descend to his brother who is lineally descended from his next immediate ancestor, their father. On failure of brethren, or sisters, and their issue, it shall descend to the uncle of John, the lineal descendant of their common ancestor, the grandfather; and so on, *Blackst. ibid.*

But this representation in infinitum amongst collaterals, is not admitted in the succession to personal estate, the same being restrained and limited by the statute (as will appear afterwards).

In the case of *Wingate and Fitch, M. 21 Ja.* Administration upon the statute of Hen. 8. was granted to the brother of the half blood. The brother of the whole blood appealed to the delegates, alledging that he was nearer of kin by the ecclesiastical law; and the delegates inclining to repeal the administration, and to grant it to the brother of the whole blood, a prohibition was granted to try the matter thereupon by the common law: for this being ordained by statute, it was said, that it ought to be interpreted according to the common law. 2 *Roll. Abr.* 303.

And in the case of *Blackborough and Davis, E. 13 W.* Holt chief justice said, that the construction of the statute of distribution, on the proximity of degrees, must be according to the common law. 12 *Mod.* 616.

But the more modern cases seem to suppose, that the said statute, being made in an ecclesiastical matter, shall be construed according to the rules of the civil law.

Upon which account, the learned Dr. Harris observes, that the three first chapters of the 118th Novel of Justinian

lian deserve the reader's attentive consideration; not only because they contain the latest policy of the civil law, in regard to the disposition of intestates estates; but because they are the foundation of our statute law in this respect. And they are still (he says) almost of continual use, by being the general guide of the courts in England, which hold cognizance of distributions, in all those cases, concerning which our own laws have been either silent, or not sufficiently express. *Har. Justin. ad finem.*

And therefore it is judged requisite to insert the said three chapters here at length, and in the progress to observe what alterations have been made by the statute aforesaid, and by the other laws of this realm, and how far the said Novel with respect to this matter seemeth to be still a rule and direction.

CHAPTER THE FIRST,

Of the succession of DESCENDENTS.

“ IF a person dieth intestate, leaving a descendent of either sex, or of whatsoever degree; such descendent is to be preferred to all ascendants and collaterals. And if any of the descendants of the deceased should die, leaving sons or daughters or other descendants, they shall succeed in the place of their parent, and shall be intitled to the same share of the intestate's estate, which their parent would have had if such parent had lived. And this kind of succession is termed a succession *in stirpes*; for in the succession of descendants we allow no priority of degree, but admit the grandchildren of any person by a deceased son or daughter to be called to inherit that person together with his sons or daughters, without making any distinction between males and females, or the descendants of males and females.”

And what the civil law distributes in this manner amongst the children and other descendants, the statute clearly enough apportioneth amongst them, taking in together with them the wife of the deceased where there is
a wife

a wife surviving. And herein the civil, canon, common, and statute laws do all agree, in giving this preference to descendents, exclusive of all ascendants and collaterals.

Only with respect to *grandchildren*, these by the civil law, even when alone, although they descend from various stocks, and are unequal in their numbers, will take the estate of their deceased grandfather *per stirpes*, and not *per capita*; as suppose a man should die, leaving grandchildren by three different sons, already dead, to wit, three by one son, six by another, and twelve by another, each of these classes of grandchildren would take a third of the estate, without any regard to the inequality of the numbers in each class. But as to this point in England, the courts in which distributions are cognizable, will order the division of an estate in such case to be made *per capita*; and this, partly from a motive of equity, and partly from a consideration of the intent of the statute, which directs an equal and just distribution: and when the act mentions representation, it must be understood to refer to it, in those cases only, where representation is necessary to prevent exclusion, but not to refer to it in those cases, where all the claimants are in equal degree, and therefore can take each in his own right. *Harr. Just. ibid.*

And if in the case of the succession of a father, who leaves behind him one or more children, his widow should happen to be big with child, the child in the mother's womb would be reckoned among the children of the deceased. And if the other children should proceed to a partition of the estate, it would be necessary to lay aside one share for the child that is to be born, and to name a curator to it, who may take care of its interest; unless they should think it more convenient to delay the partition unto the birth of the child, either by reason of the uncertainty whether the child will be born alive or not, or because it may happen that there may be more children than one of this birth. *1 Strab Dom. 624.*

But this provision is rendered more effectual by the statute aforesaid, which requires that no distribution shall be made till after the expiration of one year from the intestate's death, within which time such child or children will be born.

CHAPTER THE SECOND.

Of the succession of ASCENDENTS.

“ **WHEN** the deceased leaves no descendants, if a father or mother or other ascendent survive him, we decree, that they shall be preferred to all collateral relations; except brothers or sisters, as shall be hereafter more particularly declared. And if divers ascendents are living, we prefer those who are in the nearest degree, whether they are male or female, paternal or maternal. And when several ascendents concur in the same degree, the inheritance of the deceased must be so divided, that the ascendents on the part of the father may receive one half, and the ascendents on the part of the mother the other half, without regard to the number of persons on either side. But if the deceased leaves brothers or sisters of the whole blood, together with ascendents, these collaterals of the deceased shall be called with the nearest ascendents; and altho’ the surviving parents are a father and mother, the inheritance must be so divided according to the number of persons, that each of the ascendents, and each of the brothers and sisters, may have an equal portion (g).”

If a father or mother] By the law of England, when child dieth intestate leaving a *father*; the father is solely

(g) This Novel excludes the children of a deceased brother of the whole blood, when they concur with brothers and sisters and ascendents; but by Novel 127. c. 1. They are admitted by representation to take the same share which their father would have taken had he lived. Both Novels require whole blood only in brothers and sisters of the deceased and their children, when they concur with ascendents, or with a brother and sister of the whole blood; but not in any other degree: and therefore civilians admit brothers and sisters of the half blood to take equally, and an uncle of the half blood to concur with one of the whole, and prefer him to the son of an uncle of the whole blood. *Vinnius ad Inst. 3. 5. 4. Huber. ib. de Suc. ab intestato. Sande Decis. lib. 4. def. 2.*

intituled

intituled to the whole personal estate of the intestate, exclusive of all others; and anciently, that is, in the reign of king Henry the first, a surviving *father*, or *mother*, could have taken even the real estate of their deceased child. But this law of succession was altered soon afterwards; for we find by Glanville that in the time of king Henry the second, a father or mother could not have taken the real estate of their deceased children, the inheritance being then carried over to the collateral line. And it hath ever since been held as an inviolable maxim, that an inheritance cannot ascend. But this alteration in the law made since the reign of king Henry the first, did not extend to personal estate; so that before the statute of the 1 Jac. 2. c. 17. if a child had died intestate, without a wife, child, or father, the *mother* would have been intituled to the whole personal estate; but by that statute, every brother and sister, and their representatives, shall have an equal share with her. *Harr. Just. ibid.*

Or other ascendent] Here it is manifest by the civil law, that ascendants, of whatever degree, shall be preferred before all collaterals (except in the case of brothers and sisters as aforesaid). But by Holt chief justice, in the case of *Blackborough* and *Davis*, it was holden, that this is altered by the statute; which prefers the next of kin tho' collaterals, before one tho' lineal that is more remote. 1 P. Will. 51.

In the said case of *Blackborough* and *Davis*, E. 13 W. Administration being granted to the grandmother, the aunt moved for a mandamus to have it granted to her, urging that the first administration was void, she being nearer in degree. But by Holt chief justice: In such case it is not void, but only voidable; and it is a matter properly contestible in the spiritual court. And if they are in equal degree, the spiritual court hath election. And the grandmother is as near as the aunt, because the descent to either would be a mediate descent, the medium of which is the father. But the court thought the advantage on the grandmother's side, in this respect, that she stands in the right line. Afterwards the aunt moved for a mandamus to have *distribution*, being in equal degree. On the contrary, it was argued, that she was not intituled to it, being not so near as the grandmother, for the grandmother stands in the place of the mother, and is in the second degree to the intestate; the aunts are the daughters of the grandmother, and the daughters cannot be in equal degree with their mother. And by Holt chief justice:

justice : No mandamus ought to be in this case. And he said, as by the common law, father and mother were nearer than brother and sister, so grandfather and grandmother are nearer than uncle and aunt. And the grandmother in this case is the root of the kindred, whereas the aunt is only a branch. 1 *Salk.* 38, 251. *Precedent Chancery*. 527. 12 *Mod.* 623. 1 *P. Will.* 51. *Ld. Raym.* 684.

So in the case of *Woodroffe* and *Wickworth*, in the court of chancery, T. 1719, it was clearly agreed, that if one dies intestate, leaving a grandmother and uncles and aunts ; the grandmother is intitled to the personal estate, in exclusion of the uncles and aunts. *Precedent Chancery*. 527

If divers ascendants are living, we prefer those who are in the nearest degree, whether they are male or female, paternal or maternal] And conformable hereunto are the words of the statute, and in such case the distribution shall be made amongst the next of kindred who are in equal degree. So in the case of *Meer* and *Barkham*, May 13, 1723, where the next of kindred to the intestate were a grandfather by the father's side, and a grandmother by the mother's side ; it was decreed, that they shall take in equal moieties, as being in equal degree ; for tho' the grandfather by the father's side may in some respects be more worthy of blood (as in case of the descent of lands) ; yet in this respect, dignity of blood is not material. 1 *P. Will.* 53.

And when several ascendants concur in the same degree, the inheritance of the deceased must be so divided, that the ascendants on the part of the father may receive one half, and the ascendants on the part of the mother the other half, without regard to the number of persons on either side] By the custom of France (Mr. Domat tells us), in pursuance of the rule *paterna paternis, materna maternis*, the remotest ascendants are preferred to those that are nearer, with respect to the goods descended from their stock. And this, he says, seemeth to be more equitable and natural ; and there seemeth even to be something of a hardship in the contrary rule. 1 *Strab. Dom.* 639.

And with us, in respect of the descent of lands, the rule holdeth, that lands which came by the father shall descend to the heirs on the part of the father, and the lands which came by the mother shall descend to the heirs on the part of the mother. But with respect to the distribution

bution of personal estate, the statute requires an equal distribution amongst all such ascendants as are in equal degree.

If the deceased leaves brothers and sisters—together with ascendants, these collaterals of the deceased shall be called with the nearest ascendants] If it should here be asked, whether the brother of an intestate would exclude the grandfather by the civil law; the Novel appears at first sight to answer it very fully in the negative, by enacting, that if the deceased leaves brothers and sisters, together with ascendants in the right line, these collaterals shall be called with the nearest ascendants. And the generality of writers have understood this passage, as admitting ascendants and brothers to take jointly: Yet a contrary interpretation hath been given by some civilians, and for this, amongst other reasons, that as a benefit is hereby intended to the brothers and sisters, this benefit to them would be so much the less, as the ascendants are farther distant from the person deceased, whereas on the contrary in reason it ought to be so much the more. As for example; suppose there are two brothers, and a father and mother, in this case each brother would receive a fourth part; but if there be no father or mother, it may happen that there shall be four grandfathers and grandmothers, and then each brother would have but a sixth part; so there may be eight greatgrandfathers and greatgrandmothers, in which case each brother would receive but a tenth part; and so on.—But this question seems now to be settled in England, in consequence of three determinations; the first of which was given in the exchequer, in the case of *Pool* and *Willson*, T. 1708; the second, in the case of *Norbury* and *Vian*, before Fortescue, master of the rolls, M. 1749; and the third was delivered by the lord chancellor Hardwicke, in the case of *Evelyn* and *Evelyn*, H. 1754. *Harr. Just. ibid.*

Which case of *Evelyn* and *Evelyn* was this.—By the lord chancellor *Hardwicke*: This case is between the grandfather and the brother of the deceased. It is insisted on the behalf of the grandfather, that he is in equal degree of consanguinity with the brother of the deceased, and intitled to an equal share of his estate under the statute of distribution. The statute says, that the ordinary (in case there shall be no wife, children, or children's children) shall make a just and equal distribution among

the next of kindred to the dead person in equal degrees or legally representing their stocks *pro suo cuique jure*, “ according to the laws in such cases, and the rules and “ limitations hereafter set down.” Which limitation is only a particular specification in what cases representation shall be allowed; and there is nothing more expressed in the statute, than that the estate shall be distributed equally to every the next of kin to the intestate, who are in equal degree.

This point has been already twice determined in courts of equity. First, in the case of *Pool* and *Wilshaw*; and afterwards in the case of *Norbury* and *Vicars*.

But it has been insisted on for the grandfather, that both these decrees are erroneous; and that according to the computation of the civil law, the grandfather and brother are in equal degree, and consequently are equally intitled.

And I do agree, that in this case the computation of degrees ought to be according to the rules of the civil law; and that those of the common law are only to be regarded in matrimonial cases. Notwithstanding which I shall adhere to the determination of the case of *Pool* and *Wilshaw*. I have seen the lord chief baron Ward’s, and Mr. baron Price’s reports of this case, and also that of Mr. Dodd (afterwards chief baron). The last of which, though but short, is the clearest of the three. It was a bill brought by the grandmother, for a share of her grandson’s estate equally with his brother. And it was insisted on for her, that she was in equal degree of consanguinity, and equally intitled. But the reporter says, “ All the “ court contrary; and there has been no such usage since “ the making of the statute.” And I know of none since; though it is 83 years since that statute was made. The subsequent decree at the rolls was conformable to this. And therefore I shall not attempt to overthrow these determinations.

But if this was *res integra*, I think there are strong grounds both from the common and civil law, to prefer the brother to the grandfather. The words in the statute “ *pro suo cuique jure*, according to the laws in such cases,” refer to certain precedent rules and methods of expounding the law.

The civil law is no part of the laws of England, any further than it has been received here in certain cases. In descent of lands there is but one degree between brother and brother. See lord chief justice Hale’s argument in the case of *Collingwood* and *Pace*, 1 *Ventr.* 425. who says, that according to the computation of degrees according to the laws of England, brother and brother

makes one degree. And the brother is distant from his brother and sister in the first degree of consanguinity. And he adds, that though the brother is by the civil law in the second degree from the brother, yet they say, in collaterals *nullus est proximior fratre, ideoque in collateralibus nullus est primus gradus, sed secundus obtinet vicem primi*. In the case of *Blackborough and Davis*, 1 P. Will. 50. the lord chief justice Holt delivered the opinion of the court, and said, that the laws of England, and not any foreign law, ought to govern in this case, and he cited the Saxon laws and others to the point then in question, which was concerning a personal estate.

What I have said would, I think, alone be sufficient to support the determination in the case of *Peole and Wilshaw*; as it shews, that the construction of the statute ought to be according to the law of England. But I further think, that according to the Roman law alone, there would be sufficient ground to support the resolution. How the matter of succession of collaterals stood upon the law of the twelve tables, and what alteration it received by the constitution of the emperor Claudius, and the *senatus-consultum Tertullianum* made in the time of the emperor Antoninus Pius, the adopted son of Adrian, so as to let in the mother who was before excluded, may be seen at large in Vinnius's commentary on the *Institutes**. By the text itself of the *Institutes*†, it appears, that the grandmother was not to take as well as the mother. The words are, *Postea autem senatus-consulto Tertulliano, quod divi Adriani temporibus factum est, plenissime de tristi successione matris non etiam aviae deferendum, cautum est*. See Vinnius's comment on this passage, page 543, who shews that it was in the time of Antoninus Pius. But Heinicius's *Syntagma*, lib. 3. tit. 3. examines all the arguments; and inclines to Justinian's opinion. By the Code, the sister is preferred with the grandmother or grandfather.

But the whole has been altered by the Novels of Justinian.—It has been said, that the Novels were never received in the western empire. But this is not so in the generality in which it was laid down. For they have been received in all countries where the civil law has been received, as much as other parts of that law; which has never, since the declension of the western empire, been taken for the absolute rule of law in any nation. All the commentators of the civil law, consider the No-

* Lib. 3. tit. 2. par. 3.

† Lib. 6. tit. 53. l. 9.

† Lib. 3. tit. 3. par. 2.

vels as part of the Roman law. They call them *jus novissimum*. Vianius, in his commentary on the Institutes*, has a dissertation which he calls *ratio succedendi ab intestato ex jure novissimo*. Now by the 118th Novel, the brothers are let in to take an equal share with the father and mother. It is true that Mr. Domat is of another opinion†. But Voet maintains the former opinion with great clearness: *Illud non satis expeditum est, &c.* ‡. In this passage Mr Voet shews, that the emperor in the above cited Novel has emphatically said, *fratres et sorores cum proximis gradu ascendentibus vocari*; which mention of the *next in degree* would be entirely superfluous, if it was not intended to denote those who are in the first ascending degree (r); since it is a certain rule of law, that there is no representation in the ascending line. He afterwards shews what absurdities follow, by letting in remoter persons in the ascending line to share with the brothers; since the more remote they were, the more in number they might be, and consequently would carry away a great share from the brothers, as the estate is to be divided into as many portions as there are persons. He then argues from the words of the Novel, which says, that the brothers shall be called to succeed equally with the ascendants in the next degree. (See the critique on these words; in Domat before cited)—*Si aut pater aut mater fuerint*. Whence it follows, that they are not to come in promiscuously with all ascendants, but *Si pater aut mater fuerint*. And he gives some additional reasons to support his opinion. *Si aut pater*—these are the words of the Novel as cited by Voet; but in the Novel itself it is *Si et pater* (α καὶ πατήρ η μητέρα σινεαυ). Upon which Mr. Domat ar-

* 4to edition at Leyden, 1726. p. 554.

† Folio edition at Paris, 1713. vol. 1st. part 2d. book 2d. tit. 2d. sect. i. paragr. 7th. Or Strahan's Translation 2d edition, page 639.

‡ Hague edition 1731. vol. 1st. book 38. tit. 17. paragr. 13. page 587.

(r) But upon these words Huber has observed, that those may be said to be "next in degree *whom none precede*;" from whence he argues that though the grandfather is excluded when the father and brothers concur; yet when the father is out of the way the grandfather becomes *next in degree*, and ought to succeed with the brothers. The truth is, that on this point civilians are divided, see *Hub. ad Inst. lib. 3. de Success. ab Intest. secundum Nov. 118. l. 9.*

gues that the words *si et*, being translated from the Greek, signify *et si*. However Mr. Voet's general reasoning may be preferred to Domat's, it is not fair in him to alter the words of the Novel, on purpose to favour his own interpretation; when he could not but know, that a contrary one has been founded on the words as they stand in the Novel.

The lord chief justice Hale in the place above cited (1 Ventr. 423.) says, that the brother is the first degree in collaterals. And the text of the Institute* says, *superior quidem et inferior cognatio a primo gradu incipit; et a qua transverso numeratur, a secundo.*

Vinnius, who is a very acute commentator, in the *ratio succedendi ex jure novissimo* above cited, has an argument to prove, that the right of succeeding is not always according to the proximity of degrees. In which (p. 556.) are the words, *Concludo igitur fieri posse, ut aliqui, pari gradu constituti jure proximitatis, soli succedant, exclusis illis qui eodem gradu aut etiam propinquiores sunt, si illorum jus sit potius.* This shews, that one person may be preferred to another in equal degree *si ejus jus sit potius.*

In the present case—*Ipsa utilitas, justis prope aequi*, inclines to the preferring the brother to the grandfather; since there is in young persons a natural *propensity to growing up*. This alone indeed would not be sufficient to ground a determination upon; but joined to other reasons, it has its weight. And since not only the reasons are on this side the question, but the determinations have been that way, and to overthrow them would tend to introduce inconveniences, as it might disturb distributions already made, which is an argument of the greatest weight in the law, I shall determine this point in favour of the brother, to the exclusion of the grandfather.

CHAPTER THE THIRD.

Of the succession of COLLATERALS.

“ IF a person leaves neither descendents nor ascendents at the time of his death, we first call his brothers and sisters of the whole blood, whom we have also called to inherit with the fathers of deceased persons. And when there are

* Book 3d. tit. 6th. part 1st.

no brothers of the whole blood with the deceased, we call those, who are either by the same father only, or by the same mother. And if the deceased leaves brothers, and also nephews by a deceased brother or sister: those nephews shall be called to succeed with their uncles and aunts of the whole blood to the deceased: but however numerous those nephews are, they shall be intitled only to that share, which their parent would have taken, if alive. From whence it follows that if a man dies, and is survived by the children of a deceased brother of the whole blood, and also by brothers of the half blood, then his nephews (that is, the children of his brother by the whole blood) are to be preferred to their uncles and aunts; for altho' such nephews are themselves in the third degree, yet they are preferred, as their parent would have been if living. And on the contrary, if a man dies, and is survived by a brother of the whole blood, and by children of a brother of the half blood deceased, these nephews are excluded, as their father would have been, if he had lived. But among collaterals, we allow the privilege of representation to the sons and daughters of brothers and sisters, and no farther; and we grant it only to brothers and sisters children, when they concur with their uncles or aunts, paternal or maternal: for when descendents are called to inherit, we by no means permit the children of a deceased brother or sister to share in the succession; altho' the father or mother was of the whole blood with the deceased brother. But we have so far allowed the right of representation to brothers and sisters children, that being only in the third degree, they are called to inherit with those who are in the second: And this is evident, because brothers and sisters children are preferred to the uncles and aunts of the deceased, paternal as well as maternal; altho' they are all

in the third degree of cognation—But if a deceased person leaves neither brothers nor sisters, nor brothers nor sisters children; we then call all the other collaterals, according to the prerogative of their respective degrees, preferring the nearer to the more remote: and if several are found in the same degree, the inheritance must be divided according to the number of persons, and this manner of dividing an inheritance is called a division *in capita*." Harr. Justin. *ibid*.

Of the whole blood]. We must here observe in relation to the distinction between the whole blood and the half blood, that the law of England is different in this particular, according as the succession regards lands of inheritance, or personal estate. In the case of inheritance, the whole blood is always preferred, and the half blood is no blood inheritable by descent. In succession to personal estate, the law hath been more uncertain; inasmuch as the Statute takes no notice of this distinction between the whole blood and the half blood, but directs the distribution to be made amongst the next of kindred in equal degree to the testator. But being certain that brothers and sisters of the half blood are in the same degree with brothers and sisters of the whole blood, it hath been the general opinion, that according to the said Statute, brothers and sisters of the half blood are entitled to an equal share of the intestate's estate, with the brothers and sisters of the whole blood; although there are several precedents of judgments given, since the Statute, allowing the half blood to have but an half share. But the law in this particular is now become fixed and certain, ever since the decree of the house of lords, in the case of *Watts and Crooke*; upon an appeal from a decree in chancery, which had been given in favour of the half blood, and which was affirmed by the house of lords. 1 *Arch. Decret.* 658.

And this shall extend to a posthumous brother of the half blood. And lord Hardwicke said, he could not distinguish this from the case of a child *in utero* *in statu*. If indeed it were to go to children born at any distance of time, so as to cause an inconvenience by suspending the distribution, or to cause a taking back again, it might be an objection. But that cannot happen, because the child

child must be *in rerum natura* at the death of the intestate brother whose estate is in question; but at the utmost it cannot be carried beyond the year, in which a distribution is to be made. *Burnet and Man.* Nov. 16, 1748, *Vez.* 156.

If the deceased leaves brothers and also nephews] In the case of *Walsh and Walsh*, *M.* 1695. A man had three brothers; one of them died, leaving three children; another died, leaving two; and the third died, leaving five children: after which he himself died intestate. It was resolved, that distribution should be *per capita*, and not *per stirpes*; and that all the children should have equal; because none of them take by way of representation, but all as next of kindred in equal degree. *Præc. Chæ.* 54. (s)

So in the case of *Janson and Bury*, *H.* 1723. Lord chief baron Bury had several brothers and sisters, some of the half, and some of the whole blood, who all died in his lifetime, all leaving several children. And now upon a bill exhibited for the distribution of his estate, it was decreed by the whole court of exchequer, that the distribution should be *per capita*, and not *per stirpes*; for now they do not take by representation, but as next of kin to the intestate. But if one of the brothers or sisters of the chief baron had survived him, the children of the rest must have taken only by representation, that is to say, *per stirpes*. And the case in this court, between *Wall and Thredbam*, was cited, which was on June 28, 1711. Dr. Wall the intestate had two sisters; Susanna, of the half blood, who left Samuel; Elizabeth, of the whole blood, who left John, Mary, and Dorothy. Both the sisters died in the lifetime of Dr. Wall. His wife, as administratrix, preferred a bill for direction in the distribution; and the court decreed one moiety of the intestate's estate to the wife, and the other moiety to be divided into four

(s) And herewith the best civilians agree, *Si soli sint fratrum filii, non parentes, non fratres, succedunt in capita.* *Cujac. ad Nov.* 118.; *et de Feud.* 2. 11. For, as Vinnius has observed in his *Solutio Juris Quæstiones*, lib. 2. c. 39. the right of representation is a fiction of law, which is introduced in order that the proximity of the surviving brother or sister may not exclude their nephews or nieces. But in this case such a fiction is unnecessary, as all the claimants are in an equal degree of proximity to the deceased.

WILLS. Distribution.

parts, one part for the issue of Salome, and three for the issue of Elizabeth. And no distinction was made between the whole and the half blood. *Bush. 159.*

And so much for the 118th Novel of Justinian. We now proceed with the explanation of the other parts of the statute of distribution, and of the other Statute, consequent thereupon.

No representatives admitted among collateral, after brothers and sisters children] In the case of *Alston and Harding, Term 1691*: The question was, Whether the words of the statute are to be intended of brothers and sisters to the intestate; or whether, when distribution falls out amongst brothers and sisters, though remote relations to the intestate, representation shall be admitted amongst them? And the court held, that the representation should be only between the brothers and sisters to the intestate. *2 Vern. 233.*

In the case of *Patt and Patt, T. 1700*. The parties claiming distribution were a deceased brother's daughter, and the grandchildren of another deceased brother. And it was held by the court, that the deceased brother's daughter only was intitled; and that a deceased brother's or sister's grandchildren shall not come in with a deceased brother's or sister's children. *1 P. Will. 25. 1 Salk. 298.*

So in the case of *Bowers and Littlewood, M. 1719*. A man died intestate, leaving no wife or child, brother or sister, but his next of kin were an uncle by his mother's side, and a deceased aunt's child. The latter brought a bill against the uncle for a share of the intestate's estate. To which the defendant demurred; and the demurrer was allowed. And the lord chancellor said, that the case of *Patt and Patt* was in point; and that what had been urged in regard to the hardship of the case, was nothing; for so it may seem hard, that if an intestate leaves a deceased brother's only son, and ten children of a deceased half sister, the ten children shall take ten parts in eleven with the son of the deceased brother, and yet the law is so, because they all take per capita, and not by way of representation. *1 P. Will. 504.*

In case there be no child, then to the next of kindred in equal degree] In the case of *Dwond and Prestwood, July 30, 1738*. The intestate left two sons, and a nephew and a niece (children of a brother deceased). By the lord chancellor Hardwicke, the surplus must be divided into four parts equally amongst them, they being all in equal degree, and therefore the children do not take per stirpes, but

but *per capita*; but if the father of the nieces had been living, he would have taken the whole. 1 *Atk.* 455. (1)

That no such distribution of the goods of any person dying intestate be made till after one year] But the right to the distributive share vests immediately on the intestate's death. As in the case of *Grice and Grice*, *H.* 1708. Where a person, intitled to a distributory share of an intestate's estate, died within a year after the intestate, it was decreed, that although by the statute no distribution is to be made within a year, yet the share of the deceased person is an interest vested, transmissible to his executors or administrators; for in this sense the statute makes a will for the intestate, and it is as if a legacy was bequeathed, payable a year hence; which would plainly be an interest vested presently. Nay, where one died without wife or issue, and intestate, leaving a father, who also died before taking out administration, or altering the property of the estate; yet by the statute the right to the intestate's personal estate vested in the father, and consequently belonged to his executors or administrators, and not to the next of kin to the first intestate, who in this case happened to be a different person. 3 *P. Will.* 49.

Husband may demand and have administration] By this explanatory act of the 29 *C.* 2. the right of husbands is saved, of administering to their wives rights, credits and other personal estates.—In the case of *Cary and Taylor*, *M.* 1693. The wife intitled by the statute of distribution, died before any distribution was made, and the husband died soon after without taking administration to his wife: It was decreed, that the wife's share should go to the husband's administrator, and not to the administrator of the wife. 2 *Vern.* 302. (u)

(1) A difference is observable here between this provision of the statute of Charles 2. according to the interpretation here put upon it, and the Novel of Justinian, which in the third chapter prefers brothers and sisters children, to the uncles and aunts of the deceased, by representation, for both descriptions of persons are in the third degree. Lord Hardwicke observed in *Stanley v. Stanley*, *infra*, that the statute of distributions is inaccurately penned; and in this case it seems to have overlooked the doctrine of representation in brothers children, although the statute and the 1 *Ja.* 2. c. 17. admit of it where the children of a brother of the deceased concur with their uncles, in exclusion of the uncles and aunts of the deceased, and where they concur with the deceased's wife and mother.

(u) *Vide supra, Administration, 5.*

M. 1718.

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M. 1718. Squib and Wynne. A wife intitled by the death of her sister, to a personal estate consisting of things in action, died; her husband married again, and died intestate, without having taken administration to his first wife. The second wife took out administration to him, and also to the first wife of the goods not administered by the husband. And it was decreed, that the first wife's share of her sister's personal estate, should go to the administrators of the husband. And the lord chancellor Cowper said, that the exception in the statute of the 29 C. 2. doth not confine it to the life of the husband, or to the circumstance of his having reduced any part of the wife's personal estate into possession, but provides that no part of her estate shall be distributed among her relations after her. 1 *P. Will.* 378.

M. 1718. Cart and Reeve. A wife died possessed of things in action. The husband survived, and died without taking out letters of administration to his wife. After which the next of kin to the wife administered to her. And the lord chancellor Macclesfield held that the wife's administrator was but a trustee for the executor of the husband. And he said, that this clause in the act was made in favour of the husband, and not to his prejudice; so that it was intended by the parliament, that the husband should be within the statute of distribution so as to take the wife's things in action as to his benefit, but should not be within the same as to his prejudice; for were the construction to be otherwise, the husband of the wife intestate would be in a worse case than the next of kin, tho' ever so remote, which was not the intent of the statute. 1 *P. Will.* 381. And the reporter adds, that Mr. Vernon cited the case of *Lady Aiskough*, wherein he said, lord Cowper's opinion was the same with the lord Macclesfield's, that the wife's things in action did vest in the husband by the statute of distribution; so that since this resolution, the right of administration follows the right of the estate, and ought, in case of the husband's death after the wife, to be granted to the next of kin to the husband, in the same manner as it is granted to a residuary legatee. *Id.* 382.

For if a husband survive his wife, all interests vested in her belong to him; and although he dies without getting them in, or taking out administration to her, yet they belong to his representatives, and not to her's. 2 *Atk. Eq. Cas.* 424.

So in the case of *Humphreys and Bullen*, T. 1737. The wife had a legacy left her by her husband; and after married a second husband, and died. Her second husband took out administration to her, but died before he received the legacy. His next of kin took out administration to him, and received the legacy. Another person took out administration to the wife of the goods not administered, and brought a bill against the husband's administrator to repay the money. The question was, whether it belonged to the plaintiff in that right, or to the defendant as representative of the husband. The lord chancellor *Hardwicke* thought it so clear for the defendant, that he would not suffer it to be argued. He said, This is a plain case, taking it as it stood on the old statutes of administration, for thereby the husband was intitled to administration if he survived his wife. And as it stood on these statutes, no body could call him to an account for the effects, for the party was to administer for the good of the soul, but not to make a distribution. But by the 22 & 23 C. 2. c. 10. administrators are liable to make distribution, one third to the wife of the intestate, and so on. Yet upon the penning of that statute, though no notice was taken of the husband being administrator of his wife, it was held not to be within the act; for no person could be in equal degree to the wife with the husband, and so he was not subject to the statute of distribution. Which matter is explained by the 29 C. 2. c. 3. s. 25. which says, the husband may demand administration of his deceased wife's personal estate, and recover and enjoy the same, as he might have done before that act, which was (before that act) as his own property. And if before the statute of distribution, the husband had died before he had called in the effects of his wife, and any other person had taken out administration to the wife, he would have been a trustee for the husband. So in the case of *Cart and Reeves* in lord Maclesfield's time, it was held that an administrator *de bonis* ~~non~~ of the wife was a trustee for the representative of the husband. Therefore, though in point of law the plaintiff may be representative of the wife, yet he is only a trustee for the next of kin to the husband; and then the plaintiff, by bringing this bill against the person for whom he is intrusted, has been guilty of a breach of trust; so his bill must be dismissed with costs. 2 *Abr. Cas. Eq.* 445.

Shall die intestate without wife or child, in the lifetime of the mother] Before this statute of the 1 J. 2. c. 17. If
one

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one died without wife or child, his mother had all, and his sisters and brothers nothing; as the father surviving hath all at this day. And the reason of making this statute was, because the mother might marry, and carry all away to another husband. 1 *Salk.* 251.

But if there be no brother or sister, or representative of brother or sister, then it is out of the statute, and the mother shall have the whole, as she had before the making of it. As in the case of *Jackson and Proudbone*, T. 2 G. The son died intestate without father, brother, or sister; his mother living. She makes her will, and therein makes an executor and residuary legatee; and dies within a week after her son, and without having taken administration to him. The brother of the mother takes out administration to the son, as his uncle and next friend. The mother's executor brings a bill against the uncle, who was the son's administrator, to have an account of the personal estate of the son in right of his testatrix, who was intitled to it by the statute of distribution. Lord chancellor Cowper said, that the administrator of the son is only trustee for the next of kin to the intestate who are intitled to a distribution by the statute, and that in this case was the mother, the son dying without father brother or sister; and it is an interest vested in the mother, though she died before administration taken out to the son, and shall go to her executor and residuary legatee: And decreed accordingly. *Viner, Execut.* (Z. 12.) 1.

Without wife or child] T. 12 G. 2. *Keilway and Keilway*. R. Keilway died intestate possessed of a considerable personal estate, and without issue, leaving a wife and several brothers and sisters, and his mother living. The wife under the statute of G. 2. takes a moiety; and a question arising upon the statute of J. 2. how the other moiety should be distributed, whether the mother should have the whole, or only a distributive share with the brothers and sisters, a bill was brought in order to have the opinion of the court. Upon hearing, the lord chancellor King was clearly of opinion, and decreed, that the mother should have no more than a share of the other moiety with the brothers and sisters of the intestate; for the intent of the statute was, to put the mother (who before stood upon the same footing with the father) in the same state and condition only with these collaterals; so that whenever she is intitled, they shall have an equal share with her. *Sir.* 710.

May

May 14, 1739. *Stanley and Stanley.* *Hoby Stanley* died intestate, leaving a wife, and a mother living, and children of a brother deceased. These children, as representatives of their father, bring a bill to have one half of the moiety of the intestate's estate; the wife being intitled to the other moiety, and the mother (as they insisted) to have only an equal share with them. It is true, in this case there is a *wife* left; but the intent of the act was to put the intestate's brothers and sisters, and their representatives, in the same light and condition with the mother; so that whenever the mother was intitled, the brothers and sisters, and their representatives (*per stirpes*) were to have an equal share with her; and cited the case of *Kilway and Kilway*, which is exactly the same with the present, except that in the present case the intestate had no brother or sister living at his death, which is not material, in regard that the children of the brother take by way of representation. For the mother, who claimed the whole moiety, it was insisted, that these statutes are to receive a favourable construction, to exclude representatives in a remote degree, in respect of collaterals; and the words in the statute of *James* are in the conjunctive, and require a brother or sister to be *in esse*, as well as representatives of brothers and sisters, to make a case within this statute. It has been determined, in the case of *Walsh and Walsh*, that when the intestate leaves brothers or sisters children, and no brother or sister, such children take *per capita*, as next of kin, and not by representation; and, in the case of *Durant and Prestwood*, that the construction of the statute was the same, if a man died leaving aunts and nieces, and no brother or sister, such aunts and nieces would all take *per capita*, and the nieces could not take *per stirpes*; and yet if the father of the nieces had been living, he would have taken the whole. And from thence it was argued, that as there was no brother or sister of the intestate living, if the plaintiffs in this case took any thing, it must be necessarily *per capita*, and not by representation; that when brothers children take *per capita*, they must necessarily take as next of kin, because as they are not in equal degree with the intestate's mother, they could not otherwise take at all. And it was further argued, that if they were intitled by representation, it might be carried to the fourth or fifth generation, for there is nothing to restrain it in this act, as there is in the statute of distribution; which would create great confusion and fractions in the estates of intestates.

tates.—By the lord chancellor Hardwicke : There are two questions in this case ; First, Whether the plaintiffs, who are children of the intestate's brother, shall come with the mother of the intestate, there being a wife of the said intestate ? Secondly, supposing they may, notwithstanding that there is a wife ; whether they can come in, in respect that there is no brother or sister of the intestate living ? As to the first, it is directly within the case of *Kilmer and Kilmer* ; and I am satisfied with the reason of that case. It depends upon the construction of the proviso in the statute of *James*, which is very inaccurately penned, and so is the statute of distribution ; and therefore a construction is to be made upon the second statute, according to the intent and meaning of the legislature. Upon the statute of distribution, the descending line excluded all collaterals, and afterwards went to the next of kin, so that the father or mother would take all ; therefore the subsequent statute intended, that the mother should have a provision only equal with the brother or sister of the intestate. As to the second question, it is a new case, for the intestate has left no brother or sister, for the mother to collate (x), or share equally with. The case of *Walt and Walt* is grounded upon the statute of *Charles*. The words of that act do suppose, that there must be some persons to take in their own right, and others in right of representation ; but the statute of *James* is of a different kind, and lets in another person. Here is a mother who has an original share in her own right, and the brothers and sisters children take as if the brother and sister were living ; for the word *and*, immediately preceding the words *the representatives*, must be construed in the disjunctive. As to the objection, that such representation might be carried to several generations, I think that consequence doth not follow ; for the proviso in the statute of *James* is to be incorporated into the statute of *Charles*, which expressly says, that representation shall not be carried beyond brothers and sisters children ; and this is agreeable to the rule laid down by lord Hale, that statutes made *pari materia* shall be construed into one another. I think the statute of *James* intended to let in the rule of the civil law, which contained three lines, ascending, descending, and collateral ; the descending line absolutely excluded all others ; the ascending excluded all collaterals, except

(x) *Quære*, If not meant, to concur with ?

brothers and sisters, and they took alike. His lordship therefore ordered the residue of the intestate's estate, after satisfaction of debts, to be divided into four equal parts; two fourth parts thereof to go to the widow, one fourth to the mother, and one fourth to the brother's children.

1. E. Atkyns, 458.

Every brother and sister] Jan. 24, 1740. *Wallis and Mudgefon.* James Wallis died intestate; and at his death left issue Towers Wallis, his only child, an infant, who died within a week after his father; and his wife then enfiient of a daughter. A bill was brought by the daughter for a moiety of the personal estate of Towers Wallis, he having died without wife or child in the lifetime of his mother. A cross bill was filed by the mother, praying that the whole personal estate of Towers Wallis might be decreed unto her. At the hearing of this cause, lord chancellor Hardwicke thought it was a matter of some difficulty, and directed it to stand over till he had consulted with the civilians upon it; and now delivered his opinion: That the daughter born after the death of her brother, was intitled to a moiety of his personal estate. This is a question which depends upon the statute 1 J. 2. c. 17. If the sister had happened to have been born before the death of her brother, without doubt she would have been intitled to a share of her brother's personal estate equally with her mother. The only doubt is, inasmuch as she was a posthumous sister, and born after the death of her brother. But that circumstance, I am of opinion, will make no difference. It was admitted by the counsel for the defendant, that upon the statute of *Chas. 2.* a posthumous child shall have the benefit of a share of the personal estate of his father, equally with the other children; for this is agreeable to the intent of that statute, and to that debt of nature which parents owe to their children: Nor can any inconvenience arise from this; because the event of there being such children, must happen in nine months at furthest. But it was objected, that in collateral successions *ab intestato*, as between brothers and sisters, uncles and nephews, there is no such debt of nature: That the distributory share must vest in the party at the time of the death of the intestate, or not at all; and that great inconveniences must follow from a different determination; and that the vesting might be postponed, and broken in upon, and varied by a subsequent event: And in order to specify an inconvenience of this sort that might happen, the case of the half blood has been put that they are equally intitled

to a distributory share with the whole blood; that a mother might marry a second husband, and by that means there may be more brothers and sisters born at great distances of time, and therefore the distribution of the party's estate might perpetually vary. As to the first of these objections, that there is no debt of nature in collateral successions, that is a circumstance of no weight; for in the case of lineal successions, where that objection has been made use of as an argument for giving a share to the posthumous child, that has been only an additional corroboratory reason, and the primary reason has been the intention of the statute to preserve the estate of the father among his own children. As to the second objection, that the estate must vest immediately upon the death of the intestate; it is true that this is generally laid down in 1 *Vern.* 403. and 2 *Vern.* 274. but this objection is of equal weight in the case of lineal successions *ab intestato*, as it is in collateral successions; yet there it has never been allowed: and this appears by the opinion of lord Raymond, 2 *P. Will.* 446, *Edwards* and *Freeman*. As to the third objection, that according to this doctrine, a posthumous brother or sister of the half blood would be able to take, which would introduce many inconveniences; it is very true, that on the statute of Charles the second, the half blood shall take equally with the whole; for that was finally settled in *Shower's Parliamentary Cases*, 108. where all the learning on this head is collected together; but I do not find, that it was ever determined on this statute of James the second, that a brother of the half blood should take as representative of his brother deceased. In the case of *Watts and Cawton*, this point was argued, and many probable reasons given for that side of the question; but there was no determination, and therefore I will leave this point unprejudiced till it shall arise. The principal reason upon which I found my opinion in the present case is, that the posthumous sister was *in ventra sae matris* at the death of her brother, and consequently was a person *in rerum natura*. Upon this ground it is, that by the rules of the common and civil law, she is capable of taking in succession. By the rules of the common law, an ensient of this kind may be vouched in a common recovery; and in behalf of such an ensient, a bill may be brought, and an injunction granted to stay waste. So in the construction of wills and uses, an infant of this sort is capable of taking. Forwithstanding the case of *Slew and Cutler*, it is now

that such an infant is capable of taking by devise. And of this opinion were two judges, in the case of *Scattergood and Edge*, according to a manuscript report which I have of that case. But though this is so at common law, every body knows, that that which gave birth to the statute of Charles the second, was the contention then depending between the temporal and ecclesiastical courts, in relation to the power which the spiritual courts then exercised, of compelling distributions, and taking bonds for that purpose. The rise and progress of this dispute is mentioned in 3 *Mod.* 58. and *Raym.* 496. That statute hath ascertained that point in favour of the ecclesiastical courts; and the most material clauses in it are relative to their law, and to the course of proceedings in their courts. And the several expressions in the third section shew, that the main design of the act was (as hath been mentioned) to make the exercise of that jurisdiction in the ecclesiastical courts legal, which before that time was condemned in the temporal courts. And in the case of *Smith and Tracy*, lord Holt who was then one of the counsel argued strongly, that that statute was not to be construed by the rules of the common but of the canon and civil law; and a consultation was thereupon awarded. In the case of *Carter and Crawley*, it was likewise held, that that statute was directory to the spiritual courts, and was grounded principally on their law and the practice of their courts. In a case at the rolls, the master of the rolls was of opinion, that the statute was to be construed according to the canon and civil law; and afterwards, upon an appeal, lord King agreed to that opinion. This statute of Charles the second therefore confirms the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts which hath been mentioned, and enlarges it. It sets up the *collatio bonorum* which the civil law allows of. As this is so, the statute of James the second must be construed by the civil and canon law likewise. In 1 *Ventr.* 244. lord Hale was of opinion, that statutes made *in pari materia* were to be taken into the construction of one another; and that the statute of the 14 *Eliz.* relating to church leases, is a kind of an appendix to the 13 *Eliz.* relating to the same matter. And this rule of construction holds more strongly in the present case, than it did in that; for this statute of James the second is a continuance of that of Charles the second, with three additional clauses; and therefore it is to be considered, as if the statute of Charles the second was repealed, and re-enacted in it. And if this is so, it is con-

siderable what the civil law is in this particular ; and by that law, an infant *in ventre sa mere* is considered as *in esse*; in those respects which are for the benefit of the infant, though not in those which are to his prejudice. This appears by many passages in the Digest. In the present case, the question is *de commodo ipsius partus* merely, and no ways relates to the prejudice of this infant; therefore the decree must be accordingly.

ii. Of customs in particular places.

By a clause in the statute of distribution, as hath been observed, these customs are specially reserved and excepted. What these customs are, particularly within the city of London and the province of York, which composed so large and considerable a part of the kingdom, it is somewhat strange that so few authors have taken any pains to inform their readers or themselves. The civil law acknowledgeth not these customs : nor yet doth the common law ; and therefore perhaps neither civilians nor common lawyers have judged them a proper subject for their inquiries. And yet the general notion thereof seemeth to have sprung from the civil law, which enoblieth what the civilians call the *legitime*, or legal portion, although much different from these customs : and these customs are so ancient, and of ancient times were of such general and almost universal extent ; that some of the greatest lawyers have doubted whether they were not part of the common law.

The matter in short seemeth to have been plainly such. Before the conquest, lands were devisable by will, of which the gavelkind lands are a standing instance. And in more ancient times still, all the children, both male and female, inherited alike ; and the estate, whether real or personal, descended to all equally. (1 Salk. 251. Hall's H. C. L. 220. Dalrymp. Feud. 201, 202.) And this was agreeable to reason and nature ; although not to the policy of government which succeeded. After the conquest chiefly, came in the military tenures with the feudal law. The eldest son was fittest to bear arms ; and to the end that during the service he might be able to sustain the dignity of the military profession, he succeeded to the whole estate of land. And that the other children might not be destitute, a portion was provided for them out of the personalty, which the father might not give further.

them by will, nor the ordinary by distribution in case of intestacy.

All antiquity speaks of this as the general and established law, except only in some few boroughs and particular places, where the people lived probably by trade, and here, was not lands sufficient for the support of arms. And his accounts for it, why the lands holden in burgage tenure continued still devisable by will, when no other lands were so, except only those of gavelkind in Kent and in divers parts of Wales, which received not the laws of the conqueror.

And this order continued during all those reigns, whilst the kings were supplied with soldiers by the lords of manors and others at a price and for a time agreed on. Until at last the kings and people coming into other measures for raising of soldiers, these military services dwindled away, and were changed into pecuniary compensations. Lands in the reign of king Henry the eighth became again devisable by will. The restraints upon the personalty vanished by degrees, and only some footsteps thereof remain in particular places. In the province of York, these military services were the longer necessary, by reason of the continual incursions of the Scots; and to this day a great

great

In the county of Westmorland, there are many footsteps of this institution, in the customs of the several manors. In the manor of Ravenstonedale, wherein the customs were ascertained by indenture betwixt the lord and tenants, in the 3d and 4th of Philip and Mary, one article is, that *the tenants should break or divide no farmholds*; or, as the same is explained by a further indenture in the 22d year of queen Elizabeth, that *the tenants shall divide or sever their ancient and customary tenements*, without special agreement with the lord or his steward for that purpose. Which custom, being rivetted by the indentures, continues till this day, altho' the cause hath long since vanished. But, by permission of the lords from time to time, so many severances have been made, that it is difficult to estimate within the said manor, what might have been the value of an original military tenement.

In the manor of Kentmire, in the said county, there are remains of an establishment, which seem to lead nearer to that point. It appears that the manor was anciently divided into four quarters; each quarter into fifteen tenements; that each tenement consisted of a proportionable quantity of inclosed ground, with pasture for ten cattle in a common pasture lying within each quarter respectively, and privilege for 80 sheep in

great part of the lands within that province are not devisable by will; and until the reign of king William the third, a man there by his will might not dispose of his personal estate from his wife and children, further than his own proportionable part; and one would think by most, if not all, of the books which have been written upon the subject of wills, that have taken any notice of this matter at all, that the same law continueth still; as indeed it doth in the case of intestacies, although not in the case of last wills and testaments. For by the statute of the 4 W. c. 2. power is given to the inhabitants of the province of York, to dispose of their whole personal estate by will, notwithstanding their custom to the contrary; except only in the cities of York and of Chester: And by the 2 & 3 An. c. 5. the like power is given to the inhabitants of the city of York also. By the 7 & 8 W. c. 38. the like power is given to the inhabitants of the principality of Wales. And by the 11 G. c. 18. the like power is given to the freemen of the city of London. But the law concerning the distribution of intestates effects, in all the said places, continues as it was before.

Lord chief justice Coke, who might seem well able to give a good account of these customs, had a fair opportunity in his commentary on the great charter, where the *reasonable part* is mentioned; but he passeth it over slightly, contrary to his wonted manner, and says dryly, that it is not by the common law: and quotes Bracton for the same; whereas Bracton doth not say so, but rather the contrary.

The author of the *Law of Testaments* (which seemeth to be a book not altogether destitute of merit) professeth expressly to treat of the customs of the city of London and province of York. And he hath collected a considerable number of cases relating to that subject. But with regard to the city of London, by some fatality, he

another pasture common to the whole manor; that for each tenement a man served the office of constable, paid 2s. a year to the curate of the chapel, and now pays 13s. 4d. rent to the lord of the manor. By which distinctions the tenements have been kept so far separate, that it is easy to calculate what the soldier's estate within that manor might be supposed to be worth by the year: for one of those ancient tenements, well husbanded, seemeth to be of the value at this day of about 10l. a year. *Burn.*

hath

hath recited the statute of the 11 G. c. 18. so imperfectly, that if he did understand it himself, it is impossible the reader should understand it from his manner of expressing it: but it is plain he did not understand it; for all which he delivers, tendeth to prove, that the custom of the city of London extends to wills as well as to the distribution of intestates effects, and to wills especially. All which is in contradiction to the statute, as will appear. And of the statutes which give to the inhabitants of the province of York the like power to dispose of their whole personal estates by their last wills and testaments, he taketh not the least notice, nor ever mentions them.

Dr. *Gibson* was a native of the province of York; and received his patrimony by the law and custom of that province. He recites the statutes faithfully which take away the custom as to wills within the province at large, and within the city of York in particular, and also within the principality of Wales; but when he comes to speak of the aforesaid *reasonable part*, having recited briefly the words of *Bracton* and *Fleta*, and just mentioned the writs *de rationabili parte bonorum* in the register, he says a bare reference thereto may be sufficient, since the said right is so far abolished; and he adds, that it is now little more than matter of speculation, what we find in the *magna charta* itself concerning the same reasonable part. And when he comes to treat particularly of the distribution of intestates effects; altho' the clause of exception of these customs in the statute of distribution seemed to render an explication thereof in some sort necessary, yet he passeth it in silence.

Dr. *Swinburne* was judge of the prerogative court of York. He had great abilities and opportunities more than any other person of his time, and inclination likewise, to obtain a competent satisfaction in this matter. His book, for the time in which it was written, is a most excellent book. And one can scarcely pardon the continuators of his work (altho' upon the whole of the better sort of this kind of authors) for attempting, as they pretend, to correct his style. It needeth no correction, *Swinburne* lived at a time, namely, in the latter end of queen Elizabeth's reign, when the style of writing was elegant and easy, according to the true standard of the ancients and of nature; and utterly abhorrent from that formal bombast, which (from the royal example) succeeded in the next reign. But if they could have amended *Swinburne's* expression, they ought not to have done

it; but in an edition of Swinburne, to have exhibited Swinburne: and where he might be judged to be wrong, or where the law since his time is altered (as it is in many cases), there was scope enough for animadversion other ways. But they have mangled Swinburne, and made no distinction betwixt what is his, and what is not. By breaking the connection in improper places, and not always understanding him themselves, they have rendered even Swinburne sometimes unintelligible. All which is only intended as an apology, for having separated Swinburne throughout this title, from his editors or continuators; by inserting what is Swinburne's, in his own words, and under his own name; and by distinguishing what is an addition to Swinburne, at the end of the quotation, by the letter *a*.

As to the matter before us, we must despair of obtaining a more perfect delineation of the custom of the province of York, as it was in Swinburne's days, than Swinburne hath exhibited. He was a diligent searcher into antiquity; was nearer to the fountain head than we are by almost two hundred years; was acquainted personally with the most learned men of that time; and made it his employment, to examine minutely into this particular custom; and above all, was master of the acts and records of the court of York, and availed himself of that treasure. But what is most astonishing is, that even in the very last edition of Swinburne, where he is treating of this same custom, there is no notice at all taken (by the editors) of the statutes or acts of parliament, which at one stroke utterly abolished at least one half of this custom: but for any thing which appears, the reader must judge, that the inhabitants of the province of York cannot make their testaments of their personal estates, farther than to the extent of the testator's own rateable part, which was, and in the case of intestates is still called the *death's part*. Indeed there is a sketch of one of the said acts, in a corner of the book elsewhere; inserted where it hath no manner of connexion, by those who did not understand, or did not consider, its importance and use.

There is some shadow of this custom, as was said before in the civil law; and the proportions were thus: If there were four children or under, they had a third part equally amongst them; if five or more, they had a moiety. And the civil law allows a legitime to parents, but not to widows: whereas, on the contrary, the customs

toms we speak of do allow a legal portion to widows, but not to parents. 2 *Domat.* 119. 121.

By the statute of *magna charta*, c. 18. in the ninth year of king Henry the third, it is said, generally; *If nothing be owing to the king or any other, all the chattels shall go to the use of the dead* (that is, to his executors or administrators), *saving to his wife and children their reasonable parts*: [Or rather, their proportionable parts; ————“*salvis uxori ejus & pueris ipsius rationabilibus partibus suis.*”]

Bracton, who wrote soon after this statute, delivers it in few words as the general law of the realm, that after debts and other necessary charges deducted, the whole residue shall be divided into three parts; of which the children, if there be any, shall have one part; the wife, if she survive, shall have another part; and the third part the testator shall have free power to dispose of. If the testator hath no children, then one moiety shall be to the deceased, and the other moiety shall be reserved to the wife. If he shall die, having no wife, and having children surviving; then the deceased shall have one moiety, and the children shall have the other. If he shall die without either wife or child, then the whole shall remain to the deceased. *Bract.* 60, 61. And it is to be observed, that these proportions generally do govern the customs to this day.

And the same is delivered by the author of *Fleta*, almost in the same words; and he saith, as *Bracton* had said before, that this is the law, unless there be a custom to the contrary, as in cities, towns, and villages. *Fleta*, b. 2. c. 57.

By a constitution of archbishop *Stratford*, which was in the 16 *Ed.* 3. it is ordered thus: *Forasmuch as it happeneth sometimes, that persons dying intestate, the lords of the fees do not permit the debts of the deceased to be paid out of their moveable goods, nor the said goods to be distributed to the use of their wives, children or parents, or otherwise by the disposition of the ordinaries, according to that portion which by the custom of the country appertaineth to the deceased; we do decree, that none shall henceforth do the same, on pain of the greater excommunication.* *Lind.* 171.

According to that portion which, by the custom of the country, appertaineth to the deceased] *Lindwood* says, The portion of the deceased was, what was assigned by the ordinary for the supposed benefit of the soul of the deceased; which was to be determined by custom: sometimes (says he) it was the whole personal estate, as when there was

neither wife nor child ; sometimes one half, as where there is a wife surviving, but no children ; sometimes a third part, as where there is both wife and children. *Lind.* 178.

By the custom of the country] He doth not say, of the realm ; and that for this reason (saith Lindwood) because perhaps throughout the whole realm one and the same custom as to this matter doth not prevail ; but there are different customs according to the diversities of countries : for there may be a general custom of some province ; also a special custom of some city, territory, or place. *Lind.* 172.

Fitzherbert saith, The writ *de rationabili parte bonorum* lieth, where the wife or sons and daughters of the deceased cannot have their *reasonable part* of the deceased's goods, after the debts are paid, and funeral expences satisfied. *F. N. B.* 284.

And it seemeth, he says, by the statute of *magna charta*, c. 18. that this was the common law of the realm ; and so (he says) it appeareth by *Glanvil.* *F. N. B.* 284.

And in the 31 *Ed.* 3. A woman did demand the moiety of her husband's goods because he had no children, and counted upon the custom of the realm. *F. N. B.* 284.

But in after times, and by degrees, they came to count for the same upon the particular custom of such and such places. *F. N. B.* 284.

And accordingly the writs in the register do rehearse the customs of particular counties ; and are of this form :

“ The king to the sheriff &c. If *W* who was the
 “ wife of *D*, shall make us secure &c. that then you
 “ summon *E* and *E*, executors of the testament of the
 “ aforesaid *D*. that they be &c. to shew why, seeing that
 “ according to the custom in the county aforesaid hither-
 “ to obtained, wives after the death of their husbands
 “ ought to have their reasonable part of the goods and
 “ chattels of their husbands, they the same executors
 “ aforesaid from her the said *W* her reasonable part to
 “ the value of ten marks of the goods and chattels which
 “ were of the aforesaid *D* heretofore her husband they
 “ do detain, unjustly, and refuse to render them unto
 “ her ; to the great damage and grievance of her the said
 “ *W*, and against the custom aforesaid And have you
 “ there the summons and this writ &c.”

“ The king &c. Forasmuch as *B* of ——— and *S*
 “ his sister have made us secure &c. that you summon *E*
 “ and *E* executors of the testament of *D* of ——— that
 “ they

18 they be &c. to shew why, seeing that according to the
 16 custom in the county aforesaid hitherto obtained and
 14 approved, children after the death of their fathers,
 12 who are not their heirs, nor were promoted in the life
 10 of their fathers, ought to have their reasonable parts
 8 of the goods and chattels which were of their fathers,
 6 they the same executors aforesaid from the aforesaid *B*
 4 and *S* after the death of the aforesaid *D* their father,
 2 whose heirs they are not, and who were not promoted
 in the life of the same their father, their reasonable
 parts to the value of ten pounds of the goods and chat-
 tels which were of the aforesaid *D* their father they do
 detain, unjustly, and refuse to render the same unto
 them; to the great damage and grievance of them the
 said *B* and *S*, and against the custom aforesaid. And
 have you there the summons and this writ &c."

In the case of *Stapleton and Sherrard*, *H* 1684. (1 *Vern.*
 305.) It was said, that the custom of the province of
York is the same with the custom of the city of *London*,
 unless in the case where the eldest son hath lands by de-
 scent; but it will appear when we come to treat of them
 separately, that there are other differences.

And first of the custom of the city of *London*.

iii. Of the custom of the city of *London* in particular.

1. By the 11 G. c. 18. *Whereas great numbers of weal-* Statute enabling
thy persons, not free of the city of London, do inhabit and to dispose by will,
carry on the trade of merchandize and other employments within
the said city, and refuse or decline to become freemen of the same,
by reason of an ancient custom within the said city, restraining
the citizens and freemen of the same from disposing of their
personal estates by their last wills and testaments; to the intent
therefore that persons of wealth and ability, who exercise the
business of merchandize and other laudable employments within
the said city, may not be discouraged from becoming free of
the same, by reason of the said custom, it is enacted, that it
shall be lawful to all persons who shall after June 1, 1725,
be made free, or become free, of the said city; and also for
all persons who are already free, and on the said first day of
June 1725 shall be unmarried and not have issue by any for-
mer marriage (y), to give and devise will and dispose of their
personal estates, to such uses as they shall think fit; any custom or

(y) *Dansen v. Hawes*, *Amb.* 276.

usage in the said city, or any by-law or ordinance made or observed within the same, to the contrary thereof in any wise notwithstanding. s. 17.

Provided, that in case any person, who shall at any time after the said first day of June 1725 become free of the said city; and any person who is already free, and on the said first day of June 1725 shall be unmarried, and not have issue by any former marriage, — hath agreed or shall agree by any writing under his hand, upon or in consideration of his marriage or otherwise, that his personal estate shall be subject to or be distributed or distributable according to the custom of the city of London; or in case any person so free or becoming free as aforesaid, shall die intestate: in every such case, the personal estate of such person so making such agreement, or so dying intestate, shall be subject to, and be distributed and distributable according to the custom of the said city; any thing herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding. s. 18.

So that as to intestates, the custom continueth as it was before: which seemeth to be as follows.

Custom of distribution in case of intestacy.

2. If a freeman of London dies, in London or elsewhere, leaving a widow and a child or children; his personal estate (after his debts paid, and the customary allowance for the funeral, and for the widow's chamber, being first deducted thereout) is by the custom of the said city to be divided into three equal parts, and disposed of in the following manner; to wit, one third part thereof to the widow, another third part to the children, and the other third part (being taken out of the custom) is now made subject to the statute of distribution; and so dividing the whole into nine parts, four ninths belong to the wife, and five ninths to the children. 2 Salk. 426. L. Raym. 1328. 1 Vern. 180. Note, in the case of *Biddle and Biddle*, 18 Mar. 1718, before lord Parker, it was said, that the widow is intitled to the furniture of her chamber: or in case the estate exceeds 2000l., then to 50l. instead thereof. *Viner*, Tit. Customs of London. B. 2.

If a freeman hath no wife, but hath children; the half of his personal estate belongs to his children, and the other half (being the dead man's part) is in like manner distributable by the statute. 1 P. Will. 341.

So if he hath a wife and no children; half of his personal estate belongs to his wife, and the other half is distributable; and in this case one moiety of the dead man's part distributable by the statute as aforesaid, belongeth unto the wife by the said statute: so that in the whole she will

will have three fourths of the personal estate, besides her widow's chamber. 2 Salk. 246. Law of Test. 211.

If he hath *neither wife nor child* at the time of his death, then the whole belongs to the deceased, and is distributable by the statute. Law of Test. 192.

3. Concerning which death's part, to be distributed by the statute, it is enacted by the 1 J. 2. c. 17. as followeth: *For the determining some doubts, arising on the statute of frauds and perjuries, it is enacted and declared, that the clause therein, whereby it is provided that that act or any thing therein contained should not any ways prejudice or hinder the customs observed within the city of London and province of York, was never intended nor shall be taken or construed to extend to such part of any intestate's estate, as any administrator, by virtue only of being administrator, by pretence or reason of any custom, may claim to have to exempt the same from distribution; but that such part in the hands of such administrator shall be subject to distribution, as in other cases within the said act.* 1. 8.

The death's part distributable according to the statute of distribution.

It was called the dead man's part, because the ordinary, or he to whom the ordinary should commit administration, was to dispose of the same to pious uses; for the benefit of the soul of the deceased; but administrators, under pretence of concealed debts, did frequently keep the greatest part thereof to their own use: And after this statute of the 1 J. 2. in the case between the widow and the son of Sir Richard How, knight, the widow as administratrix claimed to herself the death's part by virtue of the letters of administration granted to her of her husband's estate; but this, being thought unreasonable, was contested by the son in chancery with his mother-in-law; and upon hearing the cause, it was settled and decreed to be observed for ever, that the deceased's part should be divided according to the statute of distribution, in pursuance of this explanatory clause of the 1 J. 2. c. 17. Green's Privil. 49, 50.

4. The court of orphans is held by custom time out of memory, before the lord mayor and aldermen of the city of London; who are guardians to the children of all freemen of London, that are under the age of twenty-one years at the time of their father's decease. Privilegia Londini, 288.

Superintendency of the court of orphans.

And if a freeman or freewoman die, leaving orphans within age unmarried; the court of orphans shall have the custody of their body and goods: and the executors or administrators shall exhibit inventories before them,

and

and become bound to the chamberlain to the use of the orphans to make a true account upon oath, and if they refuse, shall commit them till they become bound. *Priv. Lond.* 280. And their being bound so to do in the spiritual court, excuseth them not from this custom. *Law of Ex.* 252.

For if the father is a freeman of London, he cannot devise the disposition of the body of his child; and if he do, yet the infant shall remain in the custody of the mayor and aldermen. *Privil. Lond.* 287.

Children intitled, tho' born out of the city.

5. The children of a freeman of London are intitled to their share of his personal estate, though they were born out of the city; and though their father did not inhabit or die in London. *Law of Test.* 202.

And also, though their estate doth not lie in the city, but elsewhere. *Privil. Lond.* 288.

Child intitled tho' born after the father's death.

6. An after-born child shall come in with the rest for a customary share of the father's personal estate. *T.* 1718. *Walsam and Skinner.* *Prec. Cha.* 499.

Child dying, the orphanage part survives.

7. *T.* 1706. *Wilcocks and Wilcocks.* A child intitled to an orphanage share of his father's personal estate, dying under twenty-one, and unmarried, cannot devise it by his will; for by the custom it survives to the other children: But he may devise the share which he hath under the statute of distribution. *2 Vern.* 559.

In the case of *Fouke and Lewen*, *M.* 1682; it is said, that if a man marries an orphan, who dies under twenty-one; her orphanage part shall not survive to the other children, but shall go to the husband.

But in the case of *Merriweather and Hester*, *T.* 5 G. a case was cited between *Ambrose and Ambrose*, and another between *Rawlinson and Rawlinson*, where it had been certified to be the custom of London, and was accordingly decreed by the lord chancellors Harcourt and Cowper successively, that if a city orphan dies before 21, his orphanage part survives to the other orphans, and that he can make no disposition by will to contradict it; but if he dies after 21, at which time he might by will have disposed of it, there, though he die intestate, it shall go according to the statute of distribution, between his mother and surviving brothers and sisters; and that in the other case, where he dies before 21, the survivorship holds only as to the orphanage part belonging to himself, so that if he had by survivorship the part of any other of his brothers or sisters, that should go according to the statute of distribution. It was also said, that if a man marries an orphan,

orphan, yet till twenty-one his right is not so vested, as to prevent his wife's share from surviving, in case she died before twenty-one. *Prec. Cba.* 537.

So if a man marries an orphan, and dies; his representatives are not intitled to any part of what was his wife's customary share, but the whole belongs to the wife. *Viner*, Custom of London. (B. 10.) 18.

8. A wife divorced for adultery, shall not have her customary share. *Bunb.* 16. Wife divorced.

9. Where the husband was attainted of felony, and pardoned on condition of transportation; and afterwards the wife became intitled to some personal estate as orphan to a freeman of London; this personal estate was decreed to belong to the wife, as to a feme sole. *T.* 1729. *Newsome and Bowyer*, 3 *P. Will*, 32. Husband attainted.

10. If a freeman having several children, or but one child, doth fully advance all his children or his single child; this satisfies the custom, and is the same as if he had no child, and his personal estate shall go as if there was none. So if a freeman compound with his wife before marriage, for her customary part; it is the same as if there was no wife. 2 *P. Will*. 527.

M. 1710. *Hancock and Hancock*. Where the wife of a freeman of London is compounded with before marriage, by settling a jointure, altho' of land; the wife is taken as advanced, and the children by the custom of London shall have a moiety as if the wife was dead. So if all the children are advanced; the wife shall have a moiety. 2 *Vern.* 665.

H. 1718. *Babington and Greenwood*. A jointure by a freeman on his wife in bar of dower, will not bar her of her customary part: otherwise it is, if said to be in bar of her customary part. 1 *P. Will*. 530.

M. 1727. *Lewin and Lewin*. If a woman, before marriage with a freeman of London, accepts of a settlement upon her to take effect after her husband's death in case she survives him, of part of his personal estate, (without taking notice of the custom of London,) she is thereby barred of her customary part of his personal estate. 3 *P. Will*. 16.

T. 1734. *Pusey and Desboverie*. Lord chancellor Talbot, taking notice of the contrary determinations made by the court in this point, said, it had been of late settled, that where a wife was compounded withal, it should be taken, as if there was no wife; and consequently that the husband should have one moiety, and the children the other.

22115. Distribution.

by him, although it be in an almanack, or effusion.
Green's Preced. of L. 53.

M. 1708. *Dani and lord Dolewars.* The father's declaring, that the child was fully advanced or not advanced, was of no avail, unless it appeared what the advancement was in certainty; to the intent it might be known, whether such advancement did amount unto as much as would have belonged to the child by the custom. *2 Kern.* 630.

M. 1729. *Cleaver and Sparling.* If a freeman hath advanced his child on marriage, and the certainty of that advancement doth not appear under the freeman's hand; this is to be taken as a full advancement: but the freeman's declaration alone that he hath fully advanced his child, is not of itself sufficient; for at that rate it would be in the power of every freeman, by making such declaration, to bar his child of the orphanage part. *Will.* 527. (x)

Child of age
may release the
customary part.

12. The child of a freeman of London, when of age, may in consideration of a present fortune, bar herself of her customary part. As in the case of *Lockyer and Savage*, *M.* 6 G. 2. The father, on his daughter's marriage, agrees to give her 3000*l.*; which she, being of age, covenants to receive in full of her customary share as a freeman's daughter: and though it was objected, that such a future right cannot be released, and that parents might make an ill use of the power they have over their children, in forcing them to give such discharges; yet this was held a good bar of the custom, there being no fraud in the transaction. *2 Abr. Cas. Eq.* 272. *Str.* 947.

But such release, without a valuable consideration, is not good; for in such case, at the time of the release, the children having neither *jus in re*, nor *jus ad rem*, the whole being in the father during his life, there is nothing for any release to operate upon. *1 Atk.* 402.

(x) *Farnham v. Phillips*, *2 Atk.* 214. *U* 523. A freeman of London made his will, and divided his estate according to the custom, and the dead man's part he devised amongst his wife and children. Afterwards, in his lifetime he married one of his daughters, and gave her 1000*l.* which in the marriage articles was called her portion or provision. This the Court declared to be a satisfaction of her orphanage share, but not to exclude her from a share of the residue, which at the time of making the will was uncertain.

13. In the case of *Kemp and Kelsey, M. 1720.* The plaintiff's wife was a freeman's daughter; and after her marriage, her father gave her 100l. and the plaintiff executed a release for the 100l. in full of all his wife's customary part or share which was or might be due to her by the custom of London. The father died. A bill was brought for a discovery of the personal estate, and that upon the plaintiff's bringing the 100l. into hotchpot, they might be let in to a customary part of the father's estate. The defendant pleaded the release in bar. And by the lord chancellor *Macclesfield*: The husband had no power to release a future interest of his wife's. She might survive him; and would then be intitled to it in her own right. Besides, this release is suggested to be fraudulently obtained. And therefore his lordship ordered the plea to stand for an answer, with liberty to except, so as to have an account of the freeman's personal estate, and the benefit of the release to be saved to the hearing, when the question would come more properly, whether the release by the custom was good or not. 2 *Abr. Eq. Cas.* 267.

Whether the husband can release.

E. 1725. Cox and Belitha. A freeman of London had two daughters and one son. One of the daughters married; and on receiving a suitable portion, the husband released all right and interest which he had or might have to any part of the father's personal estate by the custom or otherwise; and covenanted that at any time after the death of the father he would do any further act for the releasing of any right which he might have by the custom. Jekyll and Gilbert, commissioners, inclined to think, that the release being for a valuable consideration, purporting an agreement to quit the right to the orphanage part, to be binding in equity; but though this might not be so clear, yet the covenant for a valuable consideration to release the future right is good: And so they decreed on the execution of the release. 2 *P. Will.* 272.

June 18, 1737. *Medcalf and Ives.* A bill was brought to have a specific performance of articles made on the marriage of the defendant, whereby the defendant and his wife covenanted, in consideration of 2000l. the wife's marriage portion, to release all the right and interest that might accrue to them out of her father's personal estate by the custom of the city of London, he being a freeman of the said city. The defence made for the defendant was, that the customary part being a mere possibility and contingency, which might or might not happen, it could not be released; and if it could, that at the time of the ar-

ticles, the wife was an infant, and so not bound by them; besides that the 2000l. was no consideration for releasing such an interest, the wife's father having died worth upwards of 20,000l. By the lord chancellor Hardwicke: Though hardships may happen on my determination, yet these are considerations too loose either for a judge at law or in this court to lay any weight upon; and I must determine according to the facts, by the rules of law, and of this court. In this case there appears to have been a valuable consideration for the agreement in the articles, because at the time when the 2000l. was given the defendant's wife was intitled to no part of the estate of her father, and it was given for her advancement in the world, and it is highly reasonable that such kind of articles should be carried into execution, and that when a father is bountiful to his children in his lifetime, he should have his affairs settled to his own satisfaction. As to the objection of the customary part being a possibility, and merely in contingency, it is of no weight; for there is no doubt but it might be released in equity: but here is a covenant, which the defendant is bound by in all events. And it is no objection to say, that the wife was under age; for though in this respect, if the husband were dead, the articles would not bind her, and she would by survivorship be intitled to the customary share, as a chose in action not recovered, or received by the husband; yet he being alive, it is a matter that accrues to him in right of his wife, and he may release it, and his release will bind her; and therefore it was reasonable he should perform his covenant. I found my opinion too on an old law well known in the city, by the name of *Jud's law*; whereby a husband was authorised to agree with the father for the wife, though she was under age. 1 *Atk.* 63.

Whether the share released shall fall into the dead man's or the orphanage part.

14. In the last mentioned case of *Medcalf* and *Jves*, a question arose, whether the orphanage part, covenanted to be released by the husband, should fall into the dead man's part, and go wholly according to his disposition of the residue of his estate, as a thing purchased by him; or whether it should fall into his personal estate, and be distributed with it according to the custom: And the lord chancellor said, that as in equity things covenanted to be done are things actually done, it must be considered as if the husband had actually released, and so is an extinguishment of his wife's right to the orphanage part; and being an extinguishment of the right, it leaves the estate of the father as if it had never been charged with it, and must

must therefore be considered as a part of his general personal estate, and not go wholly to the executor of the father as part of the dead man's share. 1 *Ask.* 64.

15. In the case of *Hill and Blanket*, H. 28 G. 2. It is said, that there is no such custom, as that a child marrying under the age of eighteen, without the father's consent, shall lose her orphanage part. 1 *Cha. Ca. Finch.* 248. Whether marriage without consent bars the custom.

But in the case of *Foden and Howlett*, H. 1 J. 2. By Jefferies lord chancellor: If the daughter of a citizen of London marries in his lifetime against his consent, unless the father be reconciled to her before his death, she shall not have her orphanage share of his personal estate: and it would be unreasonable to take the custom to be otherwise. 1 *Vern.* 354.

And if any person intermarry with an orphan without consent of the court, such person may be fined by them, according to the quality and portion of the orphan; and unless such person pay the fine, or give security to pay it, they may commit him to Newgate, to remain there till he submit to their orders. *Priv. Lond.* 282, 283 (a).

And he that marries an orphan without consent of the court, must make a jointure before he receives the portion. *Priv. Lond.* 286.

16. *E.* 1686. *Fowke and Hunt*. A freeman of London dies, leaving a widow and no children; but hath several grandchildren living at the time of his death. And the question was, whether they were within the custom of the city of London or not. The lord chancellor took time to consider of it; and having consulted the recorder and several of the aldermen, delivered his opinion, that grandchildren were not within the custom of the city of London. 1 *Vern.* 397. Custom extends not to grandchildren.

H. 1716. *Northey and Strange*. It was admitted by counsel, and said to have been so determined, and settled, that a freeman's grandchild (where the grandchild's father was never advanced in the freeman's lifetime, and died before the freeman, leaving a child) was not within the custom; and that only the freeman's children were within the custom, to come in for an orphanage part. 1 *P. Will.* 341. 2 *Salk.* 426.

17. If a freeman of London hath but one child, and he has received some portion from his father, and the father dies, leaving this child and a wife; the child shall Hotchpot only amongst children.

(a) Vide supra, *Form and Manner*, 7. in fine.

have his full orphan's part, without any regard to what he hath already received: for that advancement in part is only to be brought into hotchpot with children, and not with others: By Sir Edward Northey. 2 *Salk.* 426.

M. 1685. *Beckford and Beckford.* The only point was, upon the custom of the city of London, where a child that had a portion, but was not fully advanced, and was to bring her portion into hotchpot: whether the portion should be brought into the personal estate in general, that so the widow might come in for part of it, or whether it should be brought into the orphanage part only: Lord chancellor: it is beyond all doubt, that it must be brought into the orphanage part only. 1 *Vern.* 345.

T. 1691. *Fane and Bence.* Where an only child is in part advanced by the father in his lifetime; such child shall not bring his part into hotchpot, there being none in equal degree with him. 2 *Vern.* 234.

T. 1729. *Cleaver and Spurling.* A freeman of London having but one child, advanceth that child in part only; the child shall take a full share, without bringing what he had before received into hotchpot: for the only meaning of bringing the child's share into hotchpot is, to make an equality among the children; and not for the benefit of the mother, or to increase the dead man's share. 2 *P. Will.* 526.

Lease. 18. A lease for years attending the inheritance of a freeman of London, is not assets within the custom. 1 *Vern.* 2. 102.

Trust of a term. 19. So if a citizen of London has a trust of a term attending his inheritance, and dies; the trust of the term shall not be subject to the custom of London, to be divided between the wife and children, as other personal estate and chattels shall. 2 *Freem.* 66.

Mortgage. 20. A mortgage in fee shall be counted part of a freeman's personal estate, and subject to the custom. 1 *Cha. Ca.* 285.

A mortgage shall be paid out of the personal estate, in preference to the customary or orphanage part by the custom of London; because the custom of London cannot take place till after the debts paid. 2 *P. Will.* 335.

iv. *Of the custom of the province of York.*

By the statute of distribution 22 & 23 C. 2. c. 10. it is provided, that the said act or any thing therein contained,
shall

shall not any ways prejudice or hinder the customs observed within the city of London, or within the province of York, or other places, having known and received customs peculiar to them, but that the same customs may be observed as formerly; any thing therein contained to the contrary notwithstanding. s. 4.

And by the 1 J. 2. c. 17. For the determining some doubts arising upon the said statute, it is hereby enacted and declared, that the clause therein by which it is provided, that the same statute or any thing therein contained should not any ways prejudice or hinder the customs observed within the city of London and province of York, was never intended, nor shall be taken or construed to extend to such part of any intestate's estate, as any administrator, by virtue only of being administrator, by pretence or reason of any custom, may claim to have to exempt the same from distribution; but that such part in the hands of such administrator shall be subject to distribution as in other cases within the said statute. s. 8.

By virtue only of being administrator} That part which the administrator hath by virtue only of his being administrator, is the dead man's part; which being taken out of the custom, this statute of the 1 J. 2. c. 17. provides that the same shall be distributed according to the statute of distribution.

And agreeable hereunto was the case of *Stapleton and Sherrard*, Feb. 5th, in the 3 J. 2. which cause was depending when this statute was made: Between John Stapleton, esquire, and Thomas lord Meryon, plaintiffs; Bennet Sherrard, esquire, and Dorothy his wife, administratrix of the goods of Robert Stapleton, esquire, defendants—This cause having been first heard, on the 13th day of June in the 35th of Charles 2. and it being then referred to a master to take an account of the personal estate of the said Robert Stapleton, and to make exact distribution of the same according to law, amongst the plaintiff Stapleton, and the child of the lord Meryon, and also the brothers and sisters of the said Robert Stapleton, as well those of the whole blood, as of the half blood, and their respective representatives; the defendant, in right of the defendant Dorothy as she is widow of the said intestate Robert Stapleton, claiming a moiety of the clear personal estate by the custom of the province of York, and also by the late act for settling intestates estates half of the other moiety thereof; and the said master being thereby to report specially to this court, as he should think fit, what should appear doubtful as to the interest of

any of the parties concerned therein, the said master made his report dated the 9th day of June 1684, whereby he certified, that by the custom of the province of York, a moiety of the said clear personal estate was of right due and belonging to the defendant Dorothy, as the widow and relict of the said Robert Stapleton, and that the other moiety he had divided amongst the said intestates brothers and sisters, and their legal representatives, in such proportions as is therein mentioned. And exceptions having been put in to the said report, and the same coming to be heard the 24th day of February in the first year of king James the 2d, before the right honourable the lord keeper of the great seal of England; his lordship desired his grace the then lord archbishop of York to certify, when a man dies intestate within the province of York without issue (after his debts and funerals paid) how the residue was to be divided by the custom of the province of York, and what part remained by the ordinary to be distributed. And his grace the then archbishop of York having, pursuant to the said desire, on the 18th day of March in the 1st year of James the 2d, certified, that in such cases aforesaid, the widow of the intestate by the custom of the said province, hath usually had allotted to her one moiety of the clear personal estate, and that the other moiety had been distributed amongst the next of kin to the deceased intestate, and that had been the constant practice of the ecclesiastical court at York. To which certificate the said defendants took exceptions. Upon debate whereof on the 17th of May in the said first year of James the second, it was ordered, that the exceptions should be overruled; and the defendants were ordered to pay unto the plaintiffs, and bring into court respectively, the several and respective sums of money therein in that behalf mentioned within two months, or in default thereof, or if the plaintiffs should not acquiesce therein, then they were to pay costs. And the defendants being not satisfied with the said order, did afterwards petition the right honourable the lord high chancellor of England for a rehearing of the said cause, upon this point only, namely, whether the defendant Dorothy, being the widow of the said Robert Stapleton, who died an inhabitant of the province of York, and without issue, and also his administratrix, ought not by virtue of the custom of the said province, to have one moiety, or half of the clear personal estate of the said intestate Robert Stapleton her late husband, and also according to the rules of distribution mentioned

tioned in the late act for settling intestates estates to have half of the other moiety as widow of the said Robert Stapleton, who died without issue as aforesaid. And his lordship having ordered the said cause to be reheard upon that point only, and the same coming to be reheard accordingly before his lordship in the presence of the defendant's counsel, none attending for the plaintiffs, albeit due notice of the said last order for rehearing was given to them and the other parties concerned, as by affidavit then produced did appear; and the case on the pleadings in the cause being opened by the defendant's counsel, and upon consideration thereof, and of the said late act for settling of intestates estates, and of the statute made in the 1st year of his said majesty king James the 2d, intituled, an act for reviving and continuing several acts of parliament therein mentioned; his lordship declared, that notwithstanding the said certificate of the said lord archbishop of York, his lordship was fully satisfied, the defendant in right of the defendant Dorothy as widow of the said intestate Robert Stapleton her late husband ought to have the one moiety or half of his clear personal estate by virtue of the custom of the province of York, and also half of the other moiety of the said clear personal estate by virtue of the said statute and rules of distribution therein mentioned: and did order and decree the same accordingly. And it being alledged, that the defendants in pursuance of the said former decree, and to avoid any contempt for not yielding obedience thereto, had paid and satisfied unto the plaintiffs and others the brothers and sisters of the said intestate Robert Stapleton, or their respective representatives or some of them, the respective proportions to them respectively allotted by the master's report, whereas they ought but to have paid one moiety thereof, and prayed that the plaintiffs and the said other persons that were so over-paid might refund and pay the defendants the moiety or half of the money so paid or satisfied unto them, his lordship did order and decree the same accordingly, and the 5l. deposited with the register upon the granting of the said rehearing to be paid back to the defendants or their clerks in court. Afterwards on the 8th day of June in the third year of the reign of his said majesty king James the 2d, the plaintiffs being dissatisfied with the said order made, petitioned his lordship to hear the cause again; and the same coming to be reheard accordingly on the 5th day of February in the year aforesaid, before his lordship, in the presence of counsel learned on both sides, upon long debate of the

matter, and hearing what could be alledged on either side, his lordship declared the defendant's wife is well intitled to one moiety of her late husband's estate by the custom of the province of York, and to a moiety of the other moiety by the act of distribution, and therefore saw no cause to alter the former order; and therefore did order, that the said former order should stand confirmed.

By the 4 W. c. 2. *Whereas by custom within the province of York, or other usage, the widows and younger children of persons dying inhabitants of that province, are intitled to a part of the goods and chattels of their late husbands and fathers (called her and their reasonable part) notwithstanding any disposition of the same by their husbands and fathers last wills and testaments, and notwithstanding any jointures made for the livelihood of the said widows by their husbands in their lifetime, which are competent, and according to agreement; whereby many persons are disabled from making sufficient provision for their younger children: for remedy thereof. it is enacted that it shall be lawful for any person inhabiting or residing, or who shall have any goods or chattels within the province of York, by their last wills and testaments to give bequeath and dispose of all and singular their goods chattels debts and other personal estate, to their executors, or such other persons as they shall think fit, in as ample manner as by the laws and statutes of this realm any person may give and dispose of the same within the province of Canterbury or elsewhere; and the widows, children, and other the kindred of such testator, shall be barred to claim or demand any part of the goods chattels or other personal estate of such testator, in any other manner than as by the said last wills and testaments is limited and appointed. s. 1, 2. Provided, that nothing in this act shall extend to the citizens of the cities of York and Chester, who shall be freemen of the said respective cities, inhabiting therein or within the suburbs thereof at the time of their death; but that every such citizen's widow and children shall have such reasonable part and proportion of the testator's personal estate, as they might have had by the custom of the province of York before the making of this act. s. 3.*

Note, the mentioning of the city of Chester here was a mistake; for this custom of the province of York did not extend to that city, nor to any other part of the whole archdeaconry of Chester: and the reason is, because until the erection of the see of Chester in the time of king Henry the eighth, that archdeaconry was not within the province of York, but was part of the diocese of Litchfield and Coventry within the province of Canterbury. And therefore afterwards, when this proviso was taken off by the

statute here next following, with respect to the city of York; there was no need for any application to parliament to repeal the same proviso, in relation to the city of Chester.

But as to the city of York, it is enacted by the 2 & 3 An. c. 5. as followeth: *Whereas in the statute of the 4 W. c. 2. there is a proviso, that nothing in the said act contained should extend or be construed to extend to the citizens of the cities of York and Chester, who should be freemen of the said respective cities, inhabiting therein, or within the suburbs thereof, at the time of their death; but that every such citizen's widow and children should have such reasonable part and proportion of the testator's personal estate, as they might have had by the custom of the province of York before the making of the said act: And whereas notwithstanding, the mayor and commonalty, on behalf of the inhabitants of the said city of York, have requested that the said proviso may be repealed, so that the freemen of the said city may have the benefit of the said act, as well as all other persons inhabiting within the said province; it is enacted, that the said proviso, so far as the same concerneth the citizens of the city of York, shall be and is hereby repealed; so that it shall and may be lawful for all and every the citizens of the said city of York, who shall be freemen of the said city, inhabiting therein, or within the suburbs thereof, at the time of their death, by their last wills and testaments to give bequeath and dispose of their goods chattels debts and other personal estates, to their executors or such other persons as they shall think fit, as any other persons inhabiting or residing within the said province of York may lawfully do by virtue of the said act; and that the widows, children, and other kindred of such testator, shall be barred to claim or demand any part of the goods chattels or other personal estate of the testator, in any other manner than as by the said last wills and testaments is appointed; any thing in the said act, or any other law, statute, or usage to the contrary notwithstanding.*

So that the ancient law and custom restraining the inhabitants of the province of York from disposing of their whole personal estates by will, is now utterly abolished out of that whole province.

But with respect to the distribution of intestates effects, the custom continues as it hath been for ages past: which, taking Swinburne for our guide, we come now to trace out and delineate.

It is to be understood then, that within the province of York generally, there hath been an ancient custom, and divers famous writers long ago have made mention of the said custom in their works to have been observed
long

long before their days, and the same also appeareth from the acts and other very ancient instruments of undoubted credit faithfully preserved in the registry of the archbishop of York; by which custom *there is due to the widow and to the lawful children of every man being an inhabitant or an householder within the said province of York, and dying there or elsewhere intestate, being an inhabitant or householder within that province, a reasonable part of his clear moveable goods; unless such child be heir to his father deceased; or were advanced by his father in his lifetime, by which advancement it is to be understood, that the father in his lifetime bestowed upon his child a competent portion whereon to live.* Swin. 220. 230. 233.

Reasonable part) which is as followeth:

(1) If the intestate hath *neither wife nor child* at the time of his death, his whole personal estate (the funeral expences and other necessary charges being first deducted) shall be disposed in the due course of administration; the same heretofore having been wholly at the disposal of the deceased; and consequently falling now under the directions of the statute of distribution. Swin. 220.

(2) If the intestate at the time of his death leave behind him *a wife and no child*, or else *some child or children but no wife*; in this case, by the custom observed not only throughout the province of York, but in many other places besides within this realm of England, the goods are to be divided into two parts; of which, one part is due to the wife, or else to the children, by virtue of the said custom. Swin. 220.

But if by settlement a jointure is limited to the wife, in bar of all her demands out of the personal estate of her husband by virtue of the custom, in such case it is as if there were no wife, with respect to the said customary part; so, if it is in bar of all her demands by virtue of the said custom *or otherwise*, she shall be debarred also of any distributive share by the statute. 1 Vern. 15.

And if the intestate have a wife, and a child or children, which child is *heir* to the intestate, or which children were *advanced* by the father in his lifetime; in this case it is as if he had no child: and therefore in like manner the goods shall be divided into two parts; whereof the wife is to have the one part to herself, and the other half is distributable by the statute. Swin. 220, 221.

So in the case of *Goodwin and Ramsden, M. 1683.* The plaintiff exhibited a bill, to have an account, and

her share of her father's personal estate, who died intestate. The defendant pleaded, that the estate in question lay within the province of York, and that the intestate died there, and that the plaintiff being one of his daughters was advanced by him in his lifetime; and that by the custom of the province of York, a daughter being once advanced by her father in his lifetime, was excluded from all further benefit of her father's personal estate. But in this case it appearing, that all the children of the intestate were advanced by him in his lifetime, and so the estate wholly exempted out of the custom, it ought to go now in a course of administration, and be distributed according to the act for settling intestates estates; and thereupon the plea was overruled. 1 Vern. 200.

And in the case of *Collinson and Trotter*, June 24, 1727, Richard Collinson died intestate, leaving a widow, who was the present defendant, Anne Trotter; and an only child, Thomas Collinson, the plaintiff in this cause. Sir Joseph Jekyll, master of the rolls, directed two issues to be tried at York assizes: 1. Whether the defendant Anne Trotter, who was the widow, is intitled by the custom of the province of York to a moiety, or any and what part, of the intestate's estate. 2. Whether the plaintiff Thomas Collinson the infant, who is intitled to lands in fee-simple by descent, on the death of his said father, is by the custom of the said province intitled to any and what part of his said father's personal estate. These two issues were tried accordingly at the summer assizes following. And after long evidence given, the jury found, as to the first issue, that the wife is intitled by the said custom to a moiety of the intestate's personal estate: And, as to the second, that the son is excluded, by the descent of the fee-simple estate, from claiming any part of the personal estate by the said custom. And consequently, the widow would receive one half of the personal estate by the custom; and one third of the remaining half by the statute: So that taking the whole together, she would receive two thirds of the said intestate's personal estate.

(3) If the intestate at the time of his death had *both a wife and also a child or children*; in this case, the deceased's share is no more than the third part of the clear goods: for the said goods shall be divided into three parts; whereof the wife ought to have one part, the child or children another part, and the third part (which is called the death's part) is distributable by the statute. Yet so, as that the child or children be not *heir* to the intestate
their

their father, or *advanced* by him in his lifetime: for then it is as if there were no child; and consequently the goods of the deceased are to be divided into two parts, whereof the intestate's wife is to have the one part, and the other is distributable by the statute. And if the intestate have a wife, and children whereof one is *heir*, and another *advanced*, and some *not advanced* by their father in his lifetime; in this case, the goods of the deceased shall be divided into three parts, whereof the wife shall have one, the child or children not advanced another, and the third (being the death's part) is distributable as aforesaid *Swin. 221.*

But here ariseth a very important question, in case where a child hath received in his father's lifetime an advancement, not only sufficient to debar him of his customary part, but so large as to extend into, or to overbalance, what would be his proportionable share also of the dead-man's part; whether in this case such child shall receive any share of the dead-man's part, unless he will bring over into hotchpot in the said dead man's part, so much of his said advancement, as exceedeth his just proportion of the customary part. And concerning this, the opinions of learned men are various. Some hold, if a child is fully advanced; so as that his advancement doth exceed not only what would be his just proportion of the customary part, but of the dead-man's part likewise; that in such case he is excluded from any further share whatsoever of his father's personal estate, either by the custom, or by the statute. Others are of opinion, that whatsoever his advancement shall have been, so as to debar him of his customary part; yet that advancement shall have no consideration in the dead-man's part, but thereof he shall receive his full share without any retrospect to his preceding advancement. The former opinion is more agreeable to equity and reason; but whether it is consistent with the construction of the statutes, is the question. For this is a point respecting not the custom, but the acts of parliament: the custom itself in this case is clear enough; but it is questioned, how far the statutes do infringe the custom in this particular.

Before the statute of the 22 & 23 C. 2. the custom was this: The children received their own customary part and no more; and of this customary part a child fully advanced could have no share, the advancement being esteemed as a satisfaction for his filial portion: And no child could sue for any share of the dead-man's part; the
same

ame (according to its original institution) being to be disposed for the soul of the deceased. This statute left the custom intire. And the statute of the 17. 2. c. 17. doth not touch thereupon, further than to distribute the said dead-man's part. Nevertheless, in such distribution it is required, that the children (exclusive of the heir at law is aforesaid) shall bring their respective advancements into hotchpot. But in this case, the advancement is supposed to be already sunk in the customary part; and consequently nothing remained to be brought over into the dead-man's part: And therefore (upon this supposition) a child, how largely soever advanced by his father in his lifetime, shall only thereby be excluded from receiving any further filial portion by the custom, but shall not be excluded from receiving a full distributive share of the dead-man's part by the statute.

And with this seemeth to accord the case of *Gudger* and *Ramsden*, T. 1692, which was thus: The intestate, being an inhabitant in the province of York, left issue a son and daughter only, and no widow. The daughter had a portion given her in marriage, in lieu and full satisfaction of what she might claim by the custom of the province. The son was also advanced, by a settlement of lands. The question was, How this estate should be distributed? For the heir it was insisted, that now the custom of the province of York is to be quite laid out of the case, and the same distribution made of the estate, as of any other intestate's estate, and by consequence the daughter to bring her portion into hotchpot; but the heir to have a full share, without regard to what lands had been settled upon him. By the court: The daughter must not bring back her portion into hotchpot; for that came in lieu of the customary part, and was as the price the father thought fit to give her for the same. 2 Vern. 274.

But here it seemeth, that a distinction ought to be made between an advancement given and accepted expressly in lieu and satisfaction of the filial portion, and an advancement given generally without any such agreement or stipulation. In the former case it seemeth, that no respect shall be had of such advancement in the distribution of the dead-man's part, the same being to be considered not so properly an advancement by the father, as a purchase by the child: and which, by possibility, might have fallen short of, as well as exceeded, the true value of the child's portion.

portion*. And upon this principle, the said case of *Gudger* and *Ramsden* seemeth to have been determined. But where there is no such special contract or agreement, but the advancement is general, without any particular respect either to the customary or distributive share; it seemeth, that the same shall be applied either to one or both of them, according to the amount of such advancement, and so as best to answer the intent of the Statute, which expresseth that *the estate of all the said children shall be made equal as near as can be estimated.* And by this distinction, the two contrary opinions seem to be reconciled.

Of his clear moveable goods] Where the wife or children ought to have a rateable part of the goods of the deceased,

* For a child of age, for a valuable consideration, might release his future filial portion. Of which kind of release there seems to have been a special precise form; according to the following example, which is brief, and yet full withal and comprehensive; much in the stile and manner of those most accurate forms of composition, the writs in the register: viz. "*Be it known unto all men by these presents, That I Thomas Whitehead of Byebeck in the county of Westmorland, husbandman, for and in consideration of a sum of money; by Richard Whitehead my father of Byebeck aforesaid in the said county, yeoman, to me well and truly contented and paid, have remised, released, and quit-claimed, and by these presents do absolutely remit, release, and quit-claim, unto the said Richard Whitehead my father, his executors and administrators, all manner of filial or child's portion of goods, which I the said Thomas, my executors or assigns, can or may hereafter have, claim, or demand of, in, and to the goods or chattels of the said Richard Whitehead, by any manner of ways, means, title, or claim howsoever. In witnes whereof, I the said Thomas Whitehead have hereunto set my seal, the first day of May, in the eighth year of the reign of our sovereign lord James, by the grace of God, king of England, France, and Ireland, defender of the faith, and so forth, and of Scotland the forty-third, 1610.*

*Sealed and delivered
in the presence of us,*

Thomas Whitehead.

George Sharp.

Edward Brantbwaite.

Thomas Potter.

Philip Winster.

And here it is observable, that the particular sum, which was the consideration, is not specified; so that there is no room here to dispute about the *quantum* of the advancement; for it must be taken in such case as an advancement *in toto*. *Burn.*

be

be it a third part or half, as the case yieldeth; there also they ought to have a like part of the *debts* due unto the intestate, after they be recovered by the administrator; for then they are numbered or accounted amongst the goods of the intestate, but not before. *Swin.* 221.

But of *leases* (Swinburne says) the wife and children cannot have any rateable part within the province of York, or other places where they have been accustomed to have their rateable part of the moveable goods and debts recovered, unless the said wife or children, demanding their rateable part of leases, do prove that by special custom of that place (namely, of that city, county, deanry, or parish where the intestate dwelled, and had such leases) the wives and children were accustomed to have their rateable part, as well of the leases, as of the moveable goods of the intestate; which special custom being proved, they may recover the rateable part as before. (But not by the general custom of the province.) *Swin.* 221.

But concerning estates *per autre vie*, that is to say, estates held by lease during the life of another person, it is specially provided by the statute of the 14 G. 2. c. 20. that where there is no devise thereof, they shall go and be distributed in the same manner as the personal estate of the intestate.

Unless such child be heir to his father deceased] Which limitation is diversly extended: As,

(1) Not only the heir of lands holden in fee-simple, is thereby barred from the recovery of a filial portion; but he also that is heir in fee-tail, either general or special. *Swin.* 231. ●

(2) Albeit the lands be of very small revenue, peradventure not past a noble yearly rent, and the goods very great in comparison of so small a rent (be it 1000 l. or more); even in this case, the heir is barred from the hope of a filial portion. And though this may seem hard to the heir, if we consider that same right of primogeniture; yet if we shall consider on the other side, that if the lands be worth 1000 l. a-year, and the goods little or nothing worth (the debts being paid), and so little or nothing left to the rest of the children (which case is more frequent than the former); the custom we see is not void of equity, when both cases are equally balanced. *Swin.* 232.

(3) Not only that heir is excluded from a filial portion, which doth enter upon the lands immediately after his father's

father's death, but he also which is heir in reversion, is heir: and being heir can have no filial portion. For in the writ *de rationabili parte benewram*, it is contained, that he which demandeth a filial portion *neither is heir nor was advanced in the life of his father*: now he that is heir in reversion cannot say so, and therefore can recover no filial portion according to the custom of the country. Otherwise, 'if he should recover a portion, and the land afterwards; the final intent of the custom should suffer prejudice, which wou'd that the lands and goods should not go both one way, but the one to the heir, and the other to the rest of the children. And yet the case may fall out very hard with the heir in reversion: for what if he should die in the mean time, before he could lawfully enter to those lands which be his only in reversion, and so reap no benefit either of his father's lands or goods? Howsoever it shall fall out, he must be content with his lot; and tho' not he, yet his shall enjoy the land at the time appointed. *Swin. 232.*

(4) Albeit the heir received the lands by settlement made upon his father's marriage; yet he is heir so as to be excluded thereby from a filial portion. As in the case of *Constable and Constable, T. 1700.* Upon a former hearing of this cause, a question arising upon the custom of the province of York, touching the distribution of the personal estate of the father; an issue was directed to be tried at law, whether the father having by settlement on his marriage settled his real estate to himself for life, part to his wife for her jointure, and the remainder of the whole to his *first* and other sons in tail, remainder to his own right heirs, the eldest son was thereby excluded by the custom of the province of York, from having any share of his father's personal estate; and it being found that he was thereby debarred and excluded, and the cause coming now to be heard on the equity reserved, it was decreed accordingly. *2 Vern. 375.*

(5) Albeit the heir hold lands by deed or feoffment in mortgage, or with clause of redemption, that is to say, upon condition that if the feoffor pay unto him a sum of money at a certain day, that then the feoffor may re-enter, and the deed or grant to be void; yet nevertheless in the mean time, until the condition be performed, and the land redeemed, if he should demand any filial portion, he is barred, because as yet he is heir to the deceased. But if the lands should be redeemed, and the money satisfied then it is thought that he may recover a filial portion; because

because then he is not heir to the deceased, nor the advancement certain which was made by the father in his lifetime. *Swin. 232.*

(6) Likewise if a man purchase lands in fee, and by will devise the same lands to his eldest son and to the heirs of his body, and for default of such issue to his younger son and to the heirs of his body, and so on; in this case, *Swinburne* says, the eldest son is not barred from the recovery of a filial portion, as heir to the deceased; because he is not as heir to his father according to the course of the common law, but according to his father's will. *Swin. 232.* [But whether this devise shall bar him as an advancement is another question, which will be considered afterwards.]

But where a man is heir at law of lands in fee-simple, and his father also deviseth those lands to him; it seemeth that he shall take by his better title, as heir at law, and not as devisee: and consequently thereby shall be excluded from a filial portion. For no man can by his will make his heir a purchaser of a fee-simple; for the descent and will take effect at the same time, and the elder title shall be preferred.

(7) In like manner, the youngest son, who is heir in *borough English*, seemeth not to be heir, so as thereby to be debarred from a filial portion; for he is not heir according to the course of the common law, but by a particular custom.

(8) Note also, that if the child should have any *copyhold* land, after his father's death; in this case he is not reputed his father's heir to the effect aforesaid, and so barred from the recovery of a filial portion, due by the general custom of the said province. *Swin. 232.*

Note, the word *copyhold*, although of itself it conveys an idea distinct enough, yet from the different acceptation of it amongst learned men, it becometh equivocal; some using it to signify all lands which are not freehold: others, more properly, lands only which are holden by copy of court roll. It is of very much importance to determine in which of the two senses it is here to be understood. For a great part of the lands within the province of York are neither freehold nor copyhold, but are included under the word *customary*.

For *customary* is the general denomination of lands holden by the custom of the manor; of which, *copyhold* is but one species: so that altho' all copyhold lands are customary, yet all customary lands are not copyhold. And it seemeth that the word *copyhold* here shall be understood

in the less proper sense, so as to signify, that *customary* lands in general as well as those which are strictly *copyhold*, inherited from the father, shall be no hindrance to the child from obtaining a filial portion. For at the time when this custom of the province of York took place, these customary lands were not inheritable.

Or were advanced by his father in his lifetime] Here it comes to be considered, what manner of preferment or advancement that is, which doth debar the child from a filial portion.

By his father] For if another than the father bestow any preferment or advancement, tho' never so much; this preferment by another is no bar to the child, from the recovery of the filial portion of his father's goods: much less, where the child hath advanced his estate by his own industry. *Swin. 233.*

In his lifetime] Here the case aforesaid is considerable, where the father by his last will deviseth lands to his son (for this he may well do, and yet nevertheless die intestate as to his goods), whether this shall be such an advancement as shall debar the son from the recovery of his filial portion; and it seemeth that it shall not: for this was no advancement to the child in the lifetime of his father; but he may refuse or waive the bequest, and recover a filial portion due according to the custom of the country. *Swin. 233.*

Howbeit, if the father in his lifetime bestow a lease upon his child, or grant unto him an annuity for life out of his lands, yet in such manner as the child shall not reap any benefit thereby, so long as the father liveth, but after his death; this is holden for a preferment or an advancement, because it was assured unto him in his father's lifetime. Nor is this case contrary to the former: for the child had no assurance of his devise until his father was dead, because he might have revoked the same at any time whilst he lived; which he could not do in the other case. *Swin. 233.*

That the father in his lifetime bestowed upon his child] For if the father bestow any thing upon another for his child's sake, or for the good of his child; nevertheless this is no such preferment as will hinder the child of his filial portion. *Swin. 233.*

And therefore if the father bestow any thing upon a man of trade, to take his son for an apprentice, and to teach him his mystery; this is no advancement to the effect aforesaid. *Swin. 233.*

Or if he bestow any thing upon a schoolmaster, or tutor in the university, for the increase of his knowledge in learning, or for any degree there to be obtained; this is no advancement to exclude the child of a filial portion. *Swin. 233.*

No more is it (saith Swinburne) if the father buy the advowson of an ecclesiastical benefice or dignity, and afterwards present his son thereto. *Swin. 233.*

So if the father buy an office, and bestow it upon his son; this seemeth (he says) not to be an advancement to bar him of his portion. *Swin. 233.*

Or if the son be much indebted, and the father discharge the debt; yet this seemeth not to be a preferment. *Swin. 233.*

But if the father bestow a competent portion with his daughter in marriage, upon him that shall marry her; this, without question, is such an advancement as will bar her from the demand of a filial portion. *Swin. 233.*

A competent portion] By the word *portion* is to be understood, not only a sum of money, or part of the father's goods and chattels, but also lands and annuities, bestowed by the father upon the son. *Swin. 234.*

Competent] Competent signifieth equal, or not far inferior, to that quantity, which otherwise according to the custom of the province, should fall to be due to the child, after the rate and proportion of the father's estate, at the time when he doth bestow any such thing upon his child; for the same being equal, or not much under the rate which should belong to the child by the custom aforesaid, if his father had then died, shall stand for a sufficient preferment and advancement, to exclude him from a filial portion. For considering the equality, or small inequality, betwixt the one and the other; it is to be presumed, that it was the father's purpose, that the one should stand instead of the other. Insomuch that if the father after this preferment should live many years, and increase his substance; yet it seemeth, that the father's former gift would bar the child from recovery of any farther filial portion: and the reason is, because as the father did grow richer (in which case the son's preferment should be less), so it might fall out that the father might have grown poorer, and then the son's preferment should have been more than otherwise it would by the custom of the country. So that the father's gift being at the first competent, in regard of his estate at that time; the same is not made

effectual or ineffectual by the increase or decrease of his future estate. *Swin.* 233, 234.

But if the father's gift were not competent, or far under the rate of that which otherwise should belong to the child by the custom; as, for instance, if the father should give his child 5 l. to put in his purse to bestow at his pleasure, whereas otherwise his filial portion would extend to divers hundreds; this gift of the father doth not seem to be such an advancement, as will exclude the child from his filial portion, neither in the construction of law, nor in the intention of the father; and that is rather to be termed a mere benevolence, than a preferment or advancement exclusive of a filial portion: and if the son have deserved a good turn at his father's hands, this is no advancement, but a recompence of that which was formerly deserved. *Swin.* 234.

But here ariseth a question; What if the thing which the father bestoweth upon the child, be so indifferent between competent and incompetent, that it may be justly doubted whether the same shall stand for an advancement, or a mere benevolence, over and besides which, he might expect a filial portion? Now whether may the child cast in that gift of the father, and so recover an equal portion with the rest of his brethren and sisters? It seemeth at the first that he may. For if a man seised of thirty acres of land in fee-simple, have issue two daughters, and giveth with one of them in marriage ten acres of the same land in frank marriage, and died seised of the other twenty acres; she that is thus married may (if she will) have part of the twenty acres, whereof her father died seised; but then she must put her land given in frank marriage in hotchpot, that is to say, she must refuse to take the sole profits of the land given in frank marriage, and suffer the land to be commixed and mingled together with the other land whereof her father died seised, so that an equal division be made of the whole, betwixt her and her sister; and thus, for her ten acres, she shall have fifteen: whereas otherwise, her sister shall have the twenty acres of which their father died seised. And as in lands, so in goods; which is also agreeable to the civil law. And Swinburne says, he hath seen it sometimes so observed, by the consent of the children not advanced, being then of lawful years; but he hath not known it at any time so over-ruled by law, without their consents. And therefore he concludeth, that considering the strictness of the writ *de rationabili parte bonorum*, this gift of the father shall either
be

e found to be a preferment or not ; if it shall be found to be a preferment, then is the child excluded from recovery of a filial portion ; if it shall be found not to be a preferment, then may the child recover the filial portion according to the custom of the province of York, as in the said writ is contained. *Swin. 235.*

But nevertheless, the words of the writ do not seem necessarily to infer this consequence, being only general, that *children not promoted in their father's lifetime ought to have their reasonable part* : for this they may have, and yet notwithstanding be required to bring into hotchpot with their brothers and sisters what they shall have received less than their due proportion ; and it will be so much the more *reasonable* upon that account. And therefore what Swinburne intimates was in his days recommended to the parties by the judge, seemeth, at least since that time, generally to have prevailed as the custom of the province ; that children (exclusive of the heir at law) not advanced to their full proportion of the children's part, shall be admitted to come in for their share of the said children's part, bringing thereunto their partial advancements into hotchpot : agreeable to what Swinburne acknowledgeth to be the rule of the civil law ; in conformity also to the custom of the city of London, and to the measures of the statute of distribution, and to the rules observed by the courts of equity in all such like cases.

Whereon to live] If the father bestow any thing upon his child to any other end, as money in his purse to spend among his equals, or to buy him suits of apparel, or books, or armour for the service of his country ; yet this (as it seemeth) is not to be holden for an advancement, tho' peradventure the sums of money given for these particular ends, were not very much inferior to that which otherwise might belong to the child for his filial portion according to the custom, and otherwise would have been taken for an advancement : but it must be a provision of some competent thing for the maintenance of his child, whereby he may be the better enabled to live after his father's death. *Swin. 234.*

It is said by the editors or continuators of Swinburne, that it hath been much controverted, whether the ordinary hath power to compel the administrator to give portions to children, or to allot and distribute filial portions to the deceased's children out of his estate. If the ordinary attempt this, either before or after the granting of

letters of administration, it hath been held, that the administrator might have a prohibition; and that the ordinary hath not any power to make distribution of the surplusage, nor to take any bond to answer the same: for that if the ordinary might distribute, then the administrator might be charged of his own goods; for there may be dormant debts, and which are unknown: yet notwithstanding, they add, that it is usual for the ordinary to order and allot distribution of filial portions, and therein prohibitions are not often granted. *Swin.*

233. a.

But whether this is spoken of the times before the statute of distribution, doth not appear. As to the dead-man's part, there seemeth to be no doubt, but the ordinary by the said statute may cause distribution thereof. And as to the widows and children's portions, the statute provides that the custom shall be observed as before: And it seemeth that the ordinaries within the said province, even as all other ordinaries, before the making of the said act; did exercise a power of compelling distribution, although the temporal courts would not allow the same to be lawful, and that was the cause of the act being made. And the act says, that "*All ordinaries, as well the judges of the prerogative courts of Canterbury and York, as other ordinaries, shall have power to order and make just and equal distribution.*"

There is a case in 2 *Vern.* 47. 82. wherein the customs of the city of London and of the province of York did interfere; which was thus: *E.* 1688. *Chomley and Chomley.* A freeman of London died within the province of York, leaving a widow, and issue two sons and a daughter; and an estate of about 50 l. a-year within the province of York descended on the elder son; and if the custom of the province of York should prevail, he would thereby be excluded from having any share of the personalty, which was about 20,000 l. A bill was brought for the direction of the court, how and in what manner the personal estate should be disposed of. And the court was clearly of opinion, that the deceased being a freeman of London, the custom of the city for the distribution of the personalty should prevail and controul the custom of the province of York; and that, notwithstanding the custom of the province to the contrary, the heir should come in for a share of the personal estate: for the custom of the province is only local, and circumscribed to a cer-
tain

tain place ; but that of London follows the person, though never so remote from the city.

UPON the whole, so far as can be estimated from the premises, the course of distribution of intestates effects within the province of York seemeth to stand thus :

1. If a person dieth intestate, leaving no wife, but *an only child* ; which child is *heir at law*, or *advanced*, or *partly advanced*, or *not advanced* : In all these cases, it maketh no difference ; for one way or other such child shall have the whole clear personal estate. For supposing such child to be *heir at law* ; he shall have nothing by the custom, but by the statute he shall have the whole as next of kindred. If he is *advanced* ; he shall likewise have nothing by the custom, but by the statute in like manner he shall have the whole. If he is *partly advanced* ; he shall have one half by the custom, there being no other child with whom to bring his partial advancement into hotchpot ; and the other half by the statute. So in like manner, if he is *not at all advanced* ; he shall have one half by the custom, and the other half by the statute.

2. If such person hath *divers children* ; *one of whom is heir at law*, and the others are *advanced*. In this case, with respect to the custom, it is as if he had no children : none of them can claim any thing by the custom ; and (the younger children being supposed to be fully advanced), the heir at law by the statute shall have the whole.

3. If such person hath *divers children*, *the first of which is heir at law*, *the second advanced*, *the third partly advanced*, and *the fourth not advanced* : In this case, the child *partly advanced* and the child *not advanced* shall have one half equally betwixt them by the custom, the child partly advanced first thereunto bringing his partial advancement into hotchpot ; and the other half (which is the dead-man's part) shall be distributed by the statute, equally amongst all the said children (the second only excepted, who is supposed to be fully advanced already) share and share alike. But if the heir at law hath been advanced by his father, otherwise than by lands or as heir at law ; he shall bring such his advancement into hotchpot with his brothers and sisters, otherwise he shall have no distributive share by the statute.

And note, that the representatives of children dead are admitted by the statute to a distributive share of the dead-man's part in the place of the deceased child or children whom they represent ; but not so of the customary part, by the custom.

Wills. Distribution.

A man hath *a wife and no child*; she shall have her convenient bed and apparel) one half by the custom and the other half (being the dead-man's part) distributed by the statute; of which dead-man's part the said statute she shall have one half, and the other half shall go to the next of kindred to the deceased degree: So that dividing the same into four parts, she shall have three, and they shall have one.

If although there be no child, yet there hath been a child and there are any legal representatives of such child deceased; then of the dead-man's part by the said statute the wife shall have but one third, and the said representatives shall have the other two thirds: So that dividing the whole into six parts, she shall have four and they shall have two.

5. *If a man hath a wife and also a child or children, one of which children is heir at law, and the others are advanced*: In this case, with respect to the custom, it is the same as if he had no child; and consequently the wife shall have one half by the custom, and the other half (being the dead-man's part) shall be distributed by the statute: of which dead-man's part by the said statute she shall have one third, and the other two thirds shall go to the heir at law as aforesaid: So that dividing the whole into six parts, she shall have four, and he shall have two.

6. *If a man hath a wife and also a child or children, any one or more of which children are not advanced*: by the custom she shall have one third part, and the children not advanced shall have another third part, and the remaining third part (being the dead-man's part) shall be distributed by the statute: of which dead-man's part by the said statute she shall have one third, and the other two-thirds shall be distributed amongst the children in manner as is aforesaid: So that dividing the whole into nine, she shall have four and they shall have five.

As for example: A man inhabiting within the province of York dieth intestate, leaving a clear personalty of 9000 l.; and leaving a widow and four children; the first being heir at law to freehold lands, and having received likewise of his father in his lifetime 400 l. to set him up in trade; the second advanced, to the amount of 3000 l.; the third partly advanced, to the amount of 600 l.; and the fourth not at all advanced. The question is, *How this personalty shall be distributed*? First of all, The widow shall have one third part by the custom, as her *Widow's portion*, to wit, 3000 l. Another third part, by the said custom,

custom, shall be distributed amongst the children ; of which, the heir at law (as such) by the said custom is excluded from receiving any share ; the second son also, as being fully advanced, is excluded ; but hereunto the third son shall bring his partial advancement of 600l. into hotchpot, and then the third and fourth sons shall divide the 3600 l. equally between them ; but the real benefit thereof to the third son will be but 1200 l. and to the fourth son 1800 l. The remaining third part of the said personalty, which is the dead-man's part, shall be distributed by the statute ; of which, by the said statute, the widow shall have one third, to wit, 1000 l. ; and the residue, being 2000 l. shall be distributed equally amongst the said three children, namely, the heir at law and the third and fourth sons (the heir at law being let in for so much by the statute) ; and the second son being still excluded, as having received more than his just proportion of his father's whole personal estate ; but hereunto the heir at law shall first bring his partial advancement of 400 l. into hotchpot, and so the said three children shall divide the whole 2400 l. equally amongst them ; but the real benefit thereof to the heir at law will be but 400 l. and to the said two youngest children 800 l. each. So that of the whole clear personalty of 9000 l. the widow shall receive

	_____	_____	4000 l.
The heir at law	_____	_____	400 l.
The second child	_____	_____	000 l.
The third child	_____	_____	2000 l.
The fourth child	_____	_____	2600 l.

		Total	9000 l.

7. *If a person dieth intestate, leaving neither wife nor child, but a father living ; the same is out of the custom, and (supposing there is no representative of any child deceased) then the father, by the statute, as next of kindred, shall have the whole.*

But if, although there be no child, yet there hath been a child, and such child deceased hath left any child or other descendent ; then such representative of the child deceased shall receive the whole, in exclusion of the father.

8. *If the deceased leaveth neither wife nor child (nor representative of such child as aforesaid), nor father, but a mother living ; the same also is out of the custom, and by the statute of the 1 J. 2. c. 17. every brother and sister, and the representatives of them, shall have an equal share with*

with the mother : if there be no brother nor sister, nor representative of any of them, then by the statute of distribution the mother shall have the whole, as next of kindred.

9. If the deceased leaveth *neither wife nor child (nor representative of such child as aforesaid), nor father, nor mother; but leaveth brothers and sisters, and children of other brothers and sisters deceased*; this case also is out of the custom; and by the statute, the brothers and sisters, and the children of the brothers and sisters deceased, shall take *per stirpes*, and not *per capita*; for the children of the deceased, being not equal in degree with their uncles and aunts, do take in this case not in their own right, but by way of representation of their parents deceased.

10. But if a person dieth intestate leaving *neither wife, nor child (nor representative of such child as aforesaid), nor father, nor mother, nor brother, nor sister, but children of brothers and sisters*; in this case by the statute they shall all take equally *per capita* and not *per stirpes*, because they do not come in by the right of representation, but all as next of kindred in equal degree.

11. If a person dieth intestate leaving *neither wife nor child, nor representative of such child, nor father nor mother, nor brother, nor sister, nor representative of brother or sister, but hath a grandfather or grandmother living*; such grandfather or grandmother shall come in before uncles and aunts by the statute, as next of kindred to the deceased.

12. If a person dieth intestate leaving *neither wife nor child, nor representative of such child, nor father nor mother, nor brother nor sister, nor representative of brother or sister, nor grandfather nor grandmother, but uncles or aunts, and children of uncles or aunts deceased*: These children are amongst collaterals, and out of the statute in the right of representation, and shall take nothing; but the surviving uncles and aunts shall have the whole as next of kindred.

13. If a person dieth intestate leaving *none of these relations*; the general rule by the statute is, that the same shall go to the next of kindred in equal degree.

14. If such person hath *no kindred*, it is out both of the custom and the statute; and the same shall escheat to the king, or to the lord of the manor or other to whom the king hath granted it: for where no person can claim any property, there the king shall be intitled by his prerogative.

FINALLY,

FINALLY, To all that hath been said upon this abstruse subject, it may afford some light to set forth what is the law of SCOTLAND in this particular; especially as the whole kingdom of Scotland, when this custom of the province of York took place, was within and a part of that province. Now the law of Scotland, with regard to wills, continues to this day, as it was in England within the said province before the statute of the 4 *W. c. 2.* viz. that the widow and children shall have a portion out of the personalty, which the husband or father cannot devise from them; and which in both places alike, the law still gives to them in case of intestacy. And the general proportions are the same in both places; only there is some difference in distributing the children's portion amongst themselves; wherein the Scotch regulations incline more to the principle of equality, agreeable to what is one of the chief objects of our statute of distribution. Briefly, the law of Scotland is this: If a man dies, leaving a widow, and no child; his whole clear personal estate, otherwise called *free gear*, divides into two; one half goes to the widow, the other is the *dead's part*, that is, the absolute property of the deceased, of which he can make his will, and which falls to his next of kin if he dies intestate. Where he leaves a child or children, but no widow; the children get one half as their *legitime*, legal portion, or *bairns part of gear*; the other half is the *dead's part*, which falls also to the children, if he has not otherwise disposed of it by his will. If he leaves both widow and children; the division is tripartite: the wife takes one third by herself; another falls to the children, and the remaining third is the *dead's part*. If he leaves neither wife nor child; the goods suffer no division, but all is *dead's part*.

Hitherto the customs agree. But in dividing the children's portion amongst themselves, there is a difference: for whereas by the custom of the province of York, the heir at law, if his inheritance be never so small, is excluded from any share of the filial portion; on the contrary, in Scotland, if the heir finds it his interest to renounce his exclusive claim to the inheritance, and betake himself to his share amongst the rest of the children, he may collate or communicate the inheritance with the other children, who in that case must collate the children's portion with him; so that the whole is thrown into one mass, and divided in capita amongst all of them. Upon which ground, if there is only one child, who is
heir

heir at law; he shall receive the children's portion: because the law admits him to come in, where there are other children, on collating his inheritance.

And for the like reason, Swinburne's notion of *advancement*, namely, that it shall be deemed either a full advancement, or else no advancement at all, so as to intitle a child either to an entire distributive share, or else wholly to exclude him, can here have no place. But in order to preserve an equality, a child who has received a provision from his father, be it more or less, shall be admitted, if he thinks it for his interest, to cast his provision into hotchpot, and receive his proportionable share of the dividend with the other children.

But if from the deed of provision, the father's intention shall evidently appear, to continue the receiver as a *bairn in the house*; the provision is interpreted to be granted as a *præcipuum*, without the necessity of collation. So also a child is not obliged to collate an estate in lands given to him by his father; because the children's portion is not impaired by such provision.

But no filial portion is due to children foris-familiated, that is to such as, by having renounced the filial portion, are no longer considered as *bairns of the family*, and so are excluded from any farther share of the personal estate than they have already received. But as the right of legitime, or children's portion, is strongly founded in nature, the renunciation of it is not to be inferred by implication; neither by the child's carrying on an employment by himself; nor by marriage; nor even by his accepting a provision from his father, unless it specially bear to be in satisfaction of his filial portion.

If he has renounced his share of the filial portion, it has the same effect in favour of the other children intitled thereto, as if he were dead, and consequently, the share of the renouncer divides amongst the rest: But he does not thereby lose his right to the dead's part, if he does not renounce his share in that likewise: nay, his renunciation of the filial portion, where he is the only younger child, has the effect to convert the whole subject thereof into dead's part, which will therefore fall to the renouncer himself as next of kin, if the heir be not willing to collate the inheritance with him.

Also, no legitime is due to grandchildren, upon the death of their grandfather; perhaps because the immediate father is presumed to have already received his just share out of the effects of the deceased.

And

And this collation, or bringing into hotchpot, takes place only amongst children: so that the widow is not obliged to collate any thing that hath been given to her by her husband, in order to increase the children's portion; as, on the other hand, the children are not obliged to collate their provisions, in order to increase her share.

With regard to the dead-man's testamentary part, where he makes a will, and therein appoints an executor, and doth not otherwise dispose of the said testamentary part; if the executor nominated be a stranger, that is, one who has no legal interest in the personal estate, he is merely a trustee, accountable to the next of kin, but he may retain a third of the dead's part, for his trouble in executing the testament; in payment of which, any legacy that is left to him must be computed. The heir in like case, if he be named executor, has right to the third as a stranger. But if one be named who has an interest in the personalty, he has no allowance, unless such interest be less than a third.

As to the payment of debts; there are some which are called *privileged* debts; because they are preferable in payment to any other. Under which name are comprehended, medicines furnished to the deceased on his death bed; physicians fees in that period; funeral charges, which include whatever is necessary for the decent performance of the funeral; the rent of his house; and his servants wages, for the year or term current at his death. As to the rest; all creditors who shall, within six months after the death of the debtor, enter a legal claim, shall be preferred *pari passu* with those who have done more early diligence: which prevents collusion, and conferring of judgments, in favour of some creditors, and to the exclusion of others. (*Erskine's Law of Scotland*, Book 3. Tit. 9.)

v. *Of the custom within the principality of Wales.*

By the 27 H. 8. c. 26. whereby lands and other hereditaments within the principality and dominion of Wales, were made to be inheritable after the manner of the English tenure, it is provided nevertheless, that *lands tenements and hereditaments, lying within the said principality and dominion, which have been used time out of mind, by the laudable customs of the country, to be departed and departable amongst issues and heirs*

heirs male, shall so continue and be used, in like form fashion and condition, as if this act had never been made.

And this is to be understood, as it seemeth, of the lands in those parts of Wales, where the Conqueror never came.

But by the 34 & 35 H. 8. c. 26. *All lands tenements and hereditaments within the dominion of Wales, shall be taken used and holden as English tenure, to all intents, according to the common laws of England; and shall not be partable among heirs male after the custom of gavelkind, as heretofore in divers parts of Wales hath been used and accustomed. (In like manner as gavelkind lands in Kent had been disgavelled by the statute of the 31 H. 8. c. 3. and a private statute made in the 2 & 3 Ed. 6.)*

And by the 7 & 8 W. c. 38. it is enacted as followeth: *Whereas in several counties and places within the principality of Wales and marches thereof, the widows and younger children of persons dying inhabitants therein have often claimed and pretended to be intitled to a part of the goods and chattels of their late husbands or fathers, called their reasonable part, by virtue of a custom or other usage, notwithstanding any disposition of the same by their husbands and fathers last wills and testaments, or by deed in their lifetime, and notwithstanding a competent jointure made for the livelihood of the said widows, whereby great troubles disputes and expences concerning such custom have been occasioned; for remedy thereof, it is enacted, that it shall be lawful for any person inhabiting or residing, or who shall have any goods or chattels within the principality of Wales or the marches thereof, by their last wills and testaments to give bequeath and dispose of all and singular their goods chattels debts and other personal estate to their executors or to such other persons as they shall think fit, in as large and ample manner as by the laws and statutes of this realm any person may give and dispose of the same within any other part of the province of Canterbury or elsewhere; and that the widows, children, and other the kindred of such testator, shall be barred to claim or demand any part of the goods chattels or other personal estate of such testator, in any other manner than as by the said last wills and testaments is limited and appointed; any law, statute, custom, or usage to the contrary notwithstanding. s. 1.*

[III. Concerning the stamp duties chargeable on legacies, and the distributive shares of an intestate's estate.

The following table exhibits the stamp duties chargeable on legacies and distributive shares of an intestate's estate, (which stand upon the same footing,) according to the different acts of parliament by which they are imposed.

Where the amount does not exceed 20l.

All persons, excepting wives, children, and grandchildren	£.	s.	d.	{	20 G. 3. c. 28.
Wives, children, and grandchildren	0	5	0		23 G. 3. c. 58.
Wives, children, and grandchildren	0	2	6		20 G. 3. c. 28.

Where the amount does exceed 20l.

1. Wives, children, and grandchildren, if under 100l.	0	5	0	20 G. 3. c. 28.
— for 100l. or any larger sum	1	0	0	
2. Husbands, parents, and the royal family, if under 100l.	0	10	0	
— for 100l.	2	0	0	
— and for every further 100l. under 400l. an additional 20s.				
— for 400l.	6	0	0	23 G. 3. c. 58.
— and for every further 100l. an additional 40s.				29 G. 3. c. 51.
3. Brother, sister, or their descendants				2 per cent.
4. Fathers or mothers brother or sister, or their descendants				3 per cent.
5. Grandfathers or grandmothers brother or sister, or their descendants				4 per cent. 36 G. 3. c. 52.
6. Other collateral relations and strangers in blood				6 per cent.

The above *per centage* duties are not only chargeable on every legacy, but also on every clear residue of a personal

sonal estate of the value of 100l. after deducting debts, funeral expences, and other charges, and specific and pecuniary legacies.

By the 36 G. 3. c. 52. These duties are to be under the management of the commissioners of stamps (s. 3.), and are to be paid by the executors or administrators; who are to retain the amount of them and deduct it from the legacies; in default of which it shall be a debt from both parties to the king (s. 6.). If legatees refuse to accept their legacies, the duty deducted, the court in which a suit is instituted, may order them to pay costs (s. 24.). And if a suit be instituted concerning an administration or the payment of a legacy, the court shall provide for the payment of the duty (s. 25.). No payment of any legacy or distributive share of an estate shall be made without a receipt duly stamped (b), expressing the date, testator or intestate, executor or administrator, legatee, value of the legacy, and amount of the duty, under penalty of 10l. *per centum* on the legacy, &c. from the person paying and the person receiving; nor shall any receipt be available unless duly stamped, or any evidence of payment or satisfaction of a legacy be received unless the actual payment of the duty be first proved, for which a copy in the entry in the books of the commissioners of stamps, of such payment, shall suffice; and receipts shall be brought within 21 days after date to some office appointed by the commissioners, where the duty being paid, the proper officer shall acknowledge at length the receipt of the same (s. 27, 28, 29.). But receipts may be stamped within 3 months of the date upon payment of the duty, and 10l. *per centum* upon it as a penalty; within which time, if no suit be instituted, an unintentional mistake may be rectified by the commissioners (s. 29, 30.). Executors, previous to retaining their own legacies, are to transmit to the commissioners a note containing the particulars of such legacy, and the duty which they offer to pay thereon; and the commissioners shall assess the duty thereon, and the proper officer shall give a stamped receipt for the same; and persons neglecting to pay

(b) By former acts the duty was not upon the payment of the legacy, but upon the *receipt*, which, in many cases, the executor could not compel the legatee to give. See *Green v. Craft*, 2 H. Bla. 30. But the 36 G. 3. c. 52. s. 36. puts receipts for legacies, under former stamp-acts unrepealed, upon the same footing with those required by that act.

the duty within 14 days after it ought to have been paid, forfeit treble the value. *s. 35.*

All gifts by will of personal estate, though charged on real estate, except they be satisfied out of the realty, and all donations *mortis causa*, are to be deemed legacies within the intent and meaning of the act. *s. 7.*

If a legacy be refunded, the duty shall be repaid. *s. 34.* And if any authority to administer be repealed, duties improperly paid under it shall be repaid; but if they ought to have been paid, they shall be allowed in account with the rightful executor. *s. 37.*

A penalty of 500*l.* is imposed on persons altering receipts; persons swearing falsely and corruptly before the commissioners of stamp-duties or land-tax shall be guilty of perjury, and forging stamps shall suffer death. *s. 38, 39, 40.*

The following are the modes of ascertaining the value of the different legacies specified in the act, and the duty chargeable thereon :

1. **ANNUITIES.** The act contains tables to ascertain the value of annuities held on a single life, the joint continuance of two lives, and for a given number of years; also rules for inferring the value of annuities held on the longest of two, the joint continuance of three, and the longest of three lives. The value of the annuity being thus ascertained, the *per centage* duty upon the gross sum is to be charged according to the degree of proximity of the annuitant to the deceased, and the amount of it to be paid by four equal payments, the first of which shall be made before or on completing the payment of the first year's annuity, and the three others before or on completing the respective payments of the annuities for the three succeeding years : and receipts according to the act shall only be required for these four, and not for intermediate payments; or, if the annuity determine by the death of any person before four years payment have become due, for so many payments as shall actually have accrued. (*s. 8 & 27.*) The value of the annuity is to be calculated without regard to any contingency besides the death of a person; but in case an annuity shall at any time determine upon any other contingency than the death of a person or persons, not only all future payments of the duty shall cease, but it shall be lawful for those who shall have paid any duties which shall have previously become due, to apply for and obtain a return of so much of the duty so paid as will reduce the same to the like duty as would have

been payable by them for such annuity, calculated according to the term for which the same shall have endured : which abatement the commissioners are to calculate according to the tables, and to return from the monies collected by the duty. *§. 8.*

If the annuity be charged on a legacy, the duty on the annuity shall be paid as above by the person entitled to the legacy, and shall be retained by him out of the first four years payments of the annuity : and the duty on the legacy charged with such annuity shall be calculated on the value of such legacy, after deducting the value of such annuity. *§. 9.*

If an annuity be directed to be purchased, the duty shall be calculated upon the sum necessary to purchase it according to the above-mentioned tables : and the annuity to be purchased shall be reduced in proportion to the amount of the duty, such reduction to be calculated in the same manner as the duty : and the purchase of such reduced annuity with the payment of such duty shall satisfy and discharge such legacy as fully as if an annuity had been purchased equal in amount to the annuity directed to be purchased. *§. 10.*

2. LEGACIES, THE VALUE OF WHICH CAN ONLY BE ASCERTAINED FROM TIME TO TIME. The duty shall be charged on the several sums of money or effects, which shall be applied from time to time for the purposes directed by the will, as separate and distinct legacies ; and shall be paid out of the fund applicable for such purposes. *§. 11.*

3. LEGACIES GIVEN IN SUCCESSION. If the different persons who take in succession are chargeable with duties at one and the same rate, the duty shall be charged as in the case of a legacy to one person ; and shall be paid by the executor upon payment of the money to trustees, or if there are no trustees, upon payment to any of the legatees, of the whole or part. But if the legatees are chargeable with different rates of duty, so that one rate cannot be immediately charged, estates for life, and other temporary interests, shall be charged as *annuities* ; other partial interests, as if they were not taken in succession ; and persons who shall become absolutely entitled, as if they had taken immediately ; and the duties shall be chargeable when the legatees shall receive or begin to enjoy the benefit of their legacies, and shall be paid by the executors of the will, or trustees, if the property shall be vested in trustees, or persons enjoying the property out of which the partial interests arise (according as the case may be) ; all of whom shall

shall be debtors for the same to the king, his heirs and successors. *f.* 12 & 13.

4. **PLATE, FURNITURE,** and other articles not yielding an income, whilst given to be enjoyed in kind, are not liable to any duty; but when the interest becomes absolute, or they are actually sold, the duty shall be charged as if the articles had been originally given with power to sell, and shall become the debt of the person selling or having absolute power therein. *f.* 14.

5. **LEGACIES IN JOINT-TENANCY.** Joint-tenants are to pay in proportion to their interests; and if by severance or survivorship they shall become entitled to a larger interest than that for which they have paid, shall be charged as if the property to which they so become entitled had originally been given for their benefit. *f.* 16.

6. **LEGACIES SUBJECT TO BE DEFEATED BY CONTINGENCIES,** shall pay as if absolute. But if such legacy, upon the happening of the contingency, go over to a person who, had he taken immediately, would have been chargeable with a higher rate of duty, he shall pay the difference. *f.* 17.

7. **LEGACIES SUBJECT TO A POWER OF APPOINTMENT.** If the objects of the power are specially described, all persons taking subject to, under, or in default of such appointment, when they shall so respectively take, shall be charged as if the same interests had been given in a similar course of succession. Where the power is general and absolute, if the property shall in default of appointment belong to the person to whom the power is given, it shall be charged as an absolute gift; but where the interest is limited and an absolute power is given to a person to whom in default of an appointment the property will not belong, upon the execution of such power the property shall be charged in the same manner as if it had been immediately given to the person having and executing such power, after allowing any duty already paid in respect of it. *f.* 18.

8. **PERSONALTY DIRECTED TO BE APPLIED IN THE PURCHASE OF LAND,** shall be charged with duty as personal estate; except where it is to be enjoyed in succession, and then, if it is not actually laid out in land, each person entitled thereto in succession shall pay as if it had not been directed to be applied in the purchase of land.

But no duty shall be paid after it has once actually been applied in the purchase of land; but if any person or persons, before it has so actually been applied, become entitled to a real estate of inheritance in possession in the land to be purchased therewith, or part thereof, they shall pay the same duty as if absolutely entitled thereto by bequest, as personal estate, which duty shall be paid out of the fund to be applied in such purchase. *s. 19.*

9. ESTATES PUR AUTER VIE, applicable by law in the same manner as personal estate, shall be charged with the same duties as personal estate. *s. 20.*

10. MONEY LEFT TO PAY THE DUTY OF A LEGACY so that the legacy may pass free of duty, shall not be charged with duty as a legacy itself. *s. 21.*

11. PROPERTY NOT REDUCED TO MONEY. Specifick legacies and residues not reduced to money are to pay thus: The executor or legatee may set a value upon the same, and offer the duty, or require the commissioners to appoint a person to set a value at their expence. If the commissioners are not satisfied with the duty offered, they may appoint a person to appraise the effects, and may require the duty upon the value set by him; but the party by whom the duty is payable may appeal to the next meeting of the commissioners of land-tax, if such meeting be not within 14 days, otherwise to the next ensuing meeting, giving six days notice; whose judgment shall be final. And if the duty so assessed by the commissioners shall exceed the duty offered and refused by them, the party by whom it is payable shall bear the expences of the appraisement and other proceedings. If the legatees and persons having the burden of the execution of the will differ as to the value of the legacy, it shall on the application of either party be ascertained in the same manner by the commissioners of stamp-duties, or if 10 miles from London by their deputies, subject to a similar appeal to the commissioners of land-tax. *s. 22.*

12. LEGACIES SATISFIED OTHERWISE THAN BY PAYMENT OF MONEY. The duty in this case shall be charged on the amount or value of whatever is given in satisfaction. But if a legacy is made in satisfaction of another legacy, the duty shall not be charged on both, but on the subject yielding the largest duty. *s. 23.*

13. WHERE, BY REASON OF INFANCY OR ABSENCE, LEGACIES CANNOT BE PAID, the executor, after deducting the
the

the duty, may pay the legacy into the bank of England, with the privity of the accountant-general of the court of chancery, by whom it shall be placed in the 3 *per cents.* to the account of the persons entitled thereto; to whom it shall be transferred on application to the court of chancery in a summary way, and the court may make other orders in such case. *ſ. 32.*

14. WHEN THE DUTY MAY BE COMPOUNDED FOR.
If at the end of two years it shall appear to the commissioners of the stamp-duties, that it will require time to collect the outstanding debts and effects of the deceased, or that it will be difficult to ascertain the amount of the clear residue, the parties, with the consent of the commissioners, may apply to the courts of exchequer in England and Scotland for leave to compound the duty, stating upon oath the particulars of the estate for which the composition is intended to be made; and also whether they know of any other outstanding property of the deceased. And the courts may appoint a proper person to set a value on the estate, and to adjust the duty which under all the circumstances ought justly and reasonably to be paid for the same; which settlement and adjustment if the court confirm, it may order the duty to be accepted. But the full duty (under all the former penalties of the act) shall be charged and paid for every part of the estate other than what is specified in the affidavit of the persons applying to the court, and included in the valuation upon which the composition shall have been made. *ſ. 33.]*

VIII. Account.

1. IT is for the most part every where within this realm **Executor's oath**
observed, that the executors promise to the ordinary **to account.**
by their oath, to make a true and perfect account, when-
soever they shall be thereunto called by the said ordinary.
Swin. 466, 467.

2. By the statute of the 22 & 23 C. 2. c. 10. *The ad-* **Administrator's**
ministrator shall give bond to make or cause to be made a true **bond to ac-**
and just account of his administration, at a day in such bond **count.**
to be expressed; and all the residue of the goods chattels and
credits which shall be found and remaining upon the said
administrator's account, the same being first examined and al-
lowed of by the ecclesiastical judge or judges for the time being,
to deliver and pay unto such person or persons respectively, as

the said judge or judges by his or their decree or sentence shall limit and appoint.

Before whom
the account
shall be.

3. An account must be passed before the same judge, or his surrogate or successor, that grants the administration: By Dr. Bettefworth. *Play. 37.*

Ordinary's
power to compel
the executor,

4. Dr. Swinburne says, Albeit it seemeth, that the executor is not tied to make an account to the *legataries* or *creditors* extrajudicially; yet he supposeth that at the instance or promotion of such legataries and creditors, he may be compelled to render an account to the ordinary judicially. *Swin. 466.*

But that an *executor* may exact an account of his co-executor extrajudicially, but not in judgment [that is, in the spiritual court]; but the ordinary may call them both, or either of them, to a judicial account. *Swin. 466.*

Ordinary's
power to compel
the administra-
tor.

5. By the statute of the 31 Ed. 3. ft. 1. c. 11. *In case where a man dieth intestate, the ordinary shall depute the next and most lawful friends of the deceased person to administer his goods; which deputies shall have an action to demand and recover as executors the debts due to the person intestate in the king's court, for to administer and dispend for the soul of the dead; and shall answer also in the king's court to ~~other~~ to whom the said dead person was holden and bound, in the same manner as executors shall answer. And they shall be accountable to the ordinaries, as executors be in the case of testament, as well of the time past as the time to come.*

And by the statute of the 22 & 23 C. 2. c. 10. *The ordinaries shall and may proceed and call administrators to account, for and touching the goods of any person dying intestate; and upon hearing and due consideration thereof, order and make just and equal distribution of what remaineth clear (after all debts, funerals, and just expences of every sort first allowed and deducted); and the same distributions decree and settle, and compel such administrators to observe and pay the same by the due course of his majesty's ecclesiastical laws: saving to every one supposing him or themselves aggrieved, their right of appeal, as was always in such cases used.*

But by the statute of the 1 J. 2. c. 17. it is provided, that no administrator shall be cited according to the said act of the 22 & 23 C. 2. c. 10. to render an account of the personal estate of his intestate (otherwise than by an inventory or inventories thereof) unless it be at the instance or prosecution of some person in behalf of a minor, or having a demand out of such personal estate as a creditor or next of kin, nor be compellable to
account

*account before any the ordinaries or juages by the said act im-
powered and appointed to take the same, otherwise than as is
aforesaid, any thing in the said act to the contrary notwith-
standing. l. 6.*

6. The creditors to whom the testator did owe any thing, and the legataries to whom the testator did bequeath any thing, and all others having interest, are to be cited to be present at the making of the account: otherwise the account made in their absence, and they never called, is not prejudicial unto them. *Parties interested to have notice.*
Swin. 468.

And forasmuch as proofs made upon the account, at the instance of some one or more persons having interest, do not bind others who are no parties to the suit; therefore, to prevent multiplicity of actions, it behoveth the executor or administrator, when he is cited by any one of the parties to render an account, to cite the next of kindred in special, and all others in general, having or pretending to have interest in the goods of the deceased, to be present if they think fit at the rendring and passing of the account. And then, upon their appearance, or contempt in not appearing, the judge will proceed to give sentence, and the account thus determined will be final. And this is expedient to be done, whether at the instance of any party or not; because the witnesses otherwise might be dead before calling for the account; and hereby the executors or administrators of the account are freed from giving any further account, which they might not be so well able to do, because they are not supposed to have been privy to the receipts and disbursements of their testator or intestate. *I Ought.*
354, 5, 6.

7. If any person having interest (as, for instance, the son of the deceased, a legatary, creditor, or the like) shall call the executor or administrator to exhibit a true full and perfect inventory of the goods of the deceased which have come to his hands, and to give an account of his administration thereof; he who is called in such case, is bound personally to exhibit such inventory and account, and (if the adverse party demand it) to take a corporal oath of the truth thereof; notwithstanding that at another time perhaps an inventory hath been exhibited *ex officio mero* of the judge, and in the absence of the party, and an account given upon oath. *Manner of passing the account.*
I Ought.
345, 6.

And this inventory is not to be exhibited under protestation (as when an inventory is exhibited in common form, and not at the instance of the party) but absolutely and directly, for a full true and perfect inventory of all and every the goods of the deceased, which have come to the said accountant's hands since the death of the deceased. And if he shall exhibit a false or imperfect inventory or account upon his said oath, he shall be guilty of perjury. *Id.* 346.

And the adverse party shall be at liberty to disprove or object against such inventory and account. *Id.* 347.

And he shall make due proof of every payment, that is to say, of lesser sums by his oath, and of greater sums by other proofs, such as the ordinary shall allow. *Swin.* 407.

Particularly, for sums under 40s. his own general oath as aforesaid shall be allowed as sufficient; provided that there shall appear no falshood, or fraudulent division of sums; for sometimes accountants (knowing that all such small sums will be allowed to them upon their said oath) will divide greater sums into less: But if there appear no fraud, such small sums shall be allowed to them as aforesaid, to avoid expences in proving the same, and because it is presumed that the accountant will not forswear himself for obtaining the allowance of such little matters. *1 Ought.* 347, 8.

But after the death of the executors or administrators, such lesser sums as aforesaid shall not be allowed upon the oath of their executors or administrators; for this can only be done on the oath of those who laid out the money. *Id.* 347.

Expences to be allowed.

8. The executor or administrator shall be allowed all reasonable expences, as well in law-suits, as for other honest purposes: and this reasonableness of expences to be such, as that he may receive thereby neither profit nor loss. *Lind.* 178.

And therefore he shall be allowed his expences in secular courts over and above such colts as were allowed there. *Floy.* 37.

Money lost.

9. Where an executor puts out money upon a real security, which at that time there was no reason to object to, and afterwards such security proves bad; he shall not be accountable for the loss. *1 r. Will.* 141.

So if the executor pay the assets into the hands of a banker his co-executor, whom the testator used to intrust with

with his money; after which the banker fails; the executor shall not be chargeable with the loss. *1 P. Will.* 243.

10. After due examination of the account as aforesaid, the ordinary finding the same to be true and perfect, may pronounce for the validity thereof; and the executor or administrator ought to be acquitted and discharged from further molestation and suits, neither ought they to be called by the ordinary to any farther account. *Swin.* 469. Discharge. ✓

And by the statute of the 1 Ed. 6. c. 2. *All acquittances of and upon accounts made by the executors administrators or collectors of goods of any dead person, shall be made in the name and with the stile of the king, as it is in writs original or judicial at the common law: and the test thereof shall be in the name of the archbishop or bishop or other having ecclesiastical jurisdiction.*

11. A party praying an account, having an interest, is not to be condemned in costs; unless he object thereto, and fails in his proof. *Floy.* 38. Costs.

12. *M. 35 C. 2. Brown* and the archbishop of *Canterbury* against *Willis*. An action of debt was brought upon a bond conditioned for the payment of 300l., wherein one Brown was bound to the archbishop, that the administrator of *T. S.* should truly administer, and exhibit a true inventory of the intestate's estate, and give a just account of his administration. The defendant pleaded, that he had exhibited a true inventory, and given a just account. The plaintiff replied, that the intestate owed 200l. to *E. G.* by bond, and that his goods to that value came to the administrator's hands, and assigns breach in not paying that debt. And upon a demurrer to this application, the plaintiff had judgment. But it was reversed in the exchequer chamber; because the breach was not within the meaning of the condition of that bond. *Lutw.* 882.

Whether the administration bond shall be put in suit for debts not paid (c).

H. 6 An. Archbishop of Canterbury and Willis. In debt upon a bond entered into by an administrator to the ordinary, upon taking letters of administration, the question was, Whether an administrator by virtue of this obligation was bound to go, and give in his account in the spiritual court, without being cited? And by Holt chief justice, who delivered the opinion of the court. 1. It appears by the statute of *Ed. 3.* that an executor was

(c) *Vide supra*, Administration, 22.

compellable

compellable to account before the ordinary, and so to an administrator: but that the ordinary was to take the account as given in, and could not oblige them to prove the items of it, nor swear to the truth of them. So was it if a creditor sued in the ecclesiastical court; but he had a proper remedy at common law. But if a legatee sued for an account in the ecclesiastical court; the defendant before the statute was compellable to prove the whole account; for the legatee had no other remedy, and the ecclesiastical court which had a jurisdiction of legacies could not otherwise do right: Yet in such a case, if the executor would pay him, he could not sue farther, for he had right done him, and the executor was not liable, but of necessity that right might be done. 2. A person intitled to distribution on the 22 C. 2. is in consequence intitled to sue for an account as a legatee was; for the next of kin is a legatee by the statute, and as a statute-legatee shall have the same remedy as the other legatee might before the statute. The condition of an arbitration bond was, to account when required: therefore he was not to account before he was legally cited, which could not be *ex officio*; and therefore the statute of 7. 2. whereby the ordinary is prohibited from citing him in *ex officio*, had really no effect at all, for the law was so before: But since the statute of C. 2. the condition of administration bonds being, that he account at a day certain, he must account accordingly at his peril, and that without citation or suit, and this account must be in court; and if he comes at the day, and no court is held, he shall be excused; for he may plead he was there ready, and no court held. But then this account is not examinable, unless a party interested comes in and controverts it. And whereas by the words of the condition he is to administer well and truly, that shall be construed in bringing in his account, and not in paying the debts of the intestate; and therefore the creditor shall not take an assignment of the bond and sue it, and assign for breach the nonpayment of a debt to him, or a *devastavit* committed by the administrator, for that would be endless, and the bond doth not extend to that. 2 Salk. 315, 316. (d)

(d) The ordinary, after an administrator has exhibited an inventory, cannot compel him to account except *ad instantiam* *vis*. But the commissary or other obligee of the administration bond may even without citation sue the administrator on the
the

Form of an inventory.

A true and perfect inventory of all the goods, chattels, and personal estate, of A. B. late of C. in the county of ——— and diocese of ——— yeoman, deceased, made by us whose names are hereunto subscribed, the ——— day of ——— in the year of our Lord ———

	l.	s.	d.
<i>His purse and apparel</i> ———	15	0	0
<i>Horses and furniture</i> ———	20	0	0
<i>Horned cattle</i> ———	27	0	0
<i>Sheep</i> ———	20	0	0
<i>Swine</i> ———	0	13	0
<i>Poultry</i> ———	0	2	4
<i>Plate and other household goods</i> —	18	0	0
<i>One lease of &c.</i> ———	30	0	0
<i>Rent in arrear</i> ———	25	0	0
<i>Corn growing at the time of his death</i>	12	0	0
<i>Hay and corn</i> ———	10	0	0
<i>Ploughs and other implements of husbandry</i>	6	10	0
<i>Debts</i> ———	100	0	0

Total 284 6 4

Other debts supposed to be desperate — 25 2 6
Debts owing by the deceased 250 l.

*Appraised by us, the day
and year above written :*

A. B.
C. D.

the bond at law, and assign for breach that he did not deliver a true and perfect inventory ; and if a creditor by indemnifying the commissary procure an assignment of the bond, and sue the administrator or his sureties on the like breach and obtain a verdict, the penalty of the bond shall stand as a security for his debt and costs. *Grierside v. Benson*, 1 Atk. 248. S. P. *Bishop of Canterbury v. Hawse*, Cowp. 140. ; in which case Lord Mansfield expresses a strong opinion, that the ordinary *ex debito justitiæ* ought to permit a creditor, as well as the next of kin, to put the bond in suit, he being equally interested (as far as his debt reaches) in the administrators delivering in a true inventory of the effects. That a bond given by the servant of a company trading abroad to collect the effects of persons dying in their settlements is good in law, see 6 T. Rep. 588. and *supra*, Administration in fire.

Form of a will of lands.

I A. B. of C — in the county of — yeoman, do make this my last will: First I give and devise unto C. D. of — all and every my messuages, lands, tenements, and hereditaments, with the appurtenances, whereof I am seised in fee, situate lying and being in — in the county of — and now or late in the several tenures or occupations of — and — or one of them, their or one of their assigns, lessees, or under tenants; To have and to hold all and every the said messuages, lands, tenements, and hereditaments, with the appurtenances, to him the said C. D. his heirs and assigns for ever.

Also, I give and devise to my son G. B. all that my freehold land lying in a field called — field, near unto — To hold unto the said G. B. for term of his life, and after his decease to my granddaughter E. B. her heirs and assigns for ever.

Also, I give and devise unto I. K. of — all my copyhold messuages, lands, tenements, and hereditaments (and which I have surrendered to the use of my will) situate lying and being at — and which now are or lately were in the several tenures or occupations of — and — or one of them, their or one of their assigns, lessees, or under tenants: To have and to hold to the said I. K. and to the heirs of his body lawfully begotten; and for default of such heirs, then to the right heirs of me the said A. B. for ever.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal, the — day of — in the year of our Lord —

A. B.

Signed, declared, and published, as and for his last will and testament, in the presence of us who subscribed our names as witnesses in the testator's presence, and at his request,

C. D.

E. G.

H. J.

Of goods.

In the name of God, amen. I A. B. of — in the county of — yeoman, being mindful of my mortality, do this — day of — in the year of our Lord — make and publish this my last will and testament in manner following: First, I desire to be decently and privately buried in the churchyard belonging to the parish in which I shall happen to die, without any

my funeral pomp, and with as little expence as may be; and I give and bequeath unto the poor of the same parish the sum of ——— to be distributed in such proportions and manner as my executrix herein after named shall think fit.

Also, I give and bequeath unto my eldest son J. B. the sum of ———

I give and bequeath unto my second son W. B. the sum of ———

Also, I give and bequeath unto my daughter M. B. the sum of ———

To be paid unto them respectively so soon as one year after my decease shall be expired.

Also, I do forgive unto L. M. the sum of ——— out of the principal sum of ——— which he owes to me upon bond.

Also, I give to my granddaughters A. and B. children of my daughter C. the sum of ——— a-piece, to be paid to them respectively at their respective ages of twenty-one years, or days of marriage, which shall first happen; the same to be put out to interest at the discretion of my executrix, and the interest accruing thereof to be applied to their education and maintenance respectively, until their said respective ages or marriage. And in case either of them shall die before the age of twenty-one years or marriage, then I give the share of her so dying unto the survivor of them. And if both of my said granddaughters shall happen to die before the attaining the age of twenty-one years or marriage, then I give and bequeath the whole of the said several sums unto my daughter D. if she shall be then living.

Also, I give to my wife E. B. during her life, the use of all my plate and household goods, bedsteads, bedding, and other furniture; and after her decease to remain to my son J. B.

All the rest and residue of my personal estate whatsoever and wheresoever, and of what nature kind and quality soever the same may be, and not herein before given and disposed of (after payment of my debts, legacies, and funeral expences) I do give and bequeath unto my wife E. B. her executors, administrators, and assigns; to and for her and their own use and benefit absolutely: And I do hereby constitute and appoint my said wife E. B. sole executrix of this my last will and testament.

In witness whereof, I have herunto set my hand and seal, the day and year first abovewritten,

A. B.

Signed, declared, and published,
as and for his last will and testa-
ment, in the presence of us,

C. D.

E. F.

Or

Of lands and goods.

In the name of God, amen. I A. B. of ——— esquire, do make and declare this my last will and testament in manner following :

First, I give and devise to my younger son B. B. all that my whole freehold messuage and tenement, situate lying and being at ——— To have and to hold to my said son B. B. his heirs and assigns for ever.

Also, I give and devise all that my messuage and tenement, with the appurtenances, situate lying and being at ——— unto my daughter C. B.; To have and to hold to my said daughter C. B. and her assigns, for and during the term of her natural life, without impeachment of waste; and from and immediately after her decease, I give and devise the same unto my said son B. B. and the heirs of his body lawfully to be begotten; and for default of such heirs, then to my own right heirs for ever.

*Also, I give and devise unto my grandson E. G. all that my messuage and tenement, with the appurtenances, situate lying and being at ———, commonly called ——— tenement; To have and to hold (subject nevertheless to, and charged and chargeable with the annuity, yearly rent, or sum of ——— herein after mentioned) to him the said E. G. his heirs and assigns for ever: And I do hereby give devise and bequeath unto my wife E. B. and her assigns, for and during the term of her natural life, one annuity or clear yearly rent or sum of 60*l.* of lawful money of Great Britain, free of all taxes and other deductions, parliamentary or otherwise, to be issuing and payable out of the said messuage and tenement, and to be paid and payable by equal half-yearly payments, at the feast of the annunciation of the blessed virgin Mary, and of St. Michael the archangel; the first payment thereof to be on such of the same feasts as shall first and next happen after my decease; and I do hereby charge and subject the said messuage and tenement to and with the payment of the said annuity, yearly rent, or sum of 60*l.* accordingly: And my will is, that in case the said annuity, or any part thereof, shall be behind or unpaid by the space of twenty days next after either of the aforesaid feasts, wherein the same is herein before directed to be paid as aforesaid (being lawfully demanded); that then and so often it shall and may be lawful for my said wife and her assigns, to enter upon the said premises charged with the said annuity as aforesaid, and distrain for the same, or for so much thereof as shall be so in arrear; and the distress and distresses then and there*

there found, to detain and keep, until she shall be fully paid and satisfied all such arrearages, with costs and charges in and about the making and keeping thereof. And in case the said annuity, or any part thereof, shall be behind and unpaid by the space of forty days next after any of the said days of payment, whereon the same ought to be paid as aforesaid; that then and so often it shall and may be lawful for my said wife and her assigns, into all and singular the premises, charged with the said annuity as aforesaid, to enter; and the rents, issues and profits thereof to receive and take, until she be therewith and thereby, or by the person or persons who shall be then intitled to the immediate possession of the premises, paid and satisfied the same and every part thereof; and all the arrears thereof incurred before, and that shall incur during such time as she shall receive the rents issues and profits thereof, or be entitled to receive the same by virtue of such entry to be made as aforesaid, together with her costs damages and expences laid out and sustained, by reason of the non-payment thereof, or any part thereof.

Also, I give and devise unto D. F. all that my messuage and tenement, with the appurtenances, which I hold by or under a lease from ———, and all my estate, right, title, term, and interest of and in the same premises, with the appurtenances; To have and to hold to him the said D. F. his executors administrators and assigns, to and for his and their own use and benefit.

Also, I will and ordain, that the executor of this my last will and testament, or his executor or executors, for and towards the performance of my said testament, shall, with all convenient speed after my decease, bargain sell and alien in fee simple all those my lands called ———; for the doing, executing, and perfect finishing whereof, I do by these presents give to my said executor, and his executor or executors, full power and authority to grant, alien, bargain, sell, convey and assure all the same lands called ——— to any person or persons and their heirs for ever in fee simple by all and every such lawful ways and means in the law, as to my said executor or his executor or executors, or to his or their counsel learned in the law, shall seem fit or necessary.

And I do hereby appoint my trusty friend E. E. executor of this my last will and testament; and do give unto him the sum of ——— in consideration of the pains and trouble he will have in the execution of this my will.

Also, I give unto P. Q. of ——— the sum of one hundred pounds.

Also, I give unto R. S. of ——— the like sum of one hundred pounds.

Also,

Also, for the better education of my children A. B. and C. I do give and dispose of my tuition and custody of them, and every of them, unto my wife E. G. for such time as they or any of them respectively continue unmarried, and under the age of one-and-twenty years, and my said wife remains my widow; but if my said wife shall die or marry, during the single life and nonage of any of my said children, then I give the custody and tuition of such of my children, so being unmarried and under the age of one-and-twenty years at the marriage or death of my wife, unto my said executor E. H.

Also, I do hereby authorize, empower, and direct my said executor, and his executor or executors, from and after my decease until the aforesaid E. G. shall attain his age of one-and-twenty years, to manage and improve the estate and fortune of him the said E. G. by me hereby given him, for his use and benefit; and to lease all or any part of his freehold, copyhold, or leasehold estates, and to lend and place out upon security or securities at interest, or otherwise improve according to his or their discretion or discretions, all or any part of the monies belonging to or arising from the said estates and fortune of the said E. G. and to pay unto and account with him the said E. G. for all such rents, interests, produce and improvements, as shall arise from, or be made of, and produced by the said estates, monies, and fortune hereby given and devised to him, when he shall attain his age of twenty-one years.

And my will is, and I do hereby expressly declare, that my said executor, his executor or executors, shall not be charged or chargeable with or accountable for more of the aforesaid monies and estates, than he or they shall actually receive, or shall come to his or their respective hands by virtue of this my will, nor with or for any loss which shall happen of the said monies or estate hereby by me given to the said E. G. or of any of the aforesaid sums to me bequeathed, or of any part of my personal estate: so as such loss happen without his or their wilful default and neglect.

And also that it shall and may be lawful, for him my said executor, and his executor or executors, in the first place, out of the said premises respectively, and out of the residue of my personal estate, to deduct and reimburse him and themselves respectively, all such loss, costs, charges, and expences, as he or they shall sustain, expend or be put unto, for or by reason of the performance of this my will, or the management or execution thereof respectively, or any other thing in anywise relating thereto.

And finally; all the rest, residue, and remainder of all my estate and effects, real and personal whatsoever, and where-
 soever,

never, not herein before otherwise effectually disposed of (after payment of my debts, legacies, and funeral expences, and other charges and deductions as aforesaid) I do give devise and bequeath unto my eldest son A. B.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal, the — day of — in the year of our Lord —

A. B.

Signed, declared, and published, as and for his last will and testament, in the presence of us who subscribed our names as witnesses in the testator's presence, and at his request:

C. D.

E. F.

G. H.

Codicil.

Whereas I A. B. of — have made and duly executed my last will and testament in writing, bearing date —, now I do hereby declare this present writing to be as a codicil to my said will, and direct the same to be annexed thereto, and taken as part thereof: And I do hereby give and bequeath to C. D. of — the sum of —. And whereas by my said will I did give and bequeath unto E. F. the sum of —, now I do hereby revoke the said legacy, and do give unto him the said E. F. the sum of — and no more. In witness whereof I the said A. B. have to this codicil set my hand and seal the — day of — in the year of —

A. B.

Signed, declared, and published, as and for a codicil to be annexed to his last will and testament, and to be taken as part thereof, in the presence of

C. D.

E. F.

Nuncupative will.

The last will and testament of A. B. of — in the county of — deceased, declared by him by word of mouth, the — day of —, in the presence of us who have hereunto subscribed

our names as witnesses thereof. My will is, that [here insert the very words]. In witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands the — day of — in the year —.

C. D.
E. F.
G. H.

Precedents of long intails, and remainders, and contingencies, and limitations are here purposely omitted; not only because they are above the author's skill (for this he could have supplied from books of acknowledged reputation) but also and chiefly because they ought to be drawn *pro re nata*, and by the advice of counsel learned in the law. For altho' the law favours wills, yet it is when wills favour the law. The common law abhors a perpetuity; and the reason is, because if one person might indefeasibly limit his estate, so also might another, and consequently by the same rule the present generation might dispose of all the lands in the kingdom for ever; which would be full of intolerable inconvenience: and therefore the law interferes, and herein checks the vanity and pride of man. And whoever shall examine the reports of cases adjudged in the high court of chancery, will observe that scarcely any thing creates to the courts of equity so much trouble, as long intails, vainly imagined to perpetuate names and families; which although generally drawn by the ablest advice, yet always meet with discouragement and contradiction. For they are struggles against the bent and inclination of the law: and we may add also, against the course of Providence; which from its effects and appearances, doth not seem to intend that any thing here should be perpetual.

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- 2 C. 2. c. 1. dissenters.
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- 1 W. sess. 1. c. 8. benefice colleges. curates. deprivation. donative. ordination. popery. publick worship. supremacy.
- 1 W. sess. 1. c. 9. popery.
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- 1 W. sess. 1. c. 16. simony.
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